

DOI	: 10.1111/(ISSN)1469-8129
ISSN (print)	: 1354-5078
ISSN (electronic)	: 1469-8129
ID (product)	: NANA
Title (main)	: Nations and Nationalism
Title (short)	: Nations and Nationalism
DOI	: 10.1111/nana.2017.9999.issue-9999
Copyright (thirdParty)	: © The author(s) 2017. Nations and Nationalism ©ASEN/John Wiley & Sons Ltd 2017
Numbering (journalVolume)	: 9999
Numbering (journalIssue)	: 9999
CoverDate	: 2017
DOI	: 10.1111/nana.12320
ID (unit)	: NANA12320
ID (society)	: NANA-2017-OA-0001
Count (pageTotal)	: 1
Title (articleCategory)	: Original Article
Title (tocHeading1)	: Original Articles
Copyright (thirdParty)	: © The author(s) 2017. Nations and Nationalism ©ASEN/John Wiley & Sons Ltd 2017
Event (manuscriptReceived)	: 2017-01-06
Event (manuscriptAccepted)	: 2017-01-31
Event (xmlCreated)	: 2017-04-06 (SPi Global)
Numbering (pageFirst)	: n/a
Numbering (pageLast)	: n/a
SelfCitationGroup	: Alemán J., and Woods D. (2017) Inductive constructivism and national identities: letting the data speak, <i>Nations and Nationalism</i> , XXX, doi: 10.1111/nana.12320 .
Object Name (appendix)	: Appendix
Link (toTypesetVersion)	: file:nana12320.pdf

Short Title: Inductive constructivism and national identities

Short Authors: José Alemán & Dwayne Woods

Inductive constructivism and national identities: letting the data speak†

José<<Query: AUTHOR: Please confirm that given names and surnames/family names have been identified correctly.

Ans: Yes>> Alemán*¹, Dwayne Woods²

¹ Political Science Department, Fordham University, Bronx, NY, USA

² Political Science Department, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA

José Alemán: ✉ aleman@fordham.edu

Abstract

The literature on nationalism has provided conceptual definitions of national identity that supposedly delineate its underlying empirical manifestations. A binary conceptualization (civic versus ethnic) is widely used by scholars. There are confusion and ambiguity in the definition, however, as well as sense that the prevailing schema does not adequately capture the fluidity and complexity of the phenomenon. We posit that abstract conceptual definitions do not validly capture the way individuals actually experience identification with their nations. Using a methodology that models the distribution of responses to survey questionnaires – latent class analysis – we demonstrate that individuals cluster in two different groups in the way they identify with their nations: nationalists are strongly attached to the nation and more exacting in their criteria for membership, while cosmopolitans display lower identification with the nation and are more inclusive in their desired criteria of membership. These classes are to some degree fluid across indicators and nations. Broadly speaking, however, the configurations are comparable cross-nationally.

The distinction between civic/political and ethnic/cultural bases of national identification is widely used by scholars not only heuristically but also as an empirical referent of manifest and latent dispositions. Cross-national variation in citizens' reaction to immigrants and their integration has been tied to the distinction, with civic nations being seen as more welcoming to immigrants than ethnic ones (Reeskens and Wright 2013; Wright 2011).¹ In addition, the distinction has been framed in relationship to right of soil (*jus soli*) and right of blood (*jus sanguinis*) citizenship regimes denoting, respectively, civic and ethnic models of citizenship.² Some have also proposed a 'cultural' dimension (Kymlicka 2001; Reijerse et al. 2013; Shulman 2002).³ Scholars, however, have found these categories fluid (Tritler 2016; Wright, Citrin, and Wand 2012). As Wright (2011: 603) notes, 'empirical explorations ... with the aim of teasing out the ethnic–civic distinction do not neatly place ... [survey] items in either category on a consistent basis.' (Wright 2011: 603).

We believe that it is possible to 'let the data speak', that is, to reveal to us patterns of individual identification with the nation. To that end, we examine how individuals should be sorted into categories of meaning and disposition using latent class analysis (hereafter LCA) (Bonikowski 2016: 10). The method 'is tantamount to grouping individuals' by modelling the distribution of their responses to survey questionnaires. In so doing, we make two important assumptions: that there is a heterogeneous target population that can be mapped inductively, and that the population is made up of a finite number of 'latent and substantively meaningful ... groups or subpopulations' (Masyn 2013: 556).

The categorical approach has hitherto operated on the assumption that the latent boundaries of groups can be defined conceptually. However, because of the inherent ambiguity and questionable bifurcation of national identity into two categories that evoke rational (civic) and irrational (ethnic) attachments, a constructivist engagement with the data is more fruitful than simply using correlative patterns to validate abstract conceptual categories (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001). Thus, we postulate that without modelling responses to attitudinal surveys, we may not validly capture the way individuals actually experience identification with their nations (Billig 1995; Edensor 2002). Constructivists hold that interests and identities are constituted through intersubjective meanings, in turn created through varieties of social interaction (Anderson 2006).

By inductive constructivism, we mean then a method that elicits traces of the contextual factors that influence how individuals form schemas of meaning (Goode and Stroup 2015: 1). Not only personal relationships but government policies and media communications, among others, can 'construct' the schemas of the nation we aim to unearth. We assume in this regard that survey responses can lay bare discrete and inter-subjective patterns of national identification with readily interpretable, coherent meanings.⁴ Our methodology is then person-centred rather than variable-centred.

Our results reveal the existence of two classes of individual identification with the nation-state that we refer to as 'nationalist' and 'cosmopolitan', respectively.⁵ We perform an extensive battery of analyses to test the comparability of these classes across survey instruments and countries. Although the preponderance and internal composition of the classes vary by country,⁶ we can nevertheless claim that they are 'real' in the sense of being validly and reliably experienced by individuals.

<<Query: AUTHOR: Please check level headings if they were assigned to their appropriate levels. Ans: Yes>>National identity: ethnic, civic, or patriotic?

Previous attempts to measure national identity have followed one of two approaches. In the first instance, scholars have used survey prompts inductively to discern a number of latent dimensions that when combined explain patterns of identification with the national community. Kunovich (2009) found for example that a battery of survey questions from the second ISSP National Identity Module (ISSP Research Group 2012) reduces to two factors or dimensions that he labels 'civic' and 'ethnic identification'. Other scholars simply match theoretical constructs with survey prompts from the ISSP or the World Values Survey (WVS) and use those prompts to operationalize their concepts. Davidov (2009) for example distinguishes between nationalism and constructive patriotism as two specific manifestations of national identity, while Ariely (2012) speaks of national identification, patriotism, nationalism, ethnic national identity, and willingness to fight for one's country.

While scholars base their empirical classifications on previous findings or theory, neither approach results in a complete inventory of the range of emotions and attachments associated with the nation. Kunovich for example emphasizes the content of national identities – the formal and informal norms that establish criteria for membership in the national community. Davidov on the other hand focuses on identification: the extent to which a person values his/her membership in the community and sees it as an important part of their identity. Neither author sees content and identification then for what they represent, a social identity that provides 'an awareness of one's objective membership in' a 'group and a psychological sense of group attachment' (Huddy and Khatib 2007: 65).

