Lambert of Auxerre: Properties of Terms

 

Introduction

 

Not much is known about the life of Lambert of Auxerre except that he was a Dominican in the Dominican house at Auxerre around the middle of the thirteenth century, and that he wrote a logic text known as Summa Lamberti or just Logica. Lambert is usually grouped with the other, mostly older, terminist logicians of this period - Peter of Spain, William of Sherwood, and Roger Bacon. All wrote roughly similar logic texts. The section translated here is taken from the last chapter of Lambert's Logica.

Medieval logicians took a word's natural property to be signifi­cation, which they understood as a word's presentation of a universal nature to the mind. But a word acquires other properties by being used in various ways in propositions. These other properties include supposition, appellation, copulation, ampliation, and restriction. Supposition is by far the most important of these properties, roughly analogous to reference in twentieth-century terminology. Medieval logicians divided supposition into several subcategories; personal supposition, for example, is a property a term has when it is used to refer to individuals of which it is truly predicable, and simple supposition is the use of a term to refer to the associated universal. Appellation is a property of terms similar to supposition, except that a term appellates only those things that actually exist at the time of utterance and of which the term is truly predicated. Copulation is a property modifiers have by virtue of being linked to nouns either as predicates (e.g., 'The cat is black') or as attributive adjectives (e.g., 'the black cat'). Ampliation is the extension of a term's supposition to a broader range that can be brought about by certain verbs, such as 'can,' that cause the terms to which they are linked to stand also for things that only possibly exist. Restriction, on the other hand, is the contraction of a term's

supposition to a narrower range, brought about, for example, by the tense of the verb linked to the restricted term, as the present tense of the verb in the proposition 'Men are running' restricts the supposition of 'men' to currently existing things.

In the following selection, Lambert explains his general views on signification, the difference between signification and supposition, the nature of supposition, copulation, and syncategorematic words, and the relationship between supposition and copulation. He also analyzes supposition into its various subcategories. The following diagram illustrates his division of supposition:

 

Supposition

natural—accidental

simple—personal

discrete—common

determinate—confused

strong mobile—weak immobile

 

 

After dealing with supposition, Lambert turns to appellation, a common term's reference to the actually existing things the term is truly predicated of. An exception to this general description is given in the complicated rule of appellation Lambert presents and discusses: 'A substantial or accidental common term that is not restricted by any other means and that serves as the subject or the predicate of a present-tense verb that has no ampliating force of its own or from anything else is restricted to suppositing for present things if it has appellata; but if it does not have appellata, it reverts to nonexistents.' Because of the use of restriction in this rule, it leads naturally into a discussion of restriction. Lambert divides restriction into natural and use-governed, and each of these divisions is further subdivided. After a brief discussion of ampli­ation, Lambert ends this section with a detailed consideration of distribution and relatives, notions that figure in the analysis of the properties of terms.

For further reading on the properties of terms, see CHLMP IV.₇, 'The Origins of the Theory of the Properties of Terms,' and IV.₉, 'The Semantics of Terms.'

 

 

 

 

Properties of Terms

 

[I. General Introduction]

 

(205) Because the logician considers terms, it is appropriate for him to give an account of the term itself and its properties, for the person who is to consider something as a subject must consider its properties also. Now, there are many properties of terms: supposition, appellation, restriction, distribution, and relation [anaphora]. Of these, relation should be discussed earlier, but because signification is, as it were, the fulfillment of a term, and the properties of terms are founded on signification, for the sake of clarity in what follows we must at the outset consider what the signification of a term is, and how it differs from supposition.

 

 

 

[2. Signification]

 

[2a. Definition of Signification]

 

The signification of a term is the concept of a thing, a concept on which an utterance is imposed by the will of the person instituting the term. For, as Aristotle maintains in the first book of De interpretatione (16a3-5), utterances are signs of states in the soul - i.e., in the understanding - but concepts are the signs of things.

