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## Thomas Aquinas on Illumination vs. Abstraction

### *Summa Theologiae*

Part I, Question 84. How the soul, while joined to the body,  
knows material things

Article 5. Does the intellectual soul know material things in the divine ideas?

*The first point:*<sup>1</sup> 1. It would seem that the intellectual soul does not know material things in the divine ideas. For there must be prior and better knowledge of that in which a thing is known. Now the intellectual soul of man, in his earthly life, does not know the divine ideas – for it does not know God, in whom these ideas exist, but is, according to Dionysius,<sup>2</sup> *united to him as to the unknown*. Therefore the soul does not know everything in the divine ideas.

2. Again, in Scripture<sup>3</sup> it is said that *the invisible things of God are there for the mind to see in the things he has made*. But among the invisible things of God are the divine ideas. Thus these divine ideas are known through material created things and not the other way around.

3. Again, the divine ideas are precisely that – ideas. For Augustine says,<sup>4</sup> that *ideas are the patterns of things existing unchanged in the divine mind*. Therefore if we say that the intellectual soul knows everything in the divine ideas, we revive the opinion of Plato who held that all knowledge is derived from Ideas.

*On the other hand*, there is Augustine's saying,<sup>5</sup> *If we both see that what you say is true, and if we both see that what I say is true, where, I ask, do we see it? Certainly I do not see it in you, nor you in me, but both in the unchangeable truth itself, which is above our minds*. But the unchangeable truth is contained in the divine ideas. Therefore the intellectual soul knows all truths in the divine ideas.

1 Cf. 1a. 12, 11 ad 3.

2 *De mystic. theol.* 3. PG 3, 1001.

3 Romans 1: 20.

4 *Lib.* 83 *quæst.* 46 PL 40, 30.

5 *Confessions* XII, 25. PL 32, 840.

*Reply:* As Augustine says,<sup>6</sup> *If those who are called philosophers said by chance anything that was true and consistent with our faith, we must claim it from them as from unjust possessors. For some of the doctrines of the pagans are spurious imitations or superstitious inventions, which we must be careful to avoid when we renounce the society of the pagans.* Accordingly Augustine, who was steeped in the doctrines of the Platonists, whenever he found anything in their statements consistent with the Faith he accepted it, but amended what he found hostile.

Now Plato, as was said above, held that the forms of things subsist of themselves separate from matter. He called these Ideas and said that our intellects know everything by participation in them; thus, as corporeal matter becomes stone by participation in the Idea of stone, so, by participation in the same Idea, our intellects know stone. However, since it seems alien to the Faith that the forms of things should subsist of themselves, outside things and without matter – as the Platonists held, saying that ‘life as such’ and ‘wisdom as such’ are creative substances (according to Dionysius<sup>7</sup>) – Augustine substituted<sup>8</sup> in place of these Ideas which Plato posited the ideas of all creatures existing in the divine mind. All things are formed according to these, and in addition the human soul knows everything according to them.

Thus when the question is asked: Does the human soul know everything in the divine ideas?, the reply must be that one thing can be spoken of as known in another in two ways: first, as in an object itself known, for instance, when one may see in a mirror things whose images are reflected there. In this sense the soul, in its earthly state of life, cannot see everything in the divine ideas; on the other hand, the blessed who see God and everything else in God do thus know everything in the divine ideas. Secondly, a thing is spoken of as known in another as in a principle of knowledge; for instance, we might say that things seen by sunlight are seen in the sun. In this sense we must say that the human soul knows everything in the divine ideas, and that by participation in them we know everything. For the intellectual light in us is nothing more than a participating likeness of the uncreated light in which the divine ideas are contained.

*Many say: Who will give us sight of happiness?*<sup>9</sup> and the Psalmist replies to the question, *The light of your face, Lord, is signed upon us*, as if to say, by the seal of the divine light in us everything is made known to us.

Nevertheless, since besides the intellectual light which is in us, species taken from things are required for our knowledge of material things, we do not have this merely by participation in the divine ideas in the way in which Platonists held that mere participation in the Ideas sufficed for knowledge. And so Augustine asks,<sup>10</sup> *For pray, because philosophers dispute most truly, and persuade us by most certain proofs, that all things temporal are made after ideas that are eternal, are they therefore able to see clearly in these ideas, or to collect from them, how many kinds of animals there are, what are the seeds of each in their beginnings? Have they not sought out all these things through the actual history of places and times?*

Moreover, that Augustine did not understand everything to be known in the divine ideas or in the unchangeable truth in the sense that the divine ideas themselves were seen is clear

6 *De doctrina christiana* II, 40. PL 34, 63.

