Sputnik: A History of the Beginning of the Space Age
© Asif Siddiqi, 2007
Early Work
The launch of Sputnik, the world's first artificial satellite, inaugurated the Space Age in 1957. Conceptually, its origins date back to the early 20th century to the works of the Russian (and later Soviet) pseudo-scientist Konstantin Tsiolkovskiy who came up with the first mathematical considerations on the possibility of space travel using liquid propellant rocket engines. There was, however, a great deal of gap between theory and practice, and it wasn't until the late 1940s that rocket technology was mature enough to be considered as a solution to the goal of spaceflight.
At the end of World War II, Soviet recovery teams had captured a large amount of technical material and documentation from the infamous German A4 (more widely known as the V2 or 'vengeance weapon' by the Nazis). The missile had a range of about 270 kilometers. Study of the A4 ballistic missile jump-started Soviet efforts to develop more powerful indigenously developed rockets. By combining A4 technology with domestic expertise, by 1955, Soviet rocket engineers were able to produce the R-5M strategic ballistic missile with a range of 1,200 kilometers. Most of the work on long-range ballistic missiles was concentrated at a secret institute known as Scientific-Research Institute No. 88 (NII-88, pronounced 'nee-88') located in the Kaliningrad suburb (now known as Korolev) northeast of Moscow.
At NII-88, under 'Chief Designer' Sergey Korolev (above in 1953), a team of engineers developed progressively more sophisticated ballistic missiles, beginning with the R-1 (the Soviet copy of the A4), the R-2, and then the R-5 and its nuclear-tipped version, the R-5M. The next step was the development of a missile capable of intercontinental distance. By 1953, Korolev's team, in cooperation with a number of other R&D organizations had concrete ideas for two intercontinental missile projects, one a ballistic and the other a cruise missile. In May 1954, the Soviet government officially approved at least three intercontinental missile projects, one of which was an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) known as the R-7 or 'article 8K71.' (At the time, the Soviets used a confusing number-letter-number system of naming weapons systems as a way to conceal any information about them). Korolev's design team, now known as Experimental-Design Bureau No. 1 (OKB-1) was assigned as the prime contractor for the R-7 which involved hundreds of other subcontractors and factories spread across the Soviet Union. The two cruise missile projects, Burya and Buran, were directly jointly by the NII-1 aviation research institute. Hardware was developed by Semyon Lavochkin's OKB-301 (for the Burya) and Vladimir Myasishchev's OKB-23 (for the Buran). Both these projects were cancelled by the end of the decade. Neither were ever deployed.
What did the development of the R-7 have to do with space exploration? Many rockets developed prior to the 1950s flew fast, very fast, but none of them flew fast enough to reach what scientists call 'orbital velocity,' the velocity at which an object would enter orbit around the Earth. You need a rocket with a very powerful propulsion system to reach about 100 kilometers altitude and impart orbital velocity (which is roughly 7 to 8 kilometers/second) to an object. Theoretically, ICBMs were capable of achieving such altitudes and speeds. In other words, the advent of the R-7, for the first time opened up the realistic possibility of delivering a human-made object into orbit around the Earth.
As originally designed, the R-7 (or 8K71) (below) was about 30 meters tall and consisted of a core booster surrounded by four conical 'strapon' boosters. Each booster had a single engine that used liquid oxygen and kerosene as propellants. At launch, the five engines had a thrust of about 400 tons. The total rocket weighed (fully fueled) about 280 tons.
The R-7 was a strictly military project. It had a singular goal: to deliver a nuclear warhead to the continental United States. However, its utility as a satellite launch vehicle was not unnoticed, especially by space enthusiasts such as Korolev, rocket engine designer Valentin Glushko, and others.
One of Korolev's old friends (they had met during youth glider competitions in the 1920s), Mikhail Tikhonravov (below in 1970) was the driving force behind proposing a satellite. Since the 1930s, while working with Korolev and Glushko, Tikhonravov had been a strong advocate of human spaceflight. At various times in the 1930s and 1940s, he had proposed differentprojects to launch humans into the upper atmosphere. After the war, he ended up working at a secret research-institute known as NII-4, which like NII-88, was focused on research on military missiles. NII-4's job was to develop the basic strategies behind the use of missiles in war; it was something of a think-tank, something akin to the American RAND corporation.
