Thomas of Sutton was one of
the earliest, and by all measures one of the most astute defenders of St.
Thomas Aquinas’ characteristic theological and philosophical doctrines. As
usual with medieval thinkers, we have little information regarding
Sutton’s life[1]. The earliest reliable report on his
life’s events is that he was ordained deacon at Blithe by Walter Giffard, the
Archbishop of York, on
This paper examines Sutton’s
reply to contemporary challenges of the Thomistic position concerning the
nature of the intellective soul, in particular, Aquinas’ famously controversial
doctrine of the unicity of substantial form.[3]
Sutton’s arguments quite clearly indicate that acceptance or rejection of the
Thomistic position ultimately depends on sharing or rejecting certain
fundamental principles of
To see the connection
between
“Praeterea,
alia est ratio essendi formae materialis et compositi seu formae per se
subsistentis. Ratio enim essendi formae materialis est secundum quam est
aliquid aliud, ut ratio compositionis est secundum quam habet esse compositum,
et ratio figurae secundum quam habet esse figuratum; unde ratio essendi formae
materialis est quod sit unita alii. Ratio autem essendi compositi vel formae
liberatae a materia est quod sit ens per se et separate, non unum ens cum alio.
Ex hoc sic arguitur. Cum cessat ratio essendi alicuius, ipsum corrumpitur et
non est; sed cum separatur forma materialis a materia, cessat eius ratio
essendi, ut ex praedictis apparet; nulla igitur forma cuius separatio a materia
non est sua corruptio est materialis. Sed separatio animae intellectivae a
corpore et materia non est eius corruptio. Ergo non habet esse unitum ad
materiam. Et declaratur ratio in exemplo. Cum ligna, lapides et lateres in domo
cessant esse composita a forma compositionis eorum, cessat esse compositio; et
cum secundum figuram cessat aliquid figuratum esse, cessat esse figura. Et
similiter est de forma substantiali ad illud cuius est forma, quod, cum secundum
eam cessat esse materia, cessat esse formae materialis, licet notius sit in
accidentali forma quam substantiali. Et sunt istae rationes essendi, qua
aliquid habet esse unite ad materiam et qua aliquid habet rationem subsistentis
per se et separate, oppositae adeo quod eidem inesse non possunt. Unde anima
intellectiva non potest habere rationem per se subsistentis et, cum hoc, unum
facere cum materia et corpore in essendo[4].”
As is clear from this
passage, the fundamental reason why according to Siger it is impossible to hold
St. Thomas’s doctrine, namely, that the intellective soul is both subsistent
(on account of the immateriality of the intellect) and inherent (on account of
the soul’s being the form of the body), is the radical incompatibility of these
two modes of being. But then, as the argument makes clear, the whole issue of
the tenability of the Thomistic conception of the nature of the intellective
soul boils down to this ultimate question: are these modes of being really so
incompatible that they cannot simultaneously characterize the act of being of
the intellective soul?
Obviously, the question
cannot be answered without clarifying what we should understand by these modes
of being, which requires careful reflection on how we should construe the
concept of being and its relation to the concepts of form and essence in
general. As we shall see, recognizing this need is precisely the basic,
underlying insight that drives Thomas of Sutton’s arguments in the debates
concerning the nature of the intellective soul.
In his Quaestiones
Ordinariae, Sutton makes it quite clear that he does not regard the
Averroistic position a threat anymore. Indeed, as he puts it, by his time
nobody was so stupid as to side with the Commentator on the issue of the separate
existence and the consequent unity of the intellect:
“Non est
enim modo aliquis ita fatuus, quod adhaereat opinioni commentatoris, et si
esset aliquis, posset faciliter convinci per rationes praecedentium doctorum[5].”
However, given the
immateriality of the intellective soul, it still demands clarification how it
can also be the form of the body in the way the sensitive soul is, indeed, how
it can be the very same form as the sensitive soul in one and the same human
being. As Sutton puts it:
“Sed quia
sensitiva et intellectiva videntur habere oppositas condiciones, sensitiva enim
est actus corporis, intellectus non est actus corporis, sensitiva est
materialis, intellectus est immaterialis, sicut dicunt auctores, ideo
aliquantulum insistendum est, ut videamus, quomodo sit possibile tantam
oppositionem esse in una simplici substantia[6].”
One obvious way out of the
apparent inconsistency resulting from attributing these opposite conditions to one
and the same form would seem to be to distinguish the intellective soul
from the sensitive and vegetative souls as well as from the form of corporeity
(while the latter may be regarded either as three distinct forms, or one and
the same material form extending the body and performing the vegetative and
sensitive functions of an animal). But Sutton argues that this position, the
thesis of the plurality of substantial forms, directly entails the Averroistic
position, and is thus contrary to faith:
“Si quis
igitur poneret substantiam intellectivam esse aliam a sensitiva et vegetativa,
necessario incideret in errorem commentatoris Averroes, qui posuit intellectum
esse substantiam separatam, et per consequens oporteret ponere unum intellectum
omnium hominum, quia in substantiis separatis non possunt esse plures in eadem
specie, cum non possint differre, nisi per differentias formales
diversificant<es> speciem. Quia igitur illud manifeste repugnat fidei,
ideo necesse est ponere quod intellectiva sit eadem substantia cum sensitiva.
Solet tamen poni quod intellectiva et sensitiva sunt diversae formae; etiam in
diebus nostris fuit communis opinio in Anglia. Sed qui sic posuerunt, non
perceperunt errores, qui ex hoc sequuntur contra fidem, et pro tanto
excusabiles sunt[7].”
That is to say, according to
Sutton, positing the intellective soul as an immaterial form distinct from the
material substantial form(s) of the body, directly entails the
Averroistic thesis of the unity of the intellect in all humans, even though
several of his contemporaries failed to recognize this consequence of their
position. However, this entailment is valid only if one holds, as Sutton
clearly does, that plurification of individuals in the same species is possible
only in matter. But then, one can certainly avoid this conclusion on the basis
of a different theory of individuation. This was precisely the route taken by
Henry of Ghent, criticized in particular by Sutton in this question. However,
Sutton goes on to argue that such “evasions”, in terms of alternative theories
of individuation, necessarily fail, and so anyone endorsing the plurality
thesis is bound to fall back again into the Averroistic error.
To be sure, Henry’s
“evasions” rest on certain radically different interpretations of the
conceptual connections between the notions of individuation, unity, form,
essence, and existence, which fundamentally distinguish his intuitions from
Thomistic intuitions. Henry deals at some length with the issue of
individuation in his second Quodlibet[8].
There he argues, on the basis of Avicenna’s famous remarks in bk. 5 of his Metaphysics,
that any created form or essence, whether material or immaterial, considered in
itself is indifferent to plurality or singularity, whence it has to be possible
for any creaturely essence to be multiplied in several supposita:
“Quod
autem non ex se sed solum ab alio agente singulare est in supposito subsistens,
quia ex se nulli appropriatur et est essentia tantum, quantum est ex se,
indifferenter natum est esse singulare, subsistendo in unico supposito, vel
universale, subsistendo in pluribus[9]. Quod etiam bene
dicit Avicennaet determinat in Vo Metaphysicae suae. Ex quo sequitur
apertissime quod necesse est ut non sit essentia creaturae, in quantum creatura
est, quin possit, quantum est ex se, in plura individua multiplicari,
quantumcumque sit abstracta a materia[10].”
