Buran and Burya Intercontinental Cruise Missiles
© Asif Siddiqi, 2007
Buran and Burya were two important Soviet strategic missile projects from the 1950s. The Soviet military funded these two intercontinental cruise missile projects as alternatives to the ballistic R-7 ICBM program, insuring against failure of the ballistic option. Despite flight tests of Burya, the Soviet military eventually never adopted either of the vehicles for operational duty. By 1960, strategic thinking had moved to ballistic missiles (rather than cruise missiles) as a more efficient and effective option to deliver nuclear weapons over intercontinental ranges. The history of both these projects go back to the early 1950s, to studies on possible avenues for research at the famous NII-88 institute which initiated most of the early Soviet ballistic and cruise missile efforts.
Background: Korolev and Keldysh
On 13 February 1953, the USSR Council of Ministers formally initiated work on two research programs, T1 and T2, the first to begin design work to build an intercontinental ballistic missile, and the second to do the same for an intercontinental cruise missile. The NII-88's OKB-1 design bureau would be the prime contractor for both. By late 1953, work on the T2 theme had increasingly begun to conflict with the heavy workload on ICBM development, i.e., the T1 theme. Cruise missile development was thus effectively limited to the creation of a short-range experimental vehicle, the Experimental Winged Missile (EKR); it was understood that creation of the EKR would eventually lead to a full-scale intercontinental project. By the end of 1953, the NII-88 had begun manufacturing various components of the EKR while ground tests of OKB-670's ramjet engine for the missile, the RD-040, were producing good results. A special commission formed to monitor progress of the EKR program, which included Academicians M. V. Keldysh and S. A. Khristianovich, recommended at the time that the research results from the EKR had been so positive that they should move directly to an intercontinental missile instead of building the interim missile [1]. Like the abandonment of the R-3 and the jump to an ICBM, it was the second time that Soviet engineers and scientists decided to forego an interim vehicle in favor of a direct leap to an intercontinental missile. Both OKB-1 Chief Designer S. P. Korolev and Keldysh were acutely aware that the OKB-1 alone would not be able to handle both tasks, and after some "anguished discussions" Korolev decided to let go of the cruise missile option and have it transferred to other design bureaus, specifically ones in the aviation industry whose extensive experience in developing long-range bombers would come in handy [2]. The Soviet government issued an official decree (no. 957-409) on the transfer on May 20, 1954. For Korolev, this was, in many ways, the most visible manifestation that his thinking had irrevocably moved from winged missiles (a track he favored in the 1930s) to ballistic missiles as a means explore the upper atmosphere and outer space.
Keldysh's NII-1 retained overall scientific supervision over the intercontinental cruise missile program, but the actual engineering tasks were distributed to two aviation design bureaus, both of which would eventually become two of the most important organizations in the Soviet space program. Each would now design and build their own intercontinental cruise missile, in effect competing against each other to deliver a working model to the Soviet Air Force.
Lavochkin and Myasishchev
The organization picked to produce the first cruise missile was the Experimental Design Bureau No. 301 (OKB-301) located at Khimki and headed by 53-year old Chief Designer Semyon A. Lavochkin, one of the most famous airplane designers in the Soviet Union. Established in July 1937, the design bureau had produced a number of fighter aircraft such as the LaGG-3, La-5, La-5F, La-5FN, and La-7 which were used extensively during World War II. Later, Lavochkin led the development of several experimental jet aircraft such as the La-160, the first Soviet aircraft with swept-back wings, and the La-176, the first Soviet aircraft to break the speed of sound. By the early 1950s, the OKB-301 had branched out into missiles: its first forays into the field included the V-300 missile for the Moscow air defense network codenamed Berkut, and the "201" ramjet-powered air-launched drone [3].