At a scientific conference in March 1950, Tikhonravov had argued that it was technically feasible to launch a satellite and that the Soviets should begin a program to develop one. At the time, few recognized the utility (propaganda or otherwise) of a satellite. But within a couple of years there was a consensus within the NII-4 that a satellite could have potentially important military and intelligence applications. As a result, on 16 September 1953, NII-4 approved an R&D study ("Theme No. 72") to study the uses of satellites. A team under Tikhonravov studied a variety of engineering problems such as placing a satellite in orbit, changing the satellite's orbit, returning to Earth, radio communications, and tracking the satellite from the ground. They developed a model of a satellite called the "simplest satellite" which could be launched by a future ICBM. They issued their 442-page report in March 1955.
Another group of scientists at the USSR Academy of Sciences also began a similar exploratory study on satellites in 1953. This team was headed by Mstislav Keldysh (below), a brilliant mathematician who was on the rise on the Soviet scientific community. Keldysh headed a division (the Department of Applied Mathematics) at the Academy's V. A. Steklov Mathematics Institute. Keldysh was also the head of the parallel cruise missile projects.
Even before these early satellite studies were finished, Chief Designer Korolev recognized that all this work would amount to nothing if the Soviet government did not officially approve a concrete satellite project. Korolev was not only an inspiring leader and a genius manager, but he also had a particular skill in 'working' the Byzantine hierarchy of the Soviet Communist Party and government (which were theoretically two distinct bureaucracies). He was keen to move ahead with the satellite project but needed to have all his ducks in a row. Keldysh was an important ally. Through early 1954, Korolev arranged a number of meetings between Tikhonravov's group, Keldysh's group, and Korolev's own engineers, as well as leading administrators from the Academy of Sciences. The reached a consensus on the goals and basic specifications of a satellite. Tikhonravov drew up a final report.
At the same time, on May 20, 1954, the Soviet government formally approved development of the R-7 ICBM and made it a national priority.
Exactly a week after the approval of the R-7, on May 27, 1954, Korolev wrote a letter to high administrators in the Soviet military-industrial complex formally requesting approval of a satellite program. He attached Tikhonravov's report on a "simplest satellite" The idea was to launch a 3 ton scientific satellite into Earth orbit using the R-7 ICBM.
Approval?
The initial government response was not encouraging; Korolev did not receive official approval to begin a satellite development project. The plan essentially languished in bureaucratic channels for about a year until external events prompted the Soviet government to take a second look. On July 29, 1955, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's press secretary James C. Hagerty announced [pdf file] that the United States would launch "small earth-circling satellites as part of [its] participation in the International Geophysical Year which takes place between July 1957 and December 1958." The International Geophysical Year (IGY) was a period of expected heightened solar activity during which scientists from all over the world planned to study a variety of geophysical phenomena. American scientists had a number of satellite proposals under consideration, one of which (Vanguard) the Eisenhower Administration approved for development as part of IGY.
Korolev took advantage of this American announcement to push through his own project, which was in limbo. He recruited two very powerful administrators in the Soviet military-industrial complex, Mikhail Khrunichev and Vasily Ryabikov for his cause. Immediately after the American announcement, the three jointly wrote a three-page letter to Soviet Communist Party Secretary Nikita Khrushchev and Council of Ministers Chairman Nikolay Bulganin, i.e., the two men in charge of the country. In the letter (essentially written by Korolev), the authors argued that the Americans were very serious about launching a satellite. Korolev included a lot of detail on a project of former Nazi rocket scientist Wernher von Braun, even though the project that the Eisenhower Administration had just approved was not von Braun's project. There was a sense of urgency in the letter. He letter ended with the following passage:
"Considering that the creation of an artificial satellite of the Earth will open new prospects in the development of science and military technology, it is considered advisable in the nearest future to begin work on its creation. A list of necessary steps [for its implementation] can be presented within one-and-a-half and two months."
There was a discussion at the highest level (i.e., the Presidium, the old name for the Politburo) on the satellite issue, apparently on August 8, exactly ten days after the Eisenhower Administration's announcement. As a result of the meeting, Khrushchev approved a short memo which stipulated the following:
"To approve the idea for the creation of an artificial satellite of the Earth. To entrust Comrades Khrunichev and Ryabikov to go ahead in working to create an artificial satellite of the Earth and in a month-and-a-half's time present to the Central Committee of the Communist Party a draft for the necessary steps on this question. . ."
