The Likud's Power-Logic and Manipulation of US
Public Opinion
Handout
for Left Forum, NYC, June 4, 2017
by John Davenport
davenport@fordham.edu
The
Question: Can an
American now
legitimately say all of the following?
· I support Israel's founding
and continued
existence, although not the way that's its land was secured.
· But I absolutely condemn all
the settlements
built in the West Bank since 1967: it has been illegal since
the U.N. Charter
(based on the earlier Kellog-Briand
pact) for any
nation to annex territory, even as a way of punishing the
aggressors in an
allegedly defensive war (leaving aside the validity of that
claim).
· I believe that from its
beginning, the Likud
party at every major juncture has tried to prevent a final
peace settlement with
the Palestinians because they knew that such a final
settlement would involve
giving back occupied lands and increasing the Palestinian
population of Israel
itself with returnees.
· I also condemn any and all
terrorist attacks
on Israel, recognizing that indiscriminate attacks on
civilians are barbaric, contrary
to international law, and to the norms of just war on which
the laws are based.
· But the Likud party policies
are bad enough
to justify some limited form of divestment now, extending at
least to businesses
run through West Bank settlements and business which aid the
occupation.
· I still support a two-state solution, including a permanent
Palestinian nation in the
West Bank and Gaza, unless (a) Israel offers all
Palestinians in these
territories full citizenship in Israel; (b) Israel makes the
same offer to any
Palestinian refugees who wish to return to a combined
Israeli-Palestinian
state; and (c) the Palestinian authority accepts this offer on
behalf of all
Palestinians; and (d) the international community creates a
fund to help
Palestinians within such a system to rebuild, acquire new land
within the
combined state, and start new businesses, while living free
from
discrimination.
How
the Standard Moderate Position was squeezed out by right-wing
Israeli lobbies
As far as I can
see, the first four points above summarize the position of
most leading U.S. politicians back to
Nixon's time, although before the mid-1970s, some contemplated
the return of
the West Bank to Jordan (an option that I assume is now a dead
letter). Such a
position is most coherent when
For over 30 years
now, since before the Oslo
accords, the Likud and other far-right Israeli parties have
worked to confuse
average Americans, and especially American Jews, with a PR
campaign aimed
specifically at breaking down this moderate consensus. Their
goals in this
campaign have been to
(a) To repeat ad
nauseam in speeches, editorials, newsletters, mailings
to synagogue members
etc. phrases that subtly suggest that to "support Israel"
requires
"supporting the Likud's settlement policy."
--
compare highly offensive Republican party efforts to
equate supporting anti-immigrant policies and denying climate change
with "supporting
America," as if Democrats are by definition unpatriotic.
--
compare Republican efforts to brand even a very modest
estate tax as "the death tax."
--
compare Bashir al-Assad's
efforts to misconstrue his Sunni opponents in Syria as "all
terrorists."
(b) To accuse
anyone who makes even small
criticisms of the West Bank settlements, or suggests that
Israel should give
back even a small fraction of the occupied territories, of
thereby being "against
Israel."
(c) Thus to promote
blunt thinking without nuance
or distinction among American voters.
(d) To connect with
the evangelical side of the
Republican party by training them to think that supporting
Likud policies is
the only way to "support Israel" as a bulwark against rising
Islamic
threats.
It's been a
brilliant PR
campaign, one of the most successful corruptions of
consciousness in many
decades.
Terminology
Needed to Explain the Causes of Impasse: points from just war
and game theory:
If one reviews
mainstream histories, e.g.
Charles Smith's widely used textbook, Palestine
and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Bedford/St. Martins,
2010), it becomes clear
that so many major agents of change in the process have acted
on perverse
motives contrary to finding a settlement that is sufficiently
just to be sustainable.
The most familiar game-theoretic diagnoses have to be expanded
to explain the
core problems continuing impasse.
1. Ultimatum Game: game theory has come to recognize that cooperation is often blocked, even when it would make both or all main parties better off, because the proposed split of cost and benefits between them is perceived by some as so unjust as to be offensive: it is better to punish those who would take an unfair share by refusing to cooperate. "Divide-the-dollar" or ultimatum games are 'toy models' of this.
B but it makes the game even harder when it seems like the thief is proposing to split an asset that he stole.
2. Divide and Conquer: of course, even though Israel largely started the 1957 invasion war with Egypt and the 1967 Six-Day War, as early as November 1966, it justified evicting Palestinians and blowing up 125 homes in Samua on the West Bank as retaliation for Fatah raids that were encouraged by the Syrian Baathist regime (Smith, 7th ed., p.273). Thus Jordan's pro-peace king was weakened as Fatah and the PLO ascended; he was further weakened when Israel seized East Jerusalem and the West Bank in 1967 (Smith 285-88). Israel calculated that of the Arab regimes, only Egypt under Nassar and later Sadat was a serious threat that could pressure it to return occupied lands (Smith 325). So it worked to avoid a comprehensive peace plan as advocated by Carter, and succeeded in making a separate peace with Egypt (Smith 350-53).
3. Endless regress of retaliatory claims: ordinarily, distributive equity norms would help divided parties see a fair way to divide the burdens and benefits of proposed cooperation, but resentment from past wrongs makes this much harder: each side presses for rectification of past injustices to get to a fair starting point for bargaining. This has definitely been a major factor on the Palestinian side motivating the PLO to refuse to recognize Israel as a legitimate nation until 1993. But Israel has cynically manipulated this historical issue:
My claim is that this was for the most
part not a sincere conviction by right-wing Israeli politicians,
who knew that
annexing land to punish aggression was illegal. It was a deliberate stalling / obfuscation strategy.
4. Moving the Goalpost: another result of this approach was to constantly try to ratchet back American demands from "withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders," to "nearly those borders" (e.g. perhaps taking 5% of the West Bank and some of East Jerusalem), to trading "most of the West Bank for peace," to simply "not building more settlements" (Obama's demand in 2010). So now Likud officials pretend to be enraged at even being asked to "reduce the number of new units" they will build in the next cycle; they construe demands to halt all new settlements as like asking them for the Moon.
5. The 'Buffer Zone' rationalization: after the Six Day war in 1967, Israel resisted the crucial Security Council resolution 242 by constantly saying that it would only retreat to "secure boundaries" (Smith 305).
B This originally meant only keeping some small part of the West Bank, but its meaning has inflated since.
B This is
the same as the illegal Soviet
justification for taking Eastern European nations in the Cold
War.