

What if the Pious Don't Want to Deliberate?

Political Theory
2014, Vol. 42(1) 106–118
© 2013 SAGE Publications
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0090591713507866
ptx.sagepub.com



Nicholas Tampio¹

Abstract

What should political theorists do when they travel beyond the West and find that ordinary people do not want to reflect upon their political commitments? One option is to do rehabilitative political theory and argue that China and Egypt, say, already possess deliberative cultures. A second option is to maintain that China and Egypt favor different, and better, ideals than democratic deliberation. A third option, and the one that I endorse, is to promote Socratic ideals in universities around the world. As Plato recognized in the *Republic*, it is easier to teach students to love political debate than to change the habits of pious people such as Cephalus.

Keywords

deliberative democracy, comparative political theory, Egypt, China, universities

“Well, then,” said Cephalus, “I hand down the argument to you, for it’s already time for me to look after the sacrifices.”

“Am I not the heir of what belongs to you?” said Polemarchus.

“Certainly,” he said and laughed. And with that he went away to the sacrifices.

Plato, *Republic*

The *Republic* opens with Socrates and Glaucon returning home from a festival when a servant of Polemarchus stops them. Polemarchus orders the men

¹Fordham University, Bronx, NY, USA

Corresponding Author:

Nicholas Tampio, Department of Political Science, Fordham University, 665 Faber Hall, 441 East Fordham Road, Bronx, NY 10458, USA.

Email: tampio@fordham.edu

to meet with Cephalus, Polemarchus's elderly father. Cephalus wishes to reminisce with Socrates, but Socrates criticizes nearly every statement that Cephalus makes. Cephalus says that old age is fine because you can tell the truth and pay back one's debts; Socrates replies that this statement does not seem to apply in the case of a friend who wants you to return a borrowed weapon when he is in a mentally anguished state. At this juncture, Cephalus faces a choice. He could assert his authority over the group and, at the extreme, have Socrates banished or killed. Or, he could walk to the sacrifices, permitting Socrates to lead a discussion about the nature of justice. Remarkably, Cephalus laughs and exits the scene. Cephalus represents piety—or fealty to ancestral custom—in its encounter with philosophy—an activity that weighs, and often discards, old doctrines and practices.¹ The Cephalus problem, if you will, is how philosophers are to convince the pious to allow critical deliberation about politics to take place.²

The essays in the “Deliberative Democracy Beyond the West” symposium, I contend, do not adequately address the Cephalus problem. Deliberative democrats take up Aristotle's project of popularizing the Socratic *paideia*, encouraging ordinary citizens to reflect upon their preferences and express them to rulers who make them public policy.³ Deliberative democrats “believe preferences ought to be shaped reflectively by thoughtful and competent citizens (or their representatives) and that such reflection is central to deliberation.”⁴ The Euro-American political theorists in this symposium—John Dryzek, Jensen Sass, Mark Warren, and Melissa Williams—maintain that ordinary people in Egypt and China are receptive to the project of deliberative democracy. In the next two sections, I argue that many people around the world have little interest in importing political ideals that originated in ancient Athens. What should deliberative democrats do if many Chinese, say, prefer “Confucian civilities” such as *li* (ritual propriety), *rang* (deference), *jing* (respectfulness), and *gong* (humility) to thoughtful and competent citizenship?⁵ Baogang He invents the concept of authoritarian deliberation to defend China's political culture against potential deliberative democratic criticism; Sor-Hoon Tan, on the contrary, argues that Confucians should reconstruct the tradition to justify a democratic politics. In the last section, I support Sor-Hoon Tan's efforts and argue that universities can be a good home for nurturing and disseminating a deliberative political ethos.

The Pious in Egypt

Political deliberation, according to Dryzek and Sass, is a universal practice that expresses itself differently in diverse cultures. To support this claim, the authors read Saba Mahmood's *The Politics of Piety*, an ethnography of the

women's mosque movement in Egypt, "in deliberative terms." Mahmood, however, seeks to parochialize "the terms my readership is likely to bring to this material."⁶ Political theorists in Europe and America often vindicate virtues such as autonomy and self-assertion. The women of the Egyptian mosque movement, on the contrary, cherish Islamic virtues such as piety (*taqwa*) and shyness (*haya*). The notion of deliberative cultures, for Mahmood, is a false universal that does not apply to the *dawa* movement.