Following the approval, there was a lot of activity surrounding the satellite issue. Korolev, Keldysh, and Tikhonravov met many times, and came up a coordinated plan. Vasily Ryabikov, the top administrator in the military-industrial complex, ensured that any plan did not impede development of the R-7 ICBM. The military was reluctant to hand over a couple of their precious missiles for what they considered a complete waste of time. But Ryabikov's support for the project was critical. By the fall, the idea was to launch a satellite with a mass of around 1,000 to 1,400 kilograms. A detailed and revised report was drawn up.
In November, Korolev sent the whole report back up to the government, and on January 30, 1956, Khrushchev and Bulganin signed off on the final plan, formally approving a Soviet satellite project. The idea was to develop three different satellites for three different missions:
• Object D1: for scientific experiments
• Object D2: to carry an animal into orbit
• Object D3: a more advanced military satellite
According to the plan, Object D1 would be launched in time for the IGY and preempt any American plan for a satellite.
The decree also approved initial exploratory studies on military variants of the Object D named the Object OD-1 and OD-2. These were geared towards developing the capability to create a spy satellite.
Object D
The Object D1 (also known simply as Object D) was so named because it was the fifth type of payload planned for the R-7 missile. (The first four letters of the Cyrillic alphabet, A, B, V, and G, were used to denote different warhead containers for the ICBM). The massive scientific observatory, which would carry 200-300 kilograms of scientific gear, was planned for launch in 1957 at the beginning of the IGY. Korolev formally signed off on the 'draft plan,' i.e., the detailed technical design for the satellite, on 24 July 1956, allowing construction to begin soon after. Korolev's ally Keldysh was the chair of the commission to develop Object D
The 8A91 Rocket
To launch the Object D, Korolev's engineers began the design of a modified R-7 booster named the 'article 8A91'. There were five main changes introduced to the original R-7 to convert it to the 8A91:
1. throttle the engines of the central core at the moment of launch to a level of 60 tons from 73 tons;
2. throttle the engines of the strapons down to 75% of nominal thrust 17 seconds before separation of the stages;
3. introduce a special shock absorber to reduce stress forces on the auxiliary nozzles of the oxygen tanks;
4. rework the separation system of the payload to ensure the release of the fairing; and
5. delete the radio control system from the core booster.
A New Challenge
On September 20, 1956, the U.S. Army launched a Jupiter C missile (no. RTV-1) on a ballistic flight over a distance of 5,300 kilometers. If the missile had been equipped with a live third stage (and an appropriate guidance system), the booster might have been able to insert a tiny satellite into Earth orbit. News of this launch reached the USSR in a garbled manner. Korolev sincerely believed that the launch was a secret and failed U.S. Army attempt to launch an artificial satellite.
In the meantime there were problems in developing the 8A91 booster, in particular insufficient 'specific impulse' (which denotes the efficiency of a rocket engine) to launch a satellite with a mass of 1.4 tons. There were also major delays in the delivery of subsystems for the Object D satellite. In this situation, Korolev and Tikhonravov were seriously concerned that the Americans would preempt the launch of Object D. To preclude such a possibility, the two men decided, in November 1956, to introduce a more modest satellite project while concurrently proceeding with the Object D effort. Tikhonravov suggested building a simple object with a radio transmitter and power source, something that would be relatively light and uncomplicated. This was the birth of the satellite that actually became the first Sputnik.
The Birth of PS-1
On January 5, 1957, Korolev sent an official letter to the government (basically Vasily Ryabikov, below in the early 1950s) asking for permission to launch two small satellites, each about 100 kilograms in mass, before the beginning of the IGY. In other words, the idea was to launch the satellites before the IGY, since the Americans had planned to launch during the IGY. According to the plan, the Soviet military would hand over two complete ICBMs to Korolev after two fully successful test launches.
The new small satellites were known as the 'Simplest Satellites' (Prosteyshyy sputnik or 'PS'), PS-1 and PS-2. This was a nod to Tikhonravov's early studies from the early 1950s. By January 25, 1957, Korolev approved the preliminary design of the two small satellites. On February 15 (some sources say February 7), the Soviet government formally approved the new plan.