 

 

[2b. Explanation of the Definition]

 

In order to understand this, it is essential to know that four things are required for an utterance to be significant: a thing, a concept of the thing, an utterance, and the union of the utterance with the concept of the thing. What we are calling the thing is something existing outside the soul, which is apprehended by the soul by means of an idea of it - e.g., a man, or a stone. What we call

the concept of the thing is the idea or likeness of the thing, which exists in the soul; for according to Aristotle in the third book of De anima (III, 8, ₄₃1b30-432a1), not the stone but rather an appearance of the stone is in the soul; and it is by means of the appearance that the soul grasps the thing. The utterance is that which is put forward along with the concept of the thing; in that case a signification is united to the utterance ((voci/vocis)), and the utterance is made significant. And although both the concept of the thing and the utterance are natural in the same way (since they are formed by natural sources), the utterance is nevertheless said to signify by the will of the person instituting it because the union of the concept of the thing with the utterance is effected by the will, and it is in that [action] that the imposition of the utterance consists.

In this way, therefore, an utterance is primarily - in itself - and directly the sign of a concept of the thing; but in addition it is indirectly the sign of the thing. For just as we say that whatever is a cause of the cause is a cause of the thing caused, so we can (206) say that in its own way whatever is a sign of the sign is a sign of the thing signified. Thus, since an utterance is a sign of a concept, and a concept is a sign of a thing, in this way [the utterance] is a sign ((signum/signtficatum)) of the thing as well. An utterance that is a sign of a sign - of a concept - will be a sign of the thing, i.e., signified - i.e., of the thing; it is, however, a sign of the concept directly but a sign of the thing indirectly.

 

 

[2c. The Difference between Signification and Supposition]

 

Now signification differs from supposition in that signification is prior to supposition. For the signification is the concept of the thing represented by means of the utterance, and before the union of it with the utterance there is no term; rather, a term is constituted in the union of that concept of a thing with an utterance. Supposition, on the other hand, is a certain property of a term that has been constituted in that way.

There is another difference, because signification extends only to the thing the term is imposed to signify; supposition, however, extends not only to the thing signified by means of the term but can extend to supposita contained ((contenta/contempta)) under that thing. For example, the signification of 'man' extends only to man, not to the things contained ((contenta/contempta [et passim])) under

man; for 'man' signifies man, not Socrates and not Plato. 'Man' can, nevertheless, supposit for Socrates, and for Plato, and for man.

 

 

 

[3. Supposition]

 

[3a. Four Ways of Using 'Supposition']

 

Next, as regards supposition. It is important to know that 'supposition' is used in four ways. In one way, supposition is said to be the substantive designation or indication of a thing. In a second way, supposition is said to be the acceptance of a proposition as true and proven (it is often taken in this way in disputations). In the third way, supposition is said to be the ordering of a part of an expression in the role of something that something else is said of, as supposition is said to be in a noun with respect to a verb; for [in this sense] a noun supposits relative to a verb, and the verb is said of the noun. (Appellation corresponds to this sort of supposition, and appellation can be said to be a locational arrangement of that which is said of something else.) In the fourth way, supposition is said to be the acceptance of a term for ((pro/per)) itself, for its [signified] thing, for some suppositum contained under its [signified] thing, or for more than one suppositum contained under its [signified] thing.

It is in this fourth way that 'supposition' is meant here, for it is in that way, and not in the three preceding ways, that supposition is a property of a term. For 'supposition' used in the third way is the business of the grammarian, not of the logician. Supposition in the second way belongs to a proposition and not to a term, for in disputations it is not a term but a proposition that is supposited. In the first way, however, supposition is a special kind of signification of a term and not a property of a term. This is evident in the following way. The following predication is true: the substantive signification of a thing is signification. Therefore, since {207} whatever is said of a definition can be said of the thing defined, if the substantive designation or signification of a thing is the definition of supposition, it could be said that supposition is signification. If it is signification, however, it is not the supposition that is a property of terms. Therefore, we are left with the conclusion that 'supposition' used in the first way is not the supposi­tion meant here. That is true, but 'supposition' used in the first way is the signification of a substantive term, and copulation, which is the adjectival signification of a thing, corresponds to this sort of supposition.