7 *De divinis nominibus* 11. PG 3, 956. lect. 6.

8 *Lib. 83 quæst.* 46. PL 40, 30.

9 *Psalms* 4: 6–7.

10 *De Trinitate* IV, 16. PL 42, 902.

from what he writes,<sup>11</sup> *Not any and every rational soul can be called worthy of that vision, namely of the divine ideas, but only one that is pure and holy* – such as are the souls of the blessed.

From all this the replies to the objections are evident.

Article 6. Is intellectual knowledge taken from sensible things?

*The first point:*<sup>12</sup> 1. It would seem that intellectual knowledge is not taken from sensible things. For Augustine says<sup>13</sup> that *we cannot expect to acquire the pure truth from the corporeal senses*, and he proves this in two ways. First, from the fact that *whatever a corporeal sense attains is changing, and this without any lapse of time; but if something does not remain the same, it cannot be perceived*. Secondly, from the fact that *everything that we sense by means of the body we also receive in images, even when the things are not present to the senses (as for instance in sleep or in a range)*. Yet *we cannot distinguish by means of the senses whether we are perceiving the sensible things themselves or false images, and nothing can be perceived which is indistinguishable from what is false*.

He thus concludes that truth cannot be expected from the senses. But intellectual knowledge does apprehend the truth. Therefore intellectual knowledge should not be looked for from the senses.

[ . . . ]

Part I, Question 85. The Mode and Order of Understanding

Next to be considered are the mode and order of understanding, and with respect to these there are eight issues for discussion:

1. whether our intellect understands by abstracting species from sense images;
2. whether the species abstracted from images are related to our intellect as *what* is understood or as *that whereby* things are understood;
3. whether our intellect naturally understands first the more universal;
4. whether our intellect can understand more than one thing at a time;
5. whether our intellect understands by combining and separating;
6. whether the intellect can be in error;
7. whether, with respect to the same reality, one can have a better understanding than another;
8. whether our intellect knows the indivisible before the divisible.

Article 1. Does our intellect understand material, corporeal realities by abstraction from sense images?

*The first point:*<sup>14</sup> 1. It would seem that our intellect does not understand material and corporeal realities by abstraction from sense images. For if one understands an object otherwise than as it really is then he is in error. But the forms of material things are not abstract, set

11 *Lib. 83 quæst. 46. PL 40, 30.*

12 *cf De veritate x, 6. Quodl. viii, 2, 1. Compend. Theol. 81.*

13 *Lib. 83 quæst. 9. PL 40, 13.*

14 *Cf. 1a. 12, 4, CG, ii, 77. In Meta. ii, lect. 1.*

apart from the particulars represented by sense images. Therefore if we understand in abstraction species from sense images, our intellect will be in error.

2. Again, material things are natural things, requiring matter in their definition. Now nothing can be understood without something which is required for its definition. Hence material things cannot be understood without matter. But matter is the principle of individuation. Therefore material things cannot be understood by abstracting the universal from the particular, which is the same as abstracting species from sense images.

3. Again, Aristotle says<sup>15</sup> that sense images have the same relation to the intellectual soul that colour has to sight. But seeing does not take place by abstracting images from colours, but by colours being impressed on the sight. Neither, therefore, does understanding happen by way of something being abstracted from sense images, but by an impression made on the intellect by sense images.

4. Again, as Aristotle says,<sup>16</sup> in the intellectual soul there are two faculties: namely, the possible and the agent intellects. But the function of the possible intellect is not that of abstracting species from images but of receiving species already abstracted. Neither, however, does it seem to be the function of the agent intellect: it has the same relation to sense images that light has to colours, which is not that of abstracting anything from colours but rather of streaming out to them. Therefore in no way do we understand by abstracting from sense images.

5. Again, Aristotle says<sup>17</sup> that the intellect *thinks the forms in the images*. Not therefore, by abstracting them.

*On the other hand*, Aristotle says<sup>18</sup> that *as realities are separable from matter, so is it with their being understood*. Therefore material realities must be understood precisely as abstracted or set apart from matter and from material likenesses such as sense images.

