

A League of Democracies

Cosmopolitanism, Consolidation Arguments, and Global Public Goods

Routledge Global Institutions Series

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To Robin, for all her indispensable support.

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the other journalists, diplomats,
and scholars who have worked so tirelessly
to stop mass atrocities since 1989.

Their vision deserves to be fulfilled.

Contents

<i>Lists</i>	x
<i>Tables</i>	xi
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	xii
<i>Abbreviations</i>	xiv
Introduction: Our opportunity to secure a democratic future	1
1 The United Democratic League as a cosmopolitan Idea	31
2 From the Federalists to a global consolidation argument	60
3 Market limits and global public goods	92
4 The failure of the United Nations to deliver international security	133
5 How to design an effective league of democracies	168
6 Standard objections, alternatives, and replies to critics	198
<i>Select bibliography</i>	232
<i>Index</i>	235

Lists

3.1	60 likely global public goods	109
5.1	Enumerated powers of a United Democratic League	179
5.2	Democratic membership criteria	183
6.1	The global consolidation argument for a league of democracies	226

Tables

3.1	Levels and kinds of goods	120
5.1	Potential founding members of a democratic league	187

Abbreviations

AG	Assurance game	ICC	International Criminal Court
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations	ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
AU	African Union	ICJ	International Court of Justice (within the UN system)
BDR	Bill of Basic Democratic Rights	IDPs	Internally displaced persons
BF	Battle of friends ("battle of the sexes")	IEDs	Improvised explosive devices
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa	IGOs	Intergovernmental organizations
CAPs	Collective action problems	IMF	International Monetary Fund
CDem	Community of Democracies	ISIS	The Islamic State in Syria (also known as ISIL, the Islamic State in the Levant, or Daesh)
CI	Categorical imperative	LCR	League Court of Review
CP	Consolidation principle	MDGs	Millennium Development Goals (of the UN)
CPRs	Common pool resources	NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention	NGOs	Non-governmental organizations
DC	Democratic Council [part of the UDL]	NPOs	Non-profit organizations
DEP	Distributive equity problem	OAS	Organization of American States
DP	Democratic principle	OECD	Organization for Economic Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo	P5	Permanent Five members of the UNSC
ECHR	European Court of Human Rights	PD	Prisoner's dilemma game
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	P-optimality	Pareto-optimality or efficiency
EU	European Union	R2P	Responsibility to Protect doctrine
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization (of the UN)	RBS	Rights-based sovereignty
FUDN	Federal Union of Democratic Nations [from Yunker]	SB	Principle of Subsidiarity
G7	Group of Seven nations	SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals (of the UN)
G8	Group of Eight nations	START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
G20	Group of 20 forum for political leaders and national bank directors	TPGs	Transnational public goods
GPGs	Global public goods	UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
HI	Hypothetical Imperative	UDL	United Democratic League—the proposed new organization
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency	UN	United Nations
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Land Mines	UNAMID	African Union - United Nations Mission in Darfur
		UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
		UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
		UNSC	United Nations Security Council
		USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (pre-1991)
		WMDs	Weapons of mass destruction
		WTO	World Trade Organization

Introduction: Our opportunity to secure a democratic future

- **Libya and Syria: The argument in a nutshell**
- The solution in brief
- The fleeting chance afforded by this unique historical moment
- Conclusion: Two possible futures

Libya and Syria: The argument in a nutshell

The triple-horned problem that this book is meant to solve can be illustrated concisely by popular responses to the continuing mass slaughter in Syria from 2012 on, along with similar reactions to the disorder in Libya following the overthrow of Muammar al-Qaddafi's regime in 2011.

Horn (1): Many Americans and Europeans have taken the view, articulated by Senator Ted Cruz (R-Texas), that we should stop trying to topple brutal dictators like Qaddafi, even though they have committed serious atrocities, because their fall leads to extremist groups taking power. The response to this simplistic notion is two-fold. (1a) Chaos has often followed revolutionary overthrows of tyrants when no reconstruction is undertaken to secure a just peace, as happened in Libya; (1b) but the opposite holds when serious reconstruction and peace-building efforts follow the conflict, as in Bosnia after 1994, and Germany and Japan after 1945. So Cruz's statements on this issue were grossly misleading and reprehensible.¹

Horn (2): But suppose we had followed Cruz's policy and stayed out of Libya. Qaddafi's forces would then have slaughtered tens of thousands of innocent people in Benghazi, and driven as many more into exile. This scenario has played out at a higher order of magnitude in Syria: because no group of nations organized a coalition to intervene, Assad's Shia-dominated regime (supported by some members of other minority groups) has succeeded in killing at least 400,000 Syrians from the Sunni majority and driving millions more into exile.

Horn (3): Some western nations might have intervened to stop Assad's unremitting slaughter with chemical weapons and daily airstrikes aimed at burying enemies both dead and alive in rubble. (3a) In mid-2013, the United States, Britain, and France seriously considered strikes to knock out Assad's air force and perhaps enforce a no-fly zone protecting his opponents. In Britain, Edward Miliband launched a last-minute lobby against this idea, narrowly swinging the vote in parliament against limited military intervention; he argued that negotiation would be better, while knowing that only military threat could pressure Assad to compromise.²

However, if these three allies had acted together in 2013, they would have required help from a much larger set of nations to invest sufficient money and troops to "win the peace" after Assad's fall, without which we return to horn (1a). In particular, if western nations had stopped Assad's barrel bombs, artillery, and air strikes, they would have needed robust support by Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other Gulf partners for reconstruction. Without such an inclusive coalition (option 3b), many citizens in western nations would naturally have resented these Islamic-majority nations in the region as free riders.

So instead we have ended up on horn (2), with over half a million people dead, the greatest refugee crisis since World War II, dictators everywhere emboldened, and the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS) causing massive devastation everywhere between Raqqa and Mosul. ISIS propaganda has become a major threat to western nations, inspiring numerous deadly terrorist attacks. The United Nations (UN), paralyzed by repeated Russian vetoes, again appears impotent, encouraging future mass murder. Turkey is at war with Kurdish groups that fought ISIS for western nations, thus dividing NATO. All of this shows that the Cruz-style isolationist response can also open the door to chaos that is easily exploited by terror groups.

Are we then stuck choosing between inaction that permits evil regimes to carry out genocide and mass ethnic cleansing before the eyes of the world, making a mockery of all our moral principles and promises to victims of past atrocities (horn 2), or half-hearted interventions that may topple the tyrannical regime but fail to follow through with reconstruction and cultural change (horn 1a)? Or should western nations exhaust our citizens and our budgets with deeper military interventions to address the post-conflict phase more adequately, while nations in the immediate region of the crisis sit on the sidelines and cheer us on (horn 3a)?

None of these options looks either morally or strategically viable. To sit by and allow mass atrocities and scorched-earth campaigns is

an anathema that erodes the moral foundation on which democracies rest. The abused and slaughtered people rightly see idle nations who could have helped them as traitors to humanity. Mass refugee movements also destabilize whole regions, leading to endless spillover effects.³ Yet unilateral intervention by a few nations has proven too expensive for them to do properly with reconstruction; the free riders rob us of the resources needed to win a just peace, and create a sense that military risks are not fairly shared. But we have no way to assure support from a wide enough group of nations when the crisis is raging (option 3b).

Thus we desperately need a way of overcoming this free rider problem. We must create an institution that can pool the resources of many nations to stop such mass atrocities and remove tyrannical regimes that attempt them. This new institution must follow up humanitarian interventions with adequate disarmament and rehabilitation of the nation affected, and broker partition plans when absolutely necessary. Following the UN's 2005 Responsibility to Protect doctrine (R2P), this institution should act to prevent genocidal campaigns, bend back corruption, and foster pluralistic concord in weak states that are sliding toward civil war.⁴ If we did this reliably enough, eventually there would be no more mass atrocities requiring intervention to stop them. To achieve this, a transnational institution would have to ensure that all able nations do their fair share, including nations in the region most affected. These would be significant powers, but nothing short of them can solve the trilemma that led to grossly inadequate responses to mass murder in Bosnia, Rwanda, Darfur, Libya, Syria, and Myanmar in quick succession—a parade of scenes from hell that should motivate any decent person to demand a permanent, sustainable solution.

Such nation-making powers should never be given to any governing institution without democratic answerability and limits set by basic human rights that the powers exist to protect. This new alliance of many nations, with consolidated decision-making powers sufficient to ensure action backed by the whole, must, then, be a league of *democratic* nations—or at least of nations willing to democratize their domestic political systems sufficiently to cooperate within an elected transnational body.

The trilemma of mass atrocities is part of a larger story; a democratic league is also needed to counter growing threats from Russia and China, as I argue later in this chapter. My proposal should also be compared to several related ideas offered since the 1940s. These political proposals all respond to problems arising from globalized interdependencies, but I base my version on central themes in the much

older cosmopolitan philosophical tradition (chapter one), which support both democratic legitimacy conditions and recognition of shared transnational interests.

These themes provide the basis for a contribution to cosmopolitan political theory: this book develops a conceptual framework with general parameters for justification of different levels of government. This framework clarifies all of the components involved in a compelling argument for a league of democracies, but its import is more general. The paradigm of a "consolidation argument" for a new level of government is found in the *Federalist Papers*, from which we can reconstruct the principles that license such an inference (chapter two). My proposal is that cosmopolitans adopt this framework in analyzing the need for actual government, in addition to "governance" networks, beyond the national level. The consolidation argument paradigm shows how findings in basic game theory and economic accounts of market failures plug into cosmopolitan arguments through evidence for transnational public goods (TPGs; see chapter three). Readers who are skeptical about my league proposal may still find this modular analysis of consolidation arguments helpful: it clarifies how seemingly disparate pieces of a cosmopolitan theory, such as a conception of universal human rights, problems created by tax havens, and overreliance on nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to solve environmental problems, function as parts of the case for stronger transnational government.

I apply the consolidation argument paradigm by constructing a global consolidation argument for a league of democracies. This argument begins with crucial public goods that can only be secured by transnational cooperation—according to empirical evidence for their public features, such as nonexcludability and nonrivalry, as well as normative arguments for the importance of some goods (chapter three). The collective action problems (CAPs) that must be overcome to secure these transnational goods require more than the current world order can provide (chapter four). Lastly, we need to know that the proposed remedy is not worse than the disease—i.e., that a democratic league is workable and can avoid causing excessively harmful side effects. That is the task for the last two chapters, which explain how a league could get started and operate (see chapter five), respond to common objections, and consider other familiar alternatives (such as reforming the UN) (chapter six). However, readers who remain skeptical about a democratic league may still be convinced by this application of the consolidation argument that we need to consider game theory in evaluating centralization of currently distributed governance powers.

Given space constraints, I focus most on arguing that global public goods (GPGs) concerning security and atrocity prevention cannot be secured either by the current UN system or by alternative intergovernmental or "network" solutions (chapters three and four). The global consolidation argument would be strengthened by analogous arguments for other categories of GPGs, such as global financial security, fair immigration and asylum protection systems, stable world climate and wetlands, and so on. I offer examples suggesting that such public goods are also beyond the reach of the UN system and transnational networks, but a systematic case for this would require more empirical evidence and institutional experiences around each of these putative GPGs. Still, the range of likely GPGs found in recent analyses (see chapter three) suggests several tasks beyond common security that may also require a league of democratic nations.

The remainder of this chapter outlines my institutional proposal, distinguishes it from a full world government, and explains the bargain that could make it politically possible. I argue that democracies made serious mistakes after 1989 that squandered vital opportunities, especially with Russia. This analysis supports the global consolidation argument with evidence that democratic ideals and norms are in serious danger from the rise of a new kind of despotism. Public goods that are increasingly under threat include the stability of democratic nations, the integrity of their democratic processes, and their capacities to cooperate effectively. This analysis makes a case for urgency: while it is still feasible now, it may become impossible to form a league of democracies if we do not act decisively within roughly 20 years.

The solution in brief

This book is about a single idea: for the sake of humanity and our common future, people in democratic nations around the world need to unite their collective strength by forming a worldwide league of democracies to uphold the moral ideals and hopes embodied in our national constitutions. I argue that we *ought* to do this because there are vital public goods that cannot otherwise be secured—including fundamental liberties, protection from systemic atrocities, and other human rights that are essential for any government to count as legitimate. We should not hesitate to press this ethical demand, which has arisen in response to past horrors and oppressions, to the bold conclusion that it implies: a world order led by democratic nations that finally makes it impossible to carry out genocides, ethnic cleansing, sustained persecutions, and other crimes against humanity. The murderous dictators, warlords,

terrorists and other ideological fanatics who impose these horrors on the world are destroying our collective future, and our divided, passive responses are weakening prospects for democratic societies.

It is time for us all to stand up for a world in which tyranny of this kind is impossible, backing this ultimatum with military force as a last resort. The R2P doctrine, born in response to the rivers of dead in Rwanda, must become the heart of a new global order on Earth. There is no other adequate way to keep faith with the millions of victims of genocides during the last 120 years, along with all those who gave their lives in trying to stop these ultimate wrongs. A system that could fulfill the R2P ideal would also be strong enough to secure other global goods on which a decent future depends—from food security, stable management of the global economy, and fair immigration patterns, to sustained biodiversity and protection from pandemics. If we can found a league of democracies in our lifetime, we may bring about a humanly feasible age of peace and prosperity. But if we do not rally to pool our strength and moral will in time, then the horrors of the twentieth century may pale in comparison to those our grandchildren will live through by this century's end.

I also argue that we *can* do this: it is not an impossible utopian dream. If democratic leaders educate their peoples about atrocities, transnational interactions, and basic economic facts, they can understand the need for a global new deal. And if democratic peoples work together for their common benefit, their collective powers would be more than sufficient to establish a new world order based on universal human rights. Others have already reached this conclusion. Garry Kasparov, the Russian chess master, calls on us to remember how the Cold War was won, instead of trying in vain to appease brutal dictators such as Vladimir Putin:

The world needs a new alliance based on a global Magna Carta, a declaration of fundamental rights that all members must recognize. Nations that value individual liberty now control the greater part of the world's resources as well as its military power. If they band together and refuse to coddle the rogue regimes and sponsors of terror, their integrity and their influence will be irresistible.⁵

This is a feasible goal: as Kasparov argues, forming “a strong united front against Putin,” including military support for Ukraine and alternatives to Russian energy for Europe, could “provide a foundation for a new alliance of the world's democracies.”⁶ Nor would the United Democratic League (UDL) envisioned here promote “western hegemony,” despite

understandable suspicions deriving from injustices committed during the Cold War. We cannot let past grievances hold back the cooperation we desperately need among democratic nations today. While critics stuck in a Cold War mentality debate about “American imperialism,” Russia and China are building new empires tailor-made to block all progress toward protection of human rights. Rather than seek to impose a “liberal capitalist” ideology, the UDL would promote peace and stability by preventing mass atrocities and providing the needed bulwark against rising military dictatorships.