 

 

[₃b. Broad and Strict Supposition]

 

It is important to know, however, that the supposition meant here is talked about in two ways: broadly and strictly. Supposition broadly speaking is, as has already been said, the acceptance of a term for itself, or for its [signified] thing (as when one says 'Man is a species,' 'White distinguishes'), or the acceptance of a term for some suppositum or for supposita belonging to its [signified] thing (as if one were to say 'A man is running,' 'A white thing is running'). For when one says 'Man is a species,' 'man' is interpreted for itself or for its [signified) thing, and not for any suppositum; whereas if one says 'A man is running,' it is interpreted for a suppositum. Likewise, when one says 'White distinguishes,' 'white' is interpreted here for itself ((se/re)) or for its [signified] thing; for that predicate applies to white not by reason of a suppositum but by reason of its form. When, however, one says 'A white thing is running,' it is interpreted for a suppositum.

Supposition ((suppositio/supposito)) broadly speaking is divided into supposition strictly speaking and copulation. For broadly speaking both substantival and adjectival terms supposit; strictly speaking, however, supposition is attached to substantival terms and copulation to adjectival terms.

Supposition strictly speaking is the acceptance of a term repre­senting a thing that is stable and stands on its own, an acceptance in accordance with which the term can be interpreted for its [signified] thing, not for a suppositum or any supposita contained under its [signified] thing.

 

 

[3c. Copulation]

 

Copulation is the acceptance of a term representing a dependent thing, an acceptance in accordance with which it can be interpreted for its [signified] thing, or for a suppositum or supposita contained under its [signified] thing. Some words, such as substantival names, supposit a term; others, such as adjectival names used adjectivally, copulate a term. Still others, however, both supposit and copulate: adjectival substantives and those that are adjectival with respect to things but substantival with respect to utterance - such as 'knight,' 'duke,' 'count,' and the like - and, likewise, those that determine a concrete suppositum - such as 'Quirinus,' 'Gradivus,' and 'Enosigeus.' For, as Priscian says in the treatise on the name in Priscian Major (II, 28), 'they do not need the addition of other names.' Thus they can supposit by themselves in that they determine a concrete suppositum by associating it with themselves { 208) - as 'Quirinus' determines Romulus, 'Gradivus' Mars, 'Enosigeus' Neptune. For Quirinus is the same as a spear, and so to be called 'Quirinus' is the same as being said to be armed with a spear; and because Romulus was accustomed to march along at all times armed with a spear, he was called Quirinus. 'Gradivus' comes from 'gradus,' 'step'; and because he goes to battle in step - i.e., in good order - Mars, who is called the god of war, is called Gradivus ((Gradivus/Gravidus)). 'Enosigeus' comes from 'enos,' which means deep, and 'sicheus,' which means silence - as if to say deep silence; and so Neptune, who is the god of the sea, is called Enosigeus from the depth of the sea and the silence there is in the depth of the sea.

 

 

[₃d. Syncategorematic Words]

 

Some words, such as syncategorematic ((sincategorematice/sincate­gorice)) words, neither supposit nor copulate.

 

 

[3e. Signification and Property of a Term]

 

From the things already said it is clear that supposition is both the signification of a term and a property of a term, and copulation likewise. Nevertheless, 'supposition' is taken differently ((om. supponitur vel)) depending on whether it is the signification of a term or a property of a term, and so is copulation, as we have seen. And our concern here is with the supposition and copulation that are properties of terms, not insofar as they are the significations of terms.

 

[3f Supposition and Substantives, Copulation and Adjectives]

 

Again, if anyone asks why supposition is appropriate to sub­stantives and copulation to adjectives, it is clear from the things that have been said what we must say. For suppositing belongs to what stands on its own and to what represents its stable [signified] thing, but to stand on its own and to represent its stable [signified] thing is a property of substantives. Copulating, on the other hand, belongs to what adjoins ((adiacentis/adiectivis)) [something else] and to what represents a dependent thing, but to adjoin and to represent a dependent thing is a property of adjectives. Therefore, speaking strictly, supposition belongs to substantives, but copulation to adjectives.