The Politics of Piety shows that many Muslims reject "secularization" (*'almana*) and "westernization" (*tagharrub*). This claim, however, could confirm Dryzek and Sass's thesis that political deliberation is a universal practice: Egyptian deliberative democrats, after all, are likely to oppose westernization. Mahmood's bolder thesis is that Euro-American political thinkers should not interpellate others with terms that the latter would reject. Mahmood disputes "the belief that all human beings have an innate desire for freedom, that we all somehow seek to assert our autonomy when allowed to do so, that human agency primarily consists of acts that challenge social norms and not those that uphold them, and so on."⁷ Samah Selim observes that *The Politics of Piety* simplifies the political scene in Egypt, neglecting to mention, for instance, Muslims who align with the socialist and internationalist feminist tradition rather than the *dawa* movement.⁸ Still, Mahmood's book undermines the claim that political deliberation is universal.

Consider Mahmood's account of piety (*taqwa*). Mahmood quotes Hajja Samira, a prayer leader famous for evoking the emotion of fear.

People criticize us for evoking fear in our lessons. But look around you: Do you think ours is a society that is afraid of God? If we were afraid of Him and His fury, do you think we would behave in the way we do? We are all humans and commit mistakes, and we should ask for forgiveness from Him continually for these. But to commit sins *intentionally*, as a habit, is what is woeful! Do we feel remorse and cry at this condition of the Islamic community? No! . . . Remember that if we cannot cry out of fear of the fires of hell, then we should certainly cry at the condition of our souls!⁹

One could read this passage, I suppose, in deliberative terms. Hajja Samira is pressing her listeners to refine their capacities of moral discernment and action, to distinguish what is permissible and what is forbidden. People are discussing and arguing amongst themselves about ethics and the ethical foundation of politics. But does this passage confirm that the mosque movement is a deliberative culture?

Hajj Samira's speech reads differently, I think, if we translate *taqwa* as fear of God. "In the Qur'an, the eschatological fear of God and the Day of Judgment is held to be almost synonymous with true belief, and piety is at

times almost indistinguishable from the capacity to fear.”¹⁰ Mahmood refers her readers to Toshihiko Izutsu’s *Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qur’an*. Izutsu explains: “To believe in God means . . . to fear Him as the Lord of the Day, the austere Judge who will punish the Kafirs [disbelievers] for their obstinate *kufri* with the eternal Hell Fire. The most concise possible formula of definition for ‘believer’ . . . is ‘one who trembles in fear before God.’”¹¹ Izutsu quotes the Qur’an: “Verily, the *abrar* [pious] shall be in [Heavenly] bliss, while the *fujjar* [impious] shall be in the Fire, to roast therein on the Day of Judgment, nor shall they ever be removed therefrom” (82.13-16). Hajja Samira maintains that the pious will go to Paradise and the impious will roast in the fire of hell.

In the *Apology*, Plato has Socrates say that an unexamined life is not worth living. The Socratic ethos means subjecting everything, in principle, to critical scrutiny. Deliberative democrats popularize the Socratic injunction to reflect upon preferences, ideas, values, commitments, traditions, and so forth. Critical deliberation entails weighing on a scale (*libra*, the root of “deliberation”) political values and traditions that may have hitherto been considered sacrosanct. Hajj Samira, on the contrary, does not ask her audience to reflect upon their own, human, concerns: she wants her audience to fear God and the fires of hell. “Hajja Samira’s audience appreciated her not so much for her scholarly knowledge or argumentative logic, but for her ability to transform moral character through engendering in her audience various emotions associated with the divine.”¹² Deliberative democrats may argue that the only salient political question is whether people are politically autonomous, that is, self-legislative in the public sphere. But Hajj Samira is counseling her audience *not* to reflect upon politics in a deliberative manner. “The women I worked with described the condition of piety as the quality of ‘being close to God’: a manner of being and acting that suffuses all of one’s acts, both religious and worldly in character.”¹³ On Mahmood’s account, the women of the mosque movement do not want even a little Socratism.