To secure this moral minimum, we should begin a treaty process in stages like the one that developed the European Union (EU) from an economic trade partnership into something closer to a federal union. Like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the proposed democratic league would begin as primarily a security union charged with collective defense of its members against external threats and aggressions, with these additional mandates:

- The United Democratic League would take over the United Nations Security Council's (UNSC) responsibility to authorize and organize the use of sanctions and military means to stop aggressive wars and protect national boundaries against forcible change. In particular, the league would assert its authority to take such actions even if the UNSC fails to act, or continues to operate in parallel.
- The UDL would claim a final authority to approve various forms of force, including military intervention as a last resort, to prevent or punish attacks by terrorist groups, deprive such groups of safe havens, capture and prosecute leaders of such groups, and hold convicts. Member nations would retain unilateral discretion only over direct defense of their own territories.
- The UDL would uphold human rights by fulfilling the responsibility to protect civilians from the war crimes and crimes against humanity listed in the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). This includes the power to levy sanctions, to compel assistance from able nations in the region, and to use all necessary military means as a last resort to prevent systematic and protracted attacks on civilian groups.
- The UDL would organize reconstruction of nations wracked by civil war or mass atrocities after the end of major hostilities, calling on the resources of all interested nations, coordinating with peacekeepers, protecting humanitarian aid workers, and adjudicating new national boundaries when needed.

• Eventually, the democratic league could take on authority over international courts that prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity: it could appoint their judges and prosecutors, determine their functions, enforce their subpoenas and indictments, and impeach them in cases of high crimes or gross negligence.

We will consider the UDL's enumerated powers and responsibilities in more detail later (see chapter five), but these functions are the core of my proposal. The league of democracies should replace the UNSC system with one that can actually provide global security and make the R2P doctrine into a cornerstone of international law: no more Syrias, no more Darfurs, no more Rwandas, no more genocides or mass persecution of ethnic and religious groups. The purported rights of national governments have zero weight when it comes to such mass atrocities, and misplaced concerns about respect for cultures have even less relevance when thousands are being systematically bombed, tortured, raped, and exiled by force for no crime other than their identity and location. These are not expressions of culture; they are signs of its disintegration.

Yet this democratic league is emphatically *not* a proposal for a single world government. As James Yunker has argued in several works, our goal should be a transnational government with "significant ... but not excessive power and authority," i.e., an institution that can rectify the UN's weakness while avoiding the dangers of an "omnipotent world state."⁷ The new global order envisaged here would preserve national governments and multicultural diversity; democracy and full respect for other basic human rights will require robust nation-states for the foreseeable future, and democratic values and practices can flourish in many different cultural contexts. The trajectory toward human rights standards is also compatible with nondemocratic regimes in some places, including moderate religious theocracies. Moreover, the right to emigrate to nations with other styles of government is an important part of individual autonomy. To keep this option available, the proposed democratic league would *not* aim to persuade every nation to join, so that families could leave the UDL if they wish.

Thus the UDL proposal aims to overcome a *false trichotomy* that has hobbled much recent work on global governance. Too often, commentators assume that our options are limited to (i) today's system of nation-states loosely coordinated under the UN umbrella; (ii) networks of stronger inter-state agencies and transnational civil society groups that try to limit actions by national governments (like a thousand tiny Lilliputians putting strings on giant Gullivers); or a (iii) a federal world

state encompassing all nations. Because the current system is so dysfunctional, while a world state seems both impossible and dangerous, the trichotomy drives cosmopolitans toward the network solution. But there is a fourth option: a government that is "global" in the sense of including several nations in every region, while leaving many others free to go their own way within limits set by the most basic human rights. Moreover, within such a global league, a wide variety of constitutional systems could all meet the same fundamental conditions of government answerable to collective practical reasoning. A wide range of different life-ways and economic arrangements would be possible and encouraged in a world led by an effective league of democracies.

To avoid any taint of American dominance, the envisioned democratic league should include at least thirty founding member nations drawn from all inhabited continents (see chapter five). As with the UN and EU, the initial nations would set the criteria defining democratic ideals and conditions for new members, and provide aid for developing nations seeking transition to full democracy, with the goal of growing to at least fifty member nations within two decades. In fact, a successful UDL could do so much good that it would attract many more prospective members and build friendly relations with many others.

The design of the UDL should aim to make it democratic in all the ways that the UN is not. This moral desideratum ensures that the UDL would not be merely another "concert of great powers" or a strategic interest group; as Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay argue, such an approach risks stalemate between powerful nations on key issues and lacks legitimacy.⁸ Indeed the UN has failed largely because "the Security Council institutionalizes the deficiencies of a great-power concert more readily than its benefits."⁹ The UDL's authority must rest on the legitimacy of its member nations and the justice of its goals and methods, rather than simply on clout. However, its importance would also rest on being far more effective than the UNSC (chapter four).

The UDL's democratic desideratum makes this proposal fairly demanding: the league's legislators should be *directly elected* by citizens of each member-nation, and the weight of each nation in the league's lower house should be largely proportional to its population. Its upper chamber, the Democratic Council (DC), should have the final authority to authorize several types of force, including military action, to prevent crimes against peace and to stop massive atrocities in civil wars and similar contexts. While there are several possible ways of structuring the DC, in contrast to the UNSC, *no member state would have a veto*. The DC might require three-fifths supermajority

votes for the gravest kinds of decisions, such as military deployments (see chapter five).

Finally, the UDL must have a strong executive authority, ideally a chancellor or president, and *standing* armed forces constituted by volunteers from the member nations—including rapidly deployable units that are directly at the disposal of the league's executive. In sum, as Yunker proposes, this union of democracies should be a "permanent and continuous governmental structure comprised of legislative, executive, and judicial branches," with powers to enforce "binding legislation" and military forces under its direct command.¹⁰

These proposals combine, in a more feasible package, the most important reforms proposed by critics of the UN. They are feasible precisely because three distinct groups of stakeholder nations would all reap enormous gains from the proposed UDL, even though they would also have to make significant concessions to the other groups, as follows:

- European nations that have objected to unilateral American action (such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq) would finally gain binding US agreement to abide by a collective decision-making process—the multilateralist norm for the sake of which they have supported the UN system—while also achieving a way to fulfill the R2P ideal without shouldering undue military burdens.
- In turn, the United States would gain the binding promise of European nations and other powerful democracies around the world to *do their fair part* through sanctions and necessary military actions to stop aggressive wars, war crimes, terrorist threats, mass atrocities, and other humanitarian catastrophes.
- Long-standing American objections to a UN system that empowers undemocratic regimes, European passivity in the face of growing threats, and the willingness of some leaders in other democratic nations to be bound by Russian and Chinese vetoes in the Security Council, would all be resolved in the new structure of the UDL.
- Thus the United States would no longer have to take the lead in almost all interventions to stop the spread of terrorist organizations, or to stop systemic atrocities against civilians.
- Americans would also avoid the high costs of being perceived as trying to rule the world, which helps to make us a lightning rod of hatred.
- Europeans and Americans together would gain the support of democracies in Asia and across the global South, which would

join in supporting crisis prevention, supplying military forces needed for humanitarian rescue operations, and in funding post-conflict reconstruction.

- Finally, non-western democracies would at last be guaranteed a truly equal place in a new multilateral process that would assure them of global cooperation for peace and stability in their regions, and greater control over global systems that affect their future prospects.
- For example, Brazil and Argentina are home to over 250 million people; together with other Latin American democracies, South America would have more representatives than the United States in the league's legislature.
- The same holds for Indonesia, South Korea, and the Philippines as a regional group.
- India would be the largest single delegation at the UDL, with more representatives in the lower house than the United States, Canada, and Europe together.
- This in turn would provide a robust incentive for more developing nations to democratize. This is especially important in the cases of Russia and China, whose partnership are needed to make the UDL a full success in the long run.

These are strong reasons for democracies in North America, Europe, Asia, Latin America, and Africa to cooperate in founding an effective league of democracies. They would gain a united front against growing threats from China's military dictatorship, from its vassal state North Korea, and from counter-democratic forces emanating from Russia. That a UDL could eventually stand a much better chance of securing a just two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine problem and perhaps even global climate protections are only two among its many further potential benefits.

Of course, the different advantages to the three groups involve a grand compromise in which each group makes significant concessions. The United States would have to give up its alleged license to intervene unilaterally in other nations whenever the US administration sees fit; this concession is absolutely essential for the league proposal to gain support among democracies in Europe and around the world. But the benefits to the United States far outweigh this concession, which only a minority of Americans today will even see as a cost.

On their side, Europeans will have to give up misplaced faith in the Security Council and revise qualms about using hard power to secure

even minimum human rights, as several French leaders have done in responding to the crises in Rwanda, Mali, and the Central African Republic. Europeans who opposed forceful action against Assad will have to recognize that negotiation with a genocidal tyrant is worse than useless without first establishing a meaningful threat to his regime. Non-western democracies will have to recognize that blaming all global ills on the legacies of colonialism does nothing to help collectively secure our shared future. But they would gain enormously from the proposed UDL, becoming full partners in the new order that protects the free trade on which their growth depends, while doing their share to help implement R2P, defend democratic values, and promote global security.

I do not pretend that such a grand compromise would be easy to forge, but the world's democracies have no other option that is *even close* to being this good for their interests—considered collectively or separately. As a result, democratic nations should pursue such a league treaty without delay. The grand compromise sketched here could lead to a renewal of faith in democracy within many nations where people feeling alienated by the effects of “globalization” are reverting to insular, nationalist, or antiliberal ideologies (see chapter one). Rather than heed skeptical counsels of despair, we must teach our publics to understand the urgency of the league issue, given the severe perils that democracies face if we stay on our present trajectory. The next section explains these transnational harms to democratic nations *in particular*, which only a league of democracies can avert.¹¹

The fleeting chance afforded by this unique historical moment

The current historical window

We live in a special time in world history: despite numerous terrible setbacks caused by war, disease, and racism, over the previous three centuries, freedoms have spread to the point that democratic peoples could now finally unite to make fulfillment of their ideals secure for the foreseeable future. This opportunity should be recognized for the near-miracle that it is. No chance so precious has existed since the Roman Republic flourished over 2,000 years ago before collapsing into dictatorship. For at least six millennia since the beginning of kingdoms and cities, almost all people have lived under some form of autocratic rule. It was not until the mid-twentieth century that the oldest democracies achieved universal suffrage. And even after the Allied victory in World War II, these nations still did not have the upper

hand: the swift rise of the Soviet Union and Mao's totalitarian regime in China caused millions more deaths and largely stopped the spread of democracy that had taken place since the revolutions of 1840s.

Only since 1989 have the countries devoted to democracy held the greater share of the world's military and economic power—something completely unimaginable throughout all prior human history. If our ancestors had witnessed this golden opportunity, they would surely have urged us in one great voice to take this invaluable chance to make democratic rights permanent by uniting the world's democratic nations to overcome the remaining tyrannies and stand up to other dictatorships. They would surely be aghast to see us instead squabble over trade and how to deal with civil wars in other nations, while settling into comfortable lifestyles premised on the assumption that there is no big danger. They would have been shocked to witness democratic nations fail to aid Russia in the aftermath of the Cold War, fail to address the weakness and corruption that have held back many nations in Africa and Southeast Asia following decolonization, leave a billion people in absolute poverty living on less than \$1.15 a day, fumble in response to the rise of pseudo-Islamic terrorism, and succumb to Putin's many stratagems. How could we possibly be so cavalier, so quick to assume that the expansion of democratic values would just continue of its own accord?

Unlike the Roman senators, we stand on the threshold of changes to our planet's biosphere that may last for many millennia or, in the case of mass extinctions, never be undone. We are also immersed in a globalization of commerce and communication for which there is no foreseeable reversal. So the stakes now are much higher; but without adequate historical knowledge, most of our citizens do not perceive the *fragility* of our present way of life in free nations. This is partly because few of us in wealthy nations experience firsthand what people suffer in many developing nations. We do not see the total destruction they experience in natural disasters; we do not feel directly the boot of tyranny on our families, the terror of war, or the existential insecurity occasioned by political chaos and full economic collapse, e.g. in Venezuela today. The “great recession” of 2009–2011 was not that deep in comparison. We have forgotten the enormous threats that democratic nations overcame, often just barely, in the twentieth century.

We lowered our guard: A lost quarter-century

Our present opportunity was opened by the fall of the Iron Curtain during 1989–1991—one of the great turning points in modern history. Within a few months, some of the most oppressive dictatorships ever

seen collapsed one after another because of the courage of the Solidarity movement in Poland and the reasoned determination of the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to restructure Russia. That moment was not an “end of history” or ultimate triumph of market capitalism, as some hoped at the time, although free markets have since spread. As Garry Kasparov rightly said, “Communism did not disappear when the Wall came down. Nearly 1.5 billion human beings still live in Communist dictatorships today,” with another 1.5 billion in “unfree states of different stripes—including, of course, much of the former Soviet Union,” such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.¹² But the end of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) did bring freedom to most eastern European nations. With dictatorships ending in Latin America as well, democracy began to spread again after 44 years of hiatus and regression. The hope we still have today for a realistic utopia was born from the picks and bare hands that tore apart the Berlin Wall.

After eastern Europe was freed, and just months before the formal end of the USSR, President George H.W. Bush spoke hopefully of a “new world order....A world where the United Nations, freed from cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders. A world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations.”¹³ Tragically, his hope has not been fulfilled. Instead, democratic nations treated the end of dictatorship in Europe as a “mission accomplished” moment after which we could focus on tending our own gardens. Thus western nations failed to help the Russian people in their currency crisis during the early 1990s, after which the Russian economy lost *almost 40 percent* of its value (similar to US depression of the 1930s). Democracies are generally at their weakest when newly established, and Russia in 1990-1996 needed a new Marshall Plan to secure its democratic future. Instead we left it to the wolves: it was plunged into deep mafia-style corruption.

This predictably opened the door to strongman rule by a demagogue like Vladimir Putin, who rose to fame by crushing rebellions in Chechnya and Dagestan with massacres that helped foster a generation of terrorists. As with Napoleon following the French Revolution, Russian dictatorship was reestablished early in the new century. Kasparov explains how western leaders tried to appease and mollify Putin while he eliminated any serious opposition at home, took over major media outlets, began enriching himself and his circle of robber barons by seizing major industries, and started whipping up nationalist fervor by demonizing western democracies: “Every newborn democratic institution in Russia” was destroyed by

Putin “while the [Condoleezza] Rices and Kissingers of the world looked on.”¹⁴ Joe Biden and Michael Carpenter agree: Putin had opposition politicians harassed or murdered; “Basic freedoms of assembly and expression have been restricted, and Russian elections have become choreographed performances that are neither free nor fair.”¹⁵ Putin’s ambitions to reestablish a “greater Russia” were ignored until they became a global problem, just as Kasparov had warned. At this point, some analysts also believe Putin is the richest single person on Earth.

Thus the failure to aid the newly democratized Russia proved to be almost as significant as 1989 itself. As former Canadian ambassador Jeremy Kinsman says, their slow recovery left “Russians with genuinely private lives and growing prosperity, but in the messy process, ‘democracy’ became code for convulsive change, market failures, deep social inequity and violence.”¹⁶ This enabled Putin to restore crony control of industries and invoke absolute sovereignty to justify the brutal suppression of opposition around the edges of the Russian Federation—e.g. in Dagestan, Georgia, Moldova, and Belarus. Following Boris Yeltsin’s vetoes blocking UN action in Bosnia and Kosovo, Putin joined with China to prevent the UN from realizing its potential to stop mass atrocities. This is clearest in his expanding support of the Assad regime, which tried to stop a peaceful, home-grown democratic reform movement by sending parents back the tortured and mutilated bodies of their children—the atrocities that turned unarmed Syrian protesters toward armed resistance in 2011.¹⁷ From late 2015, Putin’s air force joined Assad’s in bombing rebel-held civilian areas of Syrian cities such as Aleppo, killing thousands of civilians and creating hundreds of thousands more refugees.¹⁸ Russian foreign policy today is “realism” and total war unencumbered by any moral limits.

