Thomistic “Monism” vs. 
Cartesian “Dualism”

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Dieser Artikel kontrastiert die thomistischen und cartesianischen Antworten auf die Frage, worin die substantielle Einheit von Körper und Geist bestehen kann. Eine detaillierte Diskussion der thomistischen Theorie der substantiellen Einheit von Körper und Geist identifiziert insbesondere solche Prinzipien des vorausgesetzten hylomorphistischen metaphysischen Hintergrunds dieser Theorie, die Descartes aufgab. Im Anschluss an eine Argumentation für die Widerspruchsfreiheit der thomistischen Theorie wird kurz skizziert, wie bestimmte Entwicklungen der spätmittelalterlichen Scholastik den Weg für das Aufgeben gerade dieser Prinzipien vorbereiteten. Schließlich wird gezeigt, warum aus der Perspektive der im ersten Teil herausgestellten thomistischen Prinzipien Descartes wie jemand erscheinen muss, der lediglich Lippenbekenntnisse zu der These der substantiellen Einheit von Körper und Geist abgibt.

1 ‘Mind’ and ‘Body’ for Aquinas and Descartes

Recent scholarship on Descartes tends to question received orthodoxy about Cartesian dualism, namely, the view that for Descartes a human being is a composite of two distinct substances of radically different natures, one (the body) being extended and the other (the mind) being unextended, the causal interaction of which, therefore, is a dark mystery.² Scholars who question the received view emphasize Descartes’ insistence on the substantial unity of body and mind in a human being, despite their real distinction, which is of course a point that

¹ I would like to thank both anonymous referees for their insightful comments on an earlier version of this paper.

² Cf. “Critics of Descartes, including Elizabeth, argued that Descartes’s metaphysical commitments put real pressure on the view expounded in the Passions. For, according to Descartes’s metaphysics, the nature of mind is to think and the nature of body is to be extended in length, breadth, and depth. One view concerning causation, a view that Descartes’s critics seemed to have attributed to him, is that one thing causes another to move, for example, by way of contact. Contact, in this context, seems to be possible only by way of surfaces. Now, bodies, since they are extended and thus have surfaces, can come into contact with one another and thus can cause one another to move. However, if minds are not extended, they lack surfaces. And, if they lack surfaces, there is no way in principle for bodies to come into contact with them. Thus, there is no way in principle for bodies to move minds, and visa versa. That is, minds and bodies cannot in principle causally interact. And so, if the view expounded in the Passions requires that bodies and minds be capable of causal interaction, and Descartes’s metaphysical commitments make such interaction impossible, Descartes’s metaphysics puts a great deal of pressure on the view expounded in the Passions.” Smith (2005).
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Descartes steadfastly maintains.\(^3\) The challenge to these scholars, then, is to explain exactly what the substantial unity of body and soul can possibly consist in for Descartes.

This paper is not going argue about the interpretation of Descartes’ conception, which in itself may well be more refined than what is presented by the received view on Cartesian dualism. Instead, this paper will primarily articulate a strong metaphysical conception of substantial unity, namely, that of Thomas Aquinas, which espouses unity in being, rather than merely in operation, while strictly maintaining the distinctness of body and mind (i.e., without collapsing into materialism). After the clarification of some details of this conception and arguing for its consistency, the paper will argue that whatever the finer details of Descartes’ conception may be, this strong Thomistic conception of substantial unity is already quite inaccessible to Descartes (and a fortiori to later modern philosophers as such), as a result of certain conceptual developments that took place in the intervening period.

Therefore, since the main aim of this paper is to contrast the Thomistic account of the substantial unity of mind and body with (the received view on) the Cartesian account, it should be made clear in the first place that in this comparison ‘mind’ (\textit{mens}) does not mean exactly the same for Aquinas as it does for Descartes. Indeed, perhaps somewhat more surprisingly, neither does ‘body’ (\textit{corpus}). As it has often been pointed out in the recent literature, medieval authors in general, and Aquinas in particular, would not draw the line between mind and body where Descartes would.\(^4\) Indeed, they would distinguish the two on rather different grounds.

To put it briefly, for Descartes the mind is the seat of consciousness definable in terms of the (privileged) access we have to our states of awareness. The mind is that on account of which we are aware of whatever we are directly aware of, regardless of whether there is a further, indirect object corresponding to our states of awareness. By contrast, the human mind for Aquinas is definable in terms of the powers accounting for the specific operations of a rational animal as such.

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\(^3\) As Enrique Chavez-Arvizo wrote in the call for papers for the workshop at which the first draft of this paper was presented: “Descartes’ account of a human being as a substantial union of mind and body, although central to his philosophy, has been largely neglected. This is particularly true in the Anglophone history of philosophy tradition. On the widely-held view of Descartes in this tradition, he is portrayed as the champion of mind-body Dualism which claims that a human being is constituted by two really distinct substances, an immaterial mind and a material body. But Descartes also held that in a human being, mind and body are substantially united. In the Synopsis of the Meditations, Descartes, writes that ‘... the mind is proved to be really distinct from the body, but is shown, notwithstanding, to be so closely joined to it that the mind and the body make up a kind of unity’. The widely-held view of Descartes’ account of a human being dwells in the distinctness claim at the expense of the union claim. A close examination of Descartes’ writings clearly exhibits many rich and interesting claims about human beings and their nature that do not neatly fit when forced into the standard Cartesian dualistic mould. His account of a human being as a substantial union of mind and body, although surely implausible, is too central for his philosophical system and textual references to the union are too numerous to be brushed aside. It gives raise to several key questions of considerable philosophical weight that demand investigation.” Chavez-Arvizo (2004). See also Clarke (2003), c. 9; Secada (2000), c. 9; Almog (2002).

namely, intellect and will. So, for Aquinas, the human mind is the human soul having reason and will.

Because of these differences, for instance, sensation and imagination, which would be mental phenomena for Descartes, are not specifically mental phenomena for Aquinas, but for example, prayer, skilful fencing and tilling the land are.

To be sure, this “problem of demarcation” of mental and non-mental phenomena merely indicates some more fundamental, metaphysical differences in Aquinas’ and Descartes’ “mereology” of a human being.

2 The Logical and Ontological Principles Underlying the Thomistic Account

Aquinas’ starting-point on this issue is that a human being is a primary substance, hence a primary being, and consequently a primary ontological unit. This “anthropological” principle rests on a number of even more fundamental logical and ontological principles.