Deliberative democrats may hesitate to evaluate foreign cultures with Western normative standards. In Andrew F. March’s terms, Dryzek and Sass are doing *rehabilitative* comparative political theory, showing that Egypt has its own form of deliberation. March notes, however, that rehabilitative comparative political theory risks minimizing “the reality of radical disagreement.”¹⁴ I have argued that this is what Dryzek and Sass do in their article. The women in the Egyptian mosque movement prioritize *taqwa* over political deliberation. What should Euro-American political theorists do, if anything, about it?

The Pious in China

Does deliberative democracy exist, in some form, in China? Each author in this symposium answers yes, with qualifications. Dryzek argues that democratic deliberation in China transpires in the public sphere, designed forums, and village life, but not in liberal democratic institutions.¹⁵ Warren and Williams argue that comparative political theory can serve as an “architecture of translation” to help people around the world see themselves as sharing a common fate: soon, Americans and Chinese may forge a global deliberative public. Baogang He contends that the *yuangang* (remonstrating office) and *shuyuan* (academy) serve as Chinese models of deliberative institutions, but He also defends the Chinese practice of “authoritarian deliberation” whereby elites hold the reins of power even if they are willing to debate amongst themselves and before the people.¹⁶ Sor-Hoon Tan differs from the others in that she uses deliberative norms to criticize the non-West, including “the more reprehensible aspects of Confucian political philosophy.”¹⁷ Tan reconceptualizes *yi* (议) as “discussion and thought aimed at evaluation or choice” to reconstruct the Confucian tradition for the modern world. In this section, I show how Daniel A. Bell subverts the thesis that a deliberative ethos does, could soon, or should take root in China. The goal is not to justify Bell’s call for a revival of Confucian political ethics, but rather to show that Euro-American political theorists should not presume that China is already on the road to deliberative democracy.¹⁸

In *China’s New Confucianism*, Bell writes a chapter called “A Critique of Critical Thinking.”¹⁹ The essay combines quotes from *The Analects of Confucius* and insights from Bell’s experience teaching at Tsinghua University in Beijing.²⁰ Bell stages a dialogue about the aims of university education between Professor Kong, a present-day Confucius, and Professor Hu, an avatar of Hu Shih, an early twentieth-century Chinese liberal who studied with John Dewey. Professor Hu argues that citizens need to learn how to criticize old dogmas. The way to teach citizens critical thinking is to use the Socratic method of asking open-ended questions. “We want people to critically reflect upon and assert their legitimate interests in the rough and tumble of democratic politics.”²¹ Professor Kong agrees, in part, that people may differ from each other: “‘Exemplary persons value harmony but not conformity; petty persons value conformity but not harmony’ (*Analects*, 13.23). My ideal is a kind of harmony in diversity.”²² But Professor Kong does not think that philosophers should pursue the truth at the cost of other social values. Professor Kong maintains that the Socratic method contributes to discord in the classroom and the community:

I worry about the Socratic method. Too often, the student can be subject to ruthless scrutiny. The aggressive questioning techniques often lead to the shaming of students and an adversarial approach between teacher and student. . . . If Socrates had been more concerned with harmony, he wouldn't have made so many enemies, nor would he have paid with his life to defend his ideals.²³

In *China's New Confucianism*, Bell sides with Confucius against Socrates. The Socratic method prizes originality at the expense of harmony, individual excellence at the expense of responsibility to family, friends, and the community. "Confucius says, 'Filial and fraternal responsibility is the root of humanity and compassion' (*Analects* 1.2)."²⁴ For Bell, the Chinese should ground their political ethos on filial piety rather than critique, respect for elderly parents rather than a desire to subvert their beliefs and practices.