Clearly, if Henry’s
conception of individuation is right, and it is possible even for purely
immaterial creaturely essences to multiply in several individuals, then
Sutton’s charge that the plurality thesis implies the Averroistic thesis of the
unity of the intellect is unjustified. Indeed, Henry is careful to point out
even in this article, which otherwise does not directly deal with the
individuation of the intellective soul, that on his conception of
individuation, even though matter in the actual natural order does serve to
individuate human souls, this is in no way absolutely necessary, which is all
that is needed to invalidate Sutton’s charge:
“… animae
rationales [...] individuantur per corpora quibus creando infunduntur, et
infundendo creantur. Nec omnino crearentur, nisi corporibus dispositis quibus
infunderentur, ut dictum est supra secundum Avicennam[11]. Dico secundum communem cursum divinae
ordinationis, licet Deus per se ipsas possit individuas creare, quae modo sic per
corpora esse incipiunt, ut non cum ipsis esse desinunt. Unde, cum fides teneat
quod animae rationales sunt substantiae spirituales per se substare potentes,
et quod sunt plures numero secundum hominum pluralitatem, et quod Deus potest
eas creare sine corporibus per se subsistentes antequam corporibus uniantur
(quod omnino fieri non posset, nisi essentia talis creaturae huiusmodi
multiplicationem secundum numerum absque corpore pateretur), nulli fidelium
debet provenire in dubium, quin sub eadem specie plura possunt esse individua
in substantia spirituali solis substantialibus distincta, etiam absque omni
quantitate et materia[12].”
So, according to Henry’s
conception, even though God actually uses bodies to individuate the
intellective souls within the same species according to His ordination of the
common course of nature, it would still be possible for Him to do so
supernaturally, without the assistance of bodies. The general reason for this
possibility is explained by Henry in somewhat more detail as follows:
“Nulla
enim re alia addita essentiae rei, ipsamet fit suppositum subsistens in
existentia actuali, hac sola intentione adiecta qua ipsa habet esse effectus
Dei, et hoc in natura et essentia, ipsam de non esse in esse producendo. Quod
quidem esse omnis creatura participat ex hoc quod ipsa in sua essentia est Dei
factura, non quod ipsi essentiae, quasi praecedenti, Deus imprimat esse quo
denominetur existens, sicut, praeexistente pariete, aliquis imprimit ei
albedinem, sive creando sive non, qua denominatur albus. Hoc enim falsum est et
omnino haereticum: Deus enim totum quod aliquid est in creatura, ab initio de
nihilo fecit[13].”
So, according to Henry, a
created essence, which considered in itself is indifferent to plurality and
singularity, is individuated precisely by its acquiring a singular act of
existence, which is nothing but the created thing’s being created. Therefore,
the cause of individuation of any creature is primarily God, who in a
creative act produces the essence in a singular act of existence. This is why
God can create two angels of the same species, merely on account of producing
the existence of the one as distinct from that of the other:
“[…] dicendum est, descendendo ad nostram
quaestionem, quod duo angeli in solis substantialibus existentes, posito etiam
quod nullum accidens reale differens re ab eorum essentia in se habeant, neque
scilicet potentiam neque habitum neque aliquid huiusmodi, sunt individualiter
distincti hoc solo quod subsistunt in effectu. Ubi extra communitatem essentiae
in ambobus subsistere unius non est subsistere alterius, cum unus eorum
subsistere posset sine altero. Et sic per hoc ab invicem differunt, quod iste
non est ille, duplicata scilicet natura speciei sive essentiae angelicae in eis
per rationem subsistendi sive existendi in actu aliam in uno et aliam in
altero, quae est praeter intellectum essentiae communis in utroque. […] Ut sic
sit per aliud et aliud, quod uterque illorum dicatur esse angelus simpliciter
et quod dicatur esse iste vel ille, quia intentio essentiae simpliciter, qua
uterque dicitur angelus, est alia ab intentione subsistentiae huius et illius,
qua dicuntur iste angelus et ille. Patet ergo quomodo per intentiones
subsistentiae duorum angelorum fit essentiae communis individuatio in eis. Sed
quia coniunctio istorum duorum, scilicet essentiae et subsistentiae in uno et
in altero, non potest esse ex se ipsis — quia ex se non habent quod subsistunt
in effectu, ut dictum est —, sed oportet quod fiat in eis per aliam causam,
facientem utrumque eorum esse alterum per essentiam existentem in actu, et hunc
non esse illum et e converso — ut sit totum causatum quod est in utroque —,
ideo causa individuationis eorum prima et efficiens dicendus est Deus, qui dat
utrique eorum subsistentiam in effectu et seorsum.[14]”
So, the primary cause of the
individuation of a created nature is God’s creative act producing a singular
creature of that nature, whose act of being is nothing but its being created by
God, and it is the singularity of this act which determines the otherwise
common nature of the creature in question to be had by this singular
entity as opposed to that, in which the same nature would be realized in
a numerically distinct act of existence. Therefore, to the objection that an
essence which is indistinct in itself cannot be understood to be multiplied
unless there is something distinguishing its instances, Henry answers that,
indeed, there is something distinguishing these instances, namely, the
distinct acts of existence which realize the same essence in numerically
distinct individuals:
“Dicendum
igitur ad argumentum quod unam et eandem essentiam ex se omnino simplicem,
nullo addito, nec re nec intentione, differenti ab ea, distingui et
multiplicari per plura individua est omnino inintelligibile et secundum rem
impossibile. Sic enim quaecumque essentia in se considerata nullam potest
omnino intelligi habere distinctionem, multiplicationem aut diversitatem. Sic
enim considerata intelligitur ut neque in unico individuo existens neque ut in
pluribus, neque ut universalis neque ut particularis, sed ut cui ambo nata sunt
accidere. Si ergo huiusmodi essentia debeat distingui per plura individua
numero, oportet quod hoc sit per aliquid additum distinguens, diversitate sua
diversificans essentiam et multiplicans hinc inde.[15]”
However, according to Henry,
the act of existence which sets apart one individual of a created nature from
another cannot be regarded as a distinct thing added to the nature in question,
rather it has to be something merely intentionally distinct from the
essence to which it is added:
“Sed tale
additum potest intelligi diversum ab essentia ipsa vel re, vel intentione
tantum. Additione diversi primo modo non contingit essentiam separatam
immaterialem numero distingui, quia neque per diversum additum substantiale
neque accidentale. Non per substantiale, quia illud non posset esse nisi
materia aut forma, < quod quidem non potest fieri, > quia per positionem
haec essentia est immaterialis et specifica, sub qua non est ulterior forma
substantialis et cui non est materia subiecta. Neque per accidentale diversum
hinc inde, quia neque per diversum specie neque per diversum numero. Non per
diversum specie, quia ad eandem essentiam substantialem specie necessario
sequuntur, quantum est ex ratione speciei, eadem accidentia specie: eidem enim
in quantum idem semper natum est accidere idem. Nec numero solo, quia accidens
potius numeratur et individuatur per suum subiectum quam e converso.
