Research
My first book project, Knowing Our Limits, has been published by Oxford University Press.
Here are a few of my published papers. (A full CV in PDF is available here.)
- “Hanlon’s Razor” (with Peter H. Ditto), Forthcoming, Midwest Studies in Philosophy [+]
- See pre-print version.
- “The Fog of Debate”, Forthcoming, Social Philosophy and Policy [+]
- pre-print version available soon.
- “A Review of Recent Work on Intellectual Humility: A Philosopher’s Perspective”, Forthcoming, Journal of Positive Psychology [+]
- pre-print version available soon.
- “Epistemic Trespassing”, 2019, Mind [+]
- See pre-print version.
- “The Soritical Centipede” (with Terry Horgan), 2019, Nous [+]
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Co-authored with Terry Horgan.
pre-print version to be posted soon.
- “Is Epistemic Permissivism Intuitive?”, 2018, American Philosophical Quarterly [+]
- See pre-print version.
- “Implicit Racial Bias and Epistemic Pessimism” (with Charles Lassiter), 2017, Philosophical Psychology [+]
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Co-authored with Charles Lassiter.
See pre-print version.
- “Verbal Disagreement and Philosophical Skepticism”, 2016, Australasian Journal of Philosophy [+]
- See partial pre-print version. Abstract: Many philosophers have suggested that disagreement is good grounds for scepticism. One response says that disagreement-motivated skepticism can be mitigated to some extent by the thesis that philosophical disputes are often verbal, not genuine. I consider the implications of this anti-sceptical strategy, arguing that it trades one kind of scepticism for others. I conclude with suggestions for further investigation of the epistemic significance of the nature of philosophical disagreement.
- “The Significance of Unpossessed Evidence”, 2015, The Philosophical Quarterly [+]
- See pre-print version. Abstract: By reflecting on evidence we do not have, we gain insight into the epistemic status of beliefs concerning
difficult and disputed matters. The argument offers a novel kind of skeptical challenge, because awareness of unpossessed evidence sometimes undermines rational belief.
- “Debunking Biased Thinkers (Including Ourselves)”, 2015, Journal of the American Philosophical Association [+]
- See official version.
- “David Foster Wallace on the Good Life” (with Justin Tosi), 2015, Freedom and the Self: Essays on the Philosophy of David Foster Wallace [+]
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Editors: S. Cahn and M. Eckert (Columbia UP)
See penultimate draft.
Co-authored with Justin Tosi.
- “Does Luck Have a Place in Epistemology?”, 2014, Synthese [+]
- See pre-print version.
- “Counterfactual Philosophers”, 2014, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research [+]
- See pre-print version.
- “Knockdown Arguments”, 2014, Erkenntnis [+]
- See pre-print version.
- “Schaffer’s Demon” (with Ian Evans), 2013, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly [+]
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See pre-print version.
Co-authored with Ian Evans.
- “Moral Intuitionism Defeated?” (with Joshua Thurow), 2013, American Philosophical Quarterly [+]
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See pre-print version.
Co-authored with Joshua Thurow.
- “Conciliationism and Uniqueness” (with E.J. Coffman), 2012, Australasian Journal of Philosophy [+]
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See pre-print version.
Co-authored with E.J. Coffman.
- “The Problem of Historical Variability”, 2012, Disagreement and Skepticism [+]
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Editor: D. Machuca (Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy), pp. 239-259
See pre-print version.
- “Assurance and Acquaintance”, 2012, Philosophical Studies [+]
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Publication 161.3, pp. 421–431.
See pre-print version.
- “Luck and Interests”, 2012, Synthese [+]
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Publication 185.3, pp. 319-334.
See pre-print version.
- “Anti-luck Epistemology, Pragmatic Encroachment, and True Belief”, 2011, Canadian Journal of Philosophy [+]
- See pre-print version.
- “Uniqueness, Evidence, and Rationality” (with E.J. Coffman), 2011, Philosophers’ Imprint [+]
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Publication 11.18, pp. 1-13.
See pre-print version.
Co-authored with E.J. Coffman.
- “Sosa’s Dream” (with Ian Evans), 2010, Philosophical Studies [+]
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Publication 140.2, pp. 249-252.
See pre-print version.
Co-authored with Ian Evans.
- “Augustine on Testimony” (with Peter King), 2009, Canadian Journal of Philosophy [+]
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Publication 39.2, pp. 195-214.
See pre-print version.
Co-authored with Peter King.