Emboldened by NATO’s failure to form a coalition with Middle Eastern partners to stop the Assad-Iran-Hezbollah alliance from ravaging Syria, Putin also seized Crimea and fomented civil war in eastern Ukraine without any western military response. As Larry Diamond says, he has “used violence and intimidation and has funneled money to support separatist movements and to prop up pro-Russian, antireform political forces in Georgia and Ukraine,” while supplying Ethiopia, Iran, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan with “internet and telecommunications surveillance technology” to help suppress their democratic dissent movements.¹⁹ Western nations have met this existential challenge with pinprick sanctions and useless scoldings.

But despite Putin's potent efforts, democracy has spread to many nations since the eastern European revolution of 1989. Beyond those in the former Warsaw Pact, democracy has come to western Ukraine and to the former Yugoslav republics; to Mongolia and new parts of southeast Asia such as Indonesia; to almost all of Central and South America; and slowly, haltingly, to parts of the Middle East and Africa. The Arab Spring and the revolution against Qaddafi in Libya are only the latest steps in a massive transformation that Putin seems desperate to halt. If democracy can be strengthened in eastern Europe and on Russia's eastern borders, e.g. in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, it will be harder for the Russian regime to promote autocratic nationalism against democratic principles.

At the same time, democratic norms have been written into international law, and the very idea of transnational standards has taken firmer root as international tribunals tried military leaders for war crimes in Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and (very belatedly) even in Cambodia. This trajectory culminated with the Rome Statute of the ICC, which remains the most comprehensive statement of humanitarian law. Despite cynical efforts to reject such standards as "cultural imperialism," human rights norms are more widely accepted today than in 1989.

Thus we still have a real chance to make the recent historical trajectory toward rights-respecting democracy permanent on Earth. For better or worse, the world will be very different in 30 to 50 years. With cooperation among democracies, we may reach the peak of human population size on Earth with democracies on the upswing, economic inequality declining, and social justice standards improving throughout most of the developing world. Or we may enter a new dark age of massive environmental destruction, dictatorships ruling more of the world, and small elites that own ever more of the world's wealth supporting the dictatorships and controlling public opinion in weak democracies through heavily biased medias.

Seizing the brief chance we still have to build a world secure for democratic ideals by the century's end requires democratic peoples everywhere to understand our interdependence and to recognize that if we do not start working together, our children and grandchildren may inherit the wind. It requires leaders who work to educate their people rather than feed them propaganda or follow polls, leaders who are willing to declare "that evil still exists in this world and that it must be fought on absolute terms, not negotiated with" or appeased.²⁰ Examples such as ISIS rising to power within the chaos of Syria and Iraq show again that when massive wrongs are left unchallenged, their

moral and social cancers spread, metastasizing into cultural forms that are much harder to root out.

Soft despotism: The new challenge to democracies

Among contemporary challenges to democratic nations, none is greater than the new forms taken by despotic rule in the internet age. This is not immediately apparent on a long view: according to Freedom House, "the number of democratic governments increased from 44 in 1977 to 86 in 2015."²¹ But now that trend has reversed, driven by longer-term challenges that our news cycles fail to clarify while focusing on Presidential tweets or more immediate threats from terrorism. The Democracy Index published by the *Economist* reported in 2013 that on its broad series of measures, progress toward democracy has stalled. Roughly "half of the world lives under a democracy of some form. However, only 15 percent of countries enjoy full democracy and nearly a third of the world's nations are ruled by authoritarian regimes."²²

In May 2015, Freedom House cited "Russia's invasion of Ukraine, a rollback of democratic gains by Egyptian president ... al-Sisi, Turkish president ... Erdogan's intensified campaign against press freedom and civil society, and further centralization of authority in China" as major setbacks.²³ Then, after a failed military coup in the summer of 2016, the Turkish government "fired or suspended about 130,000 [persons] suspected of being dissidents from the public and private sector," seeking out any possible opponent of Erdogan.²⁴ In 2017, he pushed through constitutional amendments that give the President excessive powers to rule by decree,²⁵ and reduced references to Atatürk and objective science in the nation's curriculum. These developments are a full-scale disaster for NATO, which could have wooed Erdogan by answering his call for a coalition against Assad. Instead, he is now working with Moscow on Syria issues.

By 2018, Freedom House reported 12 straight years of net declines in democratic freedoms.²⁶ Even established democracies have suffered losses of civil rights and voting rights as populist anger rises. In eastern Europe, things are worse. In Poland, for example, Russians bugged pro-democratic politicians to swing an election to a far right, pro-Putin administration. Anti-immigrant populism has also led to an openly racist regime in Hungary. In both nations, as in Turkey, the right-wing governments have been rewriting constitutional rules to favor their bloc and to reduce checks and balances.²⁷ In short, "democracy is in crisis. The values it embodies—particularly the right

to choose leaders in free and fair elections, freedom of the press, and the rule of law—are under assault and in retreat globally.”²⁸

Diamond summarizes the trend in his analysis of “Democracy in Decline:” “Between 2000 and 2015, democracy broke down in 27 countries,” including some large ones such as Kenya, Russia, and Turkey.²⁹ The causes are numerous, but the global nonresponse to atrocities in the Darfur region of Sudan in 2004 helped to start the reversal (see chapter six). The spread of militancy across the African Sahel and massive refugee flows have destabilized newer and older democracies from Kenya to Europe. And autocrats are learning: following Putin’s example, “many existing authoritarian regimes have become even less open, transparent, and responsive to their citizens. They are silencing dissent by censoring, regulating, and arresting” critics, swamping them with cyberattacks, and requiring foreign companies to store data on their citizens within their nation,³⁰ so their governments can weaponize this data.

As a result, policy journals are full of articles sounding alarm bells. Robin Niblett warns that dreams of a liberal world order are slipping away because leaders of democratic nations have allowed economic inequality and financial bubbles to increase while failing to coordinate their efforts to counter new tactics by dictatorial regimes.³¹ Joseph Nye worries that progress in democratization depended too much on US leadership, for all its faults. The success of the liberal order in “helping secure and stabilize the world over the past seven decades led to a strong consensus that defending, deepening, and extending that system ... [is] the central task of U.S. foreign policy.” But now, misinformed by their political leaders, Americans have become more isolationist, removing the main support that has sustained the liberal world order.³² Surveying such problems, Richard Haass, the President of the Council on Foreign Relations, rightly concludes that our neo-Westphalian world order “built along the protections and prerogatives of states” is no longer working for the protection and advancement of democratic ideals.³³ Securing and promoting democracy will now require a more transnational approach that shares the burden among democratic nations.

The situation looks better if we consider that the well-established democracies now comprise over 80 percent of the world’s economic wealth and productivity and over 90 percent of its military power.³⁴ By that measure, we might wonder why progress toward democracy has not been even swifter since 1989, and why democratic nations have not pressed for the advantage they would gain from pooling their weight in international affairs. If the world had looked like *this*

in 1945, we would have created a United Democratic Nations rather than the present UN (see chapter four). There would have been no good reason to do anything less. So why have savvy political leaders not moved in this direction? The answer involves four developments that make the threats to democratic nations more precise, and help explain why only a league of democracies can cure their root causes.

(a) First, our leaders irenically expected economic liberalization in former communist nations to facilitate democratic reforms organically without much pressure from us. China plays a special role in this part of the story. While few people in dictatorial nations suffer under the sort of absolute tyranny that we see in Syria or North Korea today, or that the Taliban hope to reimpose on Afghanistan, more than a third of all people without democratic rights live in China. For China resisted the tide of democratic revolutions by crushing the Beijing uprising in 1989; since then, one Chinese leader after another has rejected any democratic reforms at the national level. They and their enormous party apparatus have grown an amoeba of state intelligence networks more powerful than Orwell’s “Big Brother:” these agencies control internet sites, try to manage foreign coverage of China, deploy facial recognition systems to hunt opponents, and prevent reformers from organizing in China or even more widely in the Chinese diaspora.

Democracy advocates are severely repressed: for example, the Chinese regime kept their Nobel Prize winner Liu Xiaobo under house arrest until his death on 13 July 2017. Chinese human rights lawyers and other reformers feel ever more abandoned by western governments, and say that the pro-democracy movement “is now at its lowest point since the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989.”³⁵ Even Chinese human rights advocates living abroad are not safe: there are hundreds of examples of their relatives in China being assailed or threatened in reprisal. China’s central planners work tirelessly to move farmers to the cities,³⁶ expand private ownership of land and wealth, and grow market power; but they swiftly stamp out any critique and or effort to start reform movements—even when reformers only target local corruption. Instead, the central leadership selectively uses corruption charges when convenient to weed out potential opponents within the party.

No serious diplomatic efforts have been made since 1989 to nudge China closer to democratizing in any meaningful way. Internally, the material benefits of being part of the ruling elite are too enticing to give up; this elite is addicted to the one-party rule that made it so rich. While the USSR faced daunting and very costly American challenges, China has been given a largely unhindered path to growth. As Niblett

comments, "Western policymakers were confident that transitions to open markets would inevitably lead to the spread of democracy."³⁷ That strategy, adopted by Clinton and both Bush administrations, has absolutely failed, except as a rationalization for filling Walmart with cheap products. It has only reduced our leverage; now, for example, we let western media companies and tech giants like Google bow to pressure from the Chinese regime in order to retain access to China's markets. The result is a new form of dictatorship, which I term *soft despotism*, given that it uses economic growth derived from trade and limited market freedoms to stay in power.

This grim reality for over 1.4 billion residents of China is the largest challenge to democracy in our time. It is an even bigger danger than Putin's rule, because China is growing in economic wealth at a staggering rate and no internal challenges to its one-party rule seem to be on the horizon: thus Xi Jinping felt confident enough to make himself ruler for life. Although China faces ecological and demographic challenges in coming decades, its ruling party knows how to sell sophisticated rationalizations for soft despotism. The core of its narrative is that economic progress to bring people out of poverty requires that hundreds of millions be managed by a small elite with nearly absolute police powers, and that people with little education cannot be trusted to vote.³⁸

The regime also offers Chinese people the pride of economic strength and the premise (also at work in Russia) that blind communal solidarity is more important than free speech, free media, free elections, impartial courts, rights of redress, and accountability for political leaders and their families. Its paradigm bets that nationalist pride and economist desire will inspire loyalty to an elite that deprives people of their basic liberties. It teaches would-be dictators that a large public may tacitly accept economic progress as an *alternative* to popular sovereignty if they are also sufficiently scared by the government and brainwashed by state control of popular medias.

Thus the challenge of soft despotism in China is much different than that posed by Mao's or Khrushchev's belligerence during the Cold War: while the USSR threatened nuclear war, the main threat today is *more psychological*. It lies in the possibility that masses of people in advanced industrial societies around the world might one day accept material wealth and the pleasures of a consumerist culture as their opiate, in return ceding to their ruling elite any remaining pretensions to democratic control and civil liberties.

Some might say that we are already traveling this path, as civic knowledge and political participation erode in the United States, and

state education requirements do nothing to counter this slide.³⁹ While people in China have not yet won democracy, we are on the verge of losing ours to cyber-trolls, fundamentalists, media demagogues, and corporate lobbyists, who all influence too many legislators.⁴⁰ These and other structural problems in our federal system should be addressed by a new convention to pass a set of amendments to the US constitution.⁴¹ Otherwise our reputation with other peoples around the world will continue to erode.

China, by contrast, looks strong; it is not an artificial composite of peoples forced together, like Yugoslavia or the old USSR. It is an ancient and great nation, largely unified in culture (despite some oppressed minorities in its outlying regions), with tremendous economic, scientific, and social prospects. Unlike India, China has not benefitted from a transformative leader like Mahatma Gandhi who believed in democratic ideals. In China, no one with the courage of Mikhail Gorbachev or F.W. de Klerk has been able to secure the position of Chairman and gain military support for democratic reforms. Instead, China's leaders are taking ever-more belligerent stances in their region to promote more Chinese nationalism, while keeping North Korea in a buffer state status.

Yet if China did become democratic within the next 20 years, the realistic utopia of a *Pax Democratica* would be quite probable—even though we would still face large global environmental, security, and economic challenges. There is no higher priority for the future of the human race than real democracy in China, but this problem gets almost no attention from our political leaders. Beyond occasional media reports about repression of dissidents and religious minorities, there is no large-scale global advocacy for free media and free multiparty elections for China's national government—nothing like the global movements against greenhouse gases or Apartheid in South Africa, for example. Because the Chinese regime is not seen as overtly threatening to western nations (yet), and its injustices are not mainly about one racial or religious group persecuting others, we ignore all that is at stake in China.

This great omission shows how passive democratic nations have become. In China, *one sixth* of all humanity continues to live in fear of an oligarchic, military regime that increasingly threatens its whole region, and yet hardly anyone in the free world seems to care: there are no mass protest marches, no sleep-in camps or boycotts of China-made goods, or calls for divestment from Chinese businesses around the democratic world. Perhaps we are still deluded into thinking that capitalism makes transition to democracy inevitable in China. On the contrary, China

has proven that autocracies can secure economic growth if rich democracies trade with them—especially when they embed meritocratic procedures into their bureaucracies.⁴² The soft despotist model is not unstable in the way that the Soviet model was; instead, the Chinese politburo could succeed in spreading it.

(b) Our leaders were also overconfident because the world's democracies held the lion's share of economic and military power after the USSR's end. They saw no rush to act after 1991. But now it will take a united effort by many democratic nations to encourage democratic reforms in China. The founding of a UDL would occasion fundamental soul-searching among the ruling elite in Beijing, and it would offer potent possibilities. For example, democratic nations could enforce a wide reduction in trade with China until China adopted reforms to bring about multiparty democracy with media freedoms and an independent judiciary.

Yet the window for such an effective kind of pressure short of war is rapidly closing as China's power and influence waxes. Within 25–30 years, if current trends continue, China will be the greatest economic power on the planet, and eventually draw many other nations into its orbit. Hence, if China does not democratize by 2040–2050, the world will enter a massive confrontation of civilizations simultaneous with a bottleneck of environmental crises. Democracies have not faced such a combination of great economic strength and military dictatorship in a single regime since Nazi Germany. Clearly we should not wait for that point to act. We have tried to cooperate with Russia and China for three decades since 1989 to make the UN system work, while they instead fought for the view—mis-labeled as “national self-determination”—that any government may do whatever it likes to its own people.⁴³ At this point, democratic nations need a fundamentally different strategy.

(c) Our leaders also failed to foresee new Chinese and Russian strategies to pit old and emerging democratic nations against each other, thus blocking the natural tendency for these countries to ally. The massive transitions to democracy in India, parts of Southeast Asia, and Latin America are among the greatest triumphs of humanity after World War II. If western governments had been friendlier to them, these developing democracies could have joined us in an alliance that clearly rejected old colonial attitudes and Cold War strategies involving anti-socialist manipulations. But suspicions built up from decades of abuse by Britain, France, and the United States, when we supported too many right-wing military strongmen in developing nations, made it easy for Russia to organize the “BRICS” block,

which includes Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Supposedly acting as a counterweight to NATO nations and their allies in other western-style democracies, the BRICS idea implies that Brazil, India, and South Africa have more interests in common with the world's leading dictatorships than they do with other democratic nations.