Universaliter ergo verum est quod per nulla accidentia realia, neque specie
neque numero diversa, fit individuatio eiusdem essentiae sive formae in specie,
quoniam omnis substantia in se recipiens accidentia oportet quod in se prius
subsistat (et ita: quod sit individuata), quam subiectum alterius fiat, quia
secundum Philosophum «substantia prior est accidente definitione, cognitione et
tempore», et ideo substantia individuata potius est causa individuationis
cuiuscumque accidentis quam e converso. Et sic nullo modo potest intelligi
multiplicatio essentiae immaterialis per additionem diversi secundum rem.
Oportet ergo quod sit additione diversi secundum intentionem solum. Et hoc est
possibile, immo necessarium, ut supra est expositum[16].”
Henry explains in more
detail how he conceives of the intentional distinction between essence and existence
in creatures in question 9 of his first Quodlibet. Although the notion
of intentional distinction is difficult to capture (indeed, according to Sutton
it is downright inconsistent)[17], Henry’s idea here seems
to be that we have to assume this type of distinction whenever one and the same
absolute thing is also inherently related to something else, whence the same
absolute thing, on account of its own nature, also has to be conceived in terms
of a relational concept or intention. Therefore, since all created essences
exist only insofar as they are created and kept in existence by God (whence in
their actual existence they are inherently related to God), and, in virtue of
the previous argument, their existence cannot be another thing added to them, a
created essence and its existence (that is, its being created by God) also have
to be regarded as intentionally distinct, although they are one and the same
thing when the essence is produced in actual existence:
“Non enim
debet imaginari creaturae essentia sicut aer indifferens ad obscuritatem et
luminositatem, sed sicut radius quidam in se natus subsistere, a sole productus
non necessitate naturae sed libera voluntate. Unde, si sol libera voluntate
posset radium per se subsistentem producere, radius ille, quantum est de se et
natura sua, indifferens esset ad esse et non esse, et quantum esset de se,
esset non ens quoddam. Quantum autem est ex parte solis, posset esse in se
recipere et reciperet cum fieret in effectu a sole, et esset ille radius factus
et stans in se, lumen quoddam secundum suam essentiam, et similitudo lucis
solaris, participans per hoc ipsa luce solis. Et ita esset ille radius quaedam
participatio lucis solaris per suam essentiam et in sua essentia, non per
aliquid additum suae essentiae receptum in ipsa, re differens ab ipsa, sicut
lumen receptum in aere differt ab ipso. Et sicut est de isto radio lucis et
luce solis, quod participat luce solis in eo quod est, in sua essentia
existens, quaedam eius similitudo, sic est de creatura et Deo, quod ipsa
participat esse Dei in eo quod est in sua essentia quaedam divini esse
similitudo, sicut imago sigilli, si esset in se subsistens extra ceram, in sua
essentia esset quaedam similitudo sigilli, non per aliquid additum ei. Et sic
in quacumque creatura esse non est aliquid re aliud ab ipsa essentia, additum
ei ut sit. Immo ipsa sua essentia, qua est id quod est quaelibet creatura,
habet esse in quantum ipsa est effectus et similitudo divini esse, ut dictum est[18].”
On the basis of these
passages, Henry’s conception criticized by Sutton can be summarized in the
following theses.
(1)
A form or
essence of any creature, considered in itself, is indifferent to existence and
non-existence and to unity or multiplicity[19].
(2)
Nevertheless,
such a form is multipliable in actual existence only if there is something to
distinguish one of its instances from another[20].
(3)
What
distinguishes one creature from another in the same species is its singular act
of existence, the singularity of which is determined by the singularity of a
creative act of God
(4)
Thus, this act
of existence is inherently relational: for a creature to be in actual existence
is for it to be created by God.
(5)
Thus, the act
of existence in question is merely intentionally distinct from the actually
existing singular essence, in the same way as a relation is merely
intentionally distinct from its foundation.[21]
With these principles at
hand, Henry is obviously able to evade Sutton’s charge, while maintaining the
plurality thesis along with all its benefits in accounting for the opposite
conditions of the immaterial intellective soul and the material forms of
bodies.
Sutton clearly sees that he
can handle Henry’s above-described “evasion” only by a direct attack on Henry’s
conception of existence and individuation. In particular, he rejects (3) as
nonsensical, on the basis of an argument which directly points to the most
fundamental difference between their conceptions of existence:
“Advertendum
est igitur quod esse non multiplicatur nisi per multiplicationem essentiae, et
hoc potest sic videri: essentia quae est ipsum esse, non potest multiplicari,
sed est una sola, scilicet deus ipse, ut alibi dictum est. Nec esse potest includi
in essentia alicuius causati, quia essentia de cuius ratione est esse, non
potest intelligi non esse, et per consequens non potest produci a non-esse in
esse. Ad hoc igitur quod esse multiplicetur, oportet essentias multiplicari,
quae recipiant esse et limitent esse, quod participant; esse enim subsistens
non receptum in aliquo est illimitatum et unum tantum. Oportet igitur dicere
quod, sicut forma multiplicatur per hoc quod recipitur in diversis materiis,
ita esse actuale multiplicatur per hoc quod recipitur in diversis essentiis.
Unde in multiplicatione decem praedicamentorum hoc est manifestum, quia per hoc
quod ens, quod significat essentiam, multiplicatur per se et non per aliquid
additum in essentias decem praedicamentorum, esse actuale receptum in essentiis
illis et limitatum per illas multiplicatur in decem praedicamentis.
Universaliter enim multiplicatio limitantium est causa multiplicationis eius
quod limitatur, quia illimitatum in quantum huiusmodi est unum, sed per hoc
quod participatur a diversis, contrahitur et multiplicatur in illis[22].”
The most significant remark
in this passage is the closing universal claim, which seems to provide the most
general reason for Sutton’s rejection of Henry’s conception: the cause of the
multiplication of something that can undergo limitation is the multiplication
of those that limit it, for that which is unlimited, as such, is one. In
fact, this claim seems to contradict already Henry’s principle (1), for that
which can undergo limitation, and hence multiplication, should be indifferent
to number, and so it should not, as such, be one. But if we carefully consider
Suttons’s argument, we can see that this is not the case. For the indifference
to existence and number is a property of a form or nature in accordance with
its absolute consideration: this is precisely the reason why the same nature,
which can be regarded as the same on account of its lack of distinction in
the mind’s consideration, can be realized in several individuals.[23] But Sutton’s point (with which, as we
could see, Henry also agreed) is that the same nature cannot be realized
in actual being in several individuals, unless there is something that
distinguishes its several instances in these individuals. The reason for this,
of course, is the convertibility of being and unity: the indifference of nature
to existence is its indifference to unity, which applies to it only in its
absolute consideration, but its realization in actual being is the positing
of a unit of that nature in actual being. Therefore, if on account of a
lack of distinction in its actual being a nature cannot be multiply
realized, then it can only be realized in one entity, which is the case with
the absolutely simple and indivisible divine nature.[24]
So, a nature can be realized in several instances only if there is something
setting these instances apart in their actual existence.
What distinguished these
individual instances of a single nature for Henry were precisely the singular
acts of existence of the singular supposita of the same nature. It is to
this claim that Sutton objects by pointing out that considerations of
the sort just mentioned also apply to existence itself:[25] if it is realized without any
distinction, then it can be realized only in one singular, unlimited act of
existence, which is nothing but the divine essence, that is, God himself.