In *Beyond Liberal Democracy*, Bell argues that the differences between the political cultures of China and the West arise, in part, from the legacies of physical education in ancient Greece and ancient China. Ancient Greece had a maritime economy where aristocrats had leisure to pursue a *vita activa* in the polis. To train for an active life of political contestation, Greek youth competed in solitary, aggressive games where one winner accumulated all of the glory. Ancient Greeks idealized competition and citizenship, and such ideals persist in the notion that ordinary people ought to debate about and participate in politics. Ancient China, on the contrary, had an agrarian economy where almost everybody, including aristocrats, had to work, and so few people dedicated time to politics or sports. Ancient Chinese schools taught ritual, music, archery, charioteering, reading, and math, but there was no analogue to the Greek Olympics of staged competitions between independent polities. Ancient Chinese valued perfecting oneself when, say, shooting a bow, and insisted on good manners when greeting other archers. For the ancient Chinese, intellectual and ethical training was more important than physical excellence, a legacy that persists in the Confucian ideal of rule by scholar elites. Once again, Bell writes to illuminate, and affirm the superiority of, Chinese to Greek values. "The Greek ideal of citizenship is tightly linked to the glorification of warfare and underpins a highly competitive mode of life, including macho pride in athletic rivalry."²⁵ East Asian societies grounded upon the ideals of harmony, humility, and deference should not adopt a competitive ethos in the political arena.

For my purposes, I assume that Bell's reading of the Chinese political mindset is accurate enough to pose a challenge to each of the authors in this symposium, with the exception of Baogang He.²⁶ (1) Against Dryzek, Bell argues that deliberative democracy, with a few exceptions at the level of the village, is both unrealistic and a betrayal of the Confucian meritocratic ideal.

Bell, in fact, calls upon the Chinese to go in the opposite direction and create a Confucian upper house of Parliament (*Xianshiyuan*, House of Virtue and Talent) where elites can “deliberate” amongst themselves.²⁷ (2) Against Warren and Williams, Bell argues that the notion of a global democratic public originates in a Christian culture that praises the Good Samaritan. “The Confucian perspective is that feelings are extended to others, but with diminishing intensity. In cases of distress, help would be provided first and foremost to intimates, not strangers.”²⁸ Bell, I gather, would encourage Warren and Williams to learn more about Chinese culture rather than assume that their vision of global democracy is universal. (3) Against Sor-Hoon Tan, Bell argues that democracy is “the most sacred of modern Western values” but that does not mean that it is ethically or practically a good system for China.²⁹ (4) Bell praises Baogang He’s concept of authoritarian deliberation.³⁰

Baogang He lays out several reasons why the Chinese Communist Party encourages deliberation, including to improve governance, enhance authority, and generate legitimacy. “Only under the party’s leadership are people allowed to examine and discuss public policies. Public participation with regard to processes of consultation and deliberation must be not only orderly, but also reasonable.” In other words, the CCP permits deliberation if and only if it increases its power. “From ancient times to today, all deliberation in China has required an authoritarian power to deal with divisions arising from that deliberation.” “In the Ming Dynasty, remonstrating officers were not so lucky, some were ordered to be killed.” “Even today, Xi Jinping, the President of China, has stressed the point of doing concrete things rather than engaging in empty talk.” If one connects the dots between these statements, one sees a flattering picture of a single leader or party determining what qualifies as worthy or empty talk. It is noteworthy that Baogang He does not mention, much less defend, Chinese dissidents such as Ai Weiwei or Chen Guangcheng. Cultural sensitivity may lead deliberative democrats to run the risk of justifying repressive regimes.

In the next section, I will argue that universities may spread a Socratic political ethos among young elites and, eventually, a wider population. Now, I wish to address the objection that this move constitutes its own form of parochialism and imperialism. In an article entitled “Histories of Thought and Comparative Political Theory: The Curious Thesis of ‘Chinese Origins for Western Knowledge,’ 1860-1895,” Leigh Jenco argues that most Euro-American political theorists do not give foreign knowledge its due, studying it merely to disturb universalist assumptions, enhance self-reflection, or show respect for other cultures. Jenco thinks that we may learn a lesson from the

Yangwu reformers who sought to reform the Confucian civil service curriculum around 1860.

Learning from difference, as they do, ascribes that difference with authority to act-as-a-model (*fa*) for their own transformation and inquiry; difference is not simply targeted as a source of new solutions to old questions whose parameters remain uninterrogated. The result is a radical reversal: ‘The Occident is no longer seen through Confucian lenses, but instead Confucius is understood through Western eyes.’