Western leaders should have fought harder against this “divide and conquer” stratagem, by which Russia and China lulled some politicians in developing democracies. While ANC party leader Jacob Zuma in South Africa supported Mugabe's tyrannical regime in Zimbabwe, some Indian and Brazilian leaders put trade and economic ties with dictatorships ahead of standing up for the human rights so flagrantly violated by their new friends. Thus the spectacle of Brazil's Dilma Rousseff backing Russia's opposition to any military action to stop Assad's mass murder in Syria. The BRICS coalition is designed to undermine R2P by talking up imagined “western aggressions” rather than defending innocent lives from ethnic cleansing, chemical warfare, and genocidal mayhem.⁴⁴ Nations that have survived oppression by fascist death squads and brutal colonial rule should not be tricked into overlooking the obvious similarities between Putin and Marshal Branco, or between the Communist party elite in China and the British Raj.

A league of democracies would fundamentally alter this new alignment, encouraging nations like Brazil, India, Argentina, South Africa, and Indonesia to cooperate more closely with peoples who share their fundamental ideals and principles, and with democratic governments that would give them a “most-favored” status in trade relations. New leadership in South Africa, Brazil, and other developing democracies may open up such possibilities, if we had a better model to offer them. A UDL would also contradict the narrative that Putin has been spreading since 2007 that “Washington aimed at nothing less than world domination,” as Daalder put it.⁴⁵ If Russia's new belligerency was partly motivated by the 2003 Iraq invasion, as Daalder argues, a democratic league could also assure Russians that the United States would never again invade other nations without approval by a diverse group of other democratic nations.

We will not have this opportunity for long if fast-growing democratic nations such as Brazil and India abandon the principles for which they resisted military dictatorships at home and instead move closer to China and Russia. China is also expanding its influence in several African nations by buying up vast tracts of land and other natural resources.⁴⁶ And Putin's regime is successfully making economic

and political threats to keep former Soviet nations like Moldova and Belarus from democratizing or moving toward the EU. He is also manipulating social media across former Warsaw Pact nations to weaken the NATO alliance, among other goals.

(d) In the 1990s, western leaders also imagined only positive developments from the internet and the expansion of NATO and the EU. We were caught off guard by Putin's all-out crusade to roll back the tide of democratization; we have not faced a Russian leader with this level of resourcefulness and cunning since Stalin. In addition to targeted assassinations, Putin has often used energy supplies as both threats and enticements in eastern Europe; he even cut off natural gas to Ukraine for periods during the winters of 2006 and 2009.⁴⁷ Tensions there ramped up when Putin imposed an almost-total blockade on trade in August 2013 in order to force Ukraine to abandon its deal to join the EU.⁴⁸ As in 1956, western nations made no serious response, even though Ukrainian reformers were attacked by forces loyal to Putin's puppet, Viktor Yanukovich, and by Russian snipers sent into Kiev. These brave reformers were left entirely on their own through the winter of 2014 until Yanukovich gave up and fled into Russia.

In response, recognizing western apathy, Putin was emboldened to annex Crimea, seize the Ukrainian navy, and then arm, train, and fund pro-Russian militias in eastern Ukraine, encouraging them to declare unilateral secession. "For the first time in postwar European history, one country had annexed territory from another by force."⁴⁹ These offensives were so brazen that NATO should probably have launched a military counteroffensive; instead, western democracies did not even supply Ukraine with the money or weapons needed to fight back. Even when Ukrainian separatists backed by Moscow used a Russian missile to shoot down a commercial airplane full of civilians, nothing more than puny financial sanctions resulted. A functioning league of democracies would have made such Russian war crimes impossible.

Putin was also emboldened by western inaction in Syria to such an extreme that he even launched a major air offensive in support of Assad, as noted earlier. For comparison, imagine how leading democracies would have responded if Russia had bombed Tutsi villages in support of the Hutu genocidaires in Rwanda. Our nonresponse to this enormous outrage in Syria encouraged Putin to extend the covert tactics he uses against internal opponents to other nations by cyber-sabotage. As Biden and Carpenter argue, Putin exported financial corruption, laundered money through western banks, and used

business ties to gain leverage over many western companies and politicians they advise.⁵⁰ Putin's regime also employed an extensive array of hackers to seek dirt on political candidates, and set up legions of cyber-trolls to create false rumors on social media sites in order to shape social opinion to his liking, e.g. by promoting anti-immigrant bigotries and attack mainstream western medias. By spreading fabricated stories, they aim to erode the confidence of average citizens in western democracies, and make them doubt reliable fact-checked information sources so they can be manipulated by propaganda, just as citizens are in Russia.⁵¹ Putin's agents have also hacked the internal communications of political organizations that he dislikes—Watergate-style theft done electronically. Our collective response to these shocking acts has been insufficient to deter even worse cyber-attacks in the future (see chapter four).⁵²

In sum, there are dotted lines extending from Milliband's fateful act of parliamentary sabotage in mid-2013 through the rise of ISIS, Assad's successful genocide, and resulting refugee flows, to the Russian seizure of Crimea, the UK Brexit vote, and Putin's manipulations of the French and American presidential elections. When these dots are connected, an extraordinary new combination of threats to democracies comes into focus.

Conclusion: Two possible futures

In sum, democracies are now in serious peril from the rising economic and political power of China's soft despotism, Putin's military aggressions and cyber-invasions, and the many transnational consequences of mass atrocities. While people are focused on terrorism, these larger existential threats to democracy are much less noticed. These developments since 1989 support my larger argument for a new transnational institution in three ways. First, they suggest that existing institutions such as NATO are not sufficient to secure TPGs shared by democratic nations; western democracies need more support from younger democracies around the world. Rather than try to make the UN system work, China and Russia have largely used it as a cloak to hide their intentions while they perfected new strategies to undermine democracy.

Second, my analysis suggests that a much better approach to cooperation among democracies is still feasible. Asian and South American democracies would probably stand with older western democracies if a democratic league were organized in a way that was fair to them. Emerging African democracies and nations still deciding their

direction in central Asia would be encouraged by the opportunities that such a league would provide. A UDL would offer them a viable alternative to the emerging Russia-China axis of corrupt power.

Moreover, within a UDL, would-be democratic nations struggling against ultrafundamentalist religious movements, such as Pakistan and Iraq, would have massive support from a broad group of democracies without risk of unilateral control by Washington. Then the anti-democratic forces in China would be weakened, and Russians might be enabled to save their nation. The great courage of the Ukrainians at the Kiev Maidan should be a wake-up call: if these ordinary Ukrainians could stand alone against Putin's despotism, imagine what a broad league of democracies could do.

The time we have left to turn things around is shortened by other factors such as fast-rising US federal debt (and interest on the debt), rising tensions within Europe, and environmental challenges—not only climate change but also loss of fisheries, loss of topsoil and farmland, the destruction of coastal wetlands, and the ongoing erasure of tropical rainforests and the biodiversity they contain. By 2050 there may be little of these priceless ecosystems left to save, whereas a UDL formed during the next ten years could coordinate strong preservation initiatives.

Third, the history since 1989 will shed light on several recent versions of the democratic league idea discussed in the next chapter, and explain why they have remained on the sidelines. For example, consider the sentiments expressed by Senator Tim Kaine in an insightful recent article. He calls for the United States to renew Harry Truman's policy of supporting "free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures,"⁵³ such as Syrian Sunnis. He rightly cites the Marshall Plan for rebuilding Europe into a continent of stable, friendly democracies—the precedent that led to our decades-long efforts to support weak nations through foreign aid. A democratic league might extend that idea to parts of Africa. Kaine recognizes the mistake that the United States made in following Truman's doctrine, including intervening in Vietnam. But he adds that *nonintervention* can also be disastrous: "I believe that the Obama administration's unwillingness to forcefully intervene early in the Syrian civil war will come to haunt the United States in the future, much as the Clinton administration's failure to help avert the horror in Rwanda haunts the United States today."⁵⁴

My analysis supports this conclusion. The shattered remnants of Mosul and Raqqa after ISIS,⁵⁵ and the thousands of crazed ISIS

admirers we must now try to monitor, are partly due to Assad. But the trouble is, such problems are *not only* (or even mainly) America's responsibility. Kaine grasps only one horn of the atrocity trilemma that we considered at the outset. He recommends "looking for cooperative, not coercive, ways to shore up the world's existing democracies" and working together in meeting global challenges like Syria.⁵⁶ But he offers no clear institutional mechanism for doing that. A sustainable, legitimate, and sufficiently powerful institution must share both decision-making powers and the burdens of nation-building among many democratic nations—which means that it must be a broad league of democracies. In a case like Syria, it would have had to compel significant assistance from other nations in the region too.

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The next chapter reviews other recent proposals for cooperation among democracies in order to defend my version by comparison. It then explains the need for a deeper theoretical foundation in the cosmopolitan tradition of political thought to clarify the challenges of globalization. The insights of this tradition lead to a general framework for analyzing arguments in defense of higher levels of government. This form of argument, which is implicit in the recent league proposals, should be rigorously set out so that we can see exactly how needs arising from global interdependencies and basic requirements for legitimacy entail something like a democratic league. The components of such "consolidation arguments" are explained in chapter two through the American case and other historical examples. By analogy, a contemporary argument for a new governing authority spanning all continents must begin from TPGs affecting its potential member nations (as set out in this Introduction) and from several crucial GPGs.

Chapter three offers an inventory of GPGs based on recent scholarship in order to indicate how wide a set of issues potentially call for coordination via a global league of democracies. Game-theoretic analysis also suggests that the network approach will not be adequate for several GPGs. Chapter four then considers the GPGs bearing on security in more detail, arguing that the UN system has proven unable to provide these GPGs. Treaties and transnational networks have done better, but their limits are all too apparent in the face of new arms races. Chapters five and six then explain in more detail how a democratic league could be designed to protect peoples from new military technologies, terrorism, and mass atrocities. Unified action made possible by such a league would eventually help with other crucial GPGs in the environmental and economic categories as well.

Notes

1. Cruz was hardly alone. Senator Tulsi Gabbard (D-Hawaii) and Senator Rand Paul (R-Kentucky) made similar egregious errors in extended statements on Syria, sometimes even repeating lines from Assad's propaganda.
2. See, for example, Matthew D'Ancona, "Ed Miliband's Shameful Role in Assad's Aleppo Victory," *GQ Magazine*, 13 December 2016, www.gq-magazine.co.uk/article/aleppo-syria-news.
3. Elizabeth Ferris and Kemal Kirişçi, *The Consequences of Chaos* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016), ch. 2.
4. On *ius post bellum* duties implied in R2P, see the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), *The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa, ON: International Development Research Centre, 2001), ch. 5. Central elements of this report were adopted in Security Council resolution 1674, 28 April 2006.
5. Garry Kasparov, *Winter Is Coming* (Philadelphia, Penn: Perseus Group, 2015), xii; compare 261.
6. *Ibid.*, 27.
7. James A. Yunker, *The Idea of World Government* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 105–6.
8. Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, "Democracies of the World Unite," *The American Interest* 3 no. 1 (2007), 2. This article was reprinted in *Public Policy Research* (March–May 2007): 47–58.
9. *Ibid.*, 3.
10. Yunker, *The Idea of World Government*, 106. Compare James A. Yunker, *Political Globalization: A New Vision of Federal World Government* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2007), 45.
11. In other words, these considerations are partly *additional* to the global public harms listed in chapter three.
12. Kasparov, *Winter Is Coming*, xxii.
13. George H.W. Bush, Address Before the Special Joint Session of Congress, 6 March 1991, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19364.
14. Kasparov, *Winter Is Coming*, xiv–xix; compare 9–12. Putin has also tried to turn Orthodox religion into a support network for Slavic nationalism by demonizing gays and portraying western resistance to Serb fascism in the 1990s as an attack on Slavic and Orthodox cultural identity.
15. Joseph Biden, Jr., and Michael Carpenter, "How to Stand Up to the Kremlin," *Foreign Affairs* 97, no. 1 (2018): 44–57, 46.
16. Jeremy Kinsman, "Democracies of the World Unite," *International Herald Tribune* and *New York Times*, 15 September 2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/09/15/opinion/15iht-edkinsman.html.
17. A representative story from May 2011 concerns the torture and murder of 13 year-old Hamza Al-Khateeb. See www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/05/201153185927813389.html. See my political history of the Syrian Civil War at faculty.fordham.edu/davenport/Syria/Syria-History.html.
18. See Robert S. Ford, "Keeping Out of Syria: The Least-Bad Option," *Foreign Affairs* 96 (November/December 2017): 16–22. Ford had been one of the strongest advocates for military action against Assad.

19. Larry Diamond, "Democracy in Decline," *Foreign Affairs* 95 (July/August 2016): 151–159, 153.
20. Kasparov, *Winter Is Coming*, xix.
21. Robin Niblett, "Liberalism in Retreat: The Demise of a Dream," *Foreign Affairs* 96, no. 1 (2017): 17–22, 18.
22. See the Democracy Index report of 2013, www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/21/democracyindex2013economistintelligenceunit_n_2909619.html.
23. See Arch Puddington, "Discarding Democracy," *Freedom in the World* 2015, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2015#WrCum8szWpQ>.
24. Patrick Kingsley, "With Thousands Purged, Chaotic Turkey Struggles to Fill the Void," *New York Times*, 13 April 2017, A1.
25. Steven Cook, "RIP Turkey, 1921–2017," *Foreign Policy*, 16 April 2017, foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/16/tripturkey19212017/.
26. Michael Abramowitz, "Democracy in Crisis," *Freedom in the World* 2018, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018WrCum8szWpQ>.
27. Ivan Krastev, "Eastern Europe's Illiberal Revolution," *Foreign Affairs* 97 (May/June 2018): 49–56. He notes the impact of "brain drain" in eastern Europe since 1989 as well.
28. Abramowitz, "Democracy in Crisis."
29. Diamond, "Democracy in Decline," 151.
30. *Ibid.*
31. Niblett, "Liberalism in Retreat."
32. Joseph Nye, Jr., "Will the Liberal Order Survive?" *Foreign Affairs* 96, no. 1 (2017): 10–16, esp. 12.
33. Richard Haass, "World Order 2.0. The Case for Sovereign Obligation," *Foreign Affairs* 96, no. 1 (2017): 2–9.
34. See the statistics in Sarah Janssen, ed., *The World Almanac and Book of Facts 2017* (New York: World Almanac Books, 2017), 165, 732.
35. See Javier Hernández, "Some in China Despair for Democracy After Nobel Laureate's Death: Sense That the West Refuses to Help," *New York Times*, 21 July 2017, A7.
36. China's government forces farmers off their land when it wishes: "New China Cities: Shoddy Homes, Broken Hope," *New York Times*, 10 November 2013, A1–A3.
37. Niblett, "Liberalism in Retreat," 18.
38. This argument, which should remind us of literacy tests in pre-civil rights America, was made explicitly by General Secretary Jiang Zemin in his CNN interview with Andrea Koppel, 9 May 1997, www.cnn.com/WORLD/9705/09/china.jiang/transcript1.html.
39. See Timothy Snyder, *On Tyranny* (New York: Duggan Books/Penguin Random House, 2017); and Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, *How Democracies Die* (New York: Crown Publishing/Penguin Random House, 2018).
40. On the rise of lobby powers, see Lawrence Lessig, *Republic, Lost* (New York: Twelve Publishing, 2012).
41. See Davenport, "Constitutional Amendments and the Convention Idea," <http://philosophy.nyc/?author=7>.