Therefore, all other acts of existence can be realized as distinct from this
singular, unlimited act of existence only by imposing upon them some limitation
that distinguishes them from the unlimited divine existence as well as from
each other. The limitations imposed upon the resulting limited acts of
existence are nothing but the essences of creatures, which differ from each
other on account of their contrary, specific differences. But without these
limitations the only possible realization of actual existence is just the
unlimited act of divine being: ipsum esse subsistens.
Indeed, when Sutton directly
takes issue with Henry’s conception concerning the individuation of the soul,
he argues on the same basis:
“Propter
hoc adhuc aliam ponunt fictionem[26]. Dicunt quod
animae in eadem specie distinguuntur non per suas essentias, sed per suum esse.
Sed istud inter alia minus valet. Esse enim inter omnia est communissimum,
quantum est de se, in tantum quod, nisi contrahatur per essentiam alicuius
generis, non pertinet ad aliquod genus. Et propter hoc esse non limitatum per
aliquam essentiam est ipse deus, qui non est in aliquo genere. Esse igitur
animae per hoc contrahitur ad speciem animae, quod est receptum in essentia
animae. Unde esse animae distinguitur ab aliis esse per hoc, quod essentia
animae distinguitur ab aliis essentiis. Non ergo distinguuntur animae per esse
suum, sed potius e converso esse animarum distinguitur per distinctionem
ipsarum animarum. Ergo oportet dare aliquid aliud, per quod animae
distinguantur. Istud confirmatur per hoc, quod dicit auctor De causis
propositione 16, quod intelligentiae sunt finitae superius, quia habent esse
receptum in essentia et sic limitatum, sed inferius sunt infinitae, quia
essentiae earum non recipiuntur in aliquo. Ipse vocat superius in eis esse,
quod de se est communissimum, inferius in eis vocat essentiam, quia ipsa de se
est determinati generis et etiam speciei. Ergo eodem modo oportet in omnibus
intelligere quod esse non distinguitur, nisi per hoc quod essentia
distinguitur, quia eadem ratio est in uno et in alio. Omnis enim creatura habet
esse limitatum per essentiam[27]. Et videte: Si
esse animae non limitaretur per essentiam animae, sed anima distingueretur ab
aliis per suum esse, sequeretur quod anima esset ipse deus, quia illud esse
haberet omnem perfectionem essendi ex hoc ipso quod non limitaretur per aliud,
et tunc essentia animae esset suum esse subsistens, et sic esset deus, quod est
nefas dicere[28].”
So, for Sutton, it cannot be
singular acts of existence that distinguish individual instances of the same
form, for the role of forms is to distinguish acts of existence by limiting
them in the first place, on account of their own per se differences[29]. But since the formal contrariety of specific
differences can only yield specific distinction, any two singular creatures
that differ by such formal differences will have to differ specifically in
order to differ numerically. Therefore, Sutton concludes, the only way
creatures can differ numerically within the same species is by differing, not
with respect to such formal differences, but with respect to some other
differences, namely, the per se opposite locations of the various parts
of dimensive quantity, which directly follows upon matter. This is the
fundamental reason why, according to Sutton, only material creatures can be
numerically distinct within the same species[30].
As we could see, Sutton’s
criticism of Henry’s conception of the individuation of created essences, and
hence of human souls, was based in particular on his rejection of Henry’s
principle (3). Sutton’s reason for this rejection, in turn, is based on his
acceptance of the common principles (1) and (2), with the addition of the
following Thomistic principles concerning the relationship between form/essence
and existence:
(I)
Existence is
the actuality of form/essence, whereas form/essence is a
determination/limitation of existence, provided they are distinct; otherwise
they are the same, absolutely unlimited act of divine existence.
(II)
Any singular
act of existence is primarily distinguished from another by the
limitation its form/essence imposes upon it. (That is to say, there can be two
distinct acts of existence only if (a) they are the acts of two distinct
(types of) forms, or (b) they are the acts of two distinct instances of the
same form. But in case (b) the distinct instances of the same form are clearly
not distinct on account of their difference in form—just like two copies of the
same book are not distinct on account of the difference in their content, which
is why it is enough to read one copy in order to read the book—, but on account
of something else that individuates them, and so their acts of existence are
distinct secondarily, on account of whatever individuates these
instances.)
As we could see, with these
principles at his disposal Sutton can argue further to show that since the only
act of existence that is unlimited by some form/essence is divine existence,
any created act of existence has to be primarily distinguished from divine
existence and from any other created act of existence by its form/essence.
But then, the only further
principle he needs against Henry’s conception of individuation is the
following:
(III) Distinction in form always
yields a specific distinction
Sutton brings up this last
principle early on in his argument against Henry’s “evasions” to show that if
human souls were not individuated by bodies, then they would have to differ
formally, which, in virtue of (III), would yield the absurd conclusion that
individual humans differ specifically from each other:
“Quod
primum impossibile sequatur, potest videri sic: si animae distinguantur non per
corpora, sed per se ipsas, cum ipsae sint formae, distinctio earum erit
formalis, non materialis. Universaliter autem omnis diversitas formalis diversificat
speciem. Omnes igitur animae humanae erunt diversae secundum speciem ab invicem[31].”
In the subsequent paragraphs
Sutton goes on to argue further against a possible objection to this principle,
but in fact its validity can also be shown on the basis of (1) shared by Henry.
For if there is a difference in form between two individuals, then, in virtue
of (1), each of the individuals in question is just one (bearer) of the several
possible instances of its form. But the several possible individuals which
would share the same form (which is not numerically the same, but only
according to its absolute consideration) would have to belong to the same
species, whereas those that would share the other form would have to belong to
another species; therefore, the two initial individuals that differed in form
had to differ specifically, and not only numerically. Q. e. d.
However, if any created act
of existence is distinguished from another by its form, while a distinction in
form has to yield specific difference, then Sutton is justified in claiming
both that no individuals of the same species can be said to be primarily
distinguished by their acts of existence, and that whatever primarily
distinguishes distinct individuals of the same species has to be something
other than their forms.
In several places, while
criticizing not only Henry’s, but also Scotus’s, and Richard of Middleton’s
views on individuation,[32] Sutton deploys a barrage of arguments
to show that the distinctive principle accounting for the individuation of the
same substantial form in several instances can only be matter primarily
distinguished by the per se opposite positions of its parts.[33] Indeed, he goes so far as to argue on
this basis that it is impossible even for God to create several immaterial
individuals in the same species; in particular, it would be impossible for God
to create several separate human souls (which, of course, would have to be
immaterial individuals of the same species).[34]
But then, further, if he is right in this claim, then he was also right in
reducing the plurality thesis to the undesirable Averroistic conclusion.
However, instead of
following the further ramifications of Sutton’s arguments, I would rather
return to digging down to their roots, summarizing what I take to be Sutton’s
most fundamental insights into St. Thomas’s theory of being, and pointing out
their role in his defense of the Thomistic position concerning the nature of
the intellective soul.