Another issue only partially addressed by extant work is the extent to which these constructs are equivalent cross-nationally or across subsets of the population. While Davidov (2009) established configural and metric invariance across the full set of countries he examined, he did not evaluate to what extent his constructs varied among individuals. Reeskens and Hooghe (2010) on the other hand only tested for scalar invariance, a form of equivalence they were not able to establish empirically.⁷

All these studies share the characteristic that they rely exclusively on factor analytic techniques to examine

correlations among multiple manifest variables. Factor analysis requires indicator variables to be continuous and normally distributed. In reality, however, survey responses are polytomous variables with a discrete set of manifest responses. Another problematic characteristic of dominant factor analytic approaches is that they are not based on a model that generates profiles of individual responses to survey instruments based on the probability of a certain individual belonging to a particular factor, dimension, or class (as opposed to another).

Latent class analysis overcomes these limitations by modelling the data generating process. A variant of finite mixture modelling, LCA estimates one or more categorical latent variables using iterative maximum likelihood. Like factor analysis, LCA generates latent classes that capture distinct patterns of in-survey responses, ‘but factor analysis produces continuous latent variables’, while LCA generates categorical classes. The ‘classes are then characterized not by exact response patterns but by response *profiles* or typologies described by the relative frequencies of item endorsements’ (Masyn 2013: 556).

This unique feature allows LCA to classify observations into distinct response sets, which – in the context of attitudinal surveys – can be interpreted as clusters of respondents with similar cultural understandings of a particular social domain. As such, LCA is an ideal method for developing empirically grounded conceptual typologies (McCutcheon 1987). (Bonikowski 2016: 16).

The methodology is iterative in the sense that the EM algorithm estimates the log odds that individual *i* falls in latent class *l* relative to the reference class (Masyn 2013; Lanza et al. 2015). This is done by calculating

the probabilities of specific survey responses conditional on class assignment; based on those probabilities, it [the software] then predicts the distribution of responses to each nationalism8 measure in every class (Bonikowski 2016: 17),

a process that repeats itself until the indicators become conditionally independent of one another – that is, until manifest variables share no systematic associations, conditional on values of the latent variable.⁹ To account for the clustering of individual observations within countries, ‘[t]he probability structure of the extended model is restricted so that the country clustering of individual observations affects the distribution of classes within each country, but’ not ‘the response probabilities of particular indicators within each latent class.’ (Bonikowski 2016: 16).

So far as we are aware, Bonikowski (2016) provides the only inductive, cross-national LCA of national identification. His analysis, however, conflates citizens’ affect for their nations with evaluations of the state and its policies.¹⁰ It also fails to explore the contribution particular survey questions make to the distribution of individuals within classes. We identify fourteen (as opposed to twenty six)¹¹ questions that are common to more than one ISSP module and which tap into what we consider to be the most unambiguous feelings or attitudes towards the nation (ISSP Research Group 2012; ISSP Research Group 2015). These include all the questions Kunovich (2009) used in his study and two of the questions Davidov (2009) used in his.¹² The questions have the added advantage that all responses are coded on a scale where higher values indicate decreasing affect or agreement.¹³ Our analysis of the latent national identity parameters is thus based on these fourteen questions. Table 1 presents the list of questions, along with the names we will be using for them in the empirical analysis.

Table 1 Indicators of national identification

Survey question	Variable name
1) How close do you feel to [COUNTRY]?	Attachment
2) Generally speaking, [COUNTRY] is a better country than most other countries	Nationalism1
3) The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like [COUNTRY]	Nationalism2
4) I would rather be a citizen of [COUNTRY] than any other country in the world	Pride
5) People should support their country even if their country is in the wrong	Support
6) [COUNTRY] should follow its own interests, even if it leads to conflicts with other countries	Jingoism
7) How important do you think to have been born in [COUNTRY] is for being truly [NATIONALITY]?	Birth
8) How important do you think to have [COUNTRY CITIZENSHIP] is for being truly [NATIONALITY]?	Citizenship
9) How important do you think to have lived in [COUNTRY] for most of one's life is for being truly [NATIONALITY]?	Having-lived
10) How important do you think to be a [religion] is for being truly [NATIONALITY]?	Religion
11) How important do you think to be able to speak [COUNTRY LANGUAGE] is for being truly [NATIONALITY]?	Language
12) How important do you think to respect [COUNTRY] political institutions and laws is for being truly [NATIONALITY]?	Respect
13) How important do you think to feel [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] is for being truly [NATIONALITY]?	Feel ancestry
14) How important do you think having ancestry from [COUNTRY] is for being truly [NATIONALITY]?	

Kunovich (2009) uses questions 7–14 to measure national identification and explore its consequences. Following Shulman (2002), he suggests that national identity might be composed of three dimensions: ‘ethnic, cultural, and civic’, but his eight indicator variables are not sufficient to identify a three-factor model (Kunovich 2009: 579). As a result, he settles on a two-factor model in which questions 7 through 10, together with the question about ancestry, load highly on an ‘ethnic national identity factor’; the remaining three load on a ‘civic’ factor. Kunovich allows for the possibility of cross loading of indicators on factors and heterogeneity of factor composition at the individual level, but he fails to consider the possibility that national identity also includes feelings of pride for one’s national community and concern for its security. This pride manifests itself in two ways: one benign and accepting – patriotism, the other dangerous and exclusive – nationalism (DeFiguereido and Elkins 2003). An important question then is whether nationalism and patriotism should be distinguished empirically or seen as part of the same conceptual category (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989), a point that we address in the following section.¹⁴

Davidov (2009) on the other hand theorizes that national identification can be regarded as a two-dimensional phenomenon. Also using data from the 2003 ISSP National Identity module, he postulates the existence of two dimensions of national identification: nationalism and constructive patriotism. The first dimension consists of questions 2 and 3 above. Constructive patriotism is measured using three questions that ask individuals how they feel about their country in three areas: ‘(a) the way democracy works; (b) its social security system;’ and (c) whether all groups in society are treated fairly and equally (Davidov 2009: 69).¹⁵ Davidov does not consider the possibility that different questions might symbolize the same concepts, or that national identification might be composed of additional dimensions. More problematic still, whereas constructive patriotism might be a valid representation of national identification in some countries, it is doubtful that it travels well to countries that are not economically developed or long established democratically.¹⁶ As a result, we do not consider it a reliable representation of the concept of patriotism. In the following section, we build on these studies to formulate a model of national identity containing three types of identification: ethnic identity, civic identity, and nationalism/patriotism.

National identity: ethnic, civic and patriotic

Before using LCA to examine how individuals identify with their nations, we conduct a preliminary analysis of what attachments and emotions are associated with these entities. Although not strictly necessary, this preliminary step helps increase confidence in the results of the LCA.¹⁷ We go beyond extant studies however in identifying three types of identification with the nation that embody both their content and appeal: ethnic identity, civic identity, and nationalism/patriotism. Because one of our indicator variables – *jingoism* – has little shared variance with the other variables, nationalism and patriotism actually form one dimension in our data. Having verified the existence of this structure, we then explore how comparable it is cross-nationally.