*Reply:* As was said earlier,<sup>19</sup> knowable objects are proportioned to knowing faculties, and there are three levels of such faculties. First, one kind of cognitive faculty is the form of a corporeal organ: such is sense. Accordingly, the object of every sense faculty is a form existing in corporeal matter, and so, since this sort of matter is the principle of individuation, all the faculties of the sense part of man only know particulars.

A second kind of cognitive faculty is neither the form of a corporeal organ nor in any way joined to corporeal matter; such is an angel's intellect. Accordingly, its object is a form subsisting without matter, for although angels can know material things, they see them only in something immaterial, namely either in themselves or in God.

The human intellect stands in the middle. It is not the form of an organ, although it is a faculty of the soul which is the form of a body, as is clear from what was said earlier.<sup>20</sup> Accordingly, it is proper for it to know forms which, in fact, exist individually in corporeal matter, yet not precisely as existing in such or such individual matter. Now to know something which in fact exists in individuated matter, but not as existing in such or such matter

15 *De Anima* III, 7. 431a14.

16 *De Anima* III, 5. 430a14.

17 *Ibid* III, 7. 431b2.

18 *Ibid* III, 4. 429b21.

19 1a. 84, 7.

20 1a. 76, 1.

is to abstract a form from individual matter, represented by sense images. Thus we have to say that our intellect understands material things by abstraction from sense images.

Through material things known in this way we come to a limited knowledge of immaterial realities, just as, in the contrary way, angels know material realities by way of the immaterial.

Now Plato, paying attention only to the immateriality of the human intellect and not to the fact that it is somehow joined to a body, held that the object of the intellect is immaterial Ideas, and that we understand, as we have mentioned,<sup>21</sup> not by abstraction, but by participation in abstract entities.

Hence: 1. Abstraction occurs in two ways: one, by way of combining and separating, as when we understand one not to be in another or to be separate from it; two, by way of a simple and absolute consideration, as when we understand one without considering the other at all.

And so although for the intellect in the first way to abstract objects which in reality are not abstract is not without falsehood, it is not in the second way, as clearly appears with sensible realities. For example, were we to understand or say that colour does not exist in a coloured body, or that it exists apart from it, there would be falsehood in the opinion or statement. Whereas were we to consider colour and its properties, without any consideration of the apple which has colour, and go on to express verbally what we thus understand, the opinion or statement would be without falsehood. For being an apple is not part of the definition of colour, and thus nothing prevents colour from being understood apart from the apple being understood.

I claim likewise that whatever pertains to the definition of any species of material reality, for instance stone or man or horse, can be considered without individuating conditions which are no part of the definition of the species. And this is what I mean by abstracting the universal from the particular, the idea from sense images, to consider the nature of a species without considering individuating conditions represented by sense images.

Therefore when it is said that that understanding is false, which understands a thing other than as it is, the statement is true if 'other than' refers to the thing understood. For the understanding is false whenever one understands a thing to be other than it is; hence the understanding would be false if one should so abstract the species of stone from matter that he would understand it to exist apart from matter, as Plato held.

The proposition, however, would not be true if 'other than' were taken as referring to the one understanding. For there is no falsity if the mode of understanding in the one who understands is different from the mode of existing in the thing – a thing understood is in the one who understands in an immaterial way, according to the mode of the intellect, and not in a material way, according to the mode of a material reality.

2. Some have thought that the species<sup>22</sup> of a natural thing is all form, that matter is not a part of the species; but if this were so, matter would not be included in definitions of natural things.

Another way of speaking is thus required, distinguishing between two kinds of matter, *common* and *designated* or *individual*: *common* would be, for instance, flesh and bones, and *individual* this flesh and these bones. The intellect abstracts the species of a natural thing from individual sensible matter, but not from common sensible matter. Thus it abstracts the species

21 1a. 84, 1.

22 As an incidental characteristic, an *accidens* or 'accident'.

of man from this flesh and these bones which do not pertain to the definition of the specific nature – they are, rather, as Aristotle says, parts of the individual. The specific nature therefore can be considered without them. However, the species of man cannot be abstracted by the intellect from flesh and bones as such.

Mathematical species, on the other hand, can be abstracted by the intellect from both individual and common *sensible matter* – though not from common (but only individual) *intelligible matter*. For *sensible matter* means corporeal matter as underlying sensible qualities – hot and cold, hard and soft, etc. – whereas *intelligible matter* means substance as underlying quantity. Now it is obvious that quantity inheres in substance, before sensible qualities do. Hence quantities – numbers, dimensions, shapes (which are boundaries of quantities) – can be considered apart from sensible qualities, and this is precisely to abstract them from sensible matter. They cannot, however, be considered apart from an understanding of *some* substance as underlying quantity – which would be to abstract them from common intelligible matter – though they can be considered apart from this or that substance – which is to abstract them from individual intelligible matter.