Jenco’s point is more about how political theorists ought to approach foreign knowledge than what they should study. Euro-American political theorists should be receptive to the possibility of conversion, learning, for instance, to look at the West through Confucian lenses.³¹ Rather than maintain self/foreign binaries, in which we view ourselves as bound by “our” historical tradition, political theorists “must act as if Chinese thought has a Western origin—or at least treat it as ‘ours.’” Good comparative political theory “explodes . . . foreign/indigenous dichotomies.” Why begin an essay in a symposium taking political theory “beyond the West” with an episode from Plato’s *Republic*? It might be more fruitful to discipline ourselves according to Chinese scholarly norms.³²

Comparative political theorists face a judgment call about when to understand another culture on its own terms and when to propose new possibilities for it. I agree with Jenco that Euro-American political theorists ought to study other intellectual-political traditions and be open to changing our own ways of thinking and acting. But I also think one should use a very fine file, not a sledgehammer, when working at the boundaries of one’s identity.³³ I am a Euro-American political theorist. Plato’s *Republic* was the first book I read in college, my academic training has been in Anglo-American and Continental political theory, and I have spent much of my life competing in a “Greek” sport. I do not defend agonistic deliberation because it is right or true: I have been educated to cherish it, and I do. My ethico-political sensibility would probably be different if I was born in Egypt or China. Be that as it may, I dread a world where Socratic dissidents may not challenge communal pieties. Here is one idea for how to protect them.

The Idea of a University

Plato’s solution to the Cephalus problem, in part, was to found an Academy to shelter philosophers from the old-fashioned and train gentlemen (*kaloikagathoi*) to lead the city. In this section, I argue that modern universities may

likewise house critical thinkers and nurture a love for political debate in different parts of the world. Deliberative democrats, understandably, hesitate imposing their own worldviews on other peoples; at the same time, “it is hard to imagine a deliberative democracy without a well-functioning and if necessary critical public sphere.”³⁴ One task of *political* philosophy is to convince other people to change their thoughts and behavior in ways that make possible political deliberation. In this section, I draw upon John Henry Newman’s *The Idea of a University* for insights on how to spread a deliberative ethos in a pious culture.

Newman (1801–1890) presided over the founding of a Roman Catholic university in Dublin, Ireland. In 1852, he delivered a series of lectures, *Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education Addressed to the Catholics of Dublin*, which he subsequently supplemented with additional essays and republished as *The Idea of a University*. In his lectures, Newman aims to convince a Catholic lay audience to support an institution that teaches a liberal arts curriculum and that is modeled upon Oxford University.³⁵ Why should parents send their children to a university that will not teach them vocational skills, may encourage them to question their parents’ ways of doing things, and may raise them to look and act like children of other religions and places?

Newman offers several arguments for why universities should primarily teach the liberal arts rather than vocational skills, religious instruction, and what are now called the STEM disciplines. The Aristotelian argument is that knowledge is “an end sufficient to rest in and to pursue for its own sake.”³⁶ The main purpose of a university education is to inculcate “freedom, equitableness, calmness, moderation, and wisdom,” in sum, “a philosophical habit.”³⁷ A liberal arts education turns an unpolished youth into a gentleman, someone with “a cultivated intellect, a delicate taste, a candid, equitable, dispassionate mind, a noble and courteous bearing in the conduct of life;—these are the connatural qualities of a large knowledge.”³⁸ Though this argument may be close to Newman’s heart, parents who do not already appreciate the liberal arts are likely to remain unmoved.

The next argument is that the liberal professions such as law and medicine pay more, as a rule, than manual labor. A “general culture of mind is the best aid to professional and scientific study, and educated men can do what illiterate cannot.”³⁹ A liberal arts education trains a student “to think and to reason and to compare and to discriminate and to analyze” and, thus prepared, a young person may succeed in nearly any science or calling.⁴⁰ The economic argument, however, may leave cold the pious who worry that money corrupts the young.

Newman’s third argument, suitably adjusted, may have the best chance of convincing the pious to enroll their children in a liberal arts education:

Just as a commander wishes to have tall and well-formed and vigorous soldiers, not from any abstract devotion to the military standard of height or age, but for the purposes of war, and no one thinks it any thing but natural and praiseworthy in him to be contemplating, not abstract qualities, but his own living and breathing men; so, in like manner, when the Church founds a University, she is not cherishing talent, genius, or knowledge, for their own sake, but for the sake of her children, with a view to their spiritual welfare and their religious influence and usefulness, with the object of training them to fill their respective posts in life better, and of making them more intelligent, capable, active members of society.⁴¹

This argument does not appeal to the abstract good of the life of the mind nor the base calculations of economic interest. The pious argument is that a liberal arts educated person is well suited to lead the society of which he or she is part. Just as Oxford trains statesmen, industrialists, scientists, businessmen, and so forth, for Protestants and England, Newman argues, the Catholic University of Dublin should train similar leaders for Catholics and Ireland. Comparative political theorists could translate this argument into different vernaculars around the world, not as agents for American or capitalist power, but to promote an ethos of critical deliberation, a precondition for a dialogue among civilizations.