We begin our empirical investigation with a form of exploratory factor analysis – principal component analysis (PCFA) – of the fourteen indicator variables listed in Table 1. We carry out a number of these analyses in order to demonstrate the compatibility of our findings with previous ones, providing evidence along the way for the plausibility of our findings. Appendix A contains a list of countries included in this as well as subsequent analyses.¹⁸ To allow the factors to correlate with one another, we use an oblique (or promax) rotation of the factors extracted. Following Davidov (2009) and Kunovich (2009), we consider 0.4 the threshold loading for membership in a factor. Because variables indicate decreasing affect or agreement as their value increases, the overall interpretation of the loadings is that, as they increase in magnitude, the feeling or attachment the question evokes is less important to the respondent.

The findings in Table 2 resemble Kunovich's results, because all the variables he claimed mattered to ethnic identification do indeed load on that factor and all the variables he expected to account for civic identification also load on that factor. We also partially confirm Davidov's results, as his two variables, *nationalism1* and *nationalism2*, along with the three we have added, clearly delineate a nationalism/patriotism dimension. As Table 2 demonstrates, all variables load exclusively on one factor. The loading for *jingoism* on the patriotism/nationalism dimension, however, falls below the threshold for membership in a factor.

Table 2 Dimensions of national identification (2003 and 2013): an exploratory analysis

Variable	Ethnic identification	Nationalism/patriotism	Civic identification	Uniqueness
Birth	0.8211	-0.0351	0.0113	0.344
Ancestry	0.8155	0.0262	-0.0584	0.3414
Lived-in	0.7119	-0.0574	0.2007	0.4034
Citizenship	0.5481	-0.0339	0.3833	0.4464
Religion	0.6352	0.1129	-0.1033	0.5543
Language	0.3325	-0.1555	0.5353	0.5453
Nationalism1	-0.1534	0.8128	0.1503	0.3732
Nationalism2	0.0625	0.75	-0.0661	0.408
Pride	0.0787	0.5578	0.2854	0.4956
Support	0.2639	0.479	-0.2005	0.6157
Jingoism	0.2008	0.3527	-0.1677	0.7862
Attachment	-0.1358	0.3773	0.4973	0.6127
Respect	-0.1267	0.0772	0.7517	0.4586
Feel	0.2968	0.0166	0.5579	0.494
<i>N</i>	68 481			
Countries	42			

Note: Variables with loadings greater than or equal to 0.4 are underlined to denote belonging in a factor.

Principal component analysis, although suggestive, assumes indicator variables are measured without error (Acocck 2013, 3). For this reason, scholars have advocated using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Confirmatory factor analysis models both random and systematic errors in measurement (Davidov et al. 2014: 62), giving researchers more confidence in their results. Using modification indices, the cross loading of variables on multiple factors can be explored, and a number of diagnostics performed that provide a more systematic picture of how well indicator variables characterize a construct (Oberski: 2014). We proceed to estimate such a model starting with the previous configuration of variables, adding variables to factors and covariances among residuals based on their expected parameter change (standard EPC). The latter suggest what happens to a model when an additional parameter (variable or covariance) is added. Because a particular modification index is not conditional on additional indexes, standard practice is 'to add only one parameter at a time' (Acocck 2013: 27), starting with the one with the highest standard EPC.

In our case, adding a covariance to the residuals of the two nationalism indicators and including *citizenship* in the 'civic identification' factor improves model fit sufficiently.¹⁹ As Table 3 reveals, the CFI (0.901) and the CD (0.960) indicate the model fits the data well. The CFI, a number between 0 and 1, should be over 0.90 because this indicates high correlations among the indicator variables, a clear indication of their dimensionality. The RMSEA (0.07) is lower than 0.08, the number recommended for a 'reasonably close fit' (Acocck 2013: 24). As Table 3 indicates, *citizenship* loads significantly on ethnic and civic identification, although both loadings are low, most likely because our variables are not continuous and normally distributed. Whereas Reeskens and Hooghe (2010: 590) would simply drop this variable from the analysis, we believe it is better, at least for the time being, to look for heterogeneity across countries in how citizenship as a requirement for nationality is perceived.²⁰ Finally, the loading (or coefficient) for *jingoism* is now

below 0.4. Our sample contains many advanced, stable democracies with publics that may feel ambivalent about the unilateral pursuit of state interests, a situation that may lead to conflict with other states. We thus exclude this variable from subsequent factor analyses.

Table 3 CFA of fourteen variables at the individual level, 2003 and 2013

Variable	Factor	Coefficient	Standard error	z	P > z
Birth	Ethnic	0.773	0.002	365.66	0
Ancestry	Ethnic	0.735	0.002	320.58	0
Lived-in	Ethnic	0.707	0.002	294.77	0
Citizenship	Ethnic	0.401	0.006	71.74	0
	Civic	0.347	0.006	57.6	0
Religion	Ethnic	0.550	0.003	177.59	0
Nationalism1	Nationalism	0.540	0.004	144.14	0
Nationalism2	Nationalism	0.550	0.004	147.94	0
Pride	Nationalism	0.661	0.003	196.86	0
Support	Nationalism	0.454	0.004	115.57	0
Jingoism	Nationalism	0.323	0.004	76.64	0
Language	Civic	0.545	0.004	152.36	0
Attachment	Civic	0.416	0.004	105.4	0
Respect	Civic	0.463	0.004	120.26	0
Feel	Civic	0.667	0.003	205.55	0
Cov (e.nationalism1, e.nationalism2)		0.310	0.004	74.49	0
Cov (ethnic, nationalism)		0.682	0.004	178.53	0
Cov (ethnic, civic)		0.660	0.004	164.51	0
Cov (nationalism, civic)		0.601	0.005	122.4	0
N	68 481				
Countries	42				
CFI	0.901				
RMSEA	0.070				
CD	0.960				

Note: Variable variances and intercepts not shown. Standardized coefficients reported. Estimation method used is maximum likelihood.

It is important to note, however, that our three types of identification are highly correlated. This lack of differentiation casts doubt on the ability of the factor structure to capture how individuals actually identify with their nations. Rather than standing in opposition to each other then, it is likely that some individuals are simultaneously more nationalistic, less civic, and/or more ethnic in their orientations, while others are less nationalistic, more civic, and/or less ethnic in theirs. This makes it imperative that we use a methodology that more validly reflects the content of national identification (Wright et al. 2012).