PS-1 Design
There were many debates on the shape of the first satellite, with most senior OKB-1 designers preferring a conical form since it fit well with the nosecone of the rocket. At a meeting early in the year, Korolev had a change-of-heart and suggested a metal sphere at least one meter in diameter.
There were six major guidelines followed in the construction of PS-1:
• the satellite would have to be of 'maximum simplicity' and reliability while keeping in mind that methods used for the spacecraft would be used in future projects;
• the body of the satellite would be spherical in order to determine atmospheric density along its orbital trajectory;
• the satellite would be equipped with radio equipment working on at least two wavelengths of sufficient power to be tracked by amateurs and to obtain data on the propagation of radio waves through the atmosphere;
• the antennae would be designed so as to not affect the intensity of the radio signals if the satellite were to spin;
• the power sources would be onboard chemical batteries ensuring work for two to three weeks; and
• the attachment of the satellite to the core stage would be designed in such a way so as to minimize the possibility of a failure to separate or a failure to deploy the antennae.
The five primary scientific objectives of the satellite were:
• to test the method of placing an artificial satellite into Earth orbit and to verify its separation from the launch vehicle;
• to provide information on the density of the atmosphere which would be useful for calculating the orbital lifetimes of future satellites;
• to test radio and optical methods of orbital tracking;
• to determine the effects of radio wave propagation through the ionosphere; and
• to check principles of pressurization used on the satellite.
The satellite was a pressurized sphere, 58 centimeters in diameter made of an aluminum alloy. It was constructed by combining two hemispherical casings together. The pressurized internal volume of the sphere was filled with nitrogen at 1.3 atmospheres which maintained an electro-chemical source of power (three silver-zinc batteries), two radio-transmitters (known as D-200), a thermo-regulation system (known as DTK-34), a ventilation (fan) system to regulate the temperature of the satellite, a commutator, temperature and pressure transmitters, and associated wiring.
The two radio transmitters operated at frequencies of 20.005 and 40.002 megacycles at wavelengths of 1.5 and 7.5 meters. The signals on both the frequencies were spurts lasting 0.2 to 0.6 seconds, providing the famous 'beep-beep' sound to the transmissions.
The antennae system comprised four rods, two with a length of 2.4 meters each and the remaining two with a length of 2.9 meters each. Tests of this radio system were completed as early as May 5, 1957 using a helicopter and a ground station. The total mass of the satellite was 83.6 kilograms of which 51.0 kilograms was simply the power source.
Some images from the PS-1 model at the Energiya Museum in Korolev. The following images are courtesy of Mr. Seiji Yoshimoto of NPO InterCoS.
The satellite was designed under a team (led by V. I. Petrov and A. P. Frolov) who reported to Tikhonravov. In the production phase, the 'lead designer' was Mikhail Khomyakov. His deputy was Oleg Ivanovskiy.
The 8K71PS Rocket
Since the 8A91 launcher was not ready, Korolev's OKB-1 implemented some rudimentary changes to the basic R-7 ICBM to launch the new small satellites. This interim version was called the 8K71PS (above). The changes implemented included removing the radio control package from the top of hte core booster, installing a set of systems to separate the satellite from the booster and the nosecone from the satellite, and modifying the firing regime of both the core and strapon engines.
R-7 Tests
The R-7 ICBM was launched on test flights several times from May to July 1957. All of these launches were failures. The first two (partial) successes came in August and September 1957. During these last two tests, although the missile flew perfect trajectories, the dummy warhead was destroyed upon reentry over the target areas. It would require some time to fix the critical problem of warhead protection.
At the time, there were still high officers in the military who opposed the entire satellite program. They continued to believe that the whole space effort was a waste: their argument was that Korolev's engineers needed to focus their attentions on building an effective ICBM, not a frivolous satellite launch rocket. The problem with the warhead was worrying to the military.
Korolev was not one to be outdone. He developed a shrewd strategy. He argued to the military that a satellite launch would actually benefit the ICBM development program since such a launch would help verify many of the R-7's basic systems without the complications of trying to perfect the problematic warhead. And while they launched their two satellites, engineers on the ground could analyze the data on the warhead and find a solution. Based on these arguments, the government gave Korolev the final go-ahead to proceed with a satellite launch.