First of all, that a human being is a substance, indeed, a primary substance, is clear from climbing down the Porphyrian Tree in the category of substance. The division of the category of substance by the essential differences of ‘immaterial’ and ‘material’ yields the genera of immaterial substances, that is, subsistent forms, and material substances, that is, bodies. Bodies then are sorted into non-living and living ones, and living bodies into insensitive and sensitive ones, the former of which constitute the genus of plants, while the latter that of animals. Finally, the division of the genus of animals into irrational and rational ones yields the genera and species of brute animals and the species of rational animals. Since the latter cannot be further divided by essential differences, it is a species specialissima, the most specific species of human beings, who differ from one another only individually, but not by any essential differences. Individual humans, therefore, are individual substances. And individual substances are primary beings; therefore, individual humans are primary beings, and, as such, primary units of reality.

So far, so good. But what is the force of the qualification ‘primary’ here? Obviously, ‘primary’ is contrasted in this context with ‘secondary’, concerning things that can be said to be beings or units either primarily or secondarily.

2.1 The Analogy of Being and Unity and their Convertibility

According to Aquinas, whatever is predicated of some things primarily and of others secondarily is not predicated of them univocally, but analogically. As he writes:

… there are two ways in which something common can be divided into those that are under it, just as there are two ways in which something is common. For there is the division of a univocal [term] into its species by differences by which the nature of the genus is equally participated in the species, as animal is divided into man and horse, and the like. Another division is that of something common by analogy, which
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is predicated according to its perfect concept [ratio] of one of those that divide it, and of the other[s] imperfectly and with qualification [secundum quid], as being is divided into substance and accident, and into being in actuality and in potentiality … 5

A term that is analogically predicable of several things can be predicated of its primary analogata without qualification, simpliciter, whereas it applies to its secondary analogata only with qualification, secundum quid. This is precisely why anything that there is in any sense can be said to be a being either absolutely, if it is a substance, or with some qualification, in a certain diminished sense. This can easily be understood against the background of Aquinas’ semantic theory underlying his metaphysics, his own version of the common semantic theory of the period, which historians of medieval logic nowadays usually refer to as “the inherence theory of predication”. (Klima 2002a; 1996) According to this theory, a predication is true, if and only if the significate of the predicate is actually inherent in the thing referred to by the subject. For example, the predication ‘This sheet of paper is white’ is true because the form signified by the predicate, the whiteness of this sheet, is actually inherent in the sheet.

Using this fundamental idea, Aquinas is able to interpret all predications in all categories as predications of being either with or without qualification. 6 For the

5 “Respondeo dicendum, quod est duplex modus dividendi commune in ea quae sub ipso sunt, sicut est duplex communitatis modus. Est enim quaedam divisio univoci in species per differentias quibus aequaliter natura generis in speciebus participatur, sicut animal dividitur in hominem et equum, et hujusmodi; alia vero divisio est ejus quod est commune per analogiam, quod quidem secundum perfectam rationem praedicatur de uno dividendum, et de altero imperfecte et secundum quid, sicut ens dividitur in substantiam et accidentes, et in ens actu et in ens potentia: et haec divisio est quasi media inter aequipollentiam et univocam.” In Secundo Sententiarum 42, 1, 3, in corp. Cf.: “Unum enim eodem modo dictur aliquid sicut et ens; unde sicut ipsum non ens, non quidem simpliciter, sed secundum quid, idest secundum rationem, ut patet in 4o Metaphysicae, ita etiam negatio est unum secundum quid, sicut secundum rationem.” In Perihermeneias 2, 2, 3.

6 “Unde oportet, quod ens contrahatur ad diversa genera secundum diversum modum praedicandi, qui consequitur diversum modum essendi; quia quoties ens dicitur, idest quot modis aliquid praedicatur, toties esse significatur, idest tot modis significatur aliquid esse. Et propter hoc ea in quae dividitur ens primo, dicuntur esse praedicamentum, quia distinguuntur secundum diversum modum praedicandi. Quia igitur eorum quae praedicantur, quaedam significant quid, idest substantiam, quaedam quale, quaedam quantum, et sic de alis; oportet quod unicum modo praedicandi, esse significet idem; ut cum dicitur homo est animal, esse significat substantiam. Cum autem dicitur, homo est albus, significat qualitatem, et sic de alis. In Metaphysicam, 5, 9, 6. “Ad horum igitur evidentiam sciendum est quod ens dividitur in decem praedicamenta non univoce, sicut genus in specie, sed secundum diversum modum essendi. Modi autem essendi proportionales sunt modis praedicandi. Praedicando enim aliquid de aliquo alotero, dicimus hoc esse illud: unde et decem genera entis dicuntur decem praedicamenta. Trisubiectum autem fit omnis praedicatio. Unus quidem modus est, quando de alio subiecto praedicatur id quod pertinet ad essentiam eius, ut cum dico Socrates est homo, vel homo est animal; et secundum hoc acceptur praedicamentum substantiae. Alius autem modus est quo praedicatur de aliquo id quod non est de essentia eius, tamen inhaeret ei. Quod quidem vel se habet ex parte materiae subiecti, et secundum hoc accipitur praedicamentum quantitatis (nam quantum proprie consequitur materiam: unde et Plato posuit magnum ex parte materiae); aut consequitur formam, et sic est praedicamentum qualitatis (unde et qualitates fundantur super quantitatem, sicut color in superficie, et figura in lineis vel in superficiebus); aut se habet per respectum ad alterum, et sic est praedicamentum relationis (cum enim dico homo est pater, non praedicatur de homine aliquid absolutum, sed respectus qui ei inest ad aliquid extrinsicum). Tertius autem modus praedicandi est, quando aliquid extrinsecum de aliquo praedicatur per modum alciuei denominations: sic enim et
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actuality of this whiteness is nothing but the sheet’s being white, namely, the act of accidental being signified by the predicate of the predication ‘The whiteness of this sheet exists’. However, the act of existence in question is a merely accidental act of existence of the sheet: for the sheet to be white is clearly not for the sheet to be simpliciter, for otherwise the sheet’s change of color when dipped into ink would be its destruction, which is clearly not the case. Therefore, the act of being of the whiteness of the sheet is not the being of the sheet absolutely speaking; rather it is the being of the sheet secundum quid, namely, with respect to its whiteness. This is precisely why the whiteness of the sheet is not a being in the same sense as the sheet is. So, this is why we have to talk about substances as primary beings, or beings simpliciter, and about accidents as beings only in a qualified sense, as beings secundum quid. Indeed, similar considerations apply to other beings secundum quid, for example, potential beings, or mere beings of reason, such as secondary substances and other universals. (In Metaphysicam 4, 1, 539; 11, 3, 2197)

But then, given the convertibility of the transcendental notions of being and unity, similar considerations apply to the analogy of unity as well. As Aquinas explains:

… we have to be aware of the difference that some things are many absolutely [simpliciter], and one in some respect [secundum quid], while the case is the reverse with others. Now something is said to be one in the same way as it is said to be a being. But a being absolutely speaking is a substance, while a being in some respect is an accident, or even [only] a being of reason. So whatever is one in substance is one absolutely speaking, yet many in some respect. For example, a whole in the genus of substance, composed of its several integral or essential parts, is one absolutely speaking, for the whole is a being and a substance absolutely speaking, while the parts are beings and substances in the whole. Those things, however, which are diverse in substance, and one by accident, are diverse absolutely speaking, and one in some respect, as many humans are one people, or many stones are one heap; and this is the unity of composition or order. Likewise, many individuals that are one in genus or species are many absolutely speaking, and one with respect to something, for to be one in genus or species is to be one with respect to reason.
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So, the anthropological principle of the primary unity of a human being is a direct consequence of the ontological and logical principles according to which (1) a human being is a primary substance, and (2) primary substances are primary beings in the analogical division of being as such; whence, given (3) the convertibility of being and unity, it follows (4) that humans are also primary units in the analogical division of unity as such.

Indeed, on Aquinas’ strict understanding of the principle of the convertibility of being and unity within the framework of his semantic theory, what accounts for the primary unity of anything is its status as a primary being, i.e., its having an act of substantial being. For according to this interpretation, what the terms ‘being’ and ‘one’ signify in a thing is the same act of being [esse] that renders the thing in question both a being and a unit (with the difference that ‘one’ also co-signifies the indivision of the thing). Therefore, anything other than a substance, which has any sort of unity whatsoever can only have that unity as a result of having some other sort of esse in a different, yet analogically related, diminished sense. Accordingly, the unity and being of anything depends on the sort of act of being [esse] it has and the way it has it, determined by the nature of the thing in question. As Aquinas remarks:

... being [esse] is said to be the act of a being [ens] insofar as it is a being, that is, that on account of which something is denominated as a being in the nature of things. And being in this way is attributed only to the things themselves which are contained in the ten categories, whence ‘being’ [ens] predicated on account of such an act of being [esse] is divided by the ten categories. But this act of being [esse] is attributed to something in two ways. In one way as to that which [quod] properly and truly has being, or is. And thus it is attributed only to a per se subsisting substance; whence that which truly is is said to be a substance in bk. 1. of the Physics. All those [things], however, which do not subsist per se, but in others and with others, whether they are accidents or substantial forms or any sorts of parts, do not have being [esse] so that they themselves would truly be, but being [esse] is attributed to them in another way, namely, as to that by which [quo] something is; as a whiteness is said to be, not that it itself would subsist in itself, but because it is on account of [this whiteness] that something has it that it is white. Being [esse], therefore, is properly and truly attributed only to a per se subsisting thing. To this, however, two kinds of being are attributed. The one is that results from those from which its unity is integrated, which is the proper substantial being of a suppositum. Another being is attributed to a suppositum besides those that integrate it, which is an additional being, namely, accidental being; as being white is attributed to Socrates when it is said: Socrates is white.9
There are a number of important points to be noted in this passage. An act of being, *esse*, is that on account of which a being, *ens*, is denominated a being. Accordingly, something is an *ens* in the sense in which it has *esse*. But a primary substance, an *ens* in the primary sense, is a thing that has *esse* without qualification as *that which* has *esse*, as opposed to a form, whether substantial or accidental form, which has *esse* only as *that by which* something else has *esse*. So, the difference between a substantial form and an accidental form is that the former has the substantial *esse* of the substance, whereby the substance *is* without qualification, *simpliciter*, while the latter has an accidental *esse* of the substance, whereby the substance *is somehow, secundum quid*. However, both types of forms have their *esse* not as the substance has it, namely, as *that which* has *esse* [*quod est*], but as *that by which* the substance has *esse* [*quo (substantia) est*]. In short, the *esse* of an accidental form is an accidental *esse* of the substance, whereas the *esse* of a substantial form is the substantial *esse* of the substance, but both kinds of forms have these acts of being not as *quod*, but as *quo*. So, and this is particularly important, the *esse* of the substantial form is the very same act of being as the substantial *esse* of the substance, they only differ in that the substance has this *esse as that which* [*quod*] has it, whereas the form has it as *that by which* [*quo*] something else has it. But then, both the substance and its substantial form are denominated a being on account of the same act of being, but differently, insofar as they have this *esse* differently. Thus, a substance and its substantial form are not two beings, for each is denominated a being on account of the same *esse*, yet, they are not one and the same being either, for each has this *esse* in a different way, and so each is denominated a being in a different sense.

Indeed, the unity of the *esse* of a substance and its substantial form is Aquinas' most fundamental reason for holding that any substance can only have one substantial form. A substance is in actuality on account of its substantial *esse*, which is the same as the actuality of its substantial form. So, the actuality of a substantial form makes the substance actual absolutely speaking, without qualification. But then any further form can be added to this thing only as something making this already actual thing *to be somehow*, with qualification, that is, with respect to some accidental *esse*, but not as something making it *to be* without qualification, because it *already is* without qualification. Therefore, any other form can only be an accidental form of the thing, whence the thing can only have this one substantial form.10

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10 Or more simply, two distinct forms have to have two distinct acts of being (for otherwise they would be the same entity, on account of the convertibility of being and unity). But the act of being of either of these forms has to be either identical with or distinct from the being of the thing of which they are
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As can be seen, and this point is going to be crucial later, Aquinas’ metaphysical principles and conclusions discussed so far are the result of his strict adherence to the demands of the logical principles of his version of the inherence theory of predication, which can be listed as follows: (1) any predication or denomination is verified by the actuality of the signicate of the predicate in the subject; (2) the actuality of this signicate is the esse of this signicate determined by its nature; and so, given (3) the general Aristotelian principle of the convertibility of being and unity, we have (4) that the unity or distinctness of the significata and the bearers of these significata, i.e., the supposita of our terms, has to be judged in terms of the identity or non-identity of the esse actualizing these items.

2.2 Aquinas’ Inherence Theory and Human Mereology

But it is the same strict adherence to these principles that is at work in Aquinas’ treatment of the issue of the composition of a human being from soul and body, in the different senses of the term ‘body’ distinguished by him.