42. Yuen Yuen Ang, "Autocracy with Chinese Characteristics," *Foreign Affairs* 97 (May/June 2018): 39–46.
43. Compare the analysis in Daalder and Lindsay, "Democracies of the World, Unite," 3.
44. The major BRICS Declaration of New Delhi on 29 March 2012 is mostly about economics. It supports "recognized norms of international law and multilateral decision-making," and mentions human rights only once, i.e. in urging that "peaceful means" be used to stop violence in Syria. See www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/120329-delhi-declaration.html.
45. Ivo Daalder, "Responding to Russia's Resurgence," *Foreign Affairs* 96 (November/December 2017): 30–38, 32.
46. See Michael Kugelman and Susan Levenstein, eds., *The Global Farms Race* (London: Island Press, 2013).
47. Biden and Carpenter, "How to Stand Up to the Kremlin," 51.
48. See Leonid Bershidsky, "Putin's Low Blows Drive Ukraine Away from Europe," Bloomberg.com, 22 November 2013.
49. Daalder, "Responding to Russia's Resurgence," 33. Daalder notes how Moscow used "cyber-operations and relentless disinformation" to hide their deployment of unmarked special forces throughout Crimea.
50. Biden and Carpenter, "How to Stand Up to the Kremlin," 52.
51. Massimo Calabresi, "Hacking Democracy: Inside Russia's Social Media War on America," *Time*, 29 May 2017, 30–35.
52. These military, economic, and cyber strategies of manipulation have been ably described by Douglas Schoen in his insightful book, *Putin's Master Plan* (New York: Encounter Books, 2016).
53. Tim Kaine, "A New Truman Doctrine," *Foreign Affairs* 96 (July/August 2017): 36–53, 38, citing Truman's March 1947 speech to Congress.
54. *Ibid.*, 41.
55. See James Verini, "Life After ISIS," *National Geographic* 231 (April 2017): 96–123.
56. Kaine, "A New Truman Doctrine," 44. He suggests that the United States and its allies "should establish a global pro-democracy initiative—one separate from military alliances like NATO—that will highlight and advance the virtues and viability of democracy worldwide" (48). I agree that a massive public relations campaign is needed, but we clearly need a new military alliance as well.

1 The United Democratic League as a cosmopolitan Idea

- Six recent precedents for the league proposal
- Economic versus political globalization: Inarticulate debates
- Maritain versus Hobbes: An introduction to cosmopolitanism
- Cosmopolitanism, governance networks, and transnational government
- Grounds for the cosmopolitan framework
- Conclusion

The Introduction argued that democratic nations face several rising threats that may best be countered through a United Democratic League (UDL). These are urgent issues for democracies; we have to choose now between two global futures:

- A world in which most of humanity lives under peaceful democratic governments that do a better job of respecting basic human rights with each passing decade, working with their citizen groups and cooperating across national borders to solve endemic problems of violence, poverty, and overuse of ecological resources; *or*
- A world divided between older democratic nations in the west joined by a few elsewhere (e.g., Japan and Australia) that find their influence fading as their relative wealth and military advantage declines versus growing nations run by elites on the soft despotist model, collaborating for economic gain at the expense of political rights and regional environmental stability.

In the second scenario, the world will continue to lurch from crisis to crisis, with billions at risk under tyranny and military oppression, and millions more potentially starving when there is any significant shock to local water supplies or to world food production. In this dystopia, civil wars will rage unchecked, destabilizing whole regions; famine

and pandemics will be more likely; and the pressures caused by peak human population later this century may cause extreme conflicts.

By contrast, in the first scenario, we have a chance to make the trajectory toward democracy permanent and strengthen the mechanisms available to head off the greatest environmental catastrophes. In the second, we can expect ruinous inequality, devastating cyberwars and terrorism, ecosystem collapses that leave many areas looking like scenes from *Blade Runner*, and a Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) that is regarded as a quaint memento of forgotten hopes. This is no exaggeration; it is the hard truth. A UDL is the only feasible way at present to ensure a future closer to the first scenario.

This chapter begins with an overview of several recent proposals for a league or concert of democracies. Comparing and contrasting them with my proposal helps clarify crucial issues that must be resolved. The later sections introduce Cosmopolitanism as a foundation for political globalization, as distinguished from economic and cultural globalization. When rightly understood, cosmopolitan principles provide a better framework for evaluating the advantages of the league proposal over other contemporary solutions, such as the network approach to global governance.

Six recent precedents for the league proposal

Although it is not widely known, ideas for associations of democratic nations have been around under various titles for a long time. As James Yunker describes, although 'world federalist' proposals peaked immediately following World War II and tapered off during the Cold War, proposals for uniting democracies continued. In 1940, the American journalist, Clarence Streit, suggested an alliance of Atlantic nations, which helped inspire NATO. In his 1961 book, Streit then proposed that NATO nations found a new confederation aimed at becoming a tighter union over time.¹

Following Streit and John Ikenberry, James Huntley proposed an "Intercontinental Community of Democracies" based on a treaty for mutual defense, a free trade zone modelled on the EU, and a central council initially composed of democracies with advanced economies, significant militaries, and "a demonstrated willingness to share burdens fairly."² By contrast, my proposal would include more non-western and developing democracies as equal partners and add mass atrocity prevention to the organization's purposes. Huntley also suggested a broader Democratic Caucus at the UN and a "Parliamentary Assembly of Democracies," including up to 70 nations made up initially of delegates appointed by their

governments (and eventually, elected directly by their peoples).³ This looks like a smaller version of the UNSC but still much smaller than the central council larger than the UNSC's but still much smaller than the Assembly. My proposal is structured differently (see chapter six), but I will develop Huntley's proposals for global arms controls and measures to resist "democide" by coup.

In recent policy circles, a concert of democracies has been a bipartisan idea in the United States, and it has European proponents as well. Perhaps inspired by Huntley, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and her Polish counterpart, Bronislaw Geremek, organized the Community of Democracies (CDem)⁴ beginning with a 2000 conference in Warsaw attended by 106 nations. The resulting Warsaw Declaration is a bold statement that lays out a demanding set of principles defining democracy, which a future UDL could use as criteria for membership. CDem's "Governing Council" is made up of 27 well-established and solidly democratic nations that could become future founders of a UDL.

Yet most people have never heard of CDem because it has operated only as a meeting of ministers taking little concrete action. CDem's function is mainly symbolic, and it has no aspirations to step into the breach when the Security Council fails to act. But it is a promising first step that led Kinsman, as representative for Canada, to call for CDem to play a stronger role. Against rising isolationist sentiments, he affirms Franklin Roosevelt's sentiment that "other people's lives do matter, because people everywhere in the world, including Russia, aspire to human rights we take for granted and [they] look to democrats beyond their borders for solidarity" with their struggles."⁵ To provide that solidarity would be a main function of a democratic league.

More recently, in a 2004 editorial, James Lindsay and Ivo Daalder (who later served as President Barack Obama's ambassador to NATO), proposed an "alliance of democracies" in response to the tensions occasioned by the American invasion of Iraq.⁶ Around the same time, I outlined a "federation of democracies" in a debate on just war theory with Jean Elshtain.⁷ In 2006, the Princeton Project on National Security finished its "bipartisan initiative" to develop a national security strategy for America. Anne-Marie Slaughter, dean of the Wilson School, and John Ikenberry published the final report advocating for a "Concert of Democracies" to act as a backup to the UN and regional institutions, rather than as a replacement for the Security Council.⁸ They envisioned this concert as a new treaty organization devoted primarily to strengthening "security cooperation among the world's liberal democracies" by operating whenever

possible through “existing regional and global institutions,” but also acting directly when the UN fails. Its membership would be “selective, but self-selected,” meaning that member nations would abide by key norms. In particular, they would

commit to holding multiparty, free-and-fair elections at regular intervals; guarantee civil and political rights for their citizens enforceable by an independent judiciary; and accept that states have a “responsibility to protect” their citizens from avoidable catastrophe and that the international community has a right to act if they fail to uphold it.⁹

Clearly this early endorsement of R2P, and their proposed institution to fulfill it goes in the direction that I advocate, especially if the R2P principle is considered binding on all nations. Yet Ikenberry and Slaughter weaken this proposal by suggesting that the democratic concert would not initially be founded as “a new alliance system” to supersede NATO or the UN “as long as those institutions can be successfully reformed.” They clarify, however, that if the UNSC cannot be reformed within a few years, then “the Concert could become an alternative forum for the approval of the use of force” when UNSC vetoes prevented “free nations from keeping faith with the aims of the U.N. Charter” and R2P. This could require the concert to add agreements on “approving the use of force by a supermajority of member states, with no veto power” when needed to defend peace or to stop mass atrocities.¹⁰

These very promising provisions are incorporated within the UDL proposal. However, I maintain that a league of democracies should be founded from the beginning as a democracy-only organization with a vetoless version of the Security Council that is directly elected by individual citizens of member nations and authorized to act even before attempting to get UNSC approval. As I argued in the Introduction, it is too late to adopt a more incremental approach, and the main arguments for a democratic league depend on giving it binding power to make collective decisions about security and humanitarian crises like Syria. In other words, one of the main reasons to create it would be to *replace* the Security Council and thereby express the free world’s determination to end cynical manipulation by antidemocratic regimes. It was never realistic to hope for UNSC implementation of R2P, given R2P’s tensions with the principles on which the UN was built, as I will argue (chapter four). A league of democracies is needed to proclaim a more adequate basis for both R2P and the entire system of international law, which must finally be aligned with democratic ideals.

I will also argue that such a league should immediately supersede NATO because mutually assured security and determination to end mass atrocities should wed together *all* of the world’s liberal or sufficiently rights-respecting democracies (see chapter four). Ikenberry and Slaughter propose that NATO should be revived and updated with new bargains to strengthen its purpose, and to give the EU a clearer role within its framework. By contrast, while an improved NATO might continue for some time alongside a fledgling UDL, the democratic league would need to have primacy to give developing nations enough reason to join it (see chapter five). Moreover, replacing NATO would bring crucial advantages, because NATO is associated with the Cold War and thus widely misunderstood as an institution that exists only to promote western interests. Even significant expansion of NATO’s mission could not easily shake this image, whereas replacing NATO with a new UDL would offer invaluable leverage with Russia.

These points bear directly on Didier Jacobs’s 2007 argument for expanding NATO into something like a global concert of democracies.¹¹ Jacobs also suggests that political scientists focusing on transnational governance have been too reluctant to embrace direct democratic control of global institutions by individual citizens,¹² when in fact there is no adequate substitute for democratic answerability at any level of law and policy. He makes good points: NATO is an alliance of democratic nations that, unlike the Security Council, has proven itself by using the huge military power at its disposal effectively. It thus has the credibility to attract new members, and its expansion would make it more legitimate as a global authority: “The bet of global democracy is thus that the incremental expansion of an organization like NATO could increase its legitimacy, as well as its military might, without decreasing its credibility.”¹³

Jacobs is right that a more inclusive NATO would be more legitimate—especially if its council were directly elected—and that an effective global democratic institution would have to wield serious enforcement power, giving its decisions real teeth. However, directly electing NATO’s Atlantic Council and allowing it to operate by majority rule (rather than current consensus requirements) are changes too radical to achieve through the existing NATO amendment process; they would require a whole new treaty. In that case, why retain an identity associated with western Cold War policy? In a later editorial, Jacobs acknowledges that “an open League of Democracies would be less threatening than a closed club like NATO,” and he supports this proposal¹⁴ (although in another article, he still entertains the expansion of NATO as the way to create such a league).¹⁵

I believe that a fresh start without any direct association with NATO stands a better chance of buy-in from democracies in Asia and the global South. Including such nations as founding members of the UDL is crucial to its legitimacy, and to solving a range of global problems, from mutual security to a stable global financial system and fair global immigration processes. If most NATO nations (including the largest powers) were founding members of a new democratic league, it would inherit some of the credibility that NATO has built up, while billing it as a new organization would express willingness to lay aside Cold War mind-sets and any associated hegemonic ambitions. For NATO nations would be pledging themselves to live by the decisions of a global democratic league that gave non-western democracies a strong voice and voting weight (see chapter five).

However, Jacobs is correct that in NATO we already have an effective institution for limited forms of cooperation among a historically linked set of democratic nations: there is a real basis here for mutual trust. The option of growing a wider league out of NATO should be kept in mind as a fallback if other options fail. But obviously the name would have to be changed in order to encourage Russia to reform sufficiently to join it. Any pragmatic route towards forming a UDL must take into account Putin's 20-year strategy of building nationalist fervor by flooding his people with constant lies that NATO is trying to encircle and destroy Russia. A democratic league must be designed to break through this web of demagoguery and other conspiracy theories that cause fear of NATO elsewhere in the world too.

In the same year as Jacobs's book, Lindsay and Daalder published an influential call for democracies around the world to unite.¹⁶ Like Ikenberry and Slaughter, they use the language of a "Concert of Democracies, with a full-time secretariat, a budget, ministerial meetings and regular summits." In other words, they envision a council of ambassadors with "some five dozen countries" eligible for membership under reasonable basic standards similar to those outlined in Ikenberry and Slaughter's report.¹⁷ They envision this concert tackling a wider range of global problems beyond security, from preventing atrocities and promoting democracy and human rights more broadly, to economic development, stability in energy supplies, and tackling threats of pandemic disease¹⁸—a danger since underlined by the 2014 Ebola crisis in West Africa. I include meeting these needs among the functions of the UDL.

Yet they also envision this concert as a "D-60" coalition working within the UN framework, rather than making a decisive break with the UNSC. Daalder and Lindsay are correct that a wider coalition of

democracies would give the United States an ideal way to "regain the trust" of allies and to reach out to other nations who should be our allies, namely democracies in "Asia, Africa, and Latin America."¹⁹ But for the reasons Jacobs rehearse, a concert with a secretariat is not enough to meet today's global needs: only a treaty organization that is granted real *governing powers* can be a credible enforcer of the most vital international laws. And only an institution with directly elected representatives, not mere ambassadors, will be sufficiently legitimate to wield such powers as the globalization process progresses (see chapter two).

The theoretical framework developed in this chapter will enable a detailed defense of each of these claims. In particular, the cosmopolitan framework will clarify why consolidated sovereignty is needed, given what we know about the nature of global problems today. The recent versions of the league proposal were motivated by a narrower set of issues, and in particular by awareness that new answers were needed after the US-led 2003 invasion of Iraq. Following this fiasco, as Ikenberry and Slaughter put it, cooperation between America and Europe will require America to "bind our nation to and share decision-making with our European partners,"²⁰ which a working UDL would achieve on a wider scale. The problems made glaring in 2003 were not just unilateral action by powerful nations such as the United States and Britain, but also the prior failure of the UN to enforce weapons inspections in Iraq (which would have revealed the errors in US intelligence about Saddam Hussein's weapons programs).²¹ In the background were the UN's deeper failures to punish Hussein's repeated use of chemical weapons on enemy soldiers and civilians, and to pressure totalitarian dictatorships to give way to better regimes. Discussions of a democratic concert were also informed by the widespread sense among Americans that the UN would be largely useless in halting terrorism.

