“Praeterea, alia est ratio essendi formae materialis et compositi= seu formae per se subsistentis. Ratio enim essendi formae materialis est secund= um quam est aliquid aliud, ut ratio compositionis est secundum quam habet esse compositum, et ratio figurae secundum quam habet esse figuratum; unde ratio essendi formae materialis est quod sit unita alii. Ratio autem essendi compositi vel formae liberatae a materia est quod sit ens per se et separat= e, non unum ens cum alio. Ex hoc sic arguitur. Cum cessat ratio essendi alicui= us, ipsum corrumpitur et non est; sed cum separatur forma materialis a materia, cessat eius ratio essendi, ut ex praedictis apparet; nulla igitur forma cui= us separatio a materia non est sua corruptio est materialis. Sed separatio ani= mae intellectivae a corpore et materia non est eius corruptio. Ergo non habet e= sse unitum ad materiam. Et declaratur ratio in exemplo. Cum ligna, lapides et lateres in domo cessant esse composita a forma compositionis eorum, cessat = esse compositio; et cum secundum figuram cessat aliquid figuratum esse, ces= sat esse figura. Et similiter est de forma substantiali ad illud cuius est form= a, quod, cum secundum eam cessat esse materia, cessat esse formae materialis, licet notius sit in accidentali forma quam substantiali. Et sunt istae rati= ones essendi, qua aliquid habet esse unite ad materiam et qua aliquid habet rati= onem subsistentis per se et separate, oppositae adeo quod eidem inesse non possu= nt. Unde anima intellectiva non potest habere rationem per se subsistentis et, = cum hoc, unum facere cum materia et corpore in essendo= .”
The ratio essendi [raison d’être= , mode of being] of a material fo= rm is different from the ratio ess= endi of a composite substance or of a subsistent form. For the ratio essendi of a material form is that= of something on account of which [= secundum quam] something else is, just as the ratio of composition is that it is something on account of which a composite thing is, and the ratio of shape = is that it is something on account of which a thing is thus and so shaped; therefore, the ratio essendi= of a material form is that it is united with something else. But the ratio = essendi of a composite substance o= r of a form that is free from matter is that it is a being per se and separately, not one being with something else. From this we argue as follow= s. When the ratio essendi [= raison d’être] of something ceases to be, then it is destroyed and= is not; but when a material form i= s separated from matter, then its = ratio essendi ceases to be, as is clear = from what has been said; therefore, no form whose separation from matter is not = its corruption is a material form. But the separation of the intellective soul = from the body and matter is not its corruption. Therefore, it does not have being united with matter. And the reasoning is clarified by m= eans of examples. When the timbers, stones, and bricks in a house cease to be composed on account of their form of composition, the composition ceases to= be; and when something ceases to be thus and so shaped on account of its shape, that shape ceases to be. And the case is similar with the substantial form, with respect to that of which it is the form; for when matter ceases to be = actual on account of this form, then this material form ceases to be, although this is better known in connection with an accidental form than in connection with the substantial form. And these rationes essendi, on account of which somet= hing is united with matter, and on account of which it is a per se and separately subsisting being, are opposite to such an extent that they cannot belong to one and the same thing. Therefore, the intellective soul cannot h= ave the ratio of a per se subsisting being and, at the same time, constitute with matter and the body a thing that is one in being.