For from the foregoing it might appear that the issue is settled: since there is only one substantial form in any substance directly informing its prime matter, and given Aquinas’ identification of the intellective soul with the single substantial form of a human being, he seems to be committed to the identification of the human body with prime matter, immediately informed by this single substantial form. Still, he apparently never makes this identification. (Kenny, 1994, p. 28; Klima, G. 2002b, pp. 259–266)

The explanation of this apparent inconsistency is simple on the basis of the logical principles noted above. For something is denominated a ‘body’ on account of the form signified by this term in it. But for Aquinas it is the same, single substantial form of any substance that is signified by all its substantial predicates arranged on the Tree of Porphyry, although according to different concepts, co-signifying various perfections stemming from this substantial form. So, the term ‘body’, being the most generic term immediately under the term ‘substance’, signifies in a human being the same substantial form as do the other terms subordinated to it, including the most specific term ‘man’. Therefore, in this sense of the term ‘body’, we cannot really say that a human being has a body; rather we have to say that a human being is a body, a living, sensitive, reasoning body.

However, this does not mean that Aquinas would reject locutions asserting the composition of a human being from body and soul, or that he would subscribe to materialism concerning human beings.

Aquinas distinguishes different senses of the term ‘body’ on the basis of what form of the thing it signifies and what perfections it co-signifies and how. In the first place, he distinguishes corporeity signified by the term ‘body’ in the category of quantity from that in the category of substance. The former corporeity is the forms. But the two distinct acts of being cannot both be identical with the same substantial act of being of this thing. So the two forms cannot both be substantial forms of the same thing. Cf. Summa Theologiae 1, 76, 4 co. Quaestio disputata de anima, 9 co, In Secundo Sententiariam, 1, 2, 2, &c.

11 “Corporeitas autem duplceiter accipi potest. Uno modo, secundum quod est forma substantialis corporis, prout in genere substantiae collocatur. Et sic corporeitas cuiuscumque corporis nihil est aliud
but the three dimensions of a body, clearly, an accidental form that is naturally inseparable, but supernaturally separable from a material substance (as actually happens in the Eucharist). A body considered only in regard to this form is what Aquinas calls a “mathematical body” [corpus mathematicum]. The corporeity signified in the category of substance, on the other hand, is nothing but the substantial form of a material substance. However, this can be signified in two ways with respect to the further perfections such a substance may have, such as life, sensation, and intellectual operations. As Aquinas explains:

The name ‘body’ can be taken in several senses. For a body, insofar as it is in the genus of substance, is said to be a body because it has such a nature that three dimensions can be designated in it; but the three designated dimensions themselves are the body which is in the genus of quantity. But it happens that something that has some perfection also has a further perfection, as is obvious in the case of man, who has a sensitive nature, and beyond that also an intellective one. Likewise, to the perfection of having such a form that in the thing three dimensions can be designated another perfection can be added, such as life, or something like that. The name ‘body’, therefore, can signify something which has a form from which there follows the designability of three dimensions with precision, namely, so that from that form no further perfection would follow, but if something is added, then it is beyond the signification of ‘body’ in this sense. And in this sense the body will be an integral and material part of an animal, for in this way the soul will be beyond the signification of the name ‘body’, and it will be superadded to the body itself, so that the animal will be constituted from these two, namely, from the soul and the body, as its parts. But the name ‘body’ can also be taken so that it should signify some thing which has a form on account of which three dimensions can be designated in it, whatever that form may be, whether it may give rise to some further perfection or not. And in this sense body will be a genus of animal, for an animal contains nothing which is not contained implicitly in a body. For the soul is not a form other than that on account of which in that thing three dimensions can be designated; and so when it was said that a body is that which has such a form that three dimensions can be designated in it, it was understood so that whatever that form might be, whether
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animality or stone-ness, or whatever else. And thus the form of animal is implicitly contained in the form of body, insofar as body is its genus. 13

So the term ‘body’ taken as signifying the substantial form of whatever it is true of signifies a substantial form that determines that the thing with such a form has to have three dimensions by nature. But with respect to the further perfections that a thing can have by virtue of having this substantial form, the term can be taken in two different senses. In what may be called the exclusive sense, the term ‘body’ signifies the substantial form of the thing with precision, excluding from its signification any further perfections. In the other sense, which may be called the abstractive sense, the term simply abstracts from these further perfections, but without excluding them. Obviously, it is only in the abstractive sense that the term can be the genus of all bodies, including inanimate and animate ones, simply abstracting from the perfections of the latter. In the exclusive sense, however, the term can only apply to inanimate bodies, or, and this is the reason why this sense is relevant from our point of view, to parts of animate bodies, excluding their perfections beyond their three-dimensionality.

Does this mean that an animate body or specifically a human being consists of an inanimate body and a soul working somewhere in this inanimate body, thereby animating it? Is the soul in the body like the hand of a puppeteer in the puppet, or like the pilot in the ship, to use the oft-quoted Aristotelian simile?

Clearly not, because that would mean that a human being would be one merely secundum quid, consisting of two distinct actual substances, merely joined in their co-operation, like a team of horses. Indeed, we can see that this cannot be the case if we carefully consider again the sense of the term ‘body’ in which we can say that a human being is composed of body and soul.

As we could see, the sense in question is the substantial, exclusive sense of the term. In this sense, the term signifies the substantial form of the substance with the exclusion of any further perfection besides three-dimensionality, which is neces-

13 “Hoc igitur nomen quod est corpus multipliciter accepit potest. Corpus enim, secundum quod est in genere substantiae, dicitur ex eo quod habet talam naturam, ut in eo possint designari tres dimensiones; ipsae enim tres dimensiones designatae sunt corpus, quod est in genere quantitatis. Contingit autem in rebus, ut quod habet unam perfectionem ad ulteriorem etiam perfectionem pertingat, sicut patet in homine, qui et naturam sensitivam habet et ulterius intellectivam. Similiter etiam et super hanc perfectionem, quae est habere talam formam, ut in ea possint tres dimensiones designari, potest alia perfectio addiungi, ut vita vel aliqua huiusmodi. Postet ergo hoc nomen corpus significare rem quandam, quae habet talam formam, ex qua sequitur in ipsa designabilitas trium dimensionum cum praecissioni, ut scilicet ex illa forma nulla ulterior perfectio sequatur; sed si quid aliud superaddiitur, sit praeter significacionem corporis sic dicti. Et hoc modo corpus erit integralis et materialis pars animatis, quia sic anima erit praeter id quod significatum est nomine corporis et erit superveniens ipsi corpori, ilia quod ex ipsis duobus, scilicet anima et corpore, sicut ex partibus constituetur animal. Potest etiam hoc nomen corpus hoc modo accepit, ut significet rem quandam, quae habet talam formam, ex qua tres dimensiones possunt in ea designari, quaecumque forma sit illa, sive ex ea possit provenire aliqua ulterior perfectio sive non. Et hoc modo corpus erit genus animalis, quia in animali nihil est accipere quod non implicite in corpore continetur. Non enim anima est alia forma ab illa, per quam in re illa poterant designari tres dimensiones; et ideo, cum dicebat quod corpus est quod habet talam formam, ex qua possunt designari tres dimensiones in eo, intelligebatur: quaecumque forma esset, sive animalitas sive lapideitas sive quaecumque alia. Et sic forma animalis implicite in forma corporis continetur, prout corpus est genus eius.” De Ente et Essentia, c. 1.
sarily included in corporeity (whence it certainly cannot be excluded). Therefore, the term in this sense can only refer to inanimate bodies as independently existing units, such as chemical elements, rocks, planets, stars, etc. So, a tree, a horse, or a human being cannot be said to be a body in this sense. Still, we can use this term to “carve out”, conceptually, a part of these living beings, in pretty much the same way as we can conceptually carve out the half or third of a cake, before actually cutting it up. The difference in this case is simply that here we are not distinguishing the parts on the grounds of how much of the extension of the thing in question we conceive to belong to one part and how much to the other, but rather on the grounds of what perfections of the thing we take to belong to one part and what to the other.