 

 

[3g. Divisions of Supposition]

 

[3g(i). Natural and Accidental]

 

Supposition is divided first in this way: One sort of supposition is natural, the other accidental.

Natural supposition is what a term has on its own and by its nature. A term is said to have this sort of supposition when it is used by itself- i.e., when it is not joined to any other. But a term having that sort of supposition supposits not only for the things that share its form, but instead for all the things that share, [have shared, and will share] its form - i.e., for present, past, and future things [of that form]. And this supposition is called natural because it is not an extrinsic but an intrinsic propensity; for whatever has an internal source is natural.

Accidental supposition is what a term has from what is adjoined to it, and a term supposits in this supposition in keeping with the requirement of that to which it is adjoined. For if someone says 'A man exists,' ['man'] supposits for present things because it is adjoined to a present-tense verb; if someone says 'A man existed, , for past things; if someone says 'A man will exist,' for future things. And this supposition is called accidental because it inheres in a term extrinsically; for what inheres extrinsically in something is accidental to it.

 

[3g(ii). Simple and Personal]

 

{209) One sort of accidental supposition is simple, the other personal.

Simple supposition is the kind according to which a term is interpreted for itself or for its [signified] thing, without relation to the supposita contained under it. The supposition that is in the term by reason of its form is called simple; and it is because form is of itself simple and indivisible that the supposition that is in a term as a result of form is called simple. (That form is simple and indivisible is established in the book Six Principles [I. I].)

It should be noted, however, that [a term's] having no relation to the supposita can occur either in such a way that there is no sort of relation to them, neither determinately nor indeterminately, or in such a way that there is a relation to them, not determinately, but indeterminately. It is on that basis that one can say that there is a certain sort of simple supposition in which the term is in no way related to the supposita but is interpreted only for its [signified] form. The term 'man' has this sort of supposition when one says 'Man is a species,' and this is simple supposition speaking strictly. But there is another simple supposition in which a common term is not related to the supposita determinately and yet has a relation to them indeterminately. The term 'man' has this sort of supposition when one says 'I know there is a man in England'; similarly, the term 'pepper' when one says 'Pepper is sold here and in Rome.' This, however ((autem/enim)), is called simple supposition less strictly than the first sort.

Personal supposition is [the sort] according to which a term is interpreted for a suppositum or for supposita. It is called personal for the following reason, however: In the case of rational substance a suppositum or individual is the same as a person. For Boethius (Against Eutyches and Nestorius) defines person in this way: A person is an individual substance belonging to rational nature; for an individual in the case of rational substance is a person. And because in the case of other things individuals are picked out in accordance with an analogy drawn from rational things, the supposition in which a term is interpreted for supposita or individuals is called personal - not because all individuals are persons (for only individuals that have to do with rational substance are persons, certainly not other sorts of individuals); but all individuals either are persons or are picked out by analogy with those that are persons.

 

 

[3g(iii). Discrete and Common]

 

One sort of personal supposition is discrete, the other common.

Discrete supposition is what a discrete term has in itself, as in 'Socrates is running' or in something equivalent, as when a com­mon term is taken together with a determinate pronoun, as in 'This man is running.' {210} It is called discrete, however, because a term having such supposition is interpreted for something abso­lutely discrete.

Common supposition is the kind that is appropriate to a com­mon term, and it is called common because it is appropriate to a common term.

 

 

[3g(iv). Determinate and Confused]

 

One sort of common supposition is determinate, the other con­fused.

Determinate supposition is what a common term has when it can be taken equally well for one or for more than one, as when one says 'A man is running.' In that proposition 'man' has determinate supposition because it is true if one man is running or if more than one are running. But it is called determinate because for the truth of a proposition in which ((qua/una)) a common term that has that sort of supposition is used, it is enough that that common term is interpreted necessarily for some suppositum, and it is not required that it be interpreted necessarily for more than one, although in supposition of this sort it can be interpreted for more than one. It is necessary, therefore, that a common term in this sort of supposition be interpreted for one [suppositum] determinately; if it is inter­preted for more than one, that is accidental.