Cross-national comparability of confirmatory factor analysis

Despite the inconclusiveness of our results, factor analysis can nevertheless shed light on semantic differences between countries in the content and appeal of identification with the nation. As a result, before proceeding to the LCA, we re-estimate the model in Table 3, this time grouping individuals by their respective countries of residence.²¹ Because the results would take too much space to report, we simply note some outlying patterns and speculate as to the reason they occur. In particular, Israel loads lowly on *birth* and Taiwan on unconditional *support* for government policy and on the desirability for nationals of speaking the country's official language. In addition, feelings of being truly a member of one's national community are not very important to national identification in Norway, the Netherlands, and

Sweden. Neither are feelings of closeness to one's country and of respect for its political institutions in the Netherlands and Sweden.²² These results are extremely suggestive, as they indicate that residents of Israel, a country that values ancestry very highly for citizenship purposes,²³ do not regard birth on Israeli soil as crucial for identification with the Israeli ethnos. The results do not change if the analysis is restricted to those who identify as Jews. It should be noted though that in this case modification indexes suggest *birth* also belongs in the civic identification dimension. Likewise, a belief that residents should unconditionally *support* their government is not a core manifestation of Israeli nationalism.²⁴

The status of Taiwan, an island nation lacking official recognition from many important countries and international bodies, explains why a sense of being in alignment with government positions is not associated with Taiwanese nationalism.²⁵ Taiwanese identity manifests itself in highly complex ways, with residents of the island divided on questions of ethnic and national identification (Huang 2005).²⁶ As a result, the fit for Taiwan is somewhat worse than for Israel (CFI = 0.841; RMSEA = 0.082; and CD = 0.933).²⁷ Scandinavian and other northern European democracies, finally, are the countries most identified with a conception of citizenship based on tolerance and inclusion. As a result, their national imagery does not invoke feelings of closeness with and attachment to the nation.²⁸

Despite its limitations, factor analysis does raise the important question of where our latent variables lie on the spectrum between continuous latent and manifest variables (factor analysis) and discrete ones (LCA). Latent class analysis is a special case of item response theory (IRT), a general approach to data reduction that models the probability of a particular response to an item (or indicator) as a function of individual characteristics and item parameters.

Item response theory would allow us to explore the possibility of treating a discrete latent variable as continuous by formulating a semi-parametric model. Known as Mokken after its creator, 'the Mokken model requires few assumptions regarding the relationship between the latent trait and the responses to the items.' (Hardouin, Bonnaud-Antignac, and Sébille 2011: 31). In order to fit this model, however, items or indicators have to meet three characteristics: unidimensionality, local independence, and monotonicity. The latter assumption in particular can be evaluated by exploring traces of items (trace lines) graphically. 'If the monotonicity assumption is satisfied, the trace lines increase. This means that the higher the latent trait, the more frequent the positive responses.' (Hardouin et al. 2011: 33). Trace line plots reveal, however, that none of the fourteen indicators we use in the analysis meet the monotonicity assumption.

Latent class analysis

In this section, we set out to test our conjecture that individuals can be divided into groups characterized by two distinct patterns of national identification: nationalists and cosmopolitans. These classes are to some degree fluid across indicators and nations, but nationalists are strongly attached to the nation²⁹ and more exacting in their criteria for membership; cosmopolitans, on the other hand, display lower identification with the nation and are more inclusive in their desired criteria. Our goal is not simply to explore this fluidity, but to also demonstrate that in spite of it, we still obtain a bipartite distribution of observations that is valid within countries and reliable across them. Having verified the existence of this structure, we then explore how representative the measures are.

As previously mentioned, our analysis includes the equivalent of fixed effects for countries, which allow us to capture the extent to which discourses about the nation vary cross-nationally as a function of educational systems, media communications, government policies, and other forces that 'construct' schemas of the nation. To facilitate convergence, we excluded observations without complete information on all fourteen indicators. We also cluster observations by country, adjusting the standard errors accordingly, and estimate separate models for 2003 and 2013. There are two reasons for this: because survey weights, which we use in our models, vary by wave, and because we do not want to assume that country effects are constant.³⁰

There are two ways to draw inferences from a LCA: by examining the distribution of latent classes by group, or by exploring individual class assignments. The first approach provides a quick snapshot of cross-national differences in class sizes, offering in our case two membership probabilities that are constant within countries and add up to 1. The second entails examining 'the latent class for which each individual has the highest posterior probability of membership' (Lanza et al. 2015: 21), a variable that varies by individuals but can be aggregated by country to provide the percentage of individuals who belong to each latent class. While both sets of measures convey the same information, class membership can never be known exactly.³¹ Consequently, depending on which measure(s) we pay attention to, the ordering of groups may not be identical.³²

We choose to present a measure of 'prevalence' of individual class probabilities because our model for 2013 is not able to find a best match for 10.86 per cent of the observations. Our measure is thus better able to take into account the uncertainty inherent in the modelling enterprise. Because we are interested in the correspondence between 2003 and 2013, we summarize results for both years side by side, with countries ranked from those where nationalists are most prevalent to least.³³ Table 4 thus lists the 'prevalence' of nationalists in 2003 and 2013. This refers to the percentage of observations that belong to class one in a given country and year.³⁴

Table 4 Prevalence of nationalists, 2003 and 2013


Country	2003	Country	2013
Venezuela	67.22		
Philippines	63.81	Philippines	73.36
United States	60.75	Turkey	62.18
Chile	59.6	Georgia	59.25
Austria	57.45	Israel	54.76
Ireland	56.54	Slovenia	49.3
Canada	56.08	United States	47.59
Uruguay	54.25	Czech Republic	46.46
Israel	52.5	Mexico	46.39
South Africa	50.92	Slovakia	45.85
Poland	48.04	Spain	43.56
Russia	47.35	United Kingdom	41.46
Netherlands	46.45	Portugal	41.13
Australia	45.08	South Korea	41
Czech Republic	43.95	Ireland	40.48
Taiwan	43.01	Sweden	39.18
France	42.29	France	38.75
South Korea	42.03	Germany	38.62
Denmark	41.3	Latvia	38.4
Sweden	40.46	Finland	37.99
United Kingdom	39.71	Estonia	37.35
Germany	39.28	Lithuania	37.21
Hungary	38.92	Denmark	36.78
Norway	38.3	Hungary	36.27
Japan	37.95	Norway	35.19
Portugal	37.75	Iceland	34.82
Finland	37.11	Taiwan	34.75
New Zealand	36.65	Belgium	33.98
Slovakia	36.15	Japan	33.58
Spain	33.94	Croatia	32.52
Slovenia	33.89	Switzerland	29.02
Switzerland	33.8	India	25.43
<i>N</i>	35 046		33 434
Log-likelihood	-528,576.36		-516,226.05
G-squared	577,548.58		573,660.24
AIC	583,628.58		579,550.24
BIC	609,360.41		604,339.27
Adjusted BIC	599,699.3		594,980.08
Entropy R^2	0.868		0.860

Table 4 reveals that although there is some stability in country rankings of nationalist prevalence, our results are not

consistent with the observation that ‘most of the variation in nationalist attitudes is in fact found within countries not between them.’ (Bonikowski 2016: 25). There are differences between nationalists and cosmopolitans in every country, to be sure, but Table 4 indicates that more developed countries tend to have fewer nationalists than less developed ones, with India and the United States being possible exceptions.³⁵ Despite being a poor democracy, India had the lowest proportion of nationalists in 2013.³⁶ The widest gap in attitudes then is between the country with the highest and the country with the lowest percentage of nationalists in 2013 – a difference of 47.93 percentage points between the Philippines and India.³⁷

With the exception of the Philippines and France, moreover, no countries maintained their ranking in nationalist prevalence from one year to the next. Some countries kept a close correspondence – Switzerland, Japan, Hungary, Germany, Norway, Denmark, South Korea, Sweden, Israel, and the United States – but many also saw more substantial changes. Whether what is driving these findings is globalization (Norris 2011: 97–9) or the level of development per se should be investigated, but among developed countries, the United States appears to be an outlier too, probably due to its status as the world’s superpower. As Norris and Inglehart (2004: 94) write, ‘American cultural values are ... more patriotic ... than those in Europe.’ It is also worth pointing out that the number of nationalists in America was higher in 2003 than a decade later, probably because the country was still reeling from the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and starting a conflict with Iraq.

