

Chris M. Sciabarra
Marx, Hayek, and Utopia.
Albany: SUNY Press 1995.
Pp. x + 178.
(cloth: ISBN 0-7914-2615-7);
(paper: ISBN 0-7914-2616-5).

This intriguing book crosses a gulf between two camps in social philosophy that rarely address one another. Sciabarra (also author of *Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical*) uses his broad knowledge of both libertarian and Marxist literature to argue that Marx and Hayek actually *share* substantial common ground: they both employ a 'dialectical' (as opposed to 'dualistic') methodology that interprets human interaction as forming an entire social dynamic context extending beyond finite human understanding. As a result, Marx and Hayek become surprising allies against Sciabarra's real target: Cartesian 'constructivist rationalism' (35) and its attempts to impose 'utopian' solutions on evolving social contexts from an 'external' or transcendent perspective. 'Radical' theory, by contrast with utopianism, is dialectical, seeks a more integrated view of social reality' (3), and looks for immanent possibilities of change (118).

By 'utopian' theory, Sciabarra appears to have in mind contemporary 'rationalistic liberalism' (48) (*read: deontological theories of political justice*). But the book is clearly written from a social theory perspective, and it unfortunately makes little contribution to contemporary debates in political ethics. Sciabarra does not emphasize the *ethical* contrast between Marx's substantive theme of emancipation (59) and Hayek's negative account of freedom and near-total disregard for the justice of spontaneous outcomes.

Rather, Sciabarra argues that 'the prime difference between Marx and Hayek is not ethical or political but epistemological. Though both thinkers recognize the organic link between goals and context, between potentiality and actuality, they differ in their comprehension of the nature of epistemic limitations' (118-19). Hayek believes that human reason is inherently so limited that effective central planning can only be distortive (48), while Marx believes that even if omniscience is impossible, human efficacy (60) in controlling social conditions and reducing unintended consequences can be dramatically increased as capitalism is transcended. Thus Sciabarra presents their disagreement as *within* an embracing agreement on the dialectical conception of social phenomena.

But this thesis — defended in the first three chapters — that Hayek's critique of constructivism is essentially 'dialectical' in a way comparable to Marx's critique of utopianism (6), is the most controversial aspect of this book. Sciabarra's analysis seems to depend on assuming that Hayek's 'invisible hand' is a *dialectical* model simply because it describes a 'whole' that is more than the intention of any of its parts (19), and regards individual activities as 'internally' or constitutively affected (24) by emergent 'structural relationships' (18) they can neither predict nor intend. But such a *functionalist*

account of intrinsic interrelatedness is not dialectical in the Hegelian or Marxian senses. It seems that if Hayek's 'spontaneous order' can be called an 'organic unity' (115-6), then so can blind evolutionary trends in an ecosystem, which are not affected by agents' more and less adequate *understanding* of the whole and its internal relations, as dialectical processes are.

The first three chapters also compare Hayek's concerns about the limits of human reason with themes in Polanyi's theory of tacit knowledge and with the Frankfurt School's fear of bureaucratic instrumentalism. The next three chapters describe Marx's theory of capitalism, his dialectical method, and his 'epistemic utopia' (respectively), and the last treats the New Left challenge to Hayekian thought. The chapters on Marx are helpful and interesting on the whole. The first of these, which includes a revealing section tracing Marx's and Hayek's joint roots in Scottish evolutionist thought, could also serve as a useful introduction to Marx's whole project for undergraduates. The next chapter on 'Marxian Dialectics' begins with an intriguing non-determinist interpretation of 'Marx's material base' of society, though it ends with a rather simplistic account of the opposition-resolution scheme. The last chapter on Marx explains the stages of communism and argues that Marx's account of 'utopia' requires perfect knowledge of social systems of the sort Hayek rules out (yet some of the key quotations backing up this claim are from Engels. Cf. p. 89).