Newman calls the countries around the Mediterranean “the Intellect and Mind of the Human Kind” and the “seat of Civilization.”⁴² In the Euro-American context, however, many academics argue that a proper understanding of civilization encompasses a wide array of cultures and literatures.⁴³ And in non-Western contexts, intellectuals have mined their own civilizations for elements that could justify critical thinking.⁴⁴ Take Sor-Hoon Tan’s article, “Confucian Democracy as Pragmatic Experiment: Uniting Love of Learning and Love of Antiquity.” Confucius claimed to transmit, not create (*Analects* 7.1), for he loved antiquity (*haogu*). But Confucius also “urged his students to ‘make an earnest commitment to the love of learning (*haoxue*) and be steadfast to the death in service to the efficacious way’ (*Analects* 8.13).”⁴⁵ Using this and similar quotes as leverage, Tan argues that those “who wish to see Confucianism flourish again as a positive dimension of Chinese civilization need to approach it pragmatically and democratically.”⁴⁶ A pragmatic reconstruction of Confucianism could justify a deliberative political ethos.

Deliberative democrats moving beyond the West sometimes think that if deliberation cannot be found, then the solution is “looking more closely,” as if the fault resides in our vision rather than the others’ reality.⁴⁷ And yet this approach sometimes elides the Cephalus problem, namely, that some people just don’t want to reflect upon politics. Deliberative democrats should respect

other cultures, of course, but if political theorists believe that political legitimacy rests on reflective citizenship, then they should be missionaries for such a cause.⁴⁸ One way to spread the good news is to teach young people the liberal arts at universities around the world.⁴⁹

Acknowledgments

For comments on an earlier draft, I thank Leigh Jenco, Haimo Li, and Andrew March.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

1. The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines piety as (1) “reverence and obedience to God (or to the gods)” and (2) “faithfulness to the duties naturally owed to one’s relatives, superiors, etc.” The clash between piety (*eusebeia*) and philosophy is the theme of Plato’s *Euthyphro*.
2. See Allan Bloom, “Interpretive Essay,” in *The Republic of Plato*, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1991), 312–15.
3. See John Dryzek et al., “Deliberative Democracy,” in *Encyclopedia of Political Theory*, ed. Mark Bevir, Vol. 1 (Los Angeles: Sage, 2010), 352–56.
4. John Dryzek, “Deliberative Democracy in Different Places,” in *The Search for Deliberative Democracy in China*, ed. Ethan J. Leib and Baogang He (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 23.
5. Kim Sungmoon, “Confucian Citizenship? Against Two Greek Models,” *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 37, no. 3 (2010): 438–56.
6. Saba Mahmood, *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 191.
7. Mahmood, *Politics of Piety*, 5.
8. Samah Selim, “Review of Saba Mahmood, *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject*,” *Jadaliyya* (October 13, 2010).
9. Mahmood, *Politics of Piety*, 141.
10. *Ibid.*, 145.
11. Toshihiko Izutsu, *Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qur’ān* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), 195.
12. Mahmood, *Politics of Piety*, 144.
13. *Ibid.*, 122.