Sputnik Launch
On the night of the October 4, 1957, huge flood lights illuminated the launchpad as the engineers in their blockhouse checked off the rocket's systems. Officially the launch range was known as the Scientific-Research and Testing Range No. 5 (NIIP-5) but unofficially everyone called it 'Tyura-Tam' which was the closest rail stop in this deserted area in the middle of Kazakhstan in Central Asia.
In the command bunker accompanying Korolev were some of the senior members of the State Commission: Vasiliy Ryabikov, Mstislav Keldysh, Valentin Glushko, and Nikolay Pilyugin as well as Deputy Chief Designer Leonid Voskresenskiy and Lt.-Col. Aleksandr Nosov, the two individuals overseeing all launch operations. Both viewed the launch pad through periscopes as they gave the final orders. Boris Chekunov, a young Lieutenant in charge of pushing the launch (engine ignition) button later recalled the final moments as the clock ticked past midnight local time: "When only a few minutes remained until liftoff, Korolev nodded to his deputy Voskresenskiy. The operators froze, awaiting the final order. Aleksandr Nosov, the chief of the launch control team, stood at the periscope. He could see the whole pad. 'One minute to go!,' he called." OKB-1 senior engineer Yevgeniy Shabarov, also in the bunker remembered:
With the exception of the operators, everybody was standing. Only N. A. Pilyugin and S. P. Korolev were allowed to sit down. The launch director [Nosov] began issuing commands. I kept an eye on S. P. Korolev. He seemed nervous although he tried to conceal it. He was carefully examining the readings of the various instruments without missing any nuance of our body language and tone of voice. If anybody raised their voice or showed signs of nervousness, Korolev was instantly on the alert to see what was going on.
Operators then waited the few seconds until the second hand of the clock approached the precise time for engine ignition indicated on their launch cards. As the word “Launch!” (Pusk!) rang out, Chekunov decisively pressed the launch button on his panel (known as V-347) to begin the engine firing cyclogram. There was a little over a minute now left to the actual departure of the rocket from the pad, perhaps the most anxiety-inducing seconds of the whole launch. Voskresenskiy and Nosov’s eyes were glued to their periscopes as they watched the launch vehicle vent steam around it. A panel indicator lit up: “Preliminary” (Predvaritel’naya), meaning that the engines had ignited and were revving up to their preliminary thrust regime. All in the bunker began to sense the growing rumbling vibrations. An operator yelled: “Main!” (Yest’ glavnaya!) and almost immediately “Contact of Liftoff! (Yest’ kontakt pod’yema!), Liftoff!”
At exactly 2228 hours 34 seconds Moscow Time--just an hour-and-a-half before midnight--the 272,830 kilogram booster lifted off the pad in a blaze of light and smoke.
The five engines of the R-7 generated about 398 tons of thrust at launch. Although the rocket lifted off gracefully, there were problems. Delays in the firing of several engines could have easily resulted in a launch abort. Secondly, at T+16 seconds, a system known as the 'Tank Emptying System' malfunctioned, resulting in a higher than normal kerosene consumption. A turbine failure due to this resulted in main engine cutoff one second prior to the planned moment. Separation from the core stage, however, occurred successfully at T+324.5 seconds, and the 83.6 kilogram PS-1 successfully fell into a freefall elliptical trajectory. The first human-made object entered orbit around the Earth.
With most State Commission members still in the bunker, engineers at Tyura-Tam awaited confirmation of orbit insertion from PS-1 in a van set up about 800 meters from the launch pad. As a huge crowd waited outside the van, radio operator Vyacheslav Lappo who had personally designed the onboard transmitters, sat expectantly for the first signal. There was cheering once the Kamchatka station picked up signals from the satellite, but Korolev cut everybody off: "Hold off on the celebrations. The station people could be mistaken. Let's judge the signals for ourselves when the satellite comes back after its first orbit around the Earth." Eventually the distinct "beep-beep-beep" of the craft came in clearly over the radio waves and the crowd began to celebrate. Booster radio system Chief Designer Mikhail Ryazanskiy, who was at the van, immediately telephoned Korolev in the bunker. The ballistics experts back in Moscow had determined that the satellite was in an orbit with a low point (perigee) of 214 kilometers and a high point (apogee) of 939 kilometers (revised later to 228-947 km), the latter about 500 kilometers lower than planned due to the early engine cutoff. Inclination of the orbit to the Earth's equator was 65.6° while orbital period was 96.17 minutes. Experts in Moscow also determined that the satellite was slowly losing altitude. State Commission Chairman Ryabikov waited until the second orbit was over prior to telephoning Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev.