Finally, some things – such as being, oneness, potentiality and actuality, etc. – can be abstracted even from common intelligible matter, as is evident in immaterial substances.

Plato, however, since he gave no consideration to the two modes of abstraction mentioned above, held that all the things we have spoken of as abstracted by the intellect exist in reality as abstract entities.

3. Colours, as existing in individual corporeal matter, have the same mode of existence as the faculty of sight. Consequently, they can impress their likeness on sight. Sense images, on the contrary, since they are likenesses of individuals and exist in corporeal organs, do not have the same mode of existence as the human intellect – as is obvious from what has been said. Consequently, they cannot, of their own power, make an impression on the possible intellect.

However, in virtue of the agent intellect and by its turning to sense images (which, in turn, represent the realities of which they are images), a likeness is effected in the possible intellect, but only with respect to the specific nature. And it is thus that species are said to be abstracted from sense images, and not as though a form, numerically the same as the one that existed before in the sense images, should now come to exist in the possible intellect in the way in which a body is taken from one place and transferred to another.

4. Sense images are illuminated by the agent intellect and further, by its power, species are abstracted from them. They are illuminated because sense images, by the power of the agent intellect, are rendered apt to have intellectual intentions or species abstracted from them, just as man's sense part receives heightened power from being joined to his intellectual part. The agent intellect, moreover, abstracts species from images, in that by its power we can consider specific natures without individuating conditions, and it is by likenesses of these natures that the possible intellect is informed.

5. Our intellect both abstracts species from sense images – in so far as it considers the natures of things as universal – and yet, at the same time, understands these in sense images, since it cannot understand even the things from which it abstracts species without turning to sense images, as mentioned before.<sup>23</sup>

23 1a. 84, 7.

Article 2. Do species abstracted from sense images stand in relation to our intellect as what is understood?<sup>24</sup>

*The first point.*<sup>25</sup> 1. It would seem that species abstracted from sense images do stand in relation to our intellect as *that which* is understood. For what is actually understood exists in the one who understands; it is, in fact, identical with the intellect as actualized. But of the thing understood there is nothing in the intellect which understands except the abstracted species. Therefore this species is what is actually understood.

2. Again, what is actually understood must exist in something, or else it would simply not exist. But it does not exist in anything outside the soul, for, since things outside the soul are material, nothing in them can be what is actually understood. Therefore it follows by exclusion that what is actually understood is in the intellect, and thus that it is nothing other than the species mentioned.

3. Again, Aristotle says<sup>26</sup> that *spoken words are the symbols of things experienced in the soul*. But words signify things understood, since we use words precisely to signify what we understand. Therefore things experienced in the soul, namely species, are the things actually understood.

*On the other hand*, a species has the same relation to the intellect as a sensible image to the senses. But sensible images are not *what* is sensed; they are rather *that by which* sensation takes place. Therefore the species is not *what* is understood, but *that by which* the intellect understands.

*Reply:* Some have held that our cognitive faculties know only what is experienced within them, for instance, that the senses perceive only the impressions made on their organs. According to this opinion the intellect understands only what is experienced within it, i.e., the species received in it. Thus, again according to this opinion, these species are *what* is understood.

The opinion, however, is obviously false for two reasons. First, because the things we understand are the same as the objects of science. Therefore, if the things we understand were only species existing in the soul, it would follow that none of the sciences would be concerned with things existing outside the soul, but only with species existing in the soul. (It may be recalled how the Platonists held that all the sciences are concerned with Ideas, which they said were things actually understood.)

Second, because a consequence would be the error of the ancient philosophers who said that *all appearances are true*,<sup>27</sup> implying that contradictory opinions could at the same time be true. For if a faculty knows only what is experienced within it, that only is what it can

24 St Thomas is now turning to a consideration of 'representationalism' – the theory that the objects of our knowledge are ideas or images impressed on the mind of the knower. He implicitly attributes the idea to the 'ancients', a term usually reserved for the Presocratics, and to a lesser extent (and only in a very limited way) to Plato. Since these historical attributions are very uncertain, however, it seems likely that the article is to be explained historically in one of two ways. Either the opinion was held by some of St Thomas's contemporaries, otherwise unidentified; or else he raises the question as a possibility to be derived from other doctrines that were being held.