Turning now to the models’ overall performance, the first model performs well, yielding an entropy R^2 of 0.868 and a best match for all observations in 2003. For 2013, the distribution of membership probabilities is strongly bimodal, suggesting that most observations can be sorted into one class or the other despite 10 per cent of them not receiving a classification. The entropy R^2 and other measures of model fit, moreover, are similarly auspicious. To explore what is behind these differences, we plot in Figure 1 means per class for all fourteen attitudinal indicators for the year 2013. We do this because means allow us to detect, albeit in a rough manner, salient differences between our two classes, not because we think they are a valid summary measure of our indicators.³⁸ Due to the way indicator variables have been coded, the lower the score, the stronger the identification with the nation.



As Figure 1 reveals, all items tend to have lower means for class one compared to class two. Moreover, within each class, some items have higher means than others. Results for 2003 mirror those for 2013 very closely. This begs asking whether a particular survey item is disproportionally affecting membership probabilities. Figure 1 reveals that whether someone deems religion as important to their schema of the nation turned up as the most deviant item: its means tend to be higher (meaning the respondent finds this less important to their conception of nationality), than scores for other items. This is not surprising considering that belief in the centrality of God in one’s life is the attribute most associated with traditional values, of which pride in the nation is one aspect (Alemán and Woods 2016: 1047). As Figure 2 indicates, the importance citizens attached to a country’s prevalent religion in their definitions of nationality varied greatly from country to country.³⁹




Figure 2 reveals that in 2003, the Philippines and Israel were the countries where religion was most associated with conceptions of the nation.⁴⁰ Whether popular religiosity or some other process of identification is what is driving these results we cannot determine conclusively. The Philippines is known to be a very Catholic country, whereas the Arab–Israeli conflict is sometimes seen, correctly or not, as the result of intractable differences between two sides strongly attached to their respective religious identities. Cross-national differences in attitudes towards religion, however, do explain why the Philippines is the second most nationalist country in 2003 and Israel one of the most nationalists in both years. The United States also displays high levels of religiosity compared to Europe (Norris and Inglehart 2004: 94). Other countries that display high levels of religiosity in 2003 are Poland,⁴¹ South Africa, and Venezuela, the latter featuring the highest proportion of nationalists that year. For 2013, the Philippines, Turkey, and Georgia (in that order) are the most religious countries in the sample. The results closely mirror those in Table 4, as these countries, also in that order, are the three most nationalist that year.

Additional tests

To provide additional confidence in the inferences we make, we compute van der Eijk's (2001) measure of agreement ('A') for our indicator variables. Van der Eijk formulated a measure to study consensus, polarization, and dispersion in ordered rating scales that can shed additional light on which items appear to be driving the placement of observations into latent classes. While absolute certainty is impossible to attain, we can nevertheless reach some level of confidence in the results if dispersion in our indicators points in the same direction as other pieces of information.

Because widely used measures of dispersion such as the standard deviation are inappropriate for ordered data, van der Eijk (2001) uses frequencies to compute a measure of the weight of individual categories in ordered variables, with weight given by the number of observations in a category divided by the total number of observations. 'The measure of agreement provides the weighted average' of the individual weights, yielding a number that has an intuitive interpretation:

[...]levels of agreement range from -1 to 1 . There are three ideal-typical positions that help interpretation of the scores. If all respondents agree on the category (position), agreement is 1 ... If the respondents are evenly spread, and each category has the same number of responses, agreement is 0 ... If respondents are divided, and half the responses are in one category, and the other half are in a different, non-neighboring category, agreement is -1 . (Ruedin 2016: 2–3).⁴²

We computed country-specific measures of agreement for all fourteen indicators for 2003 and 2013, respectively, and several patterns emerged. The first is that with the exception of national *pride* in the United States in 2013 ($A = -0.239$), all A s are positive. This indicates that group consensus around a particular view or policy plays a more important role in placing countries near the top or the bottom of Table 4 than differences of opinion. What these numbers do not necessarily reveal is whether the consensus favours a nationalist view or rejects it. In 2013, for example, residents of Sweden and the Philippines, countries with the fifteenth and first place in Table 4, respectively, agreed on the role religion should play in defining their national community ($A = 0.708$ versus 0.7), but in very different ways: the mean for the *religion* indicator was 3.563 in Sweden versus 1.446 in the Philippines, suggesting Swedes are not comfortable with a 'religious test' for nationality, whereas Filipinos seem to be demanding one.

In 2003, the country with the highest agreement on the question of national *pride* was the United States ($A = 0.821$), but the latter also ranks high in agreement regarding the desirability of speaking the country's official *language* ($A = 0.87$), *respecting* the country's laws and institutions ($A = 0.797$), and holding American *citizenship* for the purposes of being a true national of the US ($A = 0.857$). Americans also express feelings of superiority over other countries (*nationalism1*) ($A = 0.579$), so it comes as no surprise that the United States is the third most nationalist country in 2003 according to Table 4. Venezuela and the Philippines, the first and second most nationalistic countries that year, also exhibit high agreement on the question of citizenship as well as other questions: *ancestry* (the Philippines), *birth* (the Philippines and Venezuela), the necessity of having lived in the country for being a true national (Venezuela), the view

that to be a true national one has to *feel* like one (the Philippines and Venezuela), and the proposition that to be a true national, one must speak the country's official *language* (the Philippines).

Canada features a high level of agreement as well on several questions: the one regarding *citizenship* ($A = 0.812$), feelings of superiority over foreign countries ($A = 0.604$), the sense that the world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like Canadians (*nationalism*²) ($A = 0.459$), and a feeling that the country's laws and institutions should be *respected* ($A = 0.74$). Nevertheless, Canadians are polarized regarding the compatibility of a respondent's religion with the national one ($A = -0.018$), explaining why the country is ranked seventh in its proportion of nationalists.⁴³ Just behind Canada, Uruguay exhibits high agreement around the proposition that one needs to *feel* like a true national in order to be considered one ($A = 0.85$), and just behind Uruguay, Israelis are profoundly attached to their national communities ($A = 0.737$), although they are divided on the question of ancestry ($A = 0.021$) along with Americans ($A = 0.072$).

Turning now to the results for 2013, we see that they are broadly consistent with those for 2003. The Philippines has high levels of agreement on several indicators: *ancestry* ($A = 0.812$), *birth* ($A = 0.869$), having lived in the country ($A = 0.774$), *citizenship* ($A = 0.838$), *language* ($A = 0.847$), and feelings of being a true national ($A = 0.833$). Turkey, the country with the second highest proportion of nationalists, exhibits the third highest agreement (behind Sweden and the Philippines) on the question of *religion* ($A = 0.684$). Reinforcing the results obtained above using CFA, Israelis are divided on the question of whether *birth* should constitute a fundamental criterion for nationality ($A = 0.088$).