So, on this analysis, when we say that a human being is composed of body and (rational) soul, with the term ‘body’ we are referring to a conceptually carved out part of a human being, namely the part informed by the human being’s substantial form, conceived as including three-dimensionality, but at the same time conceived with the exclusion of any further perfections. By the term ‘soul’ on the other hand, we are referring to the same substantial form that is signified by the term ‘body’, but with the inclusion of all the perfections we excluded from the signification of the term ‘body’, such as life, sensitivity, and rationality. Therefore, soul and body in the relevant senses cannot be two entities: after all, they have the same substantial act of being, the act of being of the human being, which is one entity, one being in the primary sense of the term ‘being’.\textsuperscript{14} The term ‘body’ in the exclusive substantial sense does not refer to this being, nor to another being of the same kind, for it is referring to something that is a being in a different sense, namely, a substantial part of a human being, which is only a being-in-a-being, but not a being in itself. Similar considerations apply to the soul. The soul is not another being, for it is a being in a different sense, yet it is not the same being as the whole human being either, but it is only a part of the same being.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{14} Soul and body taken together are one being, the human being. Since the soul and the body are parts of this one being, they are not beings in the same sense as this being; hence they are certainly not two beings in this sense. But they are not two beings in another sense either, because they are not even beings in the same sense as one or the other is. If we distinguish the senses in which these items exist by the addition of parenthetical numerals, then we can say that the soul exists(2) as that by which the human being exists(1). But the body, being the subject of this form, exists(3) as that in which the soul (that by which the human being exists(1)) exists(2).

\textsuperscript{15} Note that although ‘the same being as’ and ‘another being than’, predicating of the same thing with regard to the same thing are opposites, they are not contradictory opposites, so they can both be denied of the same thing. Therefore, we can consistently say that the soul is neither the same being as a human being, nor another being than a human being. To be sure, this remark needs to be understood in accordance with the Aristotelian doctrine of various sorts of opposition in the Postpraedicamenta (the last part of the Categories, as it was commonly referred to by its scholastic commentators). The relevant point of that doctrine is that the negations of non-contradictory opposites can be verified of the same subject. For example, the privatively opposed terms ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ can both be truly negated of a baby or of a rock, because both of these terms presuppose the same sort of subject, i.e., a sort of thing that is capable of justice or injustice (which does not hold for babies or rocks). Likewise, ‘the same being as’ and ‘another being than’ are (relative) opposites, but not contradictory opposites, and for their opposition they presuppose the same sorts of beings. Thus, if we are considering things that are beings in different senses, then of a thing that is a being in one sense, both of these terms
2.3 The Consistency of Aquinas’ Account

To be sure, at this point one might object that the soul is also a being in the same sense as the whole human being according to Aquinas, for since the soul has its own operation, it also has its own act of being, not only as _quo (aliquid aluid) est_, but also as _quod est_. So, if Aquinas is right in maintaining that the soul has its own operation, and so it is a subsistent being just as the whole human being is, whence the soul and the whole human are beings in the same sense, yet they are not identical, then it seems that he is committed to the claim that the soul and the whole human are two beings in the same sense (and thus the soul is another being than a human being, in exactly the same sense of ‘being’).

But we have to remember here that for Aquinas, given his strict interpretation of the convertibility of being and unity, two beings in the same sense can only be two beings if each is one, undivided in itself and divided from the other, each having its own distinct act of being. However, this is not the case with a human being and his or her soul. Therefore, the human being and his or her soul are not two beings, even if they are both beings in the same sense and the one is not the other. They are not related to each other as two beings in the same sense, because they share their act of being, which the whole human being has only as _quod est_, whereas his or her soul has _both_ as _quod est_ and as _quo est_, namely, as that by which the human being has his or her life. So the soul, in relation to the whole human being can only be regarded as a substantial part of the whole human being, having the same substantial act of being as the whole human being.\(^{16}\)

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\(^{16}\) One of the anonymous referees has also raised the following question: “One might ask the author whether, though there is a sense in which the soul of a human being is neither the same being as the human being nor another being than the human being, there is also a sense in which it is simply another substance than the human being. Does not Aquinas say as much? Does not this imply dualism? – In other words, the fine line the author draws between hylomorphism and dualism seems to me a bit too fine.” I could not find in Aquinas a claim to the effect that the soul is another substance than the human being. However, his treatment of the status of the soul as a _suppositum_ in the category of substance (e.g., in _Quaestio disputata de anima_, 1) seems to exclude his commitment to such a claim. For lacking complete nature, the soul is not an individual substance in the same sense as the human being is, even if they share the same act of being; therefore, we have to say that the soul, which is an incomplete substance(2), is neither the same substance(1) as nor another substance(1) than the complete substance(1) that is the human being. Thus, this equivocation invalidates the apparently valid inference ‘this man is a substance(1), this soul is not this man, and this soul is a substance(2); therefore, this soul is another substance(1) than this man’. This is why Aquinas is not committed to
Of course, this solution presupposes that the soul is an entity that has the same act of being as the whole human being, and that the soul has this single act of being in two of the senses distinguished by Aquinas, namely, both as an inherent form, as * quo aliquid est *, and as a subsistent entity, as * quod est *.

