research material

Is globalization self-organizing?

In: Globalization as evolutionary process: Modeling, simulating, and forecasting global change, edited by George Modelski and Tessalino Devezas and William R. Thompson. 2007. London: Routledge.

The observance of a relatively stable pattern of global system development has often been criticised for the lack of theoretical underpinnings of its pulsating behavior. This paper contributes to the growing literature that combines complex system explanations with theories of global system development, providing a generational perspective on the rise and demise of centers of socio-economic leadership. It argues, that the pattern of roughly one-hundred year long waves of alternating leadership clusters - characterized by their innovative development of a coherent socio-technological paradigm - can be empirically traced and analyzed through the observance of a three-step generational cohort pattern, what is termed here as the ``Buddenbrook cycle.'' Based of innovations originating in new forms of socio-technological behavior of the first generation, the following second generation groomed in this new environment, transforms these innovations into a coherent socio-technological paradigm, whereas the third generation remains ``stuck'' in this formerly superior paradigm, unable to adapt to emerging new alternative socio-technological innovations, and allowing new socio-economic innovations to arise in alternative and geographically separate clusters.

BibTeX


@inbook{Rennstich2007aa,
Address = {London},
Author = {Joachim K. Rennstich},
Booktitle = {Globalization as evolutionary process: Modeling, simulating, and forecasting global change},
Editor = {George Modelski and Tessalino Devezas and William R. Thompson},
Keywords = {complex systems; evolutionary models; long-cycles; generational theory},
Pages = {88--108},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Title = {Is globalization self-organizing?},
Year = {2007},
Abstract = {The observance of a relatively stable pattern of global system development has often been criticised for the lack of theoretical underpinnings of its pulsating behavior. This paper contributes to the growing literature that combines complex system explanations with theories of global system development, providing a generational perspective on the rise and demise of centers of socio-economic leadership. It argues, that the pattern of roughly one-hundred year long waves of alternating leadership clusters - characterized by their innovative development of a coherent socio-technological paradigm - can be empirically traced and analyzed through the observance of a three-step generational cohort pattern, what is termed here as the ``Buddenbrook cycle.'' Based of innovations originating in new forms of socio-technological behavior of the first generation, the following second generation groomed in this new environment, transforms these innovations into a coherent socio-technological paradigm, whereas the third generation remains ``stuck'' in this formerly superior paradigm, unable to adapt to emerging new alternative socio-technological innovations, and allowing new socio-economic innovations to arise in alternative and geographically separate clusters.},
Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://www.routledge.com/books/Globalization-as-Evolutionary-Process-isbn9780415773614}}

The Future of Hegemony and Global System Leadership (2005)

In: The Future of World Society, edited by Mark Herkenrath, Claudia König, Hanno Scholtz, and Thomas Volken (2005) Zurich, CH: Intelligent.

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The latest resurgence of interest in the concept of hegemony and empire – both in the popular and academic realm – has been mostly the result of a change in perception of power, specifically its sources, application, and distribution. Here we argue, that this can largely be explained as the result of the dynamic changes inherent in the process of global system formation. After a brief discussion of prevalent concepts of political and economic hegemony, this work offers an evolutionary perspective to place current changes of power and its distribution in the dynamic long-term development of global system formation. It then presents alternative visions of the future development of political and economic hegemony. It concludes that a further rise in instability of global political power distribution accompanied by a likely challenge to existing distributional patterns has a high probability of occurrence.

BibTeX


Three Steps in the Globalization of the International System: Global Networks from 1000 B.C.E. to 2053 C.E. (2005)

In Globalization and Global History, edited by Barry K. Gills and William R. Thompson (2005) London: Routledge.

Most treatments of globalization view it as a relatively recent and unique process. Combining frameworks of political geography (world city and network analysis) with a long-term oriented IR framework, further evidence is provided for the emergence of an informational network economy, global in extent, cyclical in occurrence, and evolutionary in nature. The chapter empirically traces the origins of today's global digital infrastructure (in the form of ICT networks) from the emergence of a commercial Phoenician system emerging 1000B C.E. over the 13/14th century Italian city-state and 16th century Dutch maritime commercial networks. The focus on networks and the re-emergence of global cities as central nodes in the world economy highlights the need to add data beyond the state as the level of analysis for studies of the international system. At the same time, however, it makes evident the need to view these nodes as an embedded part of a state-based international system.

BibTeX


The Phoenix-Cycle: Global Leadership Transition in a Long-Wave Perspective (2004)

In Hegemony, Globalization and Antisystemic Movements, edited by Thomas E. Reifer. Boulder, CO: Paradigm.

The reoccurring shift in the geographical and political location of power as a result of hegemonic transitions has been explained as the outcome of the leader’s experience of success in the current setting, creating an entrenched institutional setting (in a broader sense) that proves adaptive in defending its turf but less so in fostering the rise of new leading sectors. This paper introduces the concept of internal and external global network environments in the world system and argues that the extension of leadership from an old to a new commercial and organizational arrangement is dependent on the systemic nature of the world system. A shift from an external to an internal network environment (or vice versa) allows the parallel development and rise of new leading sectors because they pose no threat to the existing institutional setting of the established leading sectors. The emerging new leading sectors do profit from the relative advantages of the current leadership position (in terms of capital, costs, etc.) without the resistance usually encountered from the established leading sectors. The paper develops a systematic account of the shifts from maritime commercial (external network environment) phases, over industrial (internal network environment) phases, to the rise of a digital commercial (external network environment) phase. It concludes that the shift from an industrial phase to the new digital commercial phase puts the current systemic leader, the United States, in a position of continued leadership over two long-waves.

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previous, more detailed draft]

BibTeX


The Future of Great Power Rivalries (2003)

Ch. 9 (pp. 143-61) in: New Theoretical Directions for the 21st Century, edited by W. A. Dunaway. 2003. Westport, CT: Praeger

Grounded in the expanding literature on the concept of rivalry this chapter examines the question whether we should expect the number of rivalries in the twenty-first century to rise, to remain steady, or even to fall and why so. It introduces a categorization of “contexts” in the form of global rivalry environments in which interstate rivalries occur. Combining the framework of the leadership long cycle and the concept of rivalries we are able to identify global long cycle environments that determine the way rivalries are established, how they “behave,” and how they end. Just as major shocks cause the equilibria of interstate rival behavior to rearrange and create a new stable environment, so do major global shocks create a phase of transition after which a new global environment is established in which the rivalries take place. The chapter offers a unique view on the past, presence, and future of major power rivalry behavior in the international system by developing three main global rivalry environments (and two transitional phases) stretching from 1200 to 1990 and describing selected parameters influencing rivalry behavior unique in their character in each of those global rivalry environments. It concludes, that the number of strategic rivalries can be expected to remain relatively low, the number of commercial rivalries, however, is very likely to increase significantly in the not too distant future.

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