On the basis of the
foregoing considerations, I think we can establish that the difference between
Henry’s and Sutton’s respective conceptions of the nature of the intellective
soul can be reduced to their fundamentally different conceptions of the
participation of being. Indeed, Sutton himself is quite aware of this
fundamental difference as well as its consequences, as he makes it quite clear
in the following passage:
“Unde
aliqui doctores[35] bene ostendunt ratione
necessaria quod esse differt ab essentia angeli realiter ex hoc, quod essentia
angeli habet esse participatum. Patet enim per ea quae dicta sunt, quod
essentia non sic participat esse, quod habeat esse limitatum per differentiam
contrahentem esse ad constituendum essentiam, de cuius intellectu sit esse, ut
ideo dicatur participare esse, id est partem eius capere, quia est de essentia
eius quae est limitata, sicut species participat genus. Sed oportet quod habens
essentiam sic participet esse, quia capit non totam perfectionem essendi, sed
partem, in quantum esse limitatur per essentiam in qua suscipitur; quae
essentia est limitata ad genus determinatum et ad speciem. Et sic limitatur
esse per essentiam, sicut forma equi limitatur per hoc, quod recipitur in
materia tamquam in susceptivo participante. Isto enim modo actus participatur a
potentia, et isto modo participatum realiter differt a participante et non est
de intellectu ipsius. Unde patet quod male dicunt, qui ponunt[36]
essentiam participare esse sic, quod essentia causata capit a deo se ipsam
includentem esse, quod esse est pars respectu esse divini, et quod non capit
aliud a se secundum rem, sed quod est inter capiens et captum relatio rationis
tantum, sed quod inter capiens et deum a quo capit est relatio realis. Istud
dictum est erroneum, quia sequuntur multa inconvenientia, ut dictum est, si
ponatur quod essentia sic participet esse, quod esse sit de suo intellectu;
sequitur scilicet quod nihil sit causatum in rerum natura et quod omnia sint
aeterna[37].”
The contrast between these
conceptions is brought out by Sutton in a particularly vivid manner in his Tractatus
de esse et essentia, where he uses the analogy of the sun and its light,
also used by Henry in his own description of his conception[38]:
“… quidam ex adverso supradictis vitiis
contradicentes dicunt, quod esse nullam rem absolutam ponit in essentia vel
supra essentiam sed realiter est idem cum ea nisi quia addit respectum quondam
ad creatorem, prout ipsa essentia est in effectu. Ad cuius evidentiam
distinguit duplex esse, scilicet esse essentiae et esse actualis existentiae.
Esse quidem essentiae non est aliud quam ipsa essentia habens ideam in Deo, et
tale esse est illud, quod significat definitio, quia definitio indicat quid est
esse rei. Esse vero actualis existentiae est illud idem esse, nisi quia addit
respectum dependentiae ad productorem rei, prout res in actu effecta est, ut ex
hoc essentia creaturae dicatur esse, in quantum est creata sive prout est
effectus creatoris et non per aliquam rem sibi additam. Et secundum hoc
dicitur, quod quaelibet creatura participat esse, in quantum est similitudo in
effectu expressa a Deo: sicut si sol produceret radium voluntate, ipse radius
sic productus esset similitudo solis absque additione alterius rei, sic etiam
creatura, ut dicunt, voluntarie a Deo producta dicitur participare esse
divinum, non propter additionem alicuius dicentis aliam rem ab ipsa essentia.
Non ergo est imaginandum, quod ipsa essentia participet esse, quasi sit aliquid
substratum ipsi esse, ita quod esse sit aliquid informans et perficiens
essentiam creaturae, sicut forma perficit materiam sibi substratam, talis enim
imaginatio falsa est; sic ergo concludit, quod esse sit idem quod essentia
addens solum praedictum respectum[39].”
By contrast, in describing
his own Thomistic position, Sutton uses the analogy of sunshine received in and
colored (i.e., filtered, dimmed, and thus diminished) by transparent bodies
(such as the stained glass windows of cathedrals):
“Ut tamen
praedicta considerentur et nostra intentio clarius elucescat, imaginandum est,
quod divinum esse se habeat ad modum cuiusdam lucis solaris diffusae per totum
diaphanum aeris et ipsa et natura creata se habent ad modum diaphani corporis.
Dices autem, quod illa lux est splendida per essentiam suam, corpus vero
diaphanum in tantum splendet sive lucet, in quantum lumen participat a dicta
luce, non enim lumen habet radicem in diaphano. Imaginemur ulterius, quod dicta
lux solaris sua virtute producat corpus diaphanum, quod producendo semper ei
assistat et suo lumine perfundat; et corpus sic productum in tantum actu
subsistat, in quantum lumen participat. Constat autem, quod corpus, <cum est a luce>[40], producitur seu lumen participat a
luce producente ex natura suae diaphaneitatis. Quod magis appareret, si
diceremus ipsum lumen se incorporari ad modum coloris, qui dicitur esse quaedam
lux incorporata in corpore terminato. Dicemus tunc lumen in diaphano causari,
et ex principiis essentialibus eius, in quantum aptum natum est lumen perfundi,
et in natura sua hoc unum sibi incorporetur, cum secundum dictam suppositionem
ipso lumine actu subsistat; positum est enim ipsum corpus secundum se totum sic
a luce produci, quod eius lumine participato subsistit. Sed quia, ut dictum
est, corpus non potest sibi esse causa lucendi, cum lumen a se non habeat, ideo
dicemus lumen in diaphano causari principaliter a sole lumen diffundente[41].”
As can be seen, Sutton here
sharply contrasts two fundamentally different (although quite difficult to
distinguish) conceptions as to how being can be said to be participated.
According to Henry of Ghent’s “Augustinian” theory, participating in existence
is nothing but being just a “fragmentary” act of existence meted out directly
by the divine will to the capacity of a creature, which is determined by the
creature’s idea in the mind of God. Accordingly, the realization of
these ideas is nothing but their participation in divine being, which,
in turn, is just the act of their being created, an inherently
relational act, merely intentionally distinct from the individual instances of
the nature it realizes.
An important consequence of
this conception is that the real identity along with the mere intentional
distinction between an essence and its actual existence does not entail that
this essence/existence has to be the unlimited act of divine existence/essence.
An act of created existence is a directly and per se delimited act,
insofar as it is a singular realization of a per se limited essence,
different from any other essence on account of their per se opposite
differences.
On this basis we can say
that according to this conception, the determination of the concept of being as
it can be applied to more and more specific participated acts of existence
moves “from outside in”: it is starting with a comprehensive, “catch-all
concept” of being, which comprehends in its scope even the infinity of divine
being, and which gets restricted, specified and individualized according to the
essential order of things determined by their archetypes, the divine ideas.[42] So, this conception conceives of the
determination of the concept of being in terms of what can be called an
“extensional restriction” of a general concept by means of its “intensional specification”,
just like adding more and more specific differences to a generic concept
restricts the extension of the resulting more and more specific concepts by
specifying their content, their intension.
By contrast, according to
Sutton’s Thomistic theory, the participation of being is to be conceived in
terms of the “intensional diminution” of a concept by the addition of
diminishing qualifications, and its consequent “extensional amplification”. For
example, the common term “white” without any qualification is applicable only
to something that is wholly white. However, adding the qualification “in its
one half” intensionally diminishes its conditions of applicability[43], and thus, as a result, extends the
applicability of the term and the corresponding concept even to such things
that are not wholly white. In the same way, “being” without any qualification
or determination can be applied only to that which is wholly and absolutely
being, that is, God, ipsum esse subsistens[44].
