Part I

Logic and Epistemology

Introduction

As indicated in the General Introduction, logic in medieval philosophy was not as narrowly construed as it tends to be in contemporary philosophy. Logic was regarded not merely as the study of the validity of arguments, but rather as the universal instrument of reason (which is why the name *Organon* – Greek = “tool,” “instrument” – was given to the collection of Aristotle’s logical works), the universal discipline that reflects on and regulates the activity of reason in all disciplines in its search for knowledge. This conception conferred on logic (or dialectic) a particularly important status in medieval learning. Considered “the art of arts, the science of sciences” ( *ars artium, scientia scientiarum*), logic had within its scope detailed reflections on the relationships between language, thought, and reality, reflection on all forms of rational argument (including fallacious arguments, in order to detect logical errors), and on all sorts of epistemic and methodological considerations, including problems of the acquisition and justification of the first principles of scientific demonstrations, and the organization of arguments, their premises, and conclusions into scientific disciplines. Accordingly, it was also taken to be the task of logic to consider the divisions of various scientific disciplines, their distinctions and interdependencies, and thus their organization into the entire body of humanly attainable knowledge.

It is in accordance with this broad medieval conception of logic that in this part we have selections discussing such diverse topics as the division of sciences (in particular, the status of theology as a science, obviously bearing on the general issue of faith and reason discussed in the General Introduction above), selections concerning the problem of universals (the primary issue in medieval logical semantics, explaining the relationships between our common terms, common concepts, and singular items of reality), the foundations of scientific knowledge both according to the Augustinian “illuminationist” and the Aristotelian “abstractionist” account, and the issue of knowledge and skepticism.

The first set of selections, therefore, deals with the methodological considerations involved in the distinction of philosophical and scientific disciplines, and their relation to religious faith and rational theology. The first selection, from Augustine, presents the threefold distinction of the three major philosophical disciplines that also served as the rationale
for organizing the selections of this volume into three main parts. Augustine’s discussion, which forms part of a larger discussion in his monumental work De Civitate Dei ("The City of God"), provides a brief survey of the history of philosophy, culminating, according to Augustine, in Neoplatonic philosophy, which laid the foundations of the three major philosophical disciplines: logic, metaphysics, and ethics. For Augustine, Neoplatonic philosophy elevates human understanding just about as high as it can get on its own, and this is precisely what allows it to realize its need for supernatural help in the form of illumination (to aid failing human reason) and grace (to provide proper direction to human will, corrupted by original sin).

The anonymous twelfth-century author of the next selection, in the introductory discussion of an elaborate treatise on logic from the booming post-Abelard period, takes his cue from the same conception of human nature, but has much more this-worldly material to accommodate and organize into a coherent system of philosophical and scientific disciplines. It is with remarkable smoothness that the author integrates the basic threefold division we find in Augustine with the disciplines of the Seven Liberal Arts (Septem Artes Liberales) of late antiquity and with the Aristotelian system.

Finally, the last selection of this section provides Aquinas’ discussion of his conception of theology as a science, which differs methodologically from secular science only in that it takes its principles from a supernatural source, i.e., divine revelation. It is also here that we can find Aquinas’ main argument (already presented in the main introduction) for the necessary concordance between faith and reason.

The section on the problem of universals surveys the issue from Boethius to Buridan, as it formed part of logical discussions prompted by the opening remarks of Porphyry’s Isagoge, i.e., introduction to Aristotle’s Categoriae. The selection from Boethius’ second commentary on this work sets the stage for all later medieval discussions. His solution provided in terms of Aristotle’s theory of abstraction recurs in ever more refined forms e.g., in Abelard, John of Salisbury, and Aquinas.

Unfortunately, Abelard’s sophisticated discussion (his detailed refutation of contemporary alternative theories and the presentation of his own original theory) proved to be too long for this volume, but it is easily available in Spade’s excellent translation cited above, along with other longer selections from Porphyry, Boethius, Scotus, and Ockham. In the present volume Abelard’s period could only be represented by the short, but vivid, description provided by John of Salisbury in his Metalogicon.