These concerns were also uppermost for Senator John McCain, who made a "league of democracies" central to his foreign policy during the 2008 presidential campaign.²² But discussion of these crucial ideas from both Democratic and Republican authors took a back seat to the enormous financial crisis of 2008–2009, even though the subsequent global recession was another indication of the need for quick decision-making that can effectively coordinate many nations to prevent cascading financial collapse. McCain conceived his league primarily as a security apparatus like NATO, which is too narrow a focus. Subsequent developments from the Arab Spring to the current multi-layered catastrophes of Syria and Yemen today underline the critical importance of developing a global institution that could have

helped Egypt, supported reconstruction of Libya in the post-Qaddafi period, stopped civil war in Yemen, and prevented Assad's regime from burying hundreds of thousands of its own people in blasted rubble. Yet while he is rightly passionate about Syrian issue, McCain has unfortunately not continued to push the league proposal since the 2008 election.

In response, my broader argument for a democratic league will reframe these issues that drove the post-2003 proposals for a democratic concert. In the context of the consolidation argument, the pitfalls of American unilateralism and UN weakness are recognized as symptoms of more fundamental problems: for terror threats are related to other global problems, such as humanitarian crises and mass atrocities, that democratic nations are not yet sufficiently coordinated to solve.

The five versions of the league idea outlined above were all political proposals by policy experts who had no reason to engage the longer tradition of world federalist ideas in writing for policy-makers. By contrast, deep engagement with that tradition informs James Yunker's detailed proposal for a "Federal Union of Democratic Nations" (FUDN). This would be a permanent government with "clearly defined geographical boundaries," three distinct branches, and general enforcement powers. Its unicameral legislature would represent peoples of its member nations with dual votes weighted by their nation's population and by budgetary contributions to the FUDN.²³

Our proposals are remarkably similar in several respects, with two key differences. First, Yunker's proposal is tailored to reassure skeptics that the federation cannot impose massive taxes to redistribute wealth to poorer nations, given how decisively this would alienate wealthier democracies. At the same time, he suggests a ministry for protection of natural resources and infrastructure, a World Development Authority for physical and human capital, and a global Marshall Plan to speed capital accumulation in the least-developed nations.²⁴ Although I agree with these ambitions, I focus less on these topics given my assumption that a democratic league would initially prioritize security, prevention of mass atrocities, and control of global banking for stability and resistance to kleptocracy (see chapter five). Given the rapid pace of global economic growth, developing democracies should not demand massive transfers of wealth as a price for joining the UDL.

Second, despite requiring freedoms of speech, press, and political organization, Yunker suggests a latitudinarian approach to membership requirements when beginning a FUDN: in particular, he

optimistically hopes not to "exclude a nation as large and important as China," noting that membership would provide China's leaders an incentive for democratic reform.²⁵ I wholeheartedly agree with this aspiration, as indicated in the Introduction. Yet, unfortunately, China's strategy since 1989 makes this impossible. As I argued, China's initial exclusion from a democratic league would be a more potent incentive for Chinese democratization. In light of recent history, a league of democracies must be designed to confront China and Russia before it can include them.

In sum, these six recent accounts from Streit to Yunker show that a new institution for cooperation among democracies makes sense to experts from across the political spectrum. This is hardly surprising. As Churchill observed, this would be a natural extension of a historical trajectory developing from full parliamentary rule in Britain, through the birth of American and French democracies, to the UDHR in 1948. But without a more holistic framework, we cannot determine whether the recent policy proposals by Daalder and Lindsay, Slaughter and Ikenberry, Jacobs, or Yunker address the problems that only a democratic league could solve, or articulate the best feasible institutional solution. The philosophical framework needed for such a systematic evaluation also clears up common confusions about how the functions of political institutions relate to economic, technological, and cultural changes involved in globalization, which we turn to next.

Economic versus political globalization: Inarticulate debates

Political philosophy in the modern period has largely assumed a world system centered around nation-states, whereas the problems unique to our era virtually all trace to *globalization*—a series of rapid changes in markets, communication, travel, education, family connections, and culture that have transformed ways of life almost everywhere since the 1960s. These changes have caused much confusion, not only because people do not understand the market forces that are altering the jobs that are available to them and the sectors in which their home nation has or could gain a comparative advantage in world trade, but also because their leaders have not given people the concepts they need to distinguish different aspects of globalization. Thus democratic citizens have not been able to make informed choices about how to respond to the realistic contemporary options.

When this terminology became popular, people in industrialized nations mainly understood "globalization" as shorthand for threats

to domestic jobs by cheaper foreign competition, or the expansion of capital markets and ever-larger multinational corporations with growing power over the lives of people everywhere. The lingo glossed over crucial distinctions between alterations in facts and controversial normative claims. For example, John Saul used “globalism” for the thesis that “global economic forces, if left unfettered by willful man,” will lead to a better life for all, with its corollary “that the public good should be treated as a secondary outcome of trade and competition and self-interest.”²⁶ Saul recognized this as the libertarian ideology developed from neoclassical economic theory and discredited by monopolies, the Great Depression, and the findings of welfare economics. It is simply a global version of the fallacy that markets will spontaneously produce all the goods we need for decent and happy human lives, when in fact the ones we call “public goods” can only be realized by collective action through law and government policy, or through other kinds of relationships and nonprofit entities (e.g., families, clubs, and other networks) that coordinate the relevant parties.²⁷

There is a key difference between globalized free markets as an economic phenomenon and globalized libertarian ideology, which is correctly described as “Friedman’s Folly” on a planetary scale.²⁸ For the latter is a *political* doctrine suggesting, in effect, that we do not need to globalize governing powers to keep up with globalized trade, finance, and multinational corporations. This conflation leads citizens who are disturbed by various economic and cultural results of globalized markets and movements of people to assume that the solution must lie in an isolationist retrenchment rather than in multinational political controls—as if the facts of global trade, finance, travel, and international mixing of peoples and ideas were evils in themselves.

The whole cosmopolitan tradition asserts the opposite, citing massive verifiable benefits of such developments, while arguing that the significant problems created by economic, epistemic, and cultural globalization are much better addressed by *global law* and stronger global civil society, rather than by an inevitably futile attempt at isolationist retreat. As Ulrich Beck argues, we should distinguish economic globalization from growing cross-border social connections, issue campaigns, and transnational NGOs.²⁹ We should also distinguish multinational social or cultural ties, charities, and professional organizations from direct political powers to coordinate policies among nations. Until popular parlance incorporates these distinctions, many people will misunderstand any talk of transnational governance as simply opening us to more of the same problems they perceive in worldwide trade, global communication, excessive immigration, or

cultural osmosis—a conflation now promoted by Fox News propagandists like Laura Ingraham. It is an ironic error, because transnational governance is the only viable way to shape globalizing economic and cultural forces for the common good.

More generally, everyone needs to understand why there are public goods, i.e., why the spontaneous order produced by markets is not always optimal, and learn about the range of goods with public features (see chapters three and four). Such an understanding is *itself* a crucial epistemic good for functioning democracies, which has to be provided by educational and media systems aiming at truth and insight rather than (only) at economic gain.³⁰ Unfortunately, seven decades of libertarian ideology, along with for-profit media systems, have eroded this understanding of public goods in the United States.

As a result, people are especially confused about the factors that obstruct public goods in transnational contexts and how these obstructions can be overcome, as we see in populist reactions across the political spectrum. For decades, some progressive protesters at World Trade Organization (WTO) and Group of Eight (G8) meetings have lumped together reduced legal restrictions on capital flows between nations, and the consequent mobility of industrial production, with the powers of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and regional authorities like the European Central Bank. While these organizations are crucial for economic stability, as shown during the Greek financial crisis of 2009–2010, historically they have tended to use loans to developing nations in crises as incentives to adopt austerity in domestic spending, increase free trade, and open their lands and markets—especially to investment by multinational corporations. Although these are contingent policy stances rather than essential features of the IMF and World Bank, they have given the false impression that political globalization necessarily gives economic growth and transnational investment priority over social values that may conflict with likely free-market outcomes. For example, as Joseph Stiglitz notes, present forms of economic globalization force nations to compete in lowering their tax rates (mainly benefiting the richest 1 percent). Similarly,

the Financial Services Agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO) ... has tried to force financial market liberalization, requiring governments to allow foreign banks into their countries and restraining their ability to impose regulations to ensure that the financial system is stable and actually serves the economy and society in the way that it should.³¹

Peter Singer has voiced similar worries about the excessive weight of developed nations in the WTO, and its tendency to treat environmental laws as merely protective tariffs. Of course, developing nations have also gained much comparative advantage in lower-technology production: thus average income in developing nations almost doubled from 1975 to 1999, though not in sub-Saharan Africa.³² From 1990 to 2015, the percentage of people living in extreme poverty fell from 37 percent to under 10 percent; and the bottom third saw their incomes rise between 40 percent and 70 percent.³³ These are good signs, although rapid changes in developed nations have caused dislocation.

An articulate evaluation, then, requires a framework clarifying the relevant public goods, along with the distinction between the expansion of *free market forces* beyond national boundaries and globalized *political powers* that try to steer or control economic forces in various ways. The latter also come in two basic varieties, with many subtypes: international treaty bodies and other intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) that influence the background conditions in which markets operate, and enforceable transnational regulation and global law (e.g., the global ban on slavery). All three manifestations of “globalization” are often criticized simultaneously, as if they were identical. For example, the Occupy Wall Street movement (prominent during 2011 and 2012) construed global corporate power as a kind of oppression supported by technocrats in international organizations like the World Bank, IMF, and WTO. On the contrary, the mostly underpaid professionals staffing these IGOs are not “bought” or controlled by global megacorporations like legislators who have to raise large funds for paid advertising in elections.

Yet IGOs lack democratic legitimacy: they answer only to sitting administrations in the national governments of their member states, which have often appointed officials who believe in reducing regulatory limits on markets in commodities, capital, and labor. Their primary aim has been GDP growth rather than setting legal bounds on acceptable market outcomes in the name of basic human rights, worker safety, environment preservation, maintaining local communities, minimum standards of living, and other social goods necessary for human flourishing. But, as noted, that is a complaint about (a) the particular policies of these IGOs and (b) the fact that they are not democratically answerable to people affected across the world—something that only *stronger* transnational government could solve (see chapter three). So what is expressed as a generic critique of all “globalization” is actually a complaint about problems that only *more political globalization* could fix.

Thus the insightful trilemma that Stiglitz attributes to Dani Rodrik: “one cannot simultaneously have democracy, national

self-determination, and full and unfettered [economic] globalization.”³⁴ The nationalist solution of rejecting most economic and cultural globalization is an unfeasible dead-end. So we must either reduce national control over some issues to enable transnational collective self-determination, or let unsteered global economic forces determine our destinies. Contrary to the hopes of nationalist populism, problems arising from globalized markets, movements of people, and flows of ideas increasingly transcend the power of individual national governments to control—even if they are as big as the United States.³⁵ Trade imbalances and the “offshoring” of low-tech manufacturing furnish easy examples. Trying to keep manufacturing jobs in the United States via large hikes in tariffs on Chinese or Mexican goods has simply led them to slap reciprocal tariffs on US farm produce and factory goods. Similarly, the recent massive reduction in the US corporate tax rate may temporarily help American companies, but it will eventually be undercut by other nations in a race to the regulatory bottom.

Consider asymmetries between global capital and labor. As Francis Fukuyama notes, capital already had the advantage of concentration, which makes collective action among capital owners easier than among labor organizers.³⁶ Now it has also become easier for big companies to move production to places with lower wages (and costs of living), while it has become harder for would-be *employees* to move between nations, most of which have strict immigration policies. Ironically then, barriers on immigration help keep wages much lower in developing nations, making it attractive to relocate labor costs there. This asymmetry greatly favors corporations over workers; productivity gains and resulting wage increases would actually be greater if more people moved.³⁷ Thus inequalities in wealth have been rising in many developed nations.

At the same time, competition between nations creates an incentive for developing nations not to adopt adequate worker safety and environmental laws. Thus we get disasters like the collapse of the Rana Plana garment factory in Bangladesh in April 2013 due to shoddy construction and extra floors later added to the building. In this case, global safety laws enforced by a transnational institution like a democratic league would benefit both Bangladeshi and American workers as costs of Bangladeshi labor rose modestly with better occupational safety standards. With the same minimum standards everywhere in the league, Bangladesh could protect workers without being undercut. Yet without globalized political power to enforce such regulations, we will never have adequate checks on multinational corporations.

Maritain versus Hobbes: An introduction to cosmopolitanism

We have seen that political globalization is the vesting of sovereign powers either in (a) new treaty agencies and technical IGOs, or (b) in new levels of government above traditional nation-states. Both are intended to secure public goods that cannot be realized without collective political action on the global level to correct many of the bad side effects of globalization in markets, communication, culture, and movement of people, while retaining their enormous benefits. The two kinds of transnational political authorities are distinct from (c) NGOs and other transnational civil society groups that are usually considered “nonpolitical,” although these nonprofit entities also respond to market failures and thus arguably substitute for government in action in many cases.

Many ills of economic and media globalization, such as expanding trade in dangerous weapons, the spread of terrorist ideologies, monopolies in multinational industries, dilution of safety and environmental standards, violent global market swings, and small nations specializing in tax-haven services, are due (at least partly) to insufficient transnational regulation. Only stronger transnational institutions can adequately control the global market forces behind these trends.³⁸ Weak treaty regimes have not been able to regulate economic interactions sufficiently to stop such harms arising from them.

Transnational political institutions must also respond to ethical imperatives, because some limits on market forces are justified by basic human interests, environmental values, and other goods with objective merits that markets, by their nature, cannot sufficiently register (see chapter three). For example, to prevent a genetic arms race, we might want global limits on genetic engineering to enhance certain human capabilities well beyond their normal ranges. As Kasparov says,

[w]e cannot resolve the problems of globalization with the same legal and economic tools that created it. We need new, morality-based frameworks to confront the dictatorships in Russia and China now that they have so thoroughly become a part of our globalized world [markets]. We need new alliances to combat the stateless terror networks that use our technology against us [e.g., online recruiting]. These frameworks and alliances must be based on moral principles, the only weapon the enemies of democracy cannot match.³⁹

The deeper philosophical framework we need, then, starts with fundamental moral principles and the human rights that these imply, and

makes room for other objective goods as well. These are the grounds that can guide policy choices made by IGOs, transnational governments, and independent NGOs, and determine how their power should be legitimated. To assess what types of governing power are needed, the framework must also include a detailed account of the public goods that free markets cannot provide by themselves—drawing on economic theory, ethics, and experience in a globalizing world.