However, the qualification “of such and such nature” diminishes the conditions
of its strict applicability, and thus extends it even to things that are not
wholly beings, but only in respect of some specific nature, which is not its
being itself. So, upon this conception, the determination of the concept of
being as it is applicable to more and more diminished, participated acts of
existence is moving “from inside out”: it starts with a very restricted
concept, which, however, on account of its various “intensionally diminishing”
qualifications, gains an extended, less restricted applicability[45].
Most importantly, this
conception immediately yields a conclusion opposite to Henry’s, namely, that if
an essence is really identical with its act of existence, then that act of
existence can only be the single, unlimited act of divine existence, whence it
cannot be any sort of limited, participated, creaturely act of existence.[46] The reason for this should be clear
if we consider that if an act of existence is identified with the essence it
actualizes, then the act of existence/essence in question has to be unlimited,
since nothing delimits itself.[47] Indeed, according to
Sutton, as will be obvious from the subsequent quotations, this consequence has
to be regarded as analogous with adding the qualification ‘with respect to
whiteness’ to the predicate ‘white’. Clearly, this qualification is
non-diminishing precisely because of the identity of what is signified by the
absolute predicate and what is referred to in the qualification (whence
whatever can be said to be ‘white with respect to whiteness’ must be said to be
‘white’ without qualification and vice versa).[48]
So, the kind of limitation Sutton has in mind is only possible if there is a
real distinction between a created act of existence and the essence delimiting
it, and so no wonder he promptly reduces Henry’s identification of essence and
existence in creatures to the absurdity that a created essence in that case
would not be created, which, on the other hand, does not seem to follow at all
on Henry’s conception of participation.
But Sutton is steadfast in
holding on to his own Thomistic conception, and it is with this conception at
hand that he handles several, apparently obvious objections coming from the
other side. In particular, he uses this conception of participation to defuse
an objection utilizing one of his own premises for the real distinction of
essence and existence in creatures. According to the objection, if Sutton is
right in claiming that the identification of existence with essence would yield
the conclusion that it cannot be understood to be non-existent, and thus it
cannot be created, then the same should apply to any act of existence that
Sutton posits to be distinct from its created essence, for obviously no act of
existence can be understood to be non-existence, just as no man can be
understood to be a non-man, etc.:
“Sed de
hoc oritur dubitatio. Si enim essentia non posset intelligi non existens, si
includeret esse, et ita non posset habere causam sui esse, eadem ratione
videtur sequi quod essentia non habeat causam sui esse, si esse ponatur
differre realiter ab essentia, quia illud esse non potest intelligi non esse,
sicut homo non potest intelligi non-homo nec aliquid potest intelligi sub suo
opposito. Esse ergo si realiter differt ab essentia, adhuc illud esse non
habebit causam et per consequens essentia non erit producta in esse a non-esse,
sed erit aeterna etiam secundum suam actualem existentiam. Et ita sequuntur
eadem inconvenientia, posito quod esse differat ab essentia realiter, quae
sequuntur ponentes quod esse non differt realiter ab essentia, ut videtur[49].”
Sutton answers this
objection by making it clear that according to his conception, the
participation of being is the limitation of an act of being by a really
distinct, finite essence, in pretty much the same way as a part of a surface is
a limitation of its color:
“Ad hanc
vero dubitationem tollendam advertendum est quod, quamvis aliquid
non-contractum non possit intelligi cum suo opposito, ipsum tamen contractum
per aliquid diminuens potest intelligi cum suo opposito; verbi gratia, album
per se sumptum non potest intelligi non-album, album tamen secundum dentes
potest intelligi non-album simpliciter vel non-album secundum faciem. Vel
melius exemplum est de forma, quae naturaliter est separata a materia, scilicet
forma angeli non limitata per materiam; non enim potest intelligi non-separata.
Anima tamen separata, quae est contracta per materiam, potest intelligi
non-separata, quia non per naturam suam est separata, sed propter
improportionem corporis; et ideo separata pro uno tempore potest intelligi
non-separata pro alio tempore. Nunc autem si esse sit in essentia rei, illud
esse non erit contractum neque per differentiam neque per aliquod susceptivum,
ut visum est. Et ideo esse tale non potest intelligi non esse, et per
consequens nec talis essentia potest intelligi non esse. Sed si ponamus quod
esse sit contractum per essentiam in qua recipitur, tamquam diminutum per
essentiam a qua participatur, potest illud esse intelligi non esse pro aliqua
duratione, sicut et essentia in qua recipitur. Tale enim esse non existit nisi
per accidens. Sed quia esse per se convenit rei subsistenti, ideo sicut illud,
cuius est esse, potest intelligi non esse ante suam productionem et post suam
desitionem, ita illud esse, quod est actualitas eius, potest intelligi non esse
ante productionem illius cuius est et post suam desitionem. Et propterea non
sequuntur illa inconvenientia, ponendo quod esse realiter differt ab essentia,
quae sequuntur ponendo quod esse non differt ab essentia[50].”
On the basis of this
passage, the analogy should be obvious: just as that which is totally white
cannot be understood to be non-white in respect of any of its parts, so too
that which is totally being cannot be understood to be non-being in any respect
at all; but just as that which is only partially white can be understood to be
non-white in respect of another part, so too that which is only partially
being, because it is a being limited by a finite essence, can be understood to
be a non-being in some other respect (where, of course, the same applies to the
limited act of existence as to the thing that has this limited existence). For
example, that which is limited by its nature to exist for a certain time can be
understood not to exist at another time, and that which is limited to exist
under certain conditions (at the very least under the condition of being kept
in existence by God) can be thought not to exist under different conditions. In
the same way, a form which is limited to exist under the condition of informing
a body for a certain time but has the natural capacity to go on existing after
getting separated from the body after that time can be thought to exist
separately from the body, even though it actually exists informing a body; so
even if it is actually material in its present condition, it can be thought to
be immaterial at another time, in a different condition.
In the end, therefore,
Sutton thinks of the human soul as providing a peculiar kind of determination,
or limitation of the act of being which actualizes it. It is precisely this
peculiar kind of limitation that establishes the human soul as a “borderline
case” between the realms of absolute materiality and absolute immateriality
without any contradiction, despite the per se opposition between these
primary differences of the category of substance. On this basis, Sutton is able
to present the case of the Thomistic conception of the intellective soul as
being free from any inconsistency, despite the fact that it entails the attribution
of the opposite conditions of materiality and immateriality to one and the same
entity. The point, however, is that these attributions do not pertain to the
soul in the same respect and without any qualification, precisely because of
the soul’s “borderline status” between pure materiality and pure immateriality:
“Sciendum
est igitur quod anima humana sic condita est, ut ipsa secundum suam naturam sit
in confinio materialium et immaterialium. Unde in Libro de causis dicitur quod
ipsa anima est in horizonte aeternitatis et temporis, propter hoc quod ipsa est
omnium substantiarum intellectualium infima, et per consequens, cum substantiae
intellectuales sint aeviternae, ipsa est infima omnium aeviternorum. Ipsa etiam
per comparationem ad formas materiales, quae sunt corruptibiles, in tempore est
suprema: Et sic est in horizonte corruptibilium et incorruptibilium, sive in
confinio aeternitatis participatae et temporis. Et propter hoc oportet quod
anima humana, sic in medio constituta, sapiat naturam tam formarum materialium
quam immaterialium[51].”