Announcing the Satellite
On the morning of October 5, the official Soviet news agency TASS released a communiqué that Ryabikov (and others) had authored. Published in the morning edition of the newspaper Pravda, it was exceptionally low-key and was not the headline of the day:
"For several years scientific research and experimental design work have been conducted in the Soviet Union on the creation of artificial satellites. As has already been reported in the press, the first launching of the satellites in the USSR were planned for realization in accordance with the scientific research program of the International Geophysical Year. As a result of very intensive work by scientific research institutes and design bureaus the first artificial satellite in the world has been created. On October 4, 1957, this first satellite was successfully launched in the USSR. According to preliminary data, the carrier rocket has imparted to the satellite the required orbital velocity of about 8,000 meters per second. At the present time the satellite is describing elliptical trajectories around the Earth, and its flight can be observed in the rays of the rising and setting Sun with the aid of very simple optical instruments (binoculars, telescopes, etc.)."
Naming the Satellite
At the time, the Soviets generically called the satellite 'the Artificial Satellite of the Earth' (iskusstvennyy sputnik zemli). In the West, the satellite was simply called 'Sputnik,' the Russian word for 'satellite' or 'fellow traveller.' Nowadays Westerners call the satellite 'Sputnik-1' although Russians still simply call it 'the First Soviet Artificial Satellite of the Earth' (Pervyy sovetskiy iskusstvennyy sputnik zemli).
When people from all over the world saw and visually tracked the satellite in the night skies, they more than likely saw the huge core booster of the R-7 which was inserted into orbit along with the tiny satellite. The actual satellite itself was too small to see with the naked eye. Sputnik decayed from orbit in the first week of December 1957 (probably December 2). The core booster burnt up in early January 1958.
Later Sputniks
Pleasantly surprised by the international reaction over Sputnik, Soviet Party Secretary Khrushchev proposed to Korolev et al. to launch a second satellite in time for the 40th anniversary of the Great October Revolution (which is celebrated in November). Korolev suggested that if given the resources, he could launch a dog into orbit within a month. Korolev combined the PS-2 model with equipment from an older parallel program for which engineers and physicians had been lobbing dogs into suborbital trajectories. The result was a 'new' PS-2, which was successfully launched into orbit on November 3, 1957 and called 'the Second Soviet Artificial Satellite of the Earth' or in the West, Sputnik-2. The satellite carried the dog Layka (also transliterated as Laika), the first living being in orbit. There was no provision to return Layka from orbit and the dog was expected to survive for a week before the oxygen ran out. However, Layka survived only a few hours in orbit before succumbing due heat exhaustion--the thermal system on the satellite had malfunctioned.
The Object D was finally readied in the late spring of 1958. The first attempt to launch the massive scientific observatory on April 27, 1958 failed when the 8A91 launch vehicle broke up at T+96.5 seconds. Two years of work went down the drain. A second attempt, on May 15, 1958, was more successful. The 1,327 kilogram satellite reached orbit and transmitted data for about 19 days during which it returned a significant amount of data, especially on the Earth's radiation belts. The inert satellite, known as 'the Third Soviet Artificial Satellite of the Earth' or Sputnik-3, burnt up in the upper atmosphere on April 6, 1960.
List of satellite launches in the Sputnik Series
Name & model launch time date launcher & no.
1. 1-ye ISZ (Sputnik) PS-1 2228:34 10-04-57 8K71PS no. M1-1PS
2. 2-ye ISZ (Sputnik-2) PS-2 0530:42 11-03-57 8K71PS no. M1-2PS
3. [launch failure] D-1 1201 04-27-58 8A91 no. b1-2
4. 3-ye ISZ (Sputnik-3) D-1 1000:35.5 05-15-58 8A91 no. b1-1
Who was responsible?
Thousands, obviously, but four men were critical to Sputnik: Sergey Korolev (genius manager, died 1966), Mikhail Tikhonravov (space visionary, died 1974), Mstislav Keldysh (influential scientist, died 1978), and Vasiliy Ryabikov (powerful industrial bureaucrat, died 1974). Many others involved still remain alive although they were much junior in the hierarchy.