Confused supposition is what a common term has when it is interpreted necessarily for all its supposita or for more than one. It is called confused, however, from the plurality of supposita for which a term having this sort of supposition is interpreted; for where there is plurality there is confusion.

 

[3g(v). Strong Mobile and Weak Immobile]

 

One sort of confused supposition is strong [and] mobile, the other weak [and] immobile.

Strong mobile supposition is what a common term has when it is interpreted for all its supposita necessarily and a [logical] descent can be made under it. This happens when an affirmative universal sign is added directly to a common term, as when one says 'Every man is running,' and likewise when a negative universal sign is added indirectly or directly to a common term, as when one says 'No man is a stone.' For in this latter proposition the term to which the sign 'no' is indirectly ((mediate/immediate)) added - 'stone' - and likewise the one to which it is directly added have strong ((vehementem/vehementer)) mobile confused supposition. For the affirmative universal sign confuses and distributes the term to which it is directly added. When it is indirectly adjoined, however, it confuses but does not distribute. The negative universal sign, on the other hand, confuses and distributes a common term adjoined to it both directly and indirectly.

Similarly, a common term to which negation is directly added has this sort of supposition, as when one says 'Not a man is running,' which is to say 'No man is running.' Indirectly, too, as when one says 'I do not see a man,' which is to say 'No man do I see.

This sort of supposition is called strong because a term that has it cannot {211} be interpreted for more than it is interpreted for. It is called mobile because in connection with a term having this sort of supposition a descent can be made for the supposita contained under it.

Weak immobile supposition is what a common term has when it is interpreted necessarily for more than one suppositum contained under it but not for all, and a descent cannot be made under it. A term to which the affirmative universal sign is indirectly added has this sort of supposition, as when one says 'Every man is an animal.' Here 'animal' has weak immobile confused supposition because 'animal' is not interpreted for all its supposita, nor can a descent be made under it. It is called weak because in connection with such supposition a common term is not interpreted for all its supposita. It is called immobile because one is not allowed to make a descent under a term having that sort of supposition.

Notice that confused supposition is strong whenever it is mobile, but not conversely - mobile whenever it is strong - for it can indeed be strong and immobile. When one says 'Only every man is running,' 'man' has strong but immobile confused supposition; for the exclusive word ((dictio/dicto)) ['only'] added to the distri­buted term impedes it so that a descent cannot be made under it. Similarly, there is confused but immobile supposition when a [distributive] sign is added to a common term in the singular or the plural and it is interpreted collectively, as when one says 'Every man is hauling a boat,' supposing that all the men are hauling a boat, and none of them by himself. Likewise, when one says 'All the apostles are twelve.'

 

[4. Appellation]

 

[4a. Introduction]

 

Because appellation is a kind of supposition, supposition was considered first. Now we must discuss appellation.

 

 

[₄b. Four Ways of Using 'Appellation']

 

Now it is essential to know that 'appellation' is used in four ways. In one way, proper names, or the proper name of any person, is called appellation. In this connection it is said that someone has the appellation 'Peter' or 'William.' Taken in this way, appellation is nothing other than the establishment of an utterance for signifying some complex or noncomplex thing; and 'appellation' is often used this way in obligations, in connection with which it is said that 'A' appellates ((appellare/appellat)) Socrates or appellates that a man is running. 'Appellation' used in the second way is a property of names in accordance with which names are called appellative. In this sense appellation is nothing other than the positing ((positio/ petitio)) of a common nature containing more than one suppositum under it. (Appellation is something common when it belongs to more than one but something proper when it belongs to one.) 'Appellation' used in the third way is the acceptance of a term for a suppositum or {212} for supposita contained under its thing signified, whether or not those supposita are existing things. 'Appellation' taken in this way applies to terms having supposita under them either actually or potentially, and also to names of things signified. Used in the fourth way, 'appellation' is the accep­tance of a term for a suppositum or for supposita actually existing. And it is appellation spoken of in this fourth way that is meant at present.