This has been recognized explicitly in philosophical works at least since the period of the UN's founding. For example, the eminent Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain anticipated Rodrik's trilemma when he wrote in 1950 that

an essentially economic interdependence, without any corresponding fundamental recasting of the moral and political structures of human existence, can but impose by material necessity a partial and fragmentary ... political interdependence which is reluctantly and hatefully accepted ... as long as nations live on the assumption of their full political autonomy.⁴⁰

Maritain saw clearly that, despite the formation of the UN to replace the failed League of Nations, modern states still mistakenly demanded a “right of absolute sovereignty.”⁴¹ As a result, even democratic states that respond to their own citizens' views would still operate in relation to other states like agents unchecked by any “organized international public opinion.”⁴² In other words, the world still lacked a formalized institutional way for sentiments and concerns in many nations to be expressed in global collective action that would limit what national regimes can do to each other. *Maritain's thesis*, as I will call it, is that an institutional power vacuum at the global level leaves nations no sure ways to coordinate via enforceable common policy or joint actions that can be democratically approved by a transnational public. He hoped that, in time, people would develop enough sense of the global common good for nations to give up some of their independence to a world government.⁴³

Maritain's thesis is easily confused with Thomas Hobbes's view that national governments stand in the “natural condition of mankind,” a state of nature amounting to anarchy in which their actions are determined primarily by their desire to secure their economic and military interests (or advance priorities of their ruling administrations).⁴⁴ As Timothy Sinclair explains in his useful review of variant positions on global governance, this Hobbesian “realist” view returned to prominence in reaction to the more “idealist vision” in President Woodrow

Wilson's famous "Fourteen Points" speech and his policies after World War I: "Realists thought the Liberal-Idealist views championed by ... Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations had been proven wrong by the renewal of great-power war" in the late 1930s.⁴⁵ This is ironic, given that Nazi-led nationalism might have been averted by a stronger League of Nations. The US Senate's rejection of Wilson's League shows how badly national interests can be misjudged when moral considerations and the need for collective assurance are ignored.

To deduce a Hobbesian realist doctrine from Maritain's thesis about global anarchy, we would need to add the premise that national governments *can* only care about their national strategic interests or about the material advantage of the groups in power. This premise is one of two logically distinct claims that are rolled together in the old adage from Thrasymachus, the Sophist in Plato's *Republic*, that "justice is the advantage of the stronger." Thrasymachus meant both that (a) sovereigns, who could be a king or an oligarchy, simply act for their own gain; and (b) that there is no other objective measure of justice or right/wrong to check the sovereign's will. Claim (a) is an empirical assertion of psychological egoism, whereas (b) is normative, telling us that *might makes right*, i.e., there is no valid moral standard prior to an imposed settlement or negotiation among parties motivated solely by (material) self-interest.⁴⁶

Following Plato and Aristotle, virtually every theory of just government in western history rejects (b), and most theories of international relations now reject (a) on empirical grounds. The collective rejection of (b) is summed up in the ultimate norm that raw force justifies nothing: government powers ought instead to be justified to the governed in terms of reasons that they can rationally accept—rational persuasion being fundamentally distinct from sheer coercion. Given its centrality to modern European political thought, I call this the *Enlightenment principle* (EP), although it dates at least to Socrates. EP is consistent with Maritain's thesis but not with the Hobbesian claims (a) or (b).

As the world has evolved since 1945, acceptance of EP has given many governments motives to attend to ethical concerns, both because they see that effectiveness depends partly on reasons for their policies being accepted by their own people and other states, and because they desire to cooperate for mutual advantage with other nations that are wary of dealing with "tainted" agents. As Sinclair notes, so-called transnationalist theory that stresses the potential of IGOs, NGOs, and other nonstate actors to persuade political leaders is based on recognizing that "[s]tates are worried about their reputations ... and are eager to adopt international norms."⁴⁷ Few leaders are willing to

partner with rogue regimes that reject all moral limits on their conduct, and thus become international pariahs. Yet this moderation of the realist view is compatible with recognizing that nations often compete with each other, or pursue national interests, in ways that are harmful to the larger common good of the human race. Even well-meaning leaders are driven to this result by the anarchy that Maritain feared. Thus Stan van Hooff, for example, is incorrect in claiming that "[a]dvocacy of global government with the power to enforce international law depends on a Hobbesian theory of political realism."⁴⁸ On the contrary, it depends only on Maritain's thesis concerning the existence of collective action problems (CAPs) between nations that only a global government can adequately overcome.

While EP opens up the possibility of transnational cooperation, Maritain's thesis clarifies why such cooperation is needed. Contemporary cosmopolitan conceptions of a just global order combine Maritain's point with universal moral bases for international relations founded on EP. In this way, Cosmopolitanism is heir to both the classical liberal, and civic republican traditions, each of which flowed from EP combined with varying theories of social relations.⁴⁹ Cosmopolitanism extends to the global level the Enlightenment idea that government is just only when it protects basic liberties and upholds universal human rights, including democratic rights. Given Maritain's thesis, these moral goods, along with several other social goods, can now be adequately secured only with the help of stronger governance institutions above the national level. Cosmopolitanism thus provides a basis for political globalization, and for transnational consolidation of government powers in particular.

Cosmopolitanism, governance networks, and transnational government

There is no single consensus definition of Cosmopolitanism among other theories of political justice today. But it may be described as a theory uniting ideas from classical liberal and republican traditions that emphasizes universal moral principles and public goods with transnational scope, including some that require global coordination. Sinclair focuses on implications of these two features: Cosmopolitanism is a theory distinguished by holding both that "democratic choice is legitimate and should be available increasingly to all," and that "it is only through global governance that the human population can effectively tackle these global forces [of markets and information], which are increasingly too big for national governments."⁵⁰

According to cosmopolitans, then, we need powers with global reach to secure some common goods, and such powers ought to be democratically controlled. As we will see in chapter two, this is a global analog of the position on national government defended by the American Federalists. I argue in this section that Cosmopolitanism, so understood, offers the theoretical framework that we need to determine the best case for a league of democracies. More generally, when clarified and developed, this framework allows us to explain how the different parts of a sound argument for any transnational governance system fit together.

In western history, David Held identifies “three broad accounts” of the cosmopolitan kind. The first was developed by Greek and Roman Cynics and Stoics of the Hellenistic age, who tended to reject claims of priority for one’s own local community or nation: “Allegiance is owed, first and foremost, to the moral realm of all humanity, not to contingent groupings or nations”—an idea also promoted by prophetic Judaism, Christianity, and arguably other axial religions as well. The Stoics stressed universal standards of reasoning and interests common to all peoples as bases for collective problem solving.⁵¹

The second account emerged from Immanuel Kant’s defense of the “public use of reason” and free speech, and related Enlightenment emphases on “a sphere of reason free from ‘dictatorial authority’” that in principle extends globally through discourse across borders. The Kantian idea of “cosmopolitan right” refers not only to a right to visit and communicate across state boundaries, but more deeply to a requirement that nations should be willing “to enter into dialogue and interaction [including trade] constrained only by elementary principles of reason, impartiality, and the possibility of intersubjective agreement”⁵²—the bases of the universal *jus gentium* or customary law of peoples.

Held identifies a third, contemporary strand introduced by Charles Beitz, Brian Barry, and Thomas Pogge, among others, which starts from the thesis that “the ultimate units of moral concern are individual human beings, not states,” groups, or other collectives (pace consociational or corporatist theories such as Hegel’s). Contemporary cosmopolitan theories also affirm a basic equality in the status of all persons—at least at the constitutive level of personhood, prior to individuals’ varying merits. This strand helps explain cosmopolitan claims that people deserve an equal voice in democratic control over the institutions that shape their life-prospects,⁵³ as Sinclair noted.

Generalizing, we can recognize four central features of cosmopolitan thought in these strands. First, such conceptions of political justice

defend objective, universal moral norms based in part on the inherent value of each person’s potential to reason and make informed decisions about her or his life-direction. Thus, like older liberal and republican theorists of natural rights, cosmopolitans typically affirm personal autonomy as a basis for moral principles with universal scope binding *all* persons and requiring fairness to *each* person as a distinct individual, whatever their more particular group memberships and contingent social relations. Hence Cosmopolitanism is at least partly *deontological*: it recognizes a distributive aspect of justice involving fairness to each individual, in addition to collective concerns, both of which are supported by theories of public goods (see chapters two and three).

Second, for cosmopolitans, the moral importance of each individual conflicts with associationist conceptions of justice that give priority to obligations involved in non-universal social roles or communal relations and group memberships. There are weaker and stronger versions of this anti-associationism; their shared minimum is Richard Vernon’s “cosmopolitan regard,” which acknowledges that “the interests of all human beings” deserve individual consideration, even if obligations to our co-nationals occupy most of the available moral space.⁵⁴ If instead we have some robust moral obligations to every person, including to help ensure real opportunities to develop capacities necessary for a minimally decent life, we get stronger cosmopolitan theories, such as Marthan Nussbaum’s or Brian Orend’s. But all the versions share a commitment to EP: interpersonal power-relations require universally intelligible justification because, by themselves, brute preferences and the raw power of groups justify nothing. Thus cosmopolitans support the contractualist thesis that basic institutions constituting our society and shaping our opportunities, which now have a global scale, should be justifiable to each of us.

This justificatory individualism leads to the third feature, namely the belief in universal canons of rational inquiry and argument aiming to discern a shared reality—an idea defended in western traditions stretching from Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and Augustine through medieval natural lawyers to Enlightenment rationalists and empiricists. This is the guiding idea today in the discourse ethics of Jürgen Habermas, on which he based arguments that democratic procedures can operate above the level of nation-states.⁵⁵ Cosmopolitan theories deny that rational debate and its implicit presuppositions are limited to people sharing certain cultures, worldviews, or “conceptual schemes,” even though they usually recognize fallibilist limitations.

This universal phenomenon of reason ultimately underpins EP itself, which in turn entails standards of impartiality in rational decision:

people should not be silenced by force, persuaded by deception, or manipulated to consent; instead we should support their freedom to participate in enquiry and decide on bases that can be made intelligible to them and others (even when disagreement persists). Such bases for rational consent include avoiding serious harms and developing the capabilities involved in full human agency, even if interpretation of these goods varies to some extent between cultures.⁵⁶ Ulrich Beck calls this “cosmopolitan empathy:” we are able, within limits, to take the perspective of people anywhere in the world who are suffering, and thus “the spaces of our emotional imagination have expanded in a transnational sense.”⁵⁷ This feature is also connected to a sociocultural cosmopolitanism—a partial blending of identities that breaks down ethnic and national divisions, as people’s sense of their group affiliations responds to intersections of multiple cultural sources.⁵⁸

Fourth, cosmopolitans affirm the factual theses outlined earlier: “interdependence” among nations is growing⁵⁹ because there are numerous goods with vital importance to all persons that can only be adequately secured by collective action involving many nations across all continents. As Robert Fine summarizes, connections among societies lead to a “proliferation of global risks ... that have no respect for national boundaries.”⁶⁰ Because wars, movement of weapons, economic crises, disease, ecological disaster, money laundering, and people trafficking in one nation will generally affect several others, nations must work together to fix these problems. Cosmopolitanism is distinctive in arguing that such “cosmopolitan realities” require more centralized transnational authorities—including powers to enforce uniform policies across nations.

This support for global authorities comes in degrees depending on the version of cosmopolitan theory. For example, like Held, Slaughter, and Thomas Wejs, Sinclair asks what system of global governance can recognize the continuing primacy of nation-states in the organization of our world, yet call on other agents—including for-profit multinational businesses, IGOs, and “civil society actors” such as aid charities and issue campaigns—to solve problems that are beyond the power of national governments to solve by themselves.⁶¹ Like many analysts, Sinclair focuses on IGOs and NGOs on the assumption that our best international political institutions can only be servants of nation-states, such as treaty organizations with only derivative authority.

This is what I have called the “network” approach to global governance—a term now widely used to suggest some measure of “political union in a place of political division” at the global level, yet without the full powers of “government.”⁶² “Governance” is weaker because it

implies voluntary (and revocable) national cooperation with agencies that are allowed to make international policies because of their effectiveness or expertise: a governance network lacks sovereign authority or final power to make decisions that other agencies cannot override (see chapter two).⁶³

In short, today’s global governance institutions lack the monopoly on legal powers that would enable them to directly enforce their decisions without the consent of national governments. Mere “governance” is an ongoingly consensual affair, a *modus vivendi*, in which various kinds of pressure (e.g., by diplomacy or shaming in the media) may make collective decisions hold for a time. Thus in terms of the traditional branches of power, “governance” tends to concentrate in the legislative and judicial areas, e.g. in international courts and arbitration panels; it is only weakly executive. Global governance agencies operate between markets and sovereign governments, trying to sustain global goods through voluntary coordination of nations, interest groups, and firms.

As James Yunker notes, this network approach is widely favored because it is assumed that stronger global government would be either unfeasible or despotic.⁶⁴ However, transnational networks are also problematic: in many cases, they lack either the power or legitimacy to sustain permanent solutions that get to the roots of global problems (see chapter three). This will be clearer once we strengthen the cosmopolitan framework with insights from the federalist tradition and contemporary game theory—the tasks of the next chapter. As Sinclair says, conditions concerning the legitimacy of global governance institutions and powers needed to remedy global harms are linked in practice:

Cosmopolitans assume that normative concerns such as justice and fairness are central to global governance, and that the point of making change [in our global order] is to make the world a better, fairer, more just place. Not only is the normative element desirable – it is also essential to the effectiveness of global governance.⁶⁵

In other words, some level of perceived moral legitimacy has become necessary to sustain sufficient coordinative power, and both are necessary for overall political legitimacy. More deeply, these two conditions are connected by the EP requirement that coordinative powers be justifiable not only to groups but ultimately to individual persons: authority temporarily delegated to IGOs by national governments is not enough. As Held states, even at the transnational

level, "single persons are recognized as subjects of international law and, in principle, the ultimate source of political authority."⁶⁶

According to the first and second features of cosmopolitan theory, then, legitimacy conditions follow from universal respect for each person's basic status as an agent capable of reasoning with others about how institutions and practices should meet human needs and enable pursuit of other valuable goods. Traditions, shared histories, and group identities may play secondary roles. The legitimacy of government understood this way is a second-order public good that is widely shareable and sustainable over time. The result will be a cosmopolitan theory that unites federalist ideas on effective governing power and deontological conditions for moral legitimacy.

Grounds for the cosmopolitan framework

Defending the cosmopolitan framework summarized above is a large task for another work,⁶⁷ but it will help readers to know what this defense would involve. As indicated, all cosmopolitan accounts will start with universal canons of reasoning and dialogue. These include some substantive, albeit abstract, conditions that follow from the ideal of seeking the best-warranted conclusions for their own sake. Such requirements are not difficult to defend: they are implicit in worldwide recognition of their violation in informal fallacies and dialectical errors in reasoning, in addition to formal fallacies of inference. Moreover, *pace* much recent communitarian and postmodern theory, the hermeneutic tradition supports the cosmopolitan claim that there are universally acceptable bases of evidence and shared standards of relevance, even when their content varies to some extent by context. These are grounds for optimism about the possibility of transnational deliberation and decision-making. Ultimately, those who flatly reject standards of evidence and claims regarding interests and needs can only do so coherently by appealing to deeper shared standards, which they allege are being violated or ignored.⁶⁸

Cosmopolitans must also identify moral sources that can ground universal human rights, including a right to popular sovereignty. Despite the prevalent challenge of cultural relativism, it is not difficult to defend EP itself: this principle is implicitly or explicitly accepted by every culture that rejects caste systems, rule by aristocratic lineage or mere charisma, and similar ways of determining power by fortune alone. To reject EP requires one to deny the most basic meritocratic practices that hold people criminally responsible for wanton harms to others, and that award some jobs or social roles on the basis of objective

qualifications that people can work to acquire. Few defenders of relativism are willing to go this far, given nearly endless empirical evidence that people from all backgrounds can develop qualifications for good job performance, or commit crimes that no stable community can accept. In conceiving accountability for actions, the distinction between reasons and arbitrary chance is recognized in all human cultures, even when there are debates about its application in particular cases. Moreover, EP is also implicit in the entire tradition of just war theory, which has deeply influenced the development of international law. In their western, Asian, and Islamic forms, customary norms defining just war begin from the presumption that the use of military means—like all force—must be justified.⁶⁹

Furthermore, empirical evidence for universal features of human biology and psychology supports certain universal requirements of basic autonomy: the conceptual distinctions between informed choice and deception, like voluntary action versus coercion, are recognized everywhere. Similarly, the basic conditions of human well-being are "not defined by geographical or cultural location." As Held says, such arguments help assure doubters that cosmopolitan universal rights are not a product of "Western yearning for a form of ideological dominance or imperial control,"⁷⁰ on the contrary, human rights follow precisely from *the rejection of imperialism* implicit in EP.