In general, Sutton’s
Thomistic conception of the participation of being clearly provides him with a
more flexible conceptual apparatus than Henry’s “Augustinian” conception. In
any case, it is not surprising that the Thomistic conception is particularly
apt for treating the ontological status of the intellective soul as a
borderline case between pure materiality and pure immateriality. For on this
conception it does not yield any inconsistency that the act of existence of the
soul is material and inherent on account of the soul’s actually informing a
human body, and yet, the same act of existence is also subsistent in a
different respect, namely on account of being the existence of a substance that
has an immaterial power and a corresponding operation of its own, and thus this
act of existence is also immaterial after it ceases to be the act of existence
of the body.
On the other hand, such a
borderline case is certainly more troublesome on the other conception, which
would specify various acts of being in the same way as the essences with which
they are identical in re, namely, by means of opposite differences. In
this conceptual setting, materiality and immateriality, being the directly
opposite differences of two radically different and distinct realms of being,
constitute such a sharp division between these two realms that no single and
undivided entity can possibly find a place between them, on pain of
inconsistency. But if the Thomistic conception is correct, then the human soul
is constituted right there, in a however paradoxical, but in no way
inconsistent existential situation.
Notes
[1] The little that can be known about
Sutton is neatly summarized, with ample references, in F. J. Roensch,
[2] Cf.
Roensch, p. 73, n. 194.
[3] For
a summary account of Sutton’s psychology, see D. Sharp, Thomas of Sutton O.P.,
His Place in Scholasticism and an Account of His Psychology, in: Revue Néoscolastique de philosophie, Louvain, 36(1934),
332-354 and 37(1934), 88-104, 219-233.
[4]
Siger of Brabant, Quaestiones in tertium de anima,
[5]
Thomas of Sutton, Quaestiones ordinariae, München 1977. Henceforth: QORD. QORD,
q. 18, p. 503.
[6]
QORD, q. 19. p. 532.
[7]
Ibid.
[8]
Henry of
[9] Cf.
principle (1) below.
[10]
HQDL 2, q. 8, pp. 38-39.
[11]
Cf. HQDL 2, p. 15, p. 43.
[12]
Ibid. pp. 52-53.
[13]
Ibid. pp. 49-50.
[14]
Ibid. pp. 50-51.
[15]
Ibid. p. 54. Note in this passage Henry’s explicit statement of principles (1)
and (2) listed below. The significance of this fact is that Sutton is going to
attack Henry’s conception precisely on the basis of these two principles, while
rejecting Henry’s (3) as nonsensical.
[16]
Ibid. pp. 54-55.
[17] Cf. QORD
q. 26. esp. pp. 724-725.
[18]
HQDL 1, q. 9.
[19]
It must be added here that, according to Henry, just the opposite is true in
the case of divine essence: “Nulla ergo
essentia creaturae, ratione ea qua essentia est, habet rationem suppositi aut
actualiter subsistentis. Ita quod nulla earum, quantum est ex se, de se sit
singularitas quaedam, nullaque earum, sicut neque effective, sic nec formaliter
est suum esse sive sua existentia, sed hoc est privilegium solius essentiae
divinae quod ipsa ex se formaliter sit singularitas quaedam et idem in eo sunt
essentia et existentia.”, HQDL 2, q. 8, p. 39. Importantly, this principle seems
to be shared by Sutton, as part of the “common stock” of principles deriving
from Avicenna.
[20]
Again, this principle is also shared by Sutton. Indeed, he presents for it a
brief argument in QORD q. 27, p. 749. But then he goes on to use this same
principle to prove the opposite conclusion, namely, that it is impossible for
angels to be multiplied in the same species, for it is only designated matter
that can be the distinctive constituent required for numerical distinctness
within the same species, but angels cannot have matter, whence they cannot be
thus distinguished. Of course, the question is whether Sutton manages to
establish that it is only designated matter that can play this distinctive
role..
[21]
For a more detailed analysis of Henry’s conception of intentional distinction
in his theory of relation see M. G. Henninger, Relations: medieval theories,
1250-1325,
[22]
QORD q. 27, pp. 753-754. (ll. 272-290)
[23]
Perhaps, we should note here that despite possible modern worries to the
contrary, the sameness of a nature in its several instances is no more
mysterious than the sameness of a book in its several copies. Clearly, it would
be preposterous for an author to claim to have written thousands of books and
articles on the sole basis that they were printed in thousands of copies.
[24] Cf. “…impossibile est intelligere quod sint plures
albedines separatae; sed si esset albedo separata ab omni subiecto et
recipiente, esset una tantum; ita impossibile est quod sit ipsum esse
subsistens nisi unum tantum. Omne igitur quod est post primum ens, cum non sit
suum esse, habet esse in aliquo receptum, per quod ipsum esse contrahitur; et
sic in quolibet creato aliud est natura rei quae participat esse, et aliud ipsum
esse participatum.” S. Thom. Qu. Disp. De Spirit. Creaturis q. 1.; “Deus enim
per suam essentiam est ipsum esse subsistens: nec est possibile esse duo
huiusmodi, sicut nec possibile foret esse duas ideas homini separatas, aut duas
albedines per se substantes. Unde quidquid aliud ab eo est, necesse est quod
sit tanquam participans esse, quod non potest esse aequale ei, quod est
essentialiter ipsum esse.” S. Thom. Qu. Disp. De Malo, q. 16, a. 3.; “Non
enim potest intelligi quod aliqua forma separata sit nisi una unius speciei, sicut si esset albedo separata, non
posset esse nisi una tantum; haec enim albedo non differt ab illa nisi per hoc,
quod est huius vel illius.” ST1 q.
75, a. 7.
[25]
Of course, this point immediately gives rise to the difficulty of how existence
itself can be regarded as indifferent to existence. But, again, the answer
should be clear if we keep in mind that indifference to existence and unity and
number pertains to any form or nature only according to its absolute
consideration and not in its actual realization. So even though no actual act
of existence is indifferent to existence, because it cannot be but an act of
existence, yet, if it is a created act, then it can be non-actual when it is
not actually created by God, whence existence according to its absolute
consideration is indifferent to actuality, and so also to unity and number. Cf.
quote at n. 50 below. (QORD q. 26, pp. 731-732.)
[26]
Cf. HQDL 2 q. 8.
[27]
Cf. ST1 q. 4 a. l ad3
[28]
QORD q. 18, pp. 506-507.
[29]
Cf. “… quia esse consequitur formam,
multiplicatio ipsius esse est consequens multiplicationem formae et non causans
multiplicationem formae.” QORD q. 27, p. 754.
[30]
Cf. ibid. pp. 749-751. Cf. also “Ad septimum
dicendum est quod non est simile de quantitate et de esse substantiali, quia
quantitas dimensiva ex se ipsa habet distinctionem partium eiusdem rationis
propter diversitatem situs, qui est de ratione sua. Et ideo talis quantitas est
causa multiplicationis individuorum eiusdem rationis in substantiis
materialibus, sicut esse substantiale non habet de se distinctionem partium. Et
propter hoc oportet quod non sit causa multiplicationis individuorum in una
specie, sed multiplicatur in substantiis materialibus eiusdem speciei ex
multiplicatione formae, et forma multiplicatur ex multiplicatione materiae in
qua recipitur, materia autem multiplicatur ex multiplicatione quantitatis
dimensivae, quantitas vero dimensiva propter diversum situm de se
multiplicatur. Et ita tota radix multiplicationis substantiarum individualium
est quantitas dimensiva; et quia quantitas dimensiva non est in angelis, ideo
necesse est quod ibi non sit multiplicatio angelorum in una specie.” Ibid. pp.