 

 

[₄c. Appellation and Supposition]

 

It is important to know that appellation as understood here differs from supposition as a superior differs from its inferior or vice versa, because appellation is inferior to supposition  ((suppositionem/ suppositum)); for wherever there is appellation there is supposition, but not vice versa. For appellation, speaking strictly, occurs in a common term only when it is interpreted for a suppositum or for supposita actually existing under it; supposition, on the other hand, can occur both in a discrete term and in a common term when it is interpreted for a suppositum or supposita either actually or potentially existing under it. Supposition can even occur in a common term when it is interpreted for ((pro/per)) itself, without any relation to its supposita. It is for this reason that there can be natural and accidental, discrete and common, simple and personal supposition, as was seen above. (Appellation is always personal supposition, and so just as supposition is superior to personal supposition, and personal supposition is a kind of supposition, [so appellation is a kind of supposition].)

 

 

[₄d. Appellative Words and Appellata]

 

Again, it is important to know that some words are appellative and have appellata on their own - common substantival names are of that sort ((cuiusmodi/cuius)) - whereas others are appellative and have appellata not on their own but in virtue of something else. Common adjectival names are of that sort ((cuiusmodi/cuius)); for they are appellative, but they have appellata only through their substantives because there is individuation in accidents only in virtue of substance. There are other names that are not appellative and have no appellata - e.g., names of things signified, such as 'chimera' and 'goat-stag' - and others that are not appellative but are appellata. Proper names are of chat sort ((cuiusmodi/cuius)), for proper names are called appellata, supposita, and singulars. They are thus named by different names, but for different reasons. They are called appellata because they are appellated or named by their [logical] superiors; for the superiors are predicated of their inferiors according to name and according to definition. For it is right to say 'Socrates is a man'; here the superior is predicated of the inferior explicitly according to its name and implicitly according to definition. Similarly, Socrates is rightly called a mortal rational animal; here the superior is predicated of the inferior explicitly according to definition and implicitly according to name, for the definition of man is mortal rational animal. Therefore the superiors give themselves to their inferiors {213} because they are predicated of them according to name and definition. They also give their names to them because they are predicated of them according to name and definition, since the superiors give their names to the inferiors. They are called appellata because they are named or appellated by them. They are called supposita because they are 'put under' (supponuntur) their superiors or made into subjects for them. They are called singulars, however, because they name something discrete and individual, which applies to one thing singularly.

 

 

[4e. Appellation and Existence]

 

It is important to know, however, that appellata are not properly so-called unless they are actual existents; for what is, and not what is not, is properly appellated. And so it is right to say that appellation is for existent supposita or for an [existent] suppo­situm.

 

 

[4f Appellation and Common Terms]

 

Again, it is important to know that appellation applies only to a common term; for it is a property of a common term (and not of any other term) to have appellata. But sometimes [appellation] applies to it for its supposita - i.e., when by the addition of a sign [the term] is distributed for its actually existing supposita, as when one says 'Every man is running' - but sometimes it applies to it determinately for some one of its supposita - i.e., when nothing that distributes it is assigned to it but it stands determinately, [as] when one says 'A man is running.

 

[4g. Substantial and Accidental Terms]

 

Again, for the clarification of the rules that are laid down in connection with appellations it is important to know that some names or terms are substantial, such as substantival names, others accidental, such as adjectival names. And as far as predication ((appositio/appellatio)) is concerned, there is no difference between accidental and substantial terms, since accidental and substantial terms are predicated in the same way, no matter what tense the verb to which they are added ((addantur/addatur)) may be in. Similarly, where serving as a subject (suppositio) is concerned, there is no difference between substantial and accidental terms with a present-tense verb, for substantial and accidental terms serve as subjects in the same way when they are added to a present-tense verb. But there is a difference between accidental and substantial terms as far as serving as a subject is concerned with a past- or future-tense verb. This will become clear in the following rules.

 

 

[4h. Rule 1]

 

The first rule is this:

 

[Rule 1] A substantial or accidental common term that is not restricted by any other means and that serves as the subject or the predicate of a present-tense verb that has no ampliating force of its own or from any­thing else is restricted to suppositing for present things if it has appellata; but if it does not have appellata, it reverts to nonexistents ((existentes/ existentiam)).

