From: Netzero [gklima@netzero.net]
Sent: Wednesday, February 09, 2000 9:21 PM
Subject: RE: questions
-----Original Message-----
Sent: Wednesday, February 09, 2000 7:58 PM
To: gklima@netzero.net
Subject: questions
Please explain the difference between "per se" and "per
accidens" as they apply
to privation.
----------------------------------------
In the first approach, the easiest to understand the difference is if we
understand 'per accidens' as 'coincidental' (and, accordingly, 'per se' as
'non-coincidental'). For example, that a doctor is also a good pianist is
coincidental. There is nothing in his being a doctor that would entail that he
knows how to play the piano. It is definitely not on account of his being a doctor
that he is a pianist. By contrast, that a doctor knows medicine is not
coincidental, on the contrary that's precisely what makes him a doctor (not the
diploma, especially, if his parents just bought it to him). I'll explain the
considerations underlying the systematic distinction, but I think the intuitive
idea is clear. Being an F belongs to a G per se iff being an F belongs to a G
on account of its being a G, otherwise being an F belongs to a G per accidens,
i.e., by coincidence.
In the particular case of privation and matter, that from which the thing to be
generated is to be generated is both the matter of the thing to be generated,
and something lacking the form of the thing to be generated, that is, it is
something being deprived, i.e., having the privation of that form. But it is
not on account of its lacking the form of the thing to be generated that it is
the matter of the thing to be generated, and vice versa. So its lacking the
form is coincidental with its being the matter. For example, an amorphous piece
of bronze lacking the human shape of the statue to be made from it is the
matter of the statue on account of the fact that it is something that is able
to take on the shape of the statue. But it does not have this ability on
account of lacking that shape. Again, it lacks that shape on account of not
having that shape, but it is not the matter of the statue on account of lacking
this shape, but on account of being the kind of stuff that can take on that
shape (as opposed, for instance, to radio waves, or angels, or sounds, which
are just not the kind of things that can take on the shape of a statue, whence
they cannot be the matter of the statue).
OK, again, I hope the intuitive distinction is clear. I'll give a more
systematic, principled explanation in class.
-----------------------------------------------------
Gyula Klima
Associate Professor of Philosophy
Fordham University
Department of Philosophy
Collins Hall
441 E. Fordham Road
Bronx, NY 10458
Office: (718) 817-3286
E-mail: klima@murray.fordham.edu <mailto:klima@murray.fordham.edu>
US: http://www.fordham.edu/gsas/phil/klima/
EU: http://193.225.239.10/~gyula/
Fax: (603) 843-5310
Toll-free fax/voice: (877) 607-8716
Local fax/voice: (914) 612-4458
-----Original Message-----
Sent: Wednesday, February 09, 2000 8:05 PM
To: Netzero
Subject: RE: Aquinas
Dr. Klima...
How is it that "Whatever is per accidens is reduced to
what is per se?"
------------------------------------------
This means that coincidental phenomena are to be explained in terms of their per se causes. To use the example of my previous message, the doctor's ability to play the piano is certainly not explained in terms of his being a doctor, precisely because the former is merely coincidental with the latter in the case of this particular person. But this does not mean that there is absolutely no explanation for the fact that this person is able to play the piano. Obviously, the per se cause of this ability would be his learning and practicing to play, which are certainly merely coincidental with his medical studies and practice, which are per se responsible for his being a doctor.
-----------------------------------------------------
Gyula Klima
Associate Professor of Philosophy
Fordham University
Department of Philosophy
Collins Hall
441 E. Fordham Road
Bronx, NY 10458
Office: (718) 817-3286
E-mail: klima@murray.fordham.edu <mailto:klima@murray.fordham.edu>
US: http://www.fordham.edu/gsas/phil/klima/
EU: http://193.225.239.10/~gyula/
Fax: (603) 843-5310