762-763.
[31]
QORD q. 18. p. 504.
[32]
Esp. QORD q. 27, pp. 757-760. Note that in these arguments Sutton cannot assume
(1), which is directly contradicted by positing a formal principle of
individuation that cannot be indifferent to multiplication, since it is by
definition not multipliable.
[33]
Cf. Thomas of Sutton, Quodlibeta, München 1969. Henceforth: QDL. QDL 1 q. 21,
QDL 3, qq. 21-22, QDL 4, q. 16; QORD q. 18, QORD q. 27.
[34]
For this point, see esp. QORD q. 27, ad 9-um, and ad 10-um, where he writes: “… animae non possunt causari diversae nisi in diversis
corporibus animarum, quia diversitas animarum non est de se intelligibilis in
una specie, sed solum ex diversitate corporum. Quod autem non est
intelligibile, per nullum agens fieri potest.” p.
764.
[35]
Giles of Rome,De esse et essentia, Frankfurt/M. Minerva 1968,
q. 9, q. 11; cf. Thomas of Sutton, Tract. de esse et essentia, in: W. Seńko, Trzy studia nad spuścizną i
poglądami Tomasza Suttona dotyczącymi problemu istoty i istinenia,
in: Studia Mediewistyczne, 11(1970), 111-280, esp. c.2, 239.
[36]
HQDL 10 q. 7; HQDL 11 q. 3.
[37]
QORD q. 26, p. 730. Cf. also “…falsa est imaginatio, qua aliqui
imaginantur quod per creationem esse imprimatur essentiae, sicut per
generationem forma imprimitur materiae. Sed vera imaginatio est quod tam
essentia quam esse producantur per creationem; essentia scilicet determinati
generis participans esse ab esse separato, quia alio modo esse multiplicari non
potest nisi per diversa participantia. Unde ponere essentiam non differre ab
esse, est ponere tantum unum ens quod est esse separatum, ita quod nihil aliud
habeat esse.” QDL 3, q. 8, pp. 396-397.
[38]
Cf. text quoted at n. 18.
[39]
TEE c. 2, 239, ll. 6-25.
[40]
My conjectural emendation for the text’s nonsensical “dum ist a luce”.
Another possibility would be to read here “cum ista luce producitur”,
provided “lux” can be taken to refer not to the lux producens but
rather to the lumen participatum.
[41]
TEE c. 3, 244, ll. 11-30.
[42]
Cf. HQDL 5, q. 2, q. 6; 7, q. 2.
[43]
In this case, the “delimiting” in question concerns just one “dimension” of
whiteness, namely, the extent of a surface it covers. But whiteness can be
diminished also in respect of such other features as e.g. intensity, or
clarity, which would yield other diminutions of the conditions of the
applicability of its concept, thus yielding several broader concepts, which
would cover not only things that are white with a 100% albedo (the measure of
reflectivity in modern physics), but also things that reflect only a lesser
percentage of white light, and not equally all wavelengths (which, at a certain
degree would yield not something white with a certain tint, but a different
color altogether).
[44]
To be sure, one must add here that this absolutely primary concept of being
which is applicable only to God is not primary quoad nos, but it
certainly is primary secundum se. For more on this epistemological issue
see the closing section of G. Klima, Aquinas on One and Many, forthcoming in: Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale
(Società Internazionale per lo Studio del Medioevo Latino).
[45]
For more on this issue, see G. Klima, The Semantic Principles Underlying Saint
Thomas Aquinas’s Metaphysics of Being, in: Medieval Philosophy and Theology,
5(1996) 87-141.
[46]
Cf. QDL I, q. 6, p. 50; and the passages quoted in nn. 22 and 28.
[47]
Cf. “Praeterea: omne, quod participat aliquid,
est aliud ab eo, quod participatur. Quod etiam ipsum nomen participationis
ostendit. Nam id participatur proprie, quod diminutive in aliquo alio ab eo
suscipitur. Si autem dicatur, quod essentia idem est realiter quod esse,
impropriissime diceretur, quod essentia participet esse, nihil enim seipsum
participat. Sed nihil est, quod ita proprie dicatur, sicut quod essentia
participet esse, immo illa creatura participans esse est ita propria et per se,
sicut ista essentia divina est suum esse. Nam sicut esse per essentialia
proprie convenit Deo, ita esse per participationem per se convenit creaturae.
Sicut ergo in Deo una et eadem res est esse et essentia, quia ibi non est
participans et participatum, ita <in> creatura, in qua est participatio, alia
res est participans a participato; alioquin ratio participationis in creaturis
locum non haberet, quod est contra naturam eius.” TEE
c. 3, 248. (ll. 4-16)
[48]
More precisely, assuming that x’s essence is x’s existence, the consequence in
question is the following: “x exists with respect to its essence; therefore, x
exists without any limitation [i.e., x IS/EXISTS, period]”. In this conception,
this consequence has to be regarded as analogous to the following: “x is white
with respect to its whiteness; therefore, x is white without qualification
[i.e. x is white, period]”. Cf. “Ad quartum dicendum quod omnis creatura est
finita simpliciter, inquantum esse eius non est absolutum subsistens, sed
limitatur ad naturam aliquam cui advenit. Sed nihil prohibet aliquam creaturam
esse secundum quid infinitam. Creaturae autem materiales habent infinitatem ex
parte materiae, sed finitatem ex parte formae, quae limitatur per materiam in
qua recipitur. Substantiae autem immateriales creatae sunt finitae secundum
suum esse, sed infinitae secundum quod eorum formae non sunt receptae in alio.
Sicut si diceremus albedinem separatam existentem esse infinitam quantum ad
rationem albedinis, quia non contrahitur ad aliquod subiectum; esse tamen eius
esset finitum, quia determinatur ad aliquam naturam specialem.” ST1 q. 50,
a. 2, ad 4-um.
[49]
QORD q. 26, p. 731.
[50]
QORD q. 26, pp. 731-732.
[51]
QORD q. 19, pp. 532-534. (ll. 180-190, 207-229) Cf.: “propter hoc anima constituta est in confinio substantiarum separatarum quae
sunt incorporales et formarum materialium: quae sunt corporales: est enim
infima formarum incorruptibilium et suprema formarum corruptibilium: et propter
hoc est partim separata a materia, et partim in materia. Secundum intellectum
namque et voluntatem separata et incorruptibilis est: et quantum ad hoc
pertinet ad genus substantiarum separatarum: sed secundum alias potentias est actus
materiae, et secundum illas est corruptibilis: et sic pertinet ad genus
formarum materialium quae sunt corruptibiles. Quod patet ex hoc quod per
potentias illas, scilicet sensitivam et vegetativam, continet perfectionem quae
reperitur in formis brutorum, sed eminentius.” Thomas of Sutton, De
Pluralitate Formarum, in: S. Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia, Stuttgard-Bad
Cannstatt 1980, c. 1, in fine