The second aviation organization tapped was the Experimental Design Bureau No. 23 (OKB-23), a relatively new firm which had no prior experience in designing missiles. Instead it was undertaking important work on long-range bomber design. In the spring of 1951, Stalin had called in Andrey A. Tupolev, the famous aviation patriarch and Chief Designer of the Moscow-based OKB-156, to discuss the future of strategic intercontinental bombers. When asked to start work on a long-range jet-powered bomber, the old airplane designer firmly refused, arguing that Soviet technology was insufficiently advanced to handle such a task. The furious Stalin took the matter elsewhere and assigned the job to Vladimir M. Myasishchev, a 48-year old aeronautical engineer whose achievements up to 1951 had been nothing to boast about: he had worked on various airplanes through World War II as a prisoner, first under Tupolev and later at the independent OKB-482, but none of these had been adopted for serial production. Perhaps seeing a chance to bring some "new blood" into the strategic weapons development, Stalin signed an order on March 24, 1951 giving Myasishchev a new organization, the OKB-23, located at the legendary aviation Factory No. 23 in the Moscow suburb of Fili. For his new team, the new Chief Designer gathered up more than fifteen hundred of the best Soviet aeronautical engineers from the Moscow Aviation Institute (MAI), TsAGI, and from his old prison days, transferring all of them to the Fili plant. Established on April 30, 1916, this factory had originally produced automobiles but was restructured for aircraft production as early as 1927. The same plant is today known as the M. V. Khrunichev State Space Scientific-Production Center and is one of the primary participants in the creation of the International Space Station [4].
Burya Design
Both the Lavochkin and Myasischev intercontinental cruise missiles shared common features with Korolev's never-built EKR. Both vehicles were two-stage missiles. The first stages were powered by liquid propellant rocket engines while the second stages were equipped with supersonic ramjets.
The Lavochkin design, called the "350" (or V-350), but better known by its nickname Burya (Storm), used a cluster of two long rocket boosters which served as the first stage. One four-chamber S2.1100 (later replaced by the lighter S2.1150) engine was installed on each of these boosters, generating a thrust of 137.23 tons each at launch. This engine from the Isayev design bureau (NII-88 OKB-2) was developed based on experience gained in designing the engine for the R-11 short-range tactical missile.
The second cruise stage resembled a large aircraft with stubby swept wings at a 70° angle and conventional tail surfaces. The main ramjet was the RD-012U from the Bondaryuk design bureau (OKB-670). This engine had an average thrust of 7.65-7.75 tons (9.05 tons thrust at Mach 3.15 at 18 kilometers altitude) and was also based on an engine for the abandoned EKR. The 19.9 meter long missile had an overall mass of 96 tons. The 350 would be capable of delivering a conventional atomic warhead with a mass of 2.19 tons over a maximum distance of 8,500 kilometers [5]. The lead designer of Burya at OKB-301 was Naum S. Chernyakov.
Buran Design
The Myasishchev design, designated the "40" or Buran (Blizzard), had a similar conceptual configuration as its competitor, with the second stage mounted above the first stage like a cluster. Buran, however, had a different mission than Burya: it would carry a thermonuclear warhead with a mass of 3.5 tons, i.e., it had a capacity about one-and-a-half times greater than the Lavochkin design.
The first stage of Buran comprised a cluster of four booster rockets, each with a single nitric acid-kerosene engine from the Glushko design bureau (OKB-456). Glushko's concurrent work on the RD-211 engine using these same propellants for Yangel's R-12 intermediate range ballistic missile came in handy for work on Buran. In 1953, he began work on the RD-212, a modified variant of the RD-211 specifically for Myasishchev's new cruise missile. Testing of the original RD-211 in 1953, however, proved to be fraught with many setbacks. Eventually ground-testing of the RD-212 for Buran was never finished due to changes in the specifications for the cruise missile. In August 1956, Myasishchev's engineers recalculated the requirements for the first stage engine based on new payload requirements and called for a 22% increase in thrust from their original specifications. Thus, in 1956, Glushko began development of a third engine, the RD-213 to fulfill this requirement. Using these engines, the first stage of the improved 40A, called 41A, had a total thrust of 220 tons at liftoff.