The selection from the Summa Lamberti (dubiously attributed to Lambert of Auxerre, a Dominican author who flourished in the mid-thirteenth century) illustrates the way the moderate realist theory of universals that prevailed in the thirteenth century was put to work in logical semantics, in discussions of the so-called properties of terms, which describe the various semantic functions terms have in various propositional contexts.

2 Metalogicon, bk 2, c. 20, 877c7–878a9.
3 Summa Theologiae I, q. 85, a. 1, ad 1-um.
4 A larger selection from the same work is available in the source of this brief selection: see the List of Sources on page 000 above. The Suggestions for Further Reading also provides a sampling of the vast and fast-growing modern literature on the subject. An excellent survey article is easily available online: Stephen Read, "Medieval Theories: Properties of Terms," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2002 edn), ed. Edward N. Zalta, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2002/entries/medieval-terms/>. 
The selections from Ockham present his arguments against Scotus’ version of the moderate realist position, and his alternative accounts, first in terms of his ficta, and then in terms of his mental act theory, discussed in the General Introduction.

Finally, the short selection from Buridan (ostensibly written in the form of a commentary on Peter of Spain’s corresponding treatise, but in fact presenting Buridan’s own ideas) illustrates how Buridan puts to use Ockham’s nominalist conception, simply identifying universals with the predicables of Porphyry, i.e., with the common terms of various written and spoken human languages and the language of thought that is the same for all human beings (i.e., our common concepts).5

The selections in the next section deal with the epistemological aspect of the problem of universals, insofar as universal intellectual cognition is the precondition of the possibility of acquiring scientific, i.e., universal, necessary knowledge. Of the two short selections from Augustine, the first presents the link between his conception of Divine Ideas and his theory of illumination; the second presents Augustine’s main argument for the necessity of divine illumination for the formation of our intellectual concepts. This is the argument that is fundamentally challenged by the Aristotelian conception of the possibility of forming our intellectual concepts without the need for supernatural illumination in the natural process of abstraction, as explained in the subsequent selections from Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae. The next selection, from Aquinas’ commentary on Aristotle’s Analytica Posteriora (“Posterior Analytics”), explains how abstraction can ground universal scientific knowledge in the process of the induction of the first principles of scientific demonstrations.

It is this Aristotelian conception that is further challenged by the selection from Henry of Ghent, who (while granting the role of abstraction in the formation of our mundane universal concepts) argues that the attainment of “pure truth” is not possible without the supernatural help of divine illumination.

Finally, the selection from Scotus argues against Henry’s solution, and presents the Aristotelian position that came to dominate late medieval philosophy until the arrival of an “Augustinian backlash” against the dominant Aristotelianism of the late Middle Ages, in the form of Cartesian Rationalism.6

The selections in the last section of part I deal with the epistemological problems of the very possibility of acquiring knowledge. The short selections from Augustine present his reaction to the challenges of ancient skepticism, in terms of the absolute certainty of self-knowledge, serving as the starting point of his “introspective theology,” most aptly summarized in his oft-quoted admonition: Noli foras ire, in teipsum redi; in interiori homine habitat veritas – “Do not want to go outside, return into yourself; truth dwells in the inner man” (De Vera Religione 39, 72). It is important to note that the same idea of the absolute certainty of self-knowledge would be put to a very different systematic use by Descartes,

5 Of course, the selection presented here provides only a tiny fragment of Buridan’s logical theory. For those who are interested in pursuing the intricacies of his nominalist logic, his entire Summulae is now available in English translation: John Buridan, Summulae de Dialectica, an annotated translation with a philosophical introduction, tr. Gyula Klima, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001.

who made it the “Archimedean point” of his system in grounding all knowledge, including
the scientific knowledge of physical reality.