14. Andrew F. March, "What Is Comparative Political Theory?" *Review of Politics* 71, no. 4 (2009): 558.
15. Dryzek, "Deliberative Democracy in Different Places."
16. See also Baogang He and Mark E. Warren, "Authoritarian Deliberation: The Deliberative Turn in Chinese Political Development," *Perspectives on Politics* 9, no. 2 (2011): 269–89.
17. Sor-Hoon Tan, "Beyond Elitism: A Community Ideal for a Modern East Asia," *Philosophy East and West* 59, no. 4 (2009): 544.
18. On how Chinese President Xi Jinping is doubling down on China's authoritarian political model, see Jeremy Page, "'Red Nation': China's Leader Embraces Mao as He Tightens Grip on Country," *Wall Street Journal*, August 17, 2013.
19. Cf. Stephen C. Angle, *Contemporary Confucian Political Philosophy: Toward Progressive Confucianism* (Malden: Polity, 2012).
20. For an attempt to "demythify" Confucianism's relevance to China's political culture, see Charlotte Allen, "Confucius and the Scholars," *Atlantic Monthly* 283, no. 4 (1999): 78–83. On how Confucianism remains a source for East Asian moral, political, economic, and cultural regeneration, see Joseph Chan, "Confucianism and Human Rights," in *Religion and Human Rights*, ed. John Witte Jr. and M. Christian Green (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 87–102.
21. Daniel A. Bell, *China's New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 113.
22. *Ibid.*, 110.
23. *Ibid.*, 122.
24. *Ibid.*, 168.
25. Daniel A. Bell, *Beyond Liberal Democracy: Political Thinking for an East Asian Context* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 148.
26. Cf. Guidi Chen and Tao Chun, *Will the Boat Sink the Water? The Life of China's Peasants* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2007).
27. Bell, *Beyond Liberal Democracy*, ch. 6.
28. *Ibid.*, 217.
29. Daniel A. Bell, "Toward Meritocratic Rule in China? A Response to Professors Dallmayr, Li, and Tan," *Philosophy East and West* 59, no. 4 (2009): 557.
30. Daniel A. Bell, "Deliberative Democracy with Chinese Characteristics: A Comment on Baogang He's Research," in *The Search for Deliberative Democracy in China*, 149–57.
31. See also Leigh Jenco, "'What Does Heaven Ever Say?' A Methods-Centered Approach to Cross-Cultural Engagement," *American Political Science Review* 101, no. 4 (2007): 741–55.
32. Leigh Jenco, "Histories of Thought and Comparative Political Theory: The Curious Thesis of 'Chinese Origins for Western Knowledge,' 1860-1895," *Political Theory* (Forthcoming).
33. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota

- Press, 1987), 160. See also Nicholas Tampio, “The Politics of the Garden (*pairadazea*),” *Theory & Event* 16, no. 2 (2013).
34. Dryzek, “Deliberative Democracy in Different Places,” 31.
 35. On Newman’s conception of the liberal arts, see Timothy Fuller, “The Idea of the University in Newman, Oakeshott, and Strauss,” *Academic Questions* 17, no. 1 (2003): 37–53. On Newman’s claim that theology is the heart of a liberal arts education, see Alasdair MacIntyre, “The Very Idea of a University: Aristotle, Newman and Us,” *New Blackfriars* 91, no. 1031 (2010): 4–19.
 36. John Henry Newman, *The Idea of a University*, ed. Frank M. Turner (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 78.
 37. *Ibid.*
 38. *Ibid.*, 89.
 39. *Ibid.*, 118.
 40. *Ibid.*, 118.
 41. *Ibid.*, 4–5.
 42. *Ibid.*, 168, 169.
 43. Sara Castro-Klarén, “The Paradox of Self,” in *The Idea of a University*, 318–38.
 44. On the possibility that “a new core curriculum global in scope could draw on traditional resources both East and West,” see William Theodore De Bary, *Confucian Tradition and Global Education* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 18.
 45. Sor-Hoon Tan, “Confucian Democracy as Pragmatic Experiment: Uniting Love of Learning and Love of Antiquity,” *Asian Philosophy* 17, no. 2 (2007): 148.
 46. *Ibid.*, 142.
 47. Dryzek, “Deliberative Democracy in Different Places,” 33.
 48. Political theorists beyond the West may model themselves on Jesuits such as Matteo Ricci and Bartolomé de las Casas, outstanding scholars of and advocates for the cultures in which they resided.
 49. It is noteworthy that Chinese “princelings” often send their children to study at elite universities in America and Europe. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s daughter, Xi Mingze, for instance, is currently an undergraduate at Harvard University.

Author Biography

Nicholas Tampio is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Fordham University. He is the author of *Kantian Courage: Advancing the Enlightenment in Contemporary Political Theory* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012).