Held argues that we should distinguish (a) well-intended criticisms of cases where rights-rhetoric is abused for strategic purposes from (b) insincere critiques of human rights that really aim to "obscure or underpin particular interests and power systems" that give advantage to select groups.⁷¹ In the latter cases, the critics are hardly high-minded theorists; they are sophists who know their privileges cannot withstand moral scrutiny. They preach cultural authenticity and loyalty to communities only to provide a thin rationalization for the hegemony of elites (such as male members of a particular ethnic or religious group).

Universal moral principles are not unique to Cosmopolitanism, but all distinctively cosmopolitan theories recognize the moral importance of each person's potential (in principle) for rational choice and socially effective agency.⁷² In a plenary address on global justice, Charles Beitz calls this "moral cosmopolitanism," which rejects "any view that limits the scope of justification to the members of particular types of groups," whether racial, religious, or national. This requires us to jettison the "morality of states" paradigm according to which states rather than persons are "the principal bearers of rights and duties," and thus to reject associationist conceptions of political obligation that support statist accounts of global justice.⁷³ Yet moral cosmopolitanism is

not excessively individualistic: as Allan Buchanan argues, individual rights protect collective as much as individual interests, and are compatible with giving great weight to some common goods or group interests. Moreover, oppressed groups may often be better protected by individual rights than via group rights.⁷⁴

Beitz worries that moral cosmopolitanism is indeterminate concerning whether “there should be a sovereign global authority” or whether a progressive version of the Westphalian states-rights view might be sufficient.⁷⁵ In other words, is a system of sovereign nations limited only by transnational network governance sufficient, or do we also need a global government of some kind? But this is to expect the moral principles in the cosmopolitan framework to do the work that properly belongs to an account of public goods, along with analysis of CAPs that must be overcome to secure such goods. Only clarifying these grounds for the fourth distinctive aspect of Cosmopolitanism can resolve Beitz’s question: cosmopolitans should not simply opt for network solutions before examining what the global needs imply (see chapters three and four).

On the normative side, cosmopolitan moral principles need not include a complete moral theory ranking all relevant kinds of moral considerations; and they may allow us to give some range of priority to our local community or nation (an analog of legitimate partiality in individual decisions). Yet such moral principles, together with general facts about political and social relationships, will provide grounds for a fairly determinate conception of the human rights that are required of all legitimate governments—the basic rights that are elucidated in adequate arrays of legal rights within national constitutions.

At this point, cosmopolitans have a number of options. The approach I favor argues that basic human rights are moral rights to certain goods *as realized* by social institutions and practices that coordinate people at local, national, and ultimately global levels. The secure access to these goods provided by basic institutions at any level has global implications, because systemic obstacles to these goods anywhere threaten support for them elsewhere and erode trust in common standards (see chapter three). On this “linkage” approach, basic human rights are linked in their content to what Rawls called the “basic structure” of society—the fundamental expectations, along with institutions and practices securing them, that most deeply shape people’s life-prospects and opportunities. In other words, human rights are rights to *collective goods* secured by the basic structure.

Cosmopolitan theories of human rights are distinctive in recognizing that this basic structure is ultimately global: social systems operating

at regional, national, and local levels are nested within and deeply affected by global dynamics. Basic rights may be rights to negative or positive goods, but they include socially and legally secured access to these goods, as Thomas Pogge has proposed.⁷⁶ Thus the schedule of human rights is a function of both (a) their moral grounds in the conditions of meaningful personal agency and requirements of human well-being, and (b) the need to articulate them in the positive laws and social practices of different societies, as well as in the policies of transnational agencies and institutions.

Conclusion

According to this linkage conception, basic human rights point toward legal and social mediums of human interaction. They are not “pre-social” rights of isolated individuals—the view often dubiously ascribed to older theories of natural rights. Instead, human rights are linked to the global order and to the subsidiary orders of basic institutions at regional, national, and local levels. As Habermas argues, the form of modern legal orders inescapably shapes social life across the world today, and brings normative demands of equal treatment with it.⁷⁷ The linkage approach extends this point to civil society agents, social networks, and informal expectations and traditions that also regulate interactions throughout human communities of all kinds. It thus develops Pogge’s insightful suggestion, following Paragraph 28 of the UDHR, that we conceive human rights as rights to an “international order” in which people are positively enabled to resist domination, or to avoid standard threats to the objects of their rights.⁷⁸

This overview provides most of the cosmopolitan framework needed to evaluate arguments for global government, but it leaves one crucial issue for next chapter. In his helpful summary, Fine suggests that the greatest strength of contemporary cosmopolitanism is its aspiration to “reconcile the idea of universal species-wide solidarity with more particular” loyalties to regions, nation(s), or identity groups, and to “integrate” individual rights with “the common good” of collectives at multiple levels.⁷⁹ But what principles should guide this balancing or division of labor? To answer this question, the next chapter argues that insights from the federalist tradition and basic game theory must be added to complete the cosmopolitan framework outlined above. Cosmopolitans can then develop distinctions between global, regional, national, and local public goods to fulfill Fine’s aspiration (chapter three).

Notes

1. Clarence Streit, *Freedom's Frontier: Atlantic Union Now*, Book I (New York: Freedom & Union Press, 1961). Streit notes that Nelson Rockefeller and (for a time) Richard Nixon favored a confederation of democracies to succeed NATO (ch. 3).
2. James R. Huntley, *Pax Democratica: A Strategy for the 21st Century* (New York: Macmillan and St. Martin's Press, 1998), ch. 6, esp. 98–99.
3. *Ibid.*, ch. 8.
4. See the Warsaw Declaration at www.community-democracies.org/values/warsaw-declaration/.
5. Kinsman, "Democracies of the World Unite," *International Herald Tribune and New York Times*, 15 September 2010 (my italics).
6. See Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, "An Alliance of Democracies," *Brookings*, 6 November 2004, www.brookings.edu/opinions/an-alliance-of-democracies-our-way-or-the-highway/.
7. Davenport, "Just War Theory Requires a New Federation of Democratic Nations," *Fordham International Law Journal* 28, no. 3 (2005): 763–85.
8. G. John Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter, *Forging a World of Liberty Under Law* (Princeton, NJ: Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, September 2006), 25.
9. *Ibid.*, 25–26.
10. *Ibid.*, 26.
11. Didier Jacobs, *Global Democracy* (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2007), ch. 13.
12. *Ibid.*, 31.
13. *Ibid.*, 120.
14. Didier Jacobs, "A League of Democracies," *Policy Innovations* (Carnegie Council, March 2008), www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/innovations/data/000035.
15. Didier Jacobs, "From a League of Democracies to Cosmopolitan Democracy," in the *Global Democracy Symposium*, ed. Daniele Archibugi, *New Political Science* 32, no. 1 (2010): 116–21.
16. Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, "Democracies of the World, Unite," *The American Interest* 3, no. 1 (2007). Also see James Lindsay, "The Case for a Concert of Democracies," *Ethics and International Affairs* 23, no. 1 (spring 2009): Roundtable section, www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/journal/23_1/roundtable/002.
17. Daalder and Lindsay, "Democracies of the World, Unite," 6–7.
18. *Ibid.*, 8.
19. *Ibid.*, 10.
20. Ikenberry and Slaughter, *Forging a World of Liberty Under Law*, 26–27.
21. See Michael Walzer's editorials in the lead-up to the Iraq war, reprinted as "Five on Iraq" in Walzer, *Arguing About War* (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 2004): 143–68.
22. John McCain, "An Enduring Peace Built on Freedom," *Foreign Affairs* 86 (November/December 2007), www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2007-11-01/enduring-peace-built-on-freedom. Also see McCain's editorial, "Why We Must Be Firm with Moscow," *Financial Times*, 12 June 2007.

23. James A. Yunker, *Political Globalization* (Lanham, MD: University of America Press, 2007), 45–56. Similar ideas have been proposed via UN reform (see ch. 6). Among proponents of world federalism, Yunker cites Louis Pojman, Daniel Deudney, Richard Falk, and Philip Isely. See the history in Yunker, *Rethinking World Government* (University Press of America, 2005), ch. 1. For Pojman's "moderate cosmopolitan" argument for a worldwide federation with central powers mainly limited to security and protecting rights, see Pojman, *Terrorism, Human Rights, and the Case for World Government* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008).
24. *Ibid.*, 56, 59, and ch. 6.
25. *Ibid.*, 46.
26. John R. Saul, "The Collapse of Globalism," *Harper's Magazine* (March 2004): 34–35.
27. *Ibid.*, 37.
28. Jeff Madrick, *Seven Bad Ideas* (New York: Vintage/Penguin, 2014), ch. 6.
29. Ulrich Beck, *Cosmopolitan Vision*, tr. Ciaran Cronin (Malden, Mass: Polity Press, 2006), 9.
30. See my webpage on the need for a required civics course in high school; also see Al Gore, *The Assault on Reason* (New York: Penguin, 2007).
31. Joseph Stiglitz, *The Price of Inequality* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2013), 140.
32. Peter Singer acknowledges this complexity in *One World: The Ethics of Globalization*, 2nd ed. (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 2004), 77–85.
33. Peter Singer, *One World Now* (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 2017): 98–101.
34. Stiglitz, *The Price of Inequality*, 140.
35. On this loss of national "steering power" there is wide agreement in cosmopolitan scholarship; e.g. see Singer, *One World Now*, ch. 3, and Jürgen Habermas, "The Postnational Constellation and the Future of Democracy," in *The Postnational Constellation*, tr. Max Pensky (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2001), ch. 4.
36. Francis Fukuyama, "American Political Decay or Renewal?" *Foreign Affairs* 95 (July/August 2016): 58–69, 65.
37. Stiglitz, *The Price of Inequality*, 59–63.
38. Stiglitz suggests further banking reforms, closing offshore regulation havens, and "regulations on cross-border capital flows" (*The Price of Inequality*, 269–70 and 277–80).
39. Kasparov, *Winter Is Coming*, xxiv.
40. Jacques Maritain, *Man and the State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 190.
41. *Ibid.*, 191.
42. *Ibid.*, 193.
43. *Ibid.*, 206–11.
44. See Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* [1651], ed. C.B. Macpherson (New York: Penguin Books, 1985), Part I, ch. 13, 183–86.
45. Timothy Sinclair, *Global Governance* (Malden, Mass: Polity Press, 2012), 13–14.

46. The logical relations among these claims are as follows. Maritain's thesis about weak global anarchy [MT] & the empirical claim of psychological egoism [PE] ↔ the Realist view [R]. And, PE & the might-makes-right doctrine [-EP] ↔ Thrasymachus's claim T. So MT shares nothing with T. Sinclair, *Global Governance*, 62. He cites in particular the work of Robert Keohane on this point.
47. Stan van Hoof, *Cosmopolitanism* (Montreal, QB: McGill-Queens University Press, 2009), 121.
48. For example, EP is implied in the theories analyzed in J.G.A. Pocock's landmark study of the Atlantic republican tradition, *The Machiavellian Moment* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975). Philip Pettit's conception of freedom as non-domination furnishes a contemporary example: see *Republicanism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, 2010 repr.). On the possibility of "republican liberalism," also see Richard Dagger, *Civic Virtues* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
49. Sinclair, *Global Governance*, 84.
50. David Held, *Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities* (Malden, Mass: Polity Press, 2010), ch. 1, esp. 40.
51. *Ibid.*, 42–43.
52. *Ibid.*, 44–45.
53. Richard Vernon: *Cosmopolitan Regard* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). David Estlund uses "associationism" in a weaker sense that need not conflict with Cosmopolitanism: it merely maintains that groups have some "nonderivative moral standing;" see Estlund, "Liberal Associationism and the Rights of States," *Social Philosophy and Policy* 30 (2013): 425–49, 429.
54. Jürgen Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity," in *Between Facts and Norms*, tr. William Rehg (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996): 491–515. Also see Habermas, *The Inclusion of the Other*, ed. Ciaran Cronin and Pablo De Greiff (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1998), Part III.
55. See Held, *Cosmopolitanism*, 47–49.
56. Beck, *Cosmopolitan Vision*, 6–7.
57. *Ibid.*, 3.
58. *Ibid.*, 7.
59. Robert Fine, *Cosmopolitanism* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 5.
60. Sinclair, *Global Governance*, 85–87.
61. *Ibid.*, 21.
62. *Ibid.*, 28.
63. See Yunker, *Rethinking World Government*, ch. 6; and Yunker, "Beyond Global Governance," *International Journal on World Peace*, 26 (June 2009): 7–30. For example, Richard Falk assumes that the only feasible cosmopolitan alternatives are networked global governance or "a world state," which could easily become a "world tyranny": see Falk, *Achieving Human Rights* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 62.
64. Sinclair, *Global Governance*, 89.
65. Held, *Cosmopolitanism*, 54.
66. My manuscript on this topic is tentatively titled *The Universal Human Right to Democracy*.

67. For one version of this Habermasian argument, see Davenport, "In Defense of the Responsibility to Protect: A Response to Weissman," *Criminal Justice Ethics* 35 no. 2 (2016): 1–29.
68. James Turner Johnson, *Morality and Contemporary Warfare* (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1999), 35.
69. Held, *Cosmopolitanism*, 55 and 19. Held also notes Kant's own "striking rejection of colonialism" (43), even though he harbored some of assumptions of European superiority that were so common in his day.
70. *Ibid.*, 64.
71. *Ibid.*, 69–72. Compare Martha Nussbaum, *Creating Capabilities* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011), ch. 2; James Griffin, *On Human Rights* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009), 33–36 and 44–48; and Thomas Pogge, *World Poverty and Human Rights*, 2nd ed. (Malden, Mass: Polity Press, 2008, 2009), ch. 2.
72. Charles Beitz, "Cosmopolitanism and Global Justice," *The Journal of Ethics* 9 (2005): 11–17.
73. Allan Buchanan, *The Heart of Human Rights* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 259–67. Cosmopolitanism may also accept some group rights: see note 54 above.
74. Beitz, "Cosmopolitanism and Global Justice," 18.
75. Pogge, *World Poverty and Human Rights*, ch. 2.
76. See Habermas, "Remarks on Legitimation through Human Rights," reprinted in Habermas, *The Postnational Constellation*, 113–29.
77. See Pogge, "The International Significance of Human Rights," *Journal of Ethics* 4 (2000): 45–69; also see Pogge's closely related essay, "Human Rights and Human Responsibilities," in *Global Justice and Transnational Politics*, ed. Pablo de Greiff and Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press 2002), ch. 5: 151–96. Also see Beitz on standard threats in *The Idea of Human Rights* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), ch. 5: 17.
78. Fine, *Cosmopolitanism*, 15–16.