The question from Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae illustrates Aquinas’ radically different, abstrac-
tionist foundation for the possibility of acquiring certain knowledge about physical reality,
namely, the idea that since simple intellectual apprehension consists in the conformity of the
intellect and its objects, the simple concepts of the mind are necessarily related to their proper
objects, and so such simple intellectual apprehensions must always be veridical (i.e., they
must represent the true nature of the things they apprehend), and the judgments apprehended
to be true on the basis of such simple apprehensions are also necessarily true and known to
be such without error. (Error arises in judgment by taking the nature of one thing appreh-
hended by some concept to be that of another, or by constructing an at least implicitly
inconsistent definition, e.g., “the greatest prime number.”)

The selection from Henry of Ghent presents his unique combination of Aristotle and
Augustine in his response to the challenges of ancient skepticism that he learned about mainly
from these two sources. Henry’s response still reflects the characteristic epistemological
confidence of the period in the veridicality of our cognitive powers with respect to their proper
objects and our ability to sort out veridical from non-veridical cognitive acts in a reliable,
rational process.

It is this sort of confidence that is undermined by the radical skepticism reflected in the
selection from Nicholas of Autrecourt, obviously paving the way for Descartes’ “Demon-
skepticism.” The fundamental novelty of this new kind of skepticism (grounded in the post-
1277 emphasis on God’s absolute power and by the post-Ockham possibility of abandoning
the idea of the formal unity of the knower and the known) is that it allows for the pos-
sibility of the complete cognitive isolation of a thinking subject from an external physical
reality. Accordingly, in contrast to ancient skepticism, which merely doubted whether we
are ever reliably able to distinguish our veridical cognitive acts from our non-veridical
cognitive acts, this sort of skepticism allows for the possibility of our having no veridical
cognitive acts whatsoever that would faithfully represent the nature of external physical reality
as it is.

Finally, the selection from John Buridan represents his “pragmatic” nominalist reaction to
this sort of radical skepticism in terms of a surprisingly “modern” naturalistic reliabilism, which
(while granting the abstract possibility of absolute deception by an omnipotent agent) argues
that the mere logical possibility of this sort of “supernatural deception” should not suffice
for undermining the reliability of our scientific or ordinary knowledge-claims, given the vari-
ous degrees of certainty and various kinds of evidence that can reasonably be demanded in
different fields and disciplines.
Concerning the Two Schools of Philosophers, That Is, the Italic and Ionic, and their Founders

As far as concerns the literature of the Greeks, whose language holds a more illustrious place than any of the languages of the other nations, history mentions two schools of philosophers, the one called the Italic school, originating in that part of Italy which was formerly called Magna Graecia; the other called the Ionic school, having its origin in those regions which are still called by the name of Greece. The Italic school had for its founder Pythagoras of Samos, to whom also the term “philosophy” is said to owe its origin. For whereas formerly those who seemed to excel others by the laudable manner in which they regulated their lives were called sages, Pythagoras, on being asked what he professed, replied that he was a philosopher, that is, a student or lover of wisdom; for it seemed to him to be the height of arrogance to profess oneself a sage. The founder of the Ionic school, again, was Thales of Miletus, one of those seven who were styled the “seven sages,” of whom six were distinguished by the kind of life they lived, and by certain maxims which they gave forth for the proper conduct of life. Thales was distinguished as an investigator into the nature of things; and, in order that he might have successors in his school, he committed his dissertations to writing. That, however, which especially rendered him eminent was his ability, by means of astronomical calculations, even to predict eclipses of the sun and moon. He thought, however, that water was the first principle of things, and that of it all the elements of the world, the world itself, and all things which are generated in it, ultimately consist. Over all this work, however, which, when we consider the world, appears so admirable, he set nothing of the nature of divine mind. To him succeeded Anaximander, his pupil, who held a different opinion concerning the nature of things; for he did not hold that all things spring from one principle, as Thales did, who held that principle to be water, but thought that each thing