But it is precisely this latter claim that is unacceptable to many critics of Aquinas who find it to be inconsistent to claim that the same act of being is both inherent and subsistent. As Siger of Brabant famously argued:

The * ratio essendi * [mode of being] of a material form is different from the * ratio essendi * of a composite substance or of a subsistent form. For the * ratio essendi * of a material form is that of something * on account of which [secundum quam] * something else is, just as the * ratio of composition * is that it is something on account of which a composite thing is [composite], and the * ratio of shape * is that it is something on account of which a thing is [thus and so shaped]; therefore, the * ratio essendi * of a material form is that it is united with something else. But the * ratio essendi * of a composite substance or of a form that is free from matter is that it is a being * per se * and separately, not one being with something else. From this we argue as follows. When the * ratio essendi * of something ceases to be, then it is destroyed and * is not *; but when a material form is separated from matter, then its * ratio essendi * ceases to be, as is clear from what has been said; therefore, no form whose separation from matter is not its corruption is a material form. But the separation of the intellective soul from the body and matter is not its corruption. Therefore, it does not have being united with matter. And the reasoning is clarified by means of examples. When the timbers, stones, and bricks in a house cease to be composed on account of their form of composition, the composition ceases to be; and when something ceases to be thus and so shaped on account of its shape, that shape ceases to be. And the case is similar with the substantial form, with respect to that of which it is the form; for when matter ceases to be actual on account of this form, then this material form ceases to be, although this is better known in connection with an accidental form than in connection with the substantial form. And these * rationes essendi *, that on account of which something is united with matter and that on account of which something is a * per se * and separately subsisting being, are opposite to such an extent that they cannot belong to one and the same thing. Therefore, the intellective soul cannot have the * ratio of a per se subsisting being * and, at the same time, constitute with matter and the body a thing that is one in being.17

the claim that the soul is another substance than a man, and thus never makes the claim as far as I can tell, even if he is committed to the premises.

17 “Praeterea, alia est ratio essendi formae materialis et compositi seu formae per se subsistentis. Ratio enim essendi formae materialis est secundum quam est aliquid aliud, ut ratio compositionis est secundum quam habet esse compositum, et ratio figurae secundum quam habet esse figuratum; unde ratio essendi formae materialis est quod sit unita ali. Ratio autem essendi compositi vel formae liberatae a materia est quod sit ens per se et separate, non unum ens cum alio. Ex hoc sic arguitur. Cum cessat ratio essendi alciuei, ipsum corrumpitur et non est; sed cum separatur forma materialis a materia, cessat eius ratio essendi, ut ex praedictis appareat; nulla igitur forma cuius separatio a materia non est sua corruptio est materialis. Sed separatio animae intellectivae a corpore et materia non est eius corruptio. Ergo non habet esse unitum ad materiam. Et declaratur ratio in exemplo. Cum ligna, lapides et lateres in domo cessant esse composita a forma compositionis eorum, cessat esse compositio; et cum secundum figuram cessat aliquid figuratum esse, cessat esse figura. Et similiter est de forma substantiali ad illud cuius est forma, quod, cum secundum eam cessat esse materia, cessat esse formae materialis, licet notius sit in accidentalis forma quam substantiali. Et sunt istae rationes
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To deal with Siger’s challenge, we should first clarify what it means for Aquinas to say that the intellective soul is immaterial. Clearly, this claim cannot mean that the intellective soul does not have matter as its integral part, because that would not distinguish it from any other form, for no form has matter as its integral part. But this claim cannot mean either that the soul does not exist in matter, for the intellective soul is not a separate substance. On the contrary, it is the substantial form of the human body. Indeed, as has been argued above, that the soul is the substantial form of the body means that the act of being of the soul is the same act as the act of being of the body, which is nothing but the life of the human being. But this seems to go directly against the claim that the intellective soul can possibly survive the body, since if the act of being of the soul is the life of the human being, then it seems that the end of the life of the human being should be the end of the act of being of the soul, that is, with the death of the human being the soul should perish as well.

It is at this point that Aquinas’ discussion of how the immaterial act of thinking pertains to the intellective soul as its proper act (and to the whole human being on account of the soul) becomes crucial. For the immaterial act of thinking, because it is immaterial, cannot be directly an act of the composite substance (or any of its quantitative parts, such as an organ, say, the brain). It has to have as its immediate subject an entity which itself does not contain matter as its integral part. This, according to Aquinas, is the intellective soul. However, if the soul is the immediate subject of an act that is not at the same time an act of any part of the body, which therefore is the soul’s proper act, then the soul has to have subsistent being, according to Aquinas’ principle that properly speaking only subsistent beings can have their proper acts. So, the soul has to have a subsistent act of being. But it cannot have any other act of being, so this subsistent act of being is also the soul’s inherent act of being, its act of informing the body. Indeed, this act is also the subsistent act of the whole composite, since there is only one substantial act of being in any one composite substance, which is also the act of being of any of its essential parts. What remains, then, is that there can be only one substantial act of being in a human being, which pertains both to the composite and to its substantial parts. However, it pertains to the whole and to the parts in different senses, and to one part, namely, to the intellective soul in two of these senses at once. But is this possible?

18 For a detailed discussion of two of Aquinas' arguments for the immateriality of the intellect, see Klima (2001).
When we say that a certain significate of a certain predicate belongs to its suppositum in one sense or another, then this means that this significate is signified by this predicate in this suppositum according to one or another of its significations. However, viewed from this perspective, there should be nothing impossible in the claim that one and the same term that has different significations can have one significate in one of its supposita but such that this significate belongs to two of its different significations at the same time. Now, this is precisely the case here.\(^ {19}\) The predicate \textit{ens} in the sense which it signifies the act of being of subsistent supposita (\textit{ut quod est}) signifies the act of being of this human being, and of that horse, and of that tree, etc. In the same sense, however, it does not signify the act of being of the form of that tree, nor that of that horse. But according to Aquinas' claim it does signify the act of being of the soul of this human being in this sense. However, in another sense, namely, in the sense in which it signifies the act of being of substantial forms (\textit{ut quo aliquid est}), it signifies the act of being of the form of the tree and that of the form of the horse as well as that of the soul of the human being.