Finally, it is worth noting that the item with the largest number of countries registering high levels of agreement is *language*: in 2003, Denmark, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, and the United States; and in 2013, the Czech Republic, France, Georgia,⁴⁴ Germany, Hungary, Norway, the Philippines, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. These are some of the countries that register significant disagreements regarding the role of ascriptive traits like *ancestry* and *birth* in conceptions of nationality. France, Israel, Norway, the United States, and the United Kingdom registered low levels of agreement in 2003 on the question of the role ancestry should play in conceptions of nationality, and Sweden was similarly divided regarding *birth*. Belgians, French, Norwegians, Americans, Israelis, and British were divided regarding ancestry in 2013; Israelis, Swiss, and Slovenes regarding *birth*.

Discussion and conclusions

The typical approach in the social sciences when confronted with conceptual and definitional fuzziness and a sense of tenuousness as to how it extends to the empirical domain is to try to develop a tauter theoretical and conceptual apparatus. A recalibrated concept generated using deductive reasoning, it is hoped, will come closer to its true empirical manifestations (Yom [2015](#)). In this paper, we have taken an innovative approach drawn from the constructivist paradigm to conceptualizing and defining national identity: inductive classification using LCA. We have turned directly to the data to elicit from its questions the underlying schemas that frame how individuals – sorted on the basis of their own subjective conceptions and dispositions – perceive their nations.

Generally, the literature has provided conceptual definitions of national identity that supposedly delineate its underlying empirical contours. However, it is widely recognized that a binary conceptualization (civic versus ethnic) leaves a lot to be desired. There are confusion and ambiguity in the definition, as well as a sense that the prevailing schema does not adequately capture the fluidity and complexity of the phenomenon. Our results indicate that contrary to the dominant view in the literature that there are two types of national identification, there are actually three: civic identification, ethnic identification, and patriotism/nationalism. The indicators that delineate these types, moreover, create two patterns of individual identification with the nation: the first consisting of individuals more strongly attached to the nation and certain images of it, the second comprising individuals that are more tolerant in their orientations. Despite the existence of these classes, there are several ways in which variables tapping into various feelings and attachments can combine, ruling out the possibility of having a unique configuration. Furthermore, the weight of items on each dimension differs by country. Broadly speaking, however, the configurations are comparable cross-nationally.

Given differences between group level and individually based class probabilities, we suggest that in the future, these should form the basis around which typologies of right of soil and right of blood (*jus soli* versus *jus sanguinis*) citizenship regimes are constructed. We have only analysed democracies and make no claims about how our argument travels to non-democracies. We expect chauvinism, jingoism, and other forms of extreme patriotism to matter more for this group of countries, but further research is necessary to ascertain how our typological framework travels to this population.

Endnotes

¹Nations are not monolithic when it comes to government policies supporting immigrants. On average though, certain nations are more supportive of outsiders than others. We thank an anonymous reviewer for making this point to us.

²Because all countries provide entry permits and/or a path to citizenship to individuals who can trace their ancestry to them, the *jus soli* categorization is usually based on whether countries grant citizenship to individuals based just on their place of birth. A citizen is understood then to be anyone born within that country's borders, regardless of her parents' citizenship or immigration status (Goodman [2015](#): 1912). Understood this way, right of blood regimes constitute the residual category. We thank Annika Hinze for pointing this out to us.

³Most of these studies derive their conceptualization from Hans Kohn's ([1944](#)) notion of national identity as two

supposedly distinct constructs: civic and ethnic (or atavistic) identification (Shulman 2002: 555). The literature has treated the distinction as having either a cognitive or affective latent quality that can be unearthed empirically (Kuzio 2002).

⁴While inductive constructivism has proved popular in the field of ethnic politics (Chandra 2012), it has not been as influential in the literature on nationalism and national identity.

⁵We do not rule out the existence of more classes, but computational limitations prevent us from estimating such a model on a country-by-country basis.

⁶This is only to be expected because Western states, which are more civic today, took hundreds of years to become more inclusive. France denied women the right to vote before 1944, and Canada and Australia disenfranchised native peoples before the 1950s and 1960s. Postcommunist democracies, on the other hand, were expected to become civic democracies overnight in the 1990s.

⁷Reeskens and Hooghe did entertain a few different operationalizations of the ethnic versus civic dichotomy, but they use arbitrary cut points to judge the stability of their factors: a comparative fit index (CFI) larger than 0.95 and a root mean error of approximation (RMSEA) smaller than 0.05 (Reeskens and Hooghe 2010: 587).

⁸Although we distinguish nationalism – ‘the overall ideology that defines the fundamental characteristics of a nation’ (Bonikowski 2016: 37–8) – from national identification, Bonikowski and Norris (2011) use these terms interchangeably.

⁹For a guide to LCA, see ‘How does LCA compare to other statistical methods?’, available at <http://www.john-uebersax.com/stat/faq.htm#otherm>.

¹⁰There are issues with the reliability of an analysis asking individuals how proud they are about their country’s achievements in the areas of the arts, literature, science, sports, and the economy; its political system and policies, and its role in the world. Most likely, individuals in wealthier nations, whose achievements are better known, rank higher on pride in these attributes.

¹¹Bonikowski examines variables that seem redundant in a study of national identification, such as closeness to the county/province/state and continent where one lives.

¹²Another problem with analysing more indicators is that ‘adding multiple anchors for each national identity component, or asking essentially the same questions in multiple ways, would ... likely raise ... measurement problems resulting from respondent fatigue’ (Wright, Citrin, and Wand 2012: 474).

¹³The question about ancestry as a criterion for citizenship was not included in the 1995 National Identity module (ISSP Research Group 1998), and as a result, we exclude this module from the empirical analyses. This question was the most relevant to Kunovich’s (2009) ethnic identification dimension. As a result, he also excluded ISSP’s Module I from his analysis. The ISSP questionnaire also includes another potentially relevant question – how proud the individual is of being country X’s national – but when it is included in the analysis, it reduces the number of observations by 41.5 per cent. This question is also similar to question 4 in Table 1. As a result, we do not include it in our analyses.

¹⁴Some social scientists see the relationship between nationalism and patriotism as an ‘ideological dilemma’ – two belief systems that are potentially in contradiction with one another, rather than ‘two distinct and different sentiments’ (Sapountzis 2008: 45). Therefore, when pride for the national community takes the form of extreme nationalism, especially in feelings of group superiority or support for an aggressive foreign policy, scholars typically refer to the phenomena as chauvinism (Ariely 2016) and jingoism, respectively. Chauvinism and jingoism resemble what Staub (2003) has called ‘blind patriotism’: ‘an intense alignment by people with their nation or group and uncritical acceptance of and support for its policies and practices, with an absence of moral consideration of their consequences or disregard of their impact on the welfare of human beings who are outside the group or are members of its subgroups.’ More precisely, however, ‘a sense of superiority and need for foreign dominance better reflect nationalism than patriotism’ (Huddy and Khatib 2007: 63).

¹⁵The unexpected victories of Brexit and Trump seem to indicate, however, that many in the United Kingdom and the United States do not believe democracy is working well for them and all groups in society are being treated fairly and equally. With regards to point b, Canadians and Western Europeans are probably more satisfied with their social security systems than Americans.

¹⁶In some post communist democracies such as Ukraine, there is very low public trust for state institutions. At the same time, Ukrainians volunteered to fight Russia after its aggression in Crimea. What this example demonstrates is that where governance is poor (southern and eastern Europe), people fight for their country, but not necessarily for leaders, they regard as corrupt and self interested.