25 Cf. *De veritate* x, 9, CG IV, 11. In *De anima* III, lect. 8.

26 *Peri Hermeneias* I, 1. 16a3.

27 Aristotle, *Metaphysics* III, 5. 1009a8.

discern. Now a thing 'appears' in accord with the way a cognitive faculty is affected. Therefore the discernment of a cognitive faculty will always judge a thing to be what it discerns, namely, what is experienced within it, and accordingly every judgment will be true.

For instance, if the sense of taste perceives only what is experienced within it, then when a man whose sense of taste is healthy discerns that honey is sweet, his judgment will be true. Similarly, if a sick man, whose sense of taste is affected, experiences honey as bitter, his judgment will be true. For each makes his judgment as his sense of taste is affected. It will thus follow that every opinion – and indeed every perception of any kind – has an equal claim to truth.

We must say, therefore, that species stand in relation to the intellect as *that by which* the intellect understands. To make the matter clear: although there are two kinds of activity<sup>28</sup> – one that remains within the agent (e.g., seeing or understanding), and one that passes over into a thing outside (e.g., heating or cutting) – nevertheless each is produced in accord with a form. Now just as the form from which an activity extending to a thing outside proceeds is like the object of the activity (for instance, the heat of a heater is like that of the thing heated), so also, in a similar way, the form from which an activity remaining within an agent proceeds is a likeness of the object. Thus it is according to a likeness of a visible thing that the faculty of sight sees, and likewise a likeness of a thing understood, i.e., a species, is the form according to which the intellect understands.

However, since the intellect reflects upon itself, by such reflection it understands both its own understanding and the species by which it understands. Thus species are secondarily that which is understood. But what is understood first is the reality of which a particular species is a likeness.

This is, in fact, already evident in the opinion of the ancient philosophers who held that *like is known by like*.<sup>29</sup> For they held that the soul would know solids that are outside it by means of solids within it, etc. Thus if we understand the species of a solid instead of actual solid materials – according to Aristotle's teaching,<sup>30</sup> *it is not the stone which is present in the soul but its form* – it will follow that by means of species the soul knows things which are outside the soul.

Hence: 1. What is understood is in the one who understands by means of its likeness. This is the meaning of the saying that what is actually understood is identical with the intellect as actualized, in so far as a likeness of the thing understood is the form of the intellect, just as a likeness of a sensible reality is the form of a sense when actualized. Hence it does not follow that an abstracted species is what is actually understood, but only that it is a likeness of it.

2. The phrase 'what is actually understood' involves two points: namely, the thing which is understood and the being understood. And likewise in the term 'abstracted universal' there are two, namely, the nature of a thing and its state of abstraction or universality. Thus the nature, to which 'being understood' and 'being abstracted' (or the intention of universality) are applied, exists only in individuals, whereas 'being understood' and 'being abstracted' (or the intention of universality) exist in the intellect.

We can more easily see this by comparison with the senses. For instance, the sense of sight sees the colour of an apple but not its characteristic scent. Thus if one asks: Where

28 Aristotle, *Metaphysics* viii, 8. 1050a23.

29 Aristotle, *De Anima* i, 2 & 5. 404b17; 409b25.

30 *Ibid* iii, 8. 431b29.

does this colour, which is seen apart from the scent, exist?, it is obvious, on one hand, that the colour seen exists only in the apple, but on the other that being perceived without the scent can be attributed to it only with respect to sight, in so far as in the sense of sight there is a likeness of the one but not of the other.

Similarly, humanity, when understood, exists only in this or that human being, but its being apprehended without individuating conditions (i.e., its 'being abstracted' and the consequent intention of universality) can be attributed to humanity only as perceived by the intellect where there is a likeness of the specific nature, but not of individuating conditions.

3. In the sense part of man there are two kinds of activity. One takes place by way of a change effected from outside, thus the activity of the senses is fully carried out through a change effected by sensible objects. The other activity is a 'formation' by which the faculty of imagination formulates for itself a model of something absent or even of something never seen.

