

Ens Reale vs Ens Rationis

... 'being' is used in many senses. For in one sense 'being' is used as it is divided by the ten genera. And in this sense 'being' signifies something existing in the nature of things, whether it is a substance, such as a man, or an accident, such as a color. In another sense 'being' signifies the truth of a proposition; as when it is said that an affirmation is true when it signifies to be what is, and a negation is true when it signifies not to be what is not; and this 'being' signifies a composition produced by the judgment-forming intellect. So whatever is said to be a being in the first sense is a being also in the second sense: for whatever has natural existence in the nature of things can be signified to be by an affirmative proposition, e.g., when we say that a color is, or a man is. But not everything which is a being in the second sense is a being also in the first sense, for of a privation, such as blindness, we can form an affirmative proposition, by saying: 'Blindness is'; but blindness is not something in the nature of things, but it is rather a removal of a being, and so even privations and negations are said to be beings in the second sense, but not in the first. And being is predicated in different manners according to these two senses: for taken in the first sense it is a substantial predicate and pertains to the question 'What is it?', but taken in the second sense it is an accidental predicate, ... and pertains to the question 'Is there (such and such a thing)?'.¹

Ens subsistens vs Ens Inhaerens

... being [*esse*] is said to be the act of a being [*ens*] insofar as it is a being, that is, that by which something is denominated as a being in the nature of things. And being in this way is attributed only to the things themselves which are contained in the ten categories, whence 'being' [*ens*] predicated on account of such an act of being [*esse*] is divided by the ten categories. But this act of being [*esse*] is attributed to something in two ways. In one way as to *that which [quod] properly and truly has being, or is*. And thus it is attributed only to a *per se* subsisting substance; whence that which truly is is said to be a substance in bk. 1. of the *Physics*. All those [things], however, which do not subsist *per se*, but in others and with others, whether they are accidents or substantial forms or any sorts of parts, do not have being [*esse*] so that they themselves would truly be, but being [*esse*] is attributed to them in another way, namely, as to that *by which [quo] something is*; as a whiteness is said to be, not that it itself would subsist in itself, but because it is by [this whiteness] that something has it that it is white. Being [*esse*], therefore, is properly and truly attributed only to a *per se* subsisting thing. To this, however, two kinds of being are attributed. The one is that results from those from which its unity is integrated, which is the proper substantial being of a suppositum. Another being is attributed to a suppositum besides those that integrate it, which is an additional being, namely, accidental being; as being white is attributed to Socrates when it is said: Socrates is white.²

¹ "Respondeo dicendum, quod philosophus ostendit quod ens multipliciter dicitur. Uno enim modo dicitur ens quod per decem genera dividitur: et sic ens significat aliquid in natura existens; sive sit substantia, ut homo; sive accidens, ut color. Alio modo dicitur ens, quod significat veritatem propositionis; prout dicitur, quod affirmatio est vera, quando significat esse de eo quod est; et negatio, quando significat non esse de eo quod non est; et hoc ens compositionem significat, quam intellectus componens et dividens advenit. Quaecumque ergo dicuntur entia quantum ad primum modum, sunt entia quantum ad secundum modum: quia omne quod habet naturale esse in rebus, potest significari per propositionem affirmativam esse; ut cum dicitur: color est, vel homo est. Non autem omnia quae sunt entia quantum ad secundum modum, sunt entia quantum ad primum: quia de privatione, ut de caecitate, formatur una affirmativa propositio, cum dicitur, caecitas est; nec tamen caecitas aliquid est in rerum natura; sed est magis alicujus entis remotio: et ideo etiam privationes et negationes dicuntur esse entia quantum ad secundum modum, sed non quantum ad primum. Ens autem secundum utrumque istorum modorum diversimode praedicatur: quia secundum primum modum acceptum, est praedicatum substantiale, et pertinet ad quaestionem quid est: sed quantum ad secundum modum, est praedicatum accidentale, ut Commentator ibidem dicit, et pertinet ad quaestionem an est." *In Secundum Sententiarum* 34.1.1. Cf. *In Primum Sententiarum* 19.5.1.ad1, 33.1.1.ad1; *In Secundum Sententiarum* 37.1.2.ad1 & ad3; *De Ente et Essentia* 1; *De Potentia* 7.2.ad1; *De Malo* 1.1.ad19; *Quodlibeta* 9.2.2; *In Metaphysicam* 4.1, 5.9, 6.2, 6.4, 9.11, 11.8; *Summa Theologiae* 1 3.4.ad2, 16.3.ad2; 48.2.ad2; *Summa Theologiae* 1-2 36.1; ScG 1.12, 1.58, 3.9. Cf. also Cajetan (1964, 1590) c.1; C. Alamannus (1888) Tom.1. sect. II. 5. 1; Schmidt (1966) Part II. ch. 4. and Part III. ch. 8.

² "Respondeo. Dicendum, quod esse dupliciter dicitur, ut patet per Philosophum in v Metaph., Et in quadam glossa Origenis super Principium Ioan. Uno modo, secundum quod est copula verbalis significans compositionem cuiuslibet enuntiationis quam anima facit: unde hoc esse non est aliquid in rerum natura, sed tantum in actu animae componentis et dividensis. Et sic esse attribuitur omni ei de quo potest propositio formari, sive sit ens, sive privatio entis; dicimus enim caecitatem esse. Alio modo esse dicitur actus entis in quantum est ens, idest quo denominatur aliquid ens actu in rerum natura. Et sic esse non attribuitur nisi rebus ipsis quae in decem generibus continentur; unde ens a tali esse dictum per decem genera dividitur. Sed hoc esse attribuitur alicui dupliciter. Uno modo ut sicut ei quod proprie et vere habet esse vel est. Et sic attribuitur soli substantiae per se subsistenti: unde quod vere est, dicitur substantia in i Physic.. Omnia vero quae non per se subsistunt, sed in alio et cum alio, sive sint accidentia sive formae substantiales aut quaelibet partes, non habent esse ita ut ipsa vere sint, sed attribuitur eis esse alio modo, idest ut quo aliquid est; sicut albedo dicitur esse, non quia ipsa in se subsistat, sed quia ea aliquid habet esse album. Esse ergo proprie et vere non attribuitur nisi rei per se subsistenti. Huic autem attribuitur esse duplex. Unum scilicet esse resultans ex his ex quibus eius unitas integratur, quod proprium est esse suppositi substantiale. Aliud esse est supposito attributum praeter ea quae integrant ipsum, quod est esse superadditum, scilicet accidentale; ut esse album attribuitur Socrati cum dicitur: Socrates est albus." QDL 9. q. 2, a. 2, in corp.