¹⁷Bonikowski (2016) proposes four different patterns of identification with the nation, but he does not question the assumption underlying his choice of methodology that his four latent variables are categorical.

¹⁸Although Russia was included in the second and third National Identity modules, we exclude the last wave from the analysis as its Polity IV score has been consistently below 6 and its Freedom House label ‘not free’ for a number of

years, thresholds typically used to classify countries as (non-) democracies.

¹⁹We could continue adding parameters in a stepwise fashion in order to improve the fit of our model. We do not refine our CFA any further, however, because our aim is simply illustrative.

²⁰As Marsh et al. (2014) point out, in the CFA/SEM framework, it is important to ensure that cross-loadings of indicators on variables are freely estimated rather than constrained to 0.

²¹To facilitate convergence, and also because we are conducting a factor analysis for each country, we decided to constrain the cross loadings of *citizenship* on 'nationalism/patriotism' and 'civic identification' to 0.

²²Both countries have growing far right parties. Our results, however, refer to years in which these parties were not yet as popular. For the Philippines, Venezuela, and India, loadings for most indicators are smaller than is typical.

²³According to Wikipedia, '[t]he Law of Return confers an automatic right to citizenship on any immigrant to Israel who is Jewish by birth or conversion, or who has a Jewish parent, grandparent or spouse or who is the spouse of a child of a Jew or the spouse of a grandchild of a Jew.' See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jus_sanguinis. See also Kranz (2016: 70).

²⁴Although in a CFA that excludes Arab Israelis and other minorities, the loading for *support* on the second factor is 0.4 (CFI = 0.904; RMSEA = 0.072; and CD = 0.973), Israeli Jews take *pride* in being citizens of Israel, with *pride* loading significantly on the nationalism/patriotism and ethnic identification factors. *Pride's* loading on nationalism/patriotism, however, is considerably lower than on ethnic identification (0.27 versus 0.494).

²⁵As noted earlier, this is also true of countries with low levels of governance that at the same time have highly patriotic and nationalistic populations. In Greece, for example, there is general disgust with politicians and government but a highly nationalistic population.

²⁶There might be an issue of validity with the data for Taiwan, however: of the 1678 respondents in the 2003 survey wave, a majority (1671) are identified or self-identify as 'Chinese–Cantonese, Hakka, Mandarin', with no provision made for a separate Taiwanese identity. Even though over 95 per cent of the population in Taiwan is officially considered Han Chinese, the majority of these individuals are descendants of immigrants who arrived in Taiwan from mainland China centuries ago. They typically differentiate themselves from Chinese who absconded to Taiwan from the mainland following the defeat of the Nationalist government by the Communists in 1949. As a result, the relevant ethnic and linguistic cleavage on the island is between those who identify as 'Taiwanese' (84 per cent) and those who consider themselves 'mainland Chinese' (14 per cent). See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taiwan#Ethnic_groups. We thank David Yang for bringing this point to our attention.

²⁷Modification indexes suggest that *language* should also be a part of the ethnic factor in Taiwan, with the variable obtaining a standard EPC of 2.06, the highest of all such diagnostics. A model that includes *language* in the ethnic identification factor, however, does not reach convergence.

²⁸Good governance, low corruption, and high trust in institutions reduce nationalism. In addition, these countries are not threatened by foreign powers. But, as previously mentioned, the far right is growing in all of these countries in response to immigration.

²⁹One caveat though is that even for nationalists 'nation' can mean different things.

³⁰We generate twenty simulations for each individual's potential class membership based on posterior probabilities. See Lanza et al. (2015) for a full description of the mathematical model we employ and details on how it handles clusters and weights. Stata code and the data used to generate the analyses reported here are available from the authors upon request.

³¹<http://www.john-uebersax.com/stat/faq.htm#classf>.

³²This is indeed the case with our data, although differences between both sets of results are small enough to make it unnecessary to present country class probabilities, too.

³³The fit for a model with three classes, no country effects, and thirteen indicators variables (that is, excluding *jingoism*) is worse, with an entropy R^2 of approximately 0.81. To fit this model, we have to assume that model parameters are invariant cross-nationally, a strong assumption to make.

³⁴Because there are only two classes estimated, percentages for the second class are not reported. This means that if 45 per cent of Ruritania's residents are nationalists in 2003, 55 per cent are cosmopolitans. Note that whereas for 2003, the percentage of individuals belonging to class two can be calculated simply by subtracting the percentage for class one from 100, the same calculation for 2013 will yield the percentage classified as belonging to class 2 in addition to the percentage not classified.

³⁵France could see the National Front win the presidential election in 2017. In Austria, nationalists came close to winning the presidency in 2016. Nationalists are popular in the Netherlands, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Germany and

Switzerland as well as in postcommunist Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland. They are in power in Scotland, and the UK Independence Party is targeting Labour seats for political power in England. These examples suggest that nationalism has increased in the consolidated democratic world since the time our surveys were conducted.

³⁶These results do not change if, instead of posterior probabilities of individual assignment, we rely on country class probabilities. It could be that, as with factor analysis, LCA does not work very well for India, or that its observations contain a lot of measurement error.

³⁷It is important to note, however, that since 2014, India is ruled by the nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, which has close ideological ties to Hindu nationalism. In 2016, the BJP became India's largest political party and the world's largest party in terms of members. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bharatiya_Janata_Party.

³⁸Despite sharing the same misgivings, Bonikowski (2016: 18) also summarizes his results using variable means.

³⁹We should note though that expressing a preference for 'the national religion' is not synonymous with higher religiosity. People can favour a certain religion but rarely go to church because, as in Greece, being considered 'Orthodox' is part of the national identity.

⁴⁰Of all the Western democracies, the United States appears to give the most weight to religion. Religion there is very closely tied to American national identity and a sense of exceptionalism.

⁴¹Like Filipinos, Poles strongly identify with Catholicism.

⁴²Using A, one can compute a measure of polarization that yields a number between 0 and 1, with zero implying perfect agreement and 1 perfect polarization among members of a group. We judge A to be more intuitive and yield more information, however, than a measure that tries to equate polarization with a lack of consensus. For a full explanation of these indexes, see <https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/agrmt/vignettes/agrmt.pdf>.

⁴³This is probably due to differences between Quebec, where the Parti Québécois has governed on and off since 1976, and the rest of Canada. The PQ eschews the official Canadian policy of multiculturalism.

⁴⁴This reflects the legacy of German citizenship law, which was based exclusively in *jus sanguinis* principles before the year 2000.