Thus, \textit{pace} Siger (and others),\(^ {20}\) there is nothing impossible in the claim that the human soul is an \textit{ens} in both senses. However, this is precisely the claim that the human soul has being in both senses, namely, both \textit{ut quo aliquid est} and \textit{ut quod est}. Therefore, there is nothing impossible in the claim that the soul should have its act of being in both senses as long as it informs the body, while it ceases to have it in one of these senses when it ceases to inform the body, still, without ceasing to be, absolutely speaking. Indeed, this is precisely what the immateriality of the soul should consist in for Aquinas: its ability to continue to exist without informing the body, i.e., to have an act of being that it actually shares with the body as its substantial form, but which it can retain as its own, when it is no longer the body's substantial form. And the reason why it can have its act of being in this way, unlike any other form that actually informs matter, is that it has some

\(^{19}\) Denoting the significate of a predicate \(P\) in an entity \(u\) at a time \(t\) as \(\text{SGT}(P)(u)(t)\), it is easy to see that if \(P\) has two significations, \(\text{SGT1}\) and \(\text{SGT2}\), then there is nothing impossible in the claim that \(\text{SGT1}(P)(u)(t) = \text{SGT2}(P)(u)(t)\). Thus, it is quite possible that \(\text{SGT1}(\text{being})(\text{this soul})(t) = \text{SGT2}(\text{being})(\text{this soul})(t)\). Indeed, this formulation also shows at once how it is possible for a soul of this kind to cease to be a being in one sense, without ceasing to be in another at a certain time, i.e., how it is possible for the human soul to cease to be the inherent form of the human body without thereby ceasing to be. This is exactly how Aquinas' doctrine of the subsistent existence of the soul supports his claim of the soul's immortality, while preserving its genuinely "monistic" substantial unity with the body in their single act of being. For more on this technical apparatus, see Klima, G. 2002.

To put the point even more simply, we can say that the subsistent act of being of the human soul is merely contingently identical with the inherent act of being of the soul as the form of the body. Still, this does not mean that the soul is merely accidentally a form of the human being, precisely because its act of being is nothing but the substantial act of being of the human being. (\textit{Cf. Quaestio disputata de anima}, a. 1 ad 1: "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod licet anima habeat esse completum non tamen sequitur quod corpus ei accidentaliter uniatur; tum quia illud idem esse quod est animae communicat corpori, ut sit unum esse totius compositi; tum etiam quia eti possit per se subsistere, non tamen habet speciem completam, sed corpus advenit ei ad completionem speciei."). So, the soul is still \textit{essentially} the substantial form of a human being. For the relevant meaning of 'essential' and 'substantial' as opposed to 'accidental' in this context, see Klima (2002c).

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acts, namely, the acts of understanding, which it does not communicate with the body, i.e., which are its own alone.

However, this latter claim, namely, that the soul can have the acts of understanding as its own alone, can also be challenged on the grounds of Aquinas’ above-mentioned principle according to which actiones sunt suppositorum, that is to say, that only subsistent entities can properly be said to perform actions. They have their active principles by which they perform those actions, i.e., which are instrumental in performing those actions, but the actions are properly attributed only to the suppositum, and not to the active principle. As Aquinas says:

Actions pertain to supposita and to wholes, but, strictly speaking, not to [their] parts or to [their] forms. For one cannot properly say that a hand hits, but rather that a man does with his hand, nor can one properly say that heat heats, but rather that fire heats by its heat.21

However, Aquinas also insists against Averroes that what performs the activity of thinking is the human person. But the whole human person constituted from body and soul cannot be identified with his or her soul, since, as Aquinas would put it: nulla pars integralis praedicatur de suo toto – an integral part cannot be predicated of its whole; that is to say, any predication to the effect that this person is his or her soul has to be false. However, according to Aquinas’ doctrine of the immortality of the human soul, the reason on the basis of which we can conclude that the intellective soul survives the death of a human person is that the intellective soul has an immaterial act, namely, thinking. Therefore, it is unclear how Aquinas can reconcile his doctrine of the immortality of the intellective soul, which requires the attribution of the immaterial act of thinking to this soul, with his insistence against Averroes that it is not this soul that does the thinking, but rather the whole human person by means of his or her soul.

Aquinas’ answer to this problem should be that since the soul is an essential part of this composite substance, any act that belongs to this part alone denies the whole of which it is a part in accordance with the common rule concerning the denomination of a whole from its part. The common rule recognized by medieval logicians dealing with the fallacy of secundum quid et simpliciter is that a whole is properly denominated by any attribute of its part which can apply only to the part in question. For one example, if Socrates’ hair is blond or curly, then Socrates is properly denominated blond or curly, since the terms ‘blond’ or ‘curly’ can only apply to his hair. By contrast, if his hair is black, Socrates cannot on that account properly be denominated black, for the attribute ‘black’ could also denominate his whole body. In the same way, if swinging can belong to both to the arm and to the whole body of a person, one cannot properly be said to be swinging just on account of swinging

21 “Actiones autem sunt suppositorum et totorum, non autem, proprie loquendo, partium et formarum, seu potentiarum, non enim proprae dicitur quod manus percutiat, sed homo per manum; neque proprae dicitur quod calor calefaciat, sed ignis per calorem.” Summa Theologiae 1–2, 58, 2
an arm. Likewise, since blinking can only be performed with the eyes, it is the whole person who is said to be blinking on account of blinking the eyes. Again, if it is only the eyes of a person that can see, and no other part, then, precisely for this reason, the whole person is said to see on account of his or her eyesight.\(^{22}\)

So, if strictly speaking only the intellective soul does the activity of thinking, and this soul alone can do it, then, as long as the soul is a part of the whole human being, the whole human being is also properly denominated by this act. Therefore, if it is true that only the intellective soul thinks and only the intellective soul of a human person can do the thinking, then, since the soul is a part of the human person, indeed, an essential part, it is precisely for this reason that we have to say that the human person thinks, at least, as long as he or she has his or her soul.

However, when the soul gets separated from the body of the person in question, this means that the act of being of this person comes to an end. Nevertheless, this need not mean that the soul’s act of being should come to an end. What this means is only that the act of being in question ceases to be the act of being of the composite and it also ceases to be the soul’s in the sense in which it belonged to it as to the form of the body. But the same act of being can still belong to the soul in the sense in which it belonged to it as to a subsistent being. Therefore, the soul can continue in its life, and can continue its operation that belonged to it as its own, but no longer in connection with the body.

Thus, Aquinas’ account is at least possible (while its actual truth of course hinges primarily on the truth of his claim of the immateriality of thinking). But this is all we needed to establish that he can consistently maintain a position that qualifies as a strong substance-monism (as opposed to substance-dualism), still, without collapsing into the simple (indeed, Aquinas could claim, simple-minded) substance-monism of materialism.

### 3 Aquinas and the “Mind/Body Problem”

Given his “human mereology” sketched above, it is no wonder that Aquinas simply does not have a “mind/body problem” in the modern, post-Cartesian sense. He cannot have one. If mind and body are not two entities of radically different natures unified by their interaction in a human being, but rather they are substantial parts of the same human being, who is a unified agent utilizing its natural powers in all its physical and vital functions ranging from digestion, growth and reproduction to sensation, imagination, volition and abstract thought, then there cannot be an “interaction problem” and, in general, there is no greater metaphysical mystery in the workings of the soul than there is in the workings of any complex natural phenomenon.\(^{23}\)

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\(^{22}\) The rule was interpreted as covering all sorts of integral wholes, and was widely used by theologians in explaining what sorts of attributes could apply to Christ on account of his two natures. For discussion and references, see Klima (1984).