Now both of these activities are joined in the intellect. For, first, there is indeed an effect produced in the possible intellect in so far as it is informed by a species; and then, secondly, when it is thus informed, it formulates either a definition or else an affirmative or negative statement, which is then signified by words. Thus the meaning which a name signifies is a definition, and an enunciation or proposition signifies the intellect's combining or separating. Therefore words do not signify the effects produced in the possible intellect but those things which the intellect formulates for itself in order to understand things outside.

## Part I, Question 86. What our Intellect Knows with Respect to Material Realities

What our intellect knows with respect to material realities is next to be considered, and in this regard there are four points of inquiry:

1. whether it knows singulars;
2. whether it knows the infinite;
3. whether it knows contingent things;
4. whether it knows the future.

Article 1. Does our intellect know singulars?

*The first point:*<sup>31</sup> 1. It would seem that our intellect does know singulars. For whoever knows a combination knows the terms in the combination. But our intellect knows the combination, *Socrates is a man* – it is, in fact, its function to formulate such a proposition. Therefore our intellect knows this singular, for instance Socrates.

2. Again, since it is directive of activities, and activities are concerned with singulars, the practical intellect must know singulars.

3. Again, our intellect understands itself. But it is something singular or else it could not act, since activities are of individuals. Therefore our intellect knows the singular.

4. Again, since a higher power can do whatever a lower one can, and the senses know singulars, therefore *a fortiori* the intellect must also.

31 Cf. *iv Sent.* 50, 1, 3. *De veritate* II, 5–6; x, 5. *In De anima* III, lect. 8. *Quodl.* XII, 8. *De principio individuationis.*

On the other hand, Aristotle says<sup>32</sup> the the universal is more knowable in the order of explanation, the particular in the order of sense.

*Reply:* Directly and immediately our intellect cannot know the singular in material realities. The reason is that the principle of singularity in material things is individual matter, and our intellect – as said before<sup>33</sup> – understands by abstracting species from this sort of matter. But what is abstracted from individual matter is universal. Therefore our intellect has direct knowledge only of universals.

Indirectly and by a quasi-reflection, on the other hand, the intellect can know the singular, because, as mentioned before,<sup>34</sup> even after it has abstracted species it cannot actually understand by means of them except by a return to sense images in which it understands the species, as Aristotle says.<sup>35</sup>

Therefore, in this sense, it is the universal that the intellect understands directly by means of the species, and singulars (represented in sense images) only indirectly. And it is in this way that it formulates the proposition, ‘Socrates is a man’.

Hence: 1. The first solution is evident.

2. The choice of a particular thing to be done is, as it were, the conclusion of a syllogism in the practical intellect.<sup>36</sup> But a singular proposition cannot be deduced from a universal proposition directly, but only on the assumption of a mediating singular proposition. Hence a universal argument in the practical intellect has no motivating force except by means of an apprehension of the particular in the sense part of man.<sup>37</sup>

3. The singular’s repugnance to being intelligible is not because it is singular, but because it is material – since only the immaterial can be understood. Thus if there is such a thing as an immaterial singular – and the intellect is such – then it has no repugnance to being intelligible.

4. A higher power can do whatever a lower one can, but in a superior way. Thus what the senses know materially and concretely the intellect knows in an immaterial and abstract way, which is to know the universal.

Article 2. Can our intellect know the infinite?

*The first point:*<sup>38</sup> 1. It would seem that our intellect can know the infinite. For God exceeds all infinite things. But our intellect can know God, as said before.<sup>39</sup> Therefore it can, *a fortiori*, know all other infinite things.

2. Again, our intellect is by nature able to know classes and sub-classes. But some classes – for instance, number, proportion, and shape – have non-finite sub-classes. Therefore our intellect can know the infinite.

3. Again, if one body did not exclude another from existing in one and the same place, nothing would prevent an infinity of bodies from being in one place. But one species does

32 *Physics* I, lect. 5. 189a5.

33 1a. 85, 1.

34 1a. 84, 7.


35 *De Anima* III, 7. 431b2.

36 *Nicomachean Ethics* VII, 3. 1147a28.

37 *De Anima* III, 11. 434a16.


38 Cf. *De veritate* II, 9.

39 1a. 12, 1.



not prevent another from existing at the same time in the same intellect, for we can know more than one thing – habitually. Therefore nothing prevents our intellect from having a knowledge of the infinite habitually.

4. Again, the intellect, since it is not a power of corporeal matter (as said before<sup>40</sup>), would seem to be an infinite power. But an infinite power extends to infinite things. Therefore our intellect can know the infinite.



40 1a. 76, 1.