References

- Acock, A. C. 2013. *Discovering Structural Equation Modeling Using Stata, revised edition*. College Station, TX: Stata Press.
- Alemán, J. and Woods, D. 2016. 'Value orientations from the world values survey: how comparable are they cross-nationally?' *Comparative Political Studies* **49**, 8: 1039–1067.
- Anderson, B. 2006. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 2nd edn. rev. edn. London: Verso.
- Ariely, G. 2012. 'Globalization and the decline of national identity? An exploration across sixty-three countries', *Nations and Nationalism* **18**, 3: 461–482.
- Ariely, G. 2016. 'Does national identification always lead to chauvinism? A cross-national analysis of contextual explanations', *Globalizations* **13**, 4: 377–395.
- Billig, M. 1995. *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage Publications.
- Bonikowski, B. 2016. 'Schemas of the nation in modern democracies', <http://scholar.harvard.edu/bonikowski/publications/schemas-nation-modern-democracies>. (Accessed 17 September 2016).
- Chandra, K. 2012. 'Introduction' in K. Chandra (ed.), *Constructivist Theories of Ethnic Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Davidov, E. 2009. 'Measurement equivalence of nationalism and constructive patriotism in the ISSP: 34 countries in a comparative perspective', *Political Analysis* **17**, 1: 64–82.
- Davidov, E. et al. 2014. 'Measurement equivalence in cross-national research', *Annual Review of Sociology* **40**: 55–75.
- De Figueiredo, R. J. P. Jr. and Elkins, Z. 2003. 'Are patriots bigots? An inquiry into the vices of in-group pride', *American Journal of Political Science* **47**, 1: 171–188.
- Edensor, T. 2002. *National Identity, Popular Culture and Everyday Life*. Oxford: Bloomsbury Academic.
- Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. 2001. 'Taking stock: the constructivist research program in international relations and comparative politics', *Annual Review of Political Science* **4**, 1: 391–416.
- Goode, J. P. and Stroup, D. R. 2015. 'Everyday nationalism: constructivism for the masses', *Social Science Quarterly* **96**, 3: 717–739.
- Goodman, S. W. 2015. 'Conceptualizing and measuring citizenship and integration policy: past lessons and new approaches', *Comparative Political Studies* **48**, 14: 1905–1941.
- Hardouin, J.-B., Bonnaud-Antignac, A. and Sébille, V. 2011. 'Nonparametric item response theory using Stata', *Stata Journal* **11**, 1: 30–51.
- Huddy, L. and Katib, N. 2007. 'American patriotism, national identity, and political involvement'. *American Journal*

- of *Political Science* **51**, 1: 63–77.
- Huang, C. 2005. 'Dimensions of Taiwanese/Chinese identity and national identity in Taiwan: a latent class analysis', *Journal of Asian and African Studies* **40**, 1/2: 51–70.
- ISSP Research Group 1998. *International Social Survey Programme: National Identity I – ISSP 1995*. Cologne: GESIS Data Archive ZA2880 Data file Version 1.0.0, doi:<https://doi.org/10.4232/1.2880>.
- ISSP Research Group 2012. *International Social Survey Programme: National Identity II – ISSP 2003*. Cologne: GESIS Data Archive ZA3910 Data file Version 2.1.0, doi:<https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11449>.
- ISSP Research Group 2015. *International Social Survey Programme: National Identity III – ISSP 2013*. Cologne: GESIS Data Archive ZA5950 Data file Version 2.0.0, doi:<https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12312>.
- Kohn, H. 1944. *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background*. New York: MacMillan.
- Kosterman, R. and Feshbach, S. 1989. 'Toward a measure of patriotic and nationalistic attitudes', *Political Psychology* **10**, 2: 257–274.
- Kunovich, R. M. 2009. 'The sources and consequences of national identification', *American Sociological Review* **74**, 4: 573–593.
- Kranz, D. 2016. 'Quasi-ethnic capital vs. quasi-citizenship capital: access to Israeli citizenship', *Migration Letters* **13**, 1: 64–83.
- Kuzio, T. 2002. 'The myth of the civic state: a critical survey of Hans Kohn's framework for understanding nationalism', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* **25**, 1: 20–39.
- Kymlicka, W. 2001. *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lanza, S. T., Dziak, J. J., Huang, L., Wagner, A. T., and Collins, L. M. 2015. LCA Stata plugin Users' guide (Version 1.2), <https://methodology.psu.edu>. (Accessed 1 August 2016).
- Marsh, H. W. et al. 2014. 'Exploratory structural equation modeling: an integration of the best features of exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis', *Annual Review of Clinical Psychology* **10**: 85–110.
- Masyn, K. E. 2013. 'Latent class analysis and finite mixture modeling' in T. D. Little (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Quantitative Methodology in Psychology, Vol. 2: Statistical Analysis*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Norris, P. 2011. *Democratic Deficits: Critical Citizens Revisited*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Norris, P. and Inglehart, R. 2004. *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Oberski, D. L. 2014. 'Evaluating sensitivity of parameters of interest to measurement invariance in latent variable models', *Political Analysis* **22**, 1: 45–60.
- Reeskens, T. and Hooghe, M. 2010. 'Beyond the civic–ethnic dichotomy: investigating the structure of citizenship concepts across thirty-three countries', *Nations and Nationalism* **16**, 4: 579–597.
- Reeskens, T. and Wright, M. 2013. 'Nationalism and the cohesive society: a multilevel analysis of the interplay among diversity, national identity, and social capital across 27 European societies', *Comparative Political Studies* **46**, 2: 153–181.
- Reijerse, A. et al. 2013. 'Beyond the ethnic–civic dichotomy: cultural citizenship as a new way of excluding immigrants', *Political Psychology* **34**, 4: 611–630.
- Ruedin, D. 2016. 'An introduction to the R package Agrmt', <https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/agrmt/vignettes/agrmt.pdf>. (Accessed 25 September 2016).
- Sapountzis, A. 2008. 'Towards a critical social psychological account of national sentiments: patriotism and nationalism revisited', *Social and Personality Psychology Compass* **2**, 1: 34–50.
- Shulman, S. 2002. 'Challenging the civic/ethnic and west/east dichotomies in the study of nationalism', *Comparative Political Studies* **35**, 5: 554–585.
- Staub, E. 2003. 'Blind versus constructive patriotism: moving from embeddedness in the group to critical loyalty and action' in E. Staub (ed.), *The Psychology of Good and Evil: Why Children, Adults, and Groups Help and Harm Others*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press <http://ebooks.cambridge.org/chapter.jsf?bid=CBO9780511615795&cid=CBO9780511615795A058>. (Accessed 13 January 2016).
- Van der Eijk, C. 2001. 'Measuring agreement in ordered rating scales', *Quality and Quantity* **35**, 3: 325–341.
- Trittler, S. 2016. 'Repertoires of national boundaries in France and Germany – within-country cleavages and their political consequences', *Nations and Nationalism*. <https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12291>.
- Wright, M. 2011. 'Policy regimes and normative conceptions of nationalism in mass public opinion', *Comparative Political Studies* **44**, 5: 598–624.
- Wright, M., Citrin, J. and Wand, J. 2012. 'Alternative measures of American identity: implications for the civic–ethnic dimension', *Political Psychology* **33**, 4: 469–482.
- Yom, S. 2015. 'From methodology to practice: inductive iteration in comparative research', *Comparative Political Studies* **48**, 5: 616–644.

Appendix: A : Countries included in the analysis

Australia	Lithuania
Austria	Mexico
Belgium	Netherlands
Canada	New Zealand
Chile	Norway
Croatia	Philippines
Czech Republic	Poland
Denmark	Portugal
Estonia	Russia
Finland	Slovakia
France	Slovenia
Georgia	South Africa
Germany	Spain
Hungary	Sweden
Iceland	Switzerland
India	Taiwan
Ireland	Turkey
Israel	United Kingdom
Japan	United States
Korea South	Uruguay
Latvia	Venezuela