In the final chapter, Sciabarra briefly evaluates the Frankfurt School tradition and considers Hilary Wainwright's and Jürgen Habermas's visions of radicalism as transformative democracy. This last chapter is especially important, because the whole book seems to be intended as a partially-sympathetic response to Habermas and Wainwright, pleading for today's New Left (a) to recognize Marx's own proto-Hayekian emphasis on spontaneous historical development; (b) to accept what is right in Hayek's analysis of the invisible hand and human rational limitations; and (c) to incorporate these themes in a new radical theory (120-1). Sciabarra even sees the possibility of a 'non-Marxist' (5) yet *non-conservative* 'libertarian radicalism' (50-1) — though he does not explain what this could mean specifically.

Yet there are several severe problems with Sciabarra's response. He misinterprets Habermas's universal presuppositions of dialogue expressed in the *regulative* ideal speech situation as a utopian requirement that 'the tacit component of knowledge would be fully articulated' (107). Nor does he seem to appreciate that Habermas's emphasis on overcoming *strategic* intentionality depends precisely on the possibility of a kind of cooperative motivation for the sake of normative legitimacy that Hayek tries to rule out *a priori* through his Burkean model of evolving mores and his account of social outcomes as mainly the result of *rational-egoistic* interactions. In response to Wainwright's critique that Hayek has an overly individualistic conception of knowledge, Sciabarra argues that she 'fails to appreciate Hayek's understanding of the social character of knowledge' (113). But the 'information' aggregated by floating prices is not *social knowledge* in Wainwright's sense: like Habermas, she has in mind *cognitively* shared (rather than 'dispersed')

knowledge gained by democratic deliberation, which enables *intentional* cooperation for mutual goals, rather than the social interaction (114) that market actors achieve only *unintentionally* by trying to maximize their own utility. Finally, Sciabarra misreads Habermas's and Wainwright's proposals as mainly 'therapeutic' psychological ideals rather than normative in significance (114-15).

Overall, the book is based on an impressive diversity of research for its size (the 20-page bibliography is a valuable reference). Yet the strength of the connections alleged between Marx and Hayek often depends on Sciabarra's selective focus on certain *very general* similarities in their attention to sociality: the effect is to downplay fundamental oppositions between Marx's and Hayek's explanatory systems and the moral psychologies on which they depend. Nevertheless, there is much to be learned from this book, and Sciabarra should be praised for forcing us to give up our comfortable caricatures of Marx and Hayek as figures in absolute 'dualistic' opposition.

John Davenport

University of Notre Dame

Sextus Empiricus.

Outlines of Scepticism.

Trans. Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1994.

Pp. xviii + 249.

US \$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-30950-6);

US \$15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-31206-X).

If Sextus Empiricus was not the greatest Greek philosopher, he nonetheless left an influential body of writing. Despite this, translations of his *Outlines of Scepticism* (also known as *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*) have not been plentiful. Previously the most readily available complete English translation was that published by R. G. Bury in 1933 as part of the Loeb Classical Library. This translation is long outdated; in addition, Bury's work was intended for classicists rather than philosophers, and his infrequent notes reflect this audience's concerns.

The Annas-Barnes translation updates and improves upon the Bury translation. Annas and Barnes have the advantage of working from the 1958 Teubner Greek edition of the text, which suggests some readings and textual emendations not available to Bury. Where emendations to the Greek have been suggested, Annas and Barnes have provided notes to indicate their

Canadian Philosophical Reviews
Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

Volume XVI, No. 2
April • avril 1996

Editors • Directeurs

Roger A. Sinner
Department of Philosophy
4-108 Humanities Centre
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada T6G 2E5
E-Mail
ROGER.A.SINNER@UALBERTA.CA

Andrew Light
Department of Philosophy
4-108 Humanities Centre
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada T6G 2E5
E-Mail
ANDREW.LIGHT@UALBERTA.CA

Alain Vézard
Département de philosophie
Université du Québec à Montréal
C.P. 8888, Succursale Centre-Ville
Montréal, QC
Canada H3C 3P8
E-Mail
R327@OPEL.UMQ.MC

As a rule, C.P.R. publishes only invited reviews. However, we will consider for publication submitted reviews of new books in philosophy and related areas. Reviews must be a maximum of 1000 words and will be accepted in either French or English.