\(^{23}\) Accordingly, it is no wonder that Aristotelian psychology is just a branch of natural science.
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Indeed, this is precisely what should make Aquinas’ views particularly intriguing in a modern, post-Cartesian conceptual setting. Yet, precisely within this setting, Aquinas’ views appear to be obscure, couched in a barely accessible conceptual idiom.

The fundamental reason for this appears to be the loss of that conceptual idiom, as a result of certain rather complicated developments in the late-medieval and early modern history of ideas. In fact, in this complex process the emergence of the Cartesian conception of body and mind was but one, although perhaps the most influential, and hence most “visible” episode.

As in the foregoing discussion I have pointed out, Aquinas’ “human mereology” is based on his logical and ontological principles, many of which were common stock among his contemporaries. Thus, the inherence theory of predication, the analogy of being and its division into substance and accident, as well as the convertibility of being and unity were quite commonly endorsed by 13th-century philosophers and theologians. Still, the interpretation of these common principles varied in subtle ways among these authors, and hence there followed some very substantial differences in their metaphysical conclusions.

As I have argued in more detail elsewhere, Aquinas’ strict interpretation of the analogy of being in terms of the inherence theory of predication as presented above is not found in authors such as Henry of Ghent or Duns Scotus, who endorsed the thesis of the plurality of substantial forms, or Siger of Brabant, who argued for the separate existence of the intellect. But it is precisely this interpretation that for Aquinas both entails the thesis of the unity of substantial forms in general and allows the immaterial intellective soul to be the single substantial form of the human body in particular. To be sure, the above-mentioned authors also endorse the inherence theory of predication. But in their interpretation, the being of the significata of common terms need not be interpreted as something necessarily qualified or determined by these significata, whence they see no problem in identifying these significata with their respective acts of being, that is, they see no problem in identifying essence and existence not only in the case of God, but also in the case of creatures. (As it is well-known, for Aquinas such identification would only be possible in the case of God.) But then, if essences are divided in terms of mutually exclusive specific differences, then so are the acts of being identical with these essences. Therefore, the opposite differences of materiality and immateriality cannot characterize the same act of being, whence the immaterial intellective soul cannot be the same being as the material form of corporeity of a human being, for on this conception the inherent mode of existence of a material form cannot be compatible with the subsistent mode of existence of an immaterial form. This is how some sort of an interaction problem could arise for those holding the “Platonizing/Augustinian” doctrines of the plurality of substantial forms or (in the case of Siger and other “Latin Averroists”) the separate existence of a unique intellect. The reason the problem does not emerge with the force it does in the post-Cartesian tradition is that in medieval philosophy it is embedded in

24 For more detailed discussions, see Klima (2000; 2002d).
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the context of a physical theory in which the assumption of immaterial substances having the power to act on material ones is commonly made without further ado.

What more forcefully pointed in the direction of the Cartesian problem was rather the radical reinterpretation and eventual abandonment of the metaphysical principles of Aquinas’ solution, by undermining the logical-semantical grounds of the Thomistic interpretation of these principles with the emergence of the late-medieval via moderna.

William Ockham and his followers, such as John Buridan, Albert of Saxony, Marsilius of Inghen, or Peter of Ailly, completely abandoned the inherence theory of predication, replacing it with what historians of medieval logic commonly refer to as “the identity theory”. According to this theory, what renders an affirmative predication true is not the actual inherence of the form signified by the predicate in the supposita of the subject, but rather the identity of the supposita of these terms.25 Quite obviously, in this framework, the copula can no longer be regarded as signifying the act of being of a suppositum of the subject determined by the significate of the predicate in the way Aquinas would interpret it. So, in this framework, the entire logical foundation of the Thomistic interpretation of the analogy of being becomes null and void. As we could see, the Thomistic interpretation was not universally endorsed already in the framework of the older logical theory, the via antiqua, characterized by the inherence theory. But the nominalists’ move rendered that interpretation well-nigh meaningless. In general, as a result of this move, inherent forms, whether substantial or accidental ones, no longer having the necessary logical function of being the significata of common terms denominating substances, become logically unnecessary, and so they may become even metaphysically undesirable and easily dispensable entities. (Klima, 1999a; 1999b)

The emergence of the new logic of the via moderna thus severed the close conceptual ties between the old logic and the old metaphysics, thereby opening up conceptual possibilities that simply had not been there before. Such possibilities involved the elimination of all inherent accidental forms in favor of mere modes of substances (a move made by John Mirecourt in the 14th century, but condemned as heretical at the time), the elimination of substantial forms and the revival of ancient atomism (something found in the extant works of Nicholas of Autrecourt), and the possibility of perfect deception by absolute divine power (considered to be a possibility by all nominalists).

4 Conclusion: Descartes vs. Aquinas, Dualism vs. Non-Materialist Monism

Given all these conceptual possibilities opened up in late-medieval philosophy, combined with the revival of ancient skepticism and the emergence of a new scientific ideal in the Renaissance, all within the context of the general decline

of scholastic logic, to be replaced by the watered-down Aristotelian logic of the humanists by his time, no wonder the Thomistic ideas of the Jesuits he knew did not appear compelling to Descartes. Indeed, the late-medieval neo-Augustinian backlash against the dominance of Aristotle throughout the Middle Ages (Menn, 1998) also favored the move away from the strict Aristotelian monism of Aquinas, even if it was quite “revolutionary” in Aquinas’ time. But given all these developments, Descartes’ move toward a new paradigm is thoroughly understandable in his time. Finally, having to cope with the implications of Descartes’ dualism, it is equally understandable that now we are seeking ways to restore the lost sense of the substantial unity of a human being, a major theoretical and practical concern of our time.

But in this search it may be helpful to know that Descartes’ efforts to tone down his dualism, indeed, sometimes using the language of scholastic Aristotelianism he otherwise abandoned, could not possibly restore the notion of substantial unity provided by Aquinas. For by Descartes’ time the words of that language lost the strict meaning they had in the logical framework of the via antiqua, and especially the even stricter meaning they had in Aquinas’ interpretation of common metaphysical principles he provided within this logical framework. Thus, no matter how much he may have tried, Descartes simply could not have formulated the strict conception of substantial unity Aquinas had developed within a logical framework already lost for Descartes.

References