1 Sapiens, that is, a wise man, one who had attained to wisdom.
springs from its own proper principle. These principles of things he believed to be infinite in number, and thought that they generated innumerable worlds, and all the things which arise in them. He thought, also, that these worlds are subject to a perpetual process of alternate dissolution and regeneration, each one continuing for a longer or shorter period of time, according to the nature of the case; nor did he, any more than Thales, attribute anything to a divine mind in the production of all this activity of things. Anaximander left as his successor his disciple Anaximenes, who attributed all the causes of things to an infinite air. He neither denied nor ignored the existence of gods, but, so far from believing that the air was made by them, he held, on the contrary, that they sprang from the air. Anaxagoras, however, who was his pupil, perceived that a divine mind was the productive cause of all things which we see, and said that all the various kinds of things, according to their several modes and species, were produced out of an infinite matter consisting of homogeneous particles, but by the efficiency of a divine mind. Diogenes, also, another pupil of Anaximenes, said that a certain air was the original substance of things out of which all things were produced, but that it was possessed of a divine reason, without which nothing could be produced from it. Anaxagoras was succeeded by his disciple Archelaus, who also thought that all things consisted of homogeneous particles, of which each particular thing was made, but that those particles were pervaded by a divine mind, which perpetually energized all the eternal bodies, namely, those particles, so that they are alternately united and separated. Socrates, the master of Plato, is said to have been the disciple of Archelaus; and on Plato’s account it is that I have given this brief historical sketch of the whole history of these schools.

Chapter 3
Of the Socratic Philosophy

Socrates is said to have been the first who directed the entire effort of philosophy to the correction and regulation of manners, all who went before him having expended their greatest efforts in the investigation of physical, that is, natural phenomena. However, it seems to me that it cannot be certainly discovered whether Socrates did this because he was wearied of obscure and uncertain things, and so wished to direct his mind to the discovery of something manifest and certain, which was necessary in order to the obtaining of a blessed life, – that one great object toward which the labor, vigilance, and industry of all philosophers seem to have been directed, – or whether (as some yet more favorable to him suppose) he did it because he was unwilling that minds defiled with earthly desires should essay to raise themselves upward to divine things. For he saw that the causes of things were sought for by them, – which causes he believed to be ultimately reducible to nothing else than the will of the one true and supreme God, – and on this account he thought they could only be comprehended by a purified mind; and therefore that all diligence ought to be given to the purification of the life by good morals, in order that the mind, delivered from the depressing weight of lusts, might rise itself upward by its native vigor to eternal things, and might, with purified understanding, contemplate that nature which is incorporeal and unchangeable light, where live the causes of all created natures. It is evident, however, that he hunted out and pursued, with a wonderful pleasantness of style and argument, and with a most pointed and insinuating urbanity, the foolishness of ignorant men, who thought that they knew this or that, – sometimes confessing his own ignorance, and sometimes dissimulating his knowledge, even in those very moral questions to which he seems to have directed
the whole force of his mind. And hence there arose hostility against him, which ended in his being calumniously impeached, and condemned to death. Afterwards, however, that very city of the Athenians, which had publicly condemned him, did publicly bewail him, – the popular indignation having turned with such vehemence on his accusers, that one of them perished by the violence of the multitude, whilst the other only escaped a like punishment by voluntary and perpetual exile.

Illustrious, therefore, both in his life and in his death, Socrates left very many disciples of his philosophy, who vied with one another in desire for proficiency in handling those moral questions which concern the chief good (\textit{summum bonum}), the possession of which can make a man blessed; and because, in the disputations of Socrates, where he raises all manner of questions, makes assertions, and then demolishes them, it did not evidently appear what he held to be the chief good, every one took from these disputations what pleased him best, and every one placed the final good\(^2\) in whatever it appeared to himself to consist. Now, that which is called the final good is that at which, when one has arrived, he is blessed. But so diverse were the opinions held by those followers of Socrates concerning this final good, that (a thing scarcely to be credited with respect to the followers of one master) some placed the chief good in pleasure, as Aristippus, others in virtue, as Antisthenes. Indeed, it were tedious to recount the various opinions of various disciples.