En général, R.C.C.P. ne publie que les comptes rendus qui sont explicitement invités. Néanmoins, nous prendrions en considération la publication de comptes rendus soumis, si les auteurs traitent de livres philosophiques (ou de livres sur un sujet apparenté) qui viennent de paraître. Les comptes rendus devraient être de 1000 mots au maximum, et le manuscrit rédigé en français ou en anglais.

Subscription prices
for a volume of six double issues

<i>Institutions</i>	<i>Individuals</i>	<i>Students</i>
\$98 (Canadian)	\$47 (Canadian)	\$34 (Canadian)
US\$95/Cdn\$132 (Foreign)	US\$48/Cdn\$64 (Foreign)	US\$33/Cdn\$52 (Foreign)

Prix de l'abonnement
à un volume de six numéros

<i>Institutions</i>	<i>Individus</i>	<i>Étudiants</i>
\$98 (Canada)	\$47 (Canada)	\$34 (Canada)
US\$95/Cdn\$132 (Hors-Canada)	US\$48/Cdn\$64 (Hors-Canada)	US\$33/Cdn\$52 (Hors-Canada)

Subscriptions should be sent to the publisher.
Les abonnements peuvent être pris chez l'éditeur.

Academic Printing & Publishing

P.O. Box 4218, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
T6E 4T2
Tel: (403) 435-5898 Fax: (403) 435-5852

Publications Mail Registration No. 5550

ISSN 0228-491X
© 1996 Academic Printing & Publishing

Published six times a year

Table of Contents • Table des matières

Kurt Baier, <i>The Rational and the Moral Order: The Social Roots of Reason and Morality</i> James B. Sauer	79
Joseph Andrew Barash, <i>Heidegger et son siècle. Temps de l'Être, temps de l'histoire</i> Daniel Cayer	81
Josiane Boulad-Ayoub, <i>Mimes et Parades. L'activité symbolique dans la vie sociale</i> Sonia Deragon	84
Robert Damien, <i>Bibliothèque et État. Naissance d'une raison politique dans la France du XVII^e siècle</i> Josiane Boulad-Ayoub	86
Alain de Libera, <i>La philosophie médiévale</i> Fabienne Pironet	89
Keith Devlin, <i>Logic and Information</i> Peter Novak	91
Alan Donagan, <i>The Philosophical Papers of Alan Donagan</i> Hugh J. McCann	93
Adam Drozdek, <i>The Moral Dimension of Man in the Age of Computers</i> Robert S. Stufflebeam	97
Pascal Engel, <i>Davidson et la philosophie du langage</i> Michel Desy	99
Rivka Feldhay, <i>Galileo and the Church. Political Inquisition or Critical Dialogue?</i> James B. Sauer	101
Michael Gagarin and Paul Woodruff, eds. <i>Early Greek Political Thought from Homer to the Sophists</i> Trevor J. Saunders	103
Alan H. Goldman, <i>Aesthetic Value</i> Eileen John	106
Marjorie Grene, <i>A Philosophical Testament</i> Robert D. Lane	108
H.S. Harris, <i>Hegel: Phenomenology and System</i> George E. A. Williamson	110
Howard Kanler, <i>Identification and Character. A Book on Psychological Development</i> Katarzyna Paprzycka	111
F.H. Low-Beer, <i>Questions of Judgment: Determining What's Right</i> Stephen Sarus	114
Mohan Matthen and R.X. Ware, eds., <i>Biology and Society</i> Arthur J. Miller	115