The second stage, the 42A, used a single Bondaryuk RD-018A ramjet with an average thrust of 10.6 tons (13.5 tons thrust at Mach 3.1 at 18 kilometers altitude). One of Myasishchev's more original ideas was to use Buran as the basis for a rocket-plane, i.e., one with a specially designed cockpit for a single pilot. The pilot would eject out of the vehicle prior to impact.
The length of the overall vehicle was 24 meters and mass was 125 tons [6]. The Soviet Air Force formally approved the draft plan for Buran on September 12, 1955 [7]. The lead designer of Buran at OKB-23 was G. N. Nazarov.
Development Work
The work on the cruise missiles was backed up by an immense investment in basic aeronautical research focused primarily at Keldysh's NII-1, remnants of the considerable efforts expended on the Sanger-Bredt bomber. Each missile had two-element guidance systems, one based on inertial guidance using gyroscopic platforms and double integrating accelerometers for the early stage of flight, and the second based on a celestial navigation system which introduced constant corrections to the trajectory during the cruise phase. Both systems were designed by scientists at NII-1, the latter based on years of research at NII-88 under Izrael M. Lisovich who perfected on operating system for use by both Burya and Buran by 1953.
The All-Union Institute for Materials (VIAM) and the N. E. Bauman Moscow Higher Technical School (MVTU) were tasked with the development of heat-resistant structural materials such as titanium and high-strength stainless steel which were indispensable for cruise missile operation, as well as the technology to weld them. The venerable Central Aerohydrodynamics Institute (TsAGI) was responsible for setting the aerodynamic parameters for both missiles, in particular the delta wings and the vehicles' thin supersonic profiles.
Although most Western accounts imply that Lavochkin and Myasishchev headed the programs, in truth Academician Keldysh served as the overall coordinator and manager for both of these important projects [8].
The two cruise missile projects, having officially begun in 1954, progressed at different paces, with the Lavochkin model taking an early lead. By 1955, the OKB-301 had built and tested an operational model of the AN-2Sh astronavigation system for the missile on board a Tu-16 bomber. Signals from the stellar sensors were transmitted to the plane's autopilot for more than four hours, enabling the aircraft to automatically correct deviations in its flight-path to less than four kilometers accuracy. The following year, Lavochkin's engineers had finished construction at their own plant (Factory No. 301) and at Factory No. 18 at Kuybyshev of the first flight-models of the two-stage cruise missile [9]. The ramjets were manufactured at Factory No. 24 (also in Kuybyshev) while the main engines of the first stage boosters were built at Factory No. 301 (at first) and Factory No. 500 in Tushino (later).
Flight-Testing of Burya
Launch attempts of the Burya commenced on August 1, 1957 from the Air Force's test-range at Vladimirovka in the Volga delta near Kapustin Yar at exactly the same time when Korolev was testing his R-7 from Tyura-Tam. Instead of an explosive payload, all the Burya test vehicles contained extra telemetric equipment. The first three launch attempts were complete failures: on the first try, the missile never even left the ground; on the second try, on September 1, the missile did a spectacular somersault and thundered to the ground not far from the pad.
During a second phase of eight launch attempts in March-December 1958, engineers studied the parameters of the boost stage prior to separation of the dummy second stage. Only one flight, a two minute long jaunt in May, was completely successful; it was the first time that the second stage ramjet fired without problems.
The third phase of launch attempts, four in all, were much more successful. On the 12th and 14th attempts, Burya reached 3,300 km/hour and 3,500 km/hour respectively, the highest speeds reached by any Soviet flying vehicle up to that point.
Despite the relatively encouraging results, the 350 Burya was a victim of its times. With the advent of the ICBM, Burya was an anachronism. Because of its low flight altitude (18-23 kilometers), it was extremely vulnerable to defensive measures. It also took far too long, over two hours, to reach its target. By comparison, ICBMs could do the same job in minutes. The Soviet government was also concerned that work on Burya would divert resources from OKB-301's primary project which was the long-range Dal' anti-aircraft missile system for the city of Leningrad. On February 5, 1960, the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee issued a decree (no. 138-48) formally terminating all work on the Burya missile. By this time, 19 examples of the missile had been manufactured, at least five of which remained unflown. The decree allowed flight tests of these vehicles for continuing development of an airborne photo-reconnaissance system; the OKB-301 had begun work on such a system as early as 1958 [10]. With this permission, engineers accomplished four final launches between February-December 1960 that tested the Burya system in full, including the complex astronavigation system. Three of these were spectacular successes; Burya flew full distances of 5,500-6,500 kilometers without any significant problems from Vladimirovka all the way to the Kamchatka peninsula on the eastern coast of the USSR. Burya's final launch was in December 1960 when the vehicle was re-equipped as a test variant to simulate a target for the Dal' anti-aircraft missile defense system. After this point, all remaining groundwork for the missile was destroyed.
Lavochkin was not witness to the final flight; he died unexpectedly of a heart attack on July 9, 1960 during testing of the Dal' system at Sary-Shagan. He was succeeded by Mikhail M. Pashinin. Earlier, in March 1960, the month following official cancellation of the program, an assessment report on the system indicated that the vehicle had satisfied its original primary requirements, i.e., an 8,000 kilometer flight with a target accuracy of 10 kilometers [11].
Fate of Burya
Myasishchev's competitive 40A Buran fared even worse. Flight-tests of the missile were slated to begin in August 1957 but there were innumerable delays in the project, most apparently due to Glushko's engines for the first stage. As with Burya, the spectacular successes of the R-7 ICBM sealed Buran's fate. On November 28, 1957, the Council of Ministers and Central Committee issued a decree terminating all work on Buran. By this time, there were three experimental models of the M-42A in various states of assembly at the giant Factory No. 23 in Fili [12]. All were eventually destroyed.
Buran Flight History
Footnotes
[1]. I. Afanas'yev, "Without the Secret Stamp: Halt the Work, Destroy the Materials" (in Russian), Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika no. 6 (1993): 42-44.
[2]. B. E. Chertok, Rakety i liudi (Moscow: Mashinostroyeniye, 1994), p. 290.
[3]. For Lavochkin's early work, see A. N. Ponomarev, Sovetskiye aviatsionnye kosntruktory (Moscow: Voyennoe izdatel'stvo, 1990), pp. 183-191; G. P. Svishchev, ed., Aviatsiya entsiklopediya (Moscow: Bol'shaya Rossiyskaya entsiklopediia, 1994), pp. 304-305. For Berkut, see Anatolii Pokrovskii, "Three Episodes From the Life of Our ABM Defense: There Is No More 'Berkut': What Kind of Geese Will Save Moscow Now?" (in Russian), Pravda, February 3, 1993, p. 4; Iu. V. Votintsev, "Unknown Troops of a Vanished Superpower" (in Russian), Voyenno-istoricheskii zhurnal no. 8 (1993): 54-61; S. M. Ganin, "The First National Anti-Aircraft System of the Moscow PVO--The S-25 'Berkut' " (in Russian), Nevskiy bastion no. 2 (1997): 25-32; Steven J. Zaloga, "Defending the Capitals: The First Generation of Soviet Strategic Air Defense Systems 1950-1960," The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 10 (December 1997): 30-43.
[4]. V. A. Fedotov, "The Scientific-Design Activities of V. M. Myasishchev" (in Russian), Iz istorii aviatsii i kosmonavtiki 50 (1984): 3-13; Ponomarev, Sovetskiye aviatsionnye kosntruktory, p. 233; Steven J. Zaloga, Target America: The Soviet Union and the Strategic Arms Race, 1945-1964 (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1993), pp. 81-82; O. Shinkovich, "The Khrunichev Center--80 Years" (in Russian), Novosti kosmonavtiki (April 22-May 5, 1996): 75-77. S. A. Zhiltsov, ed., Gosudarstvennyi kosmicheskii nauchno-proizvodstvennyi tsentr imeni M. V. Khrunicheva (Moscow: RUSSLIT, 1997), pp. 12, 20. D. N. Osipov was Director of the factory from 1952 to 1961. The Ministry of Aviation Industry (MAP) order for the establishment of the OKB-23 was dated May 26, 1951.
[5]. V. Aslanov, " 'Soviet Shuttle' of the 50s" (in Russian), Apogey 5 (June 1993): 1; Yakov M. Natenzon, "The First Cruise Missile 'Burya'," Space Bulletin 1 (1993): 26-27; Boris V. Rauschenbach, "The 'Burya' Intercontinental Cruise Missile," presented at the 43rd Congress of the International Astronautical Federation, August 28-September 5, 1992, IAA-92-0187.; Afanas'ev, "Without the Secret Stamp: Halt the Work, Destroy the Materials"; Christian Lardier, "70 Years of Soviet Ramjets," presented at the 48th International Astronautical Federation, IAA-97-IAA.2.3.03; Yevgeniy Yerokhin, "The Missiles of Bondaryuk" (in Russian), Krylia rodiny no. 11 (1993): 33-37.
[6]. V. Petrakov and M. Chernyshev, "Without the Stamp 'Secret': The Unknown Buran" (in Russian), Sovetskaya rossiya, April 10, 1991, p. 4; Afanas'ev, "Without the Secret Stamp: Halt the Work, Destroy the Materials"; Igor Afanas'ev, R-12: Sandalovoye derevo (Moscow: EksPrint NV, 1997), p. 8; Lardier, "70 Years of Soviet Ramjets"; Yerokhin, "The Missiles of Bondaryuk."
[7]. Aleksey Fomichev, "Intercontinental Winged Missiles" (in Russian), Samolety mira no.1 (1998): 27-31.
[8]. Afanas'ev, "Without the Secret Stamp: Halt the Work, Destroy the Materials"; Rauschenbach, "The 'Burya' Intercontinental Cruise Missile."
[9]. Rauschenbach, "The 'Burya' Intercontinental Cruise Missile"; Afanas'ev, "Without the Secret Stamp: Halt the Work, Destroy the Materials."
[10]. Igor Shevalev and Aleksey Fomichev, "Intercontinental Misssile of S. A. Lavochkin" (in Russian), Samoleta mira no. 4 (1996): 2-5.
[11]. Aslanov, " 'Soviet Shuttle' of the 50s"; Lardier, "70 Years of Soviet Ramjets"; Afanas'ev, "Without the Secret Stamp: Halt the Work, Destroy the Materials"; Rauschenbach, "The 'Burya' Intercontinental Cruise Missile"; S. M. Ganin and V. I. Ivanovskiy, "The Multi-channel 'Dal' Anti-Aircraft Missile System of Great Range" (in Russian), Nevskiy bastion no. 1 (1998): 7-15.
[12]. Petrakov and Chernyshev, "Without the Stamp 'Secret': The Unknown Buran"; Fomichev, "Intercontinental Winged Missiles"; L. L. Seliakov, Maloizvestnye stranitsy tvorcheskoy deyatel'nosti aviatsionnogo konstruktora Vladimira Mikhaylovich Myasishcheva (Moscow: AO ANTK im. Tupoleva, 1997), pp. 109-112.
General References
[1]. I. V. Yakubovich and V. N. Lavrov, Samolety V. M. Myasishcheva (Moscow: Rusavia, 1999).
[2]. A. V. Karpenko, A. F. Utkin, and A. D. Popov, Otechestvennye strategicheskie raketnye kompleksy (spravochnik) (St. Petersburg: Nevskii bastion, 1999).
[3]. Mikhail Pervov, Raketnye kompleksy raketnykh voisk strategicheskogo naznacheniya (Moscow: Mikhail Pervov, 1999).
[4]. M. D. Evstaf'yev, Dolgii put' k 'burye' (o sozdanii mezhkontinental'nykh krylatykh raket 'burya' i 'buran') (Moscow: Vyzovskaya kniga, 1999).