 

For an explanation of this rule it is important to know [these things]. 'Common term' is used in it because of the difference between it and a discrete term, which cannot be restricted or ampliated. 'Substantial or accidental' is used in it because there is no difference between {214} a substantial and an accidental term serving as a subject with a present-tense verb. 'Not restricted by any other means' is used in it because in virtue of something added to a term serving as the subject ((supponenti/suppositi)) of a present-tense verb the term can indeed supposit for something other than a present thing (for instance, when one says 'A man who has been is, 'man' serves as the subject of the verb 'is,' and yet because of the modifying clause used there it supposits for a past thing). 'Serves as the subject or the predicate' is used in it because there is no difference between a substantial and an accidental term when it serves as the subject or the predicate of a present-tense verb. 'Of a present-tense verb' is used in it because of the difference between it and a verb of any other tense, for a term when added to a present-tense verb supposits differently from the way it supposits when added to a verb of any other tense. 'That has no ampliating force' is used in it because of the difference between it and verbs that do have ampliating force (such ((ut/et)) as 'can,' 'is thought about,' 'is praised').

(Thus if one says 'A man can run, 'man' is ampliated in that case to supposit for present and future things; likewise when one says 'A man is thought about,' it supposits for present and future things. But in order to recognize which verbs ampliate and which ones do not, it is important to know that an action can be related to substance in two different ways: in one way as regards that in which it is and of which it is stated - as when one says 'Socrates is running,' where the running that is in Socrates and is said of Socrates is stated relative to or is related to Socrates - in the other way as regards that of which it is stated although it is not in it - as when one says 'Caesar is praised,' where the praise is stated of Caesar and yet is not in Caesar but in the one doing the praising. Similarly, when one says 'A chimera is thought about' - i.e., is a being in thought - where the thought is stated of the chimera and yet is not in the chimera but in the one doing the think­ing. Similarly, when one says 'Antichrist can exist,' where the potentiality for existing is stated of Antichrist. It must be said, therefore, that the verbs that signify an action that is related to the subject, is in the subject, and is said of the subject do not ampliate; but those that signify an action that is related to the subject of which it is said but is not in the subject do ampliate.)

'Of its own or from anything else' is used in the rule because there are certain verbs that have ampliating force on their own, as is evident, but there are others that have ampliating force from an adjunct - e.g., if one says 'A man is thinkable,' 'man' is ampliated, but not because ((quia/hic)) the verb 'is' has ampliating force of its own; rather, [the ampliating force comes] from the adjunct 'thinkable.' 'Is restricted to suppositing for present things' is used in it in order to show that a present-tense verb restricts a term added to it to present things ((presentes/presens)) and not to others. 'If [it has] appellata' is used in it because there are certain {21 5} common terms that have more than one appellatum at once in actuality -e.g., 'man,' 'donkey' - there are others, however, that do not have more than one appellatum at once or successively, but are unique terms ((unici termini/unicum terminum)) - e.g., sun and 'moon. (There is another common term that never has more than one appellated suppositum at once in actuality but always just one successively and not simultaneously, although it can indeed have more than one - i.e.,  phoenix.') Therefore, when there is a common term that has a unique appellatum or more than one appellatum, and it serves as the subject of a present-tense verb that has no ampliating force, it always supposits for the appellatum or for the appellata it actually has ((habet/habent)), but it never supposits for any nonexistent thing or things. On the other hand, if it does not have appellata, then it does revert to nonexistent things - i.e., if a common term ((si terminus/situs)) serves as the subject of a present-tense verb and does not have appellata, then it is necessary for it to revert to nonexistent things - i.e., [it is necessary] that it supposit for nonexistent things. Thus, if we suppose that no rose exists, if someone says 'Every rose exists,' the term 'rose' supposits for nonexistent things.

In brief, therefore, it can be said that the point of the rule stated above is this: When a common term serves as the subject of a present-tense verb and there is no impediment either on the part of the term or on the part of the verb, then the term always supposits for existing things if it has appellata; but if it does not have any, then it supposits for nonexistent things.