Chapter 4
Concerning Plato, the Chief Among the Disciples of Socrates, and his Threefold Division of Philosophy

But, among the disciples of Socrates, Plato was the one who shone with a glory which far excelled that of the others, and who not unjustly eclipsed them all. By birth, an Athenian of honorable parentage, he far surpassed his fellow-disciples in natural endowments, of which he was possessed in a wonderful degree. Yet, deeming himself and the Socratic discipline far from sufficient for bringing philosophy to perfection, he travelled as extensively as he was able, going to every place famed for the cultivation of any science of which he could make himself master. Thus he learned from the Egyptians whatever they held and taught as important; and from Egypt, passing into those parts of Italy which were filled with the fame of the Pythagoreans, he mastered, with the greatest facility, and under the most eminent teachers, all the Italic philosophy which was then in vogue. And, as he had a peculiar love for his master Socrates, he made him the speaker in all his dialogues, putting into his mouth whatever he had learned, either from others, or from the efforts of his own powerful intellect, tempering even his moral disputations with the grace and politeness of the Socratic style. And, as the study of wisdom consists in action and contemplation, so that one part of it may be called active, and the other contemplative, – the active part having reference to the conduct of life, that is, to the regulation of morals, and the contemplative part to the investigation into the causes of nature and into pure truth, – Socrates is said to have excelled in the active part of that study, while Pythagoras gave more attention to its contemplative part, on which he brought to bear all the force of his great intellect. To Plato is given the praise of having perfected philosophy by combining both parts into one. He then divides it into three parts, – the first moral, which is

\footnote{\textit{Finem boni}.}
chiefly occupied with action; the second natural, of which the object is contemplation; and the third rational, which discriminates between the true and the false. And though this last is necessary both to action and contemplation, it is contemplation, nevertheless, which lays peculiar claim to the office of investigating the nature of truth. Thus this tripartite division is not contrary to that which made the study of wisdom to consist in action and contemplation. Now, as to what Plato thought with respect to each of these parts, – that is, what he believed to be the end of all actions, the cause of all natures, and the light of all intelligences, – it would be a question too long to discuss, and about which we ought not to make any rash affirmation. For, as Plato liked and constantly affected the well-known method of his master Socrates, namely, that of dissimulating his knowledge or his opinions, it is not easy to discover clearly what he himself thought on various matters, any more than it is to discover what were the real opinions of Socrates. We must, nevertheless, insert into our work certain of those opinions which he expresses in his writings, whether he himself uttered them, or narrates them as expressed by others, and seems himself to approve of, – opinions sometimes favorable to the true religion, which our faith takes up and defends, and sometimes contrary to it, as, for example, in the questions concerning the existence of one God or of many, as it relates to the truly blessed life which is to be after death. For those who are praised as having most closely followed Plato, who is justly preferred to all the other philosophers of the Gentiles, and who are said to have manifested the greatest acuteness in understanding him, do perhaps entertain such an idea of God as to admit that in Him are to be found the cause of existence, the ultimate reason for the understanding, and the end in reference to which the whole life is to be regulated. Of which three things, the first is understood to pertain to the natural, the second to the rational, and the third to the moral part of philosophy. For if man has been so created as to attain, through that which is most excellent in him, to that which excels all things, – that is, to the one true and absolutely good God, without whom no nature exists, no doctrine instructs, no exercise profits, – let Him be sought in whom all things are secure to us, let Him be discovered in whom all truth becomes certain to us, let Him be loved in whom all becomes right to us.

Chapter 5
That It Is Especially with the Platonists that We Must Carry on our Disputations on Matters of Theology, their Opinions Being Preferable to Those of All Other Philosophers

If, then, Plato defined the wise man as one who imitates, knows, loves this God, and who is rendered blessed through fellowship with Him in His own blessedness, why discuss with the other philosophers? It is evident that none come nearer to us than the Platonists. To them, therefore, let that fabulous theology give place which delights the minds of men with the crimes of the gods, and that civil theology also, in which impure demons, under the name of gods, have seduced the peoples of the earth given up to earthly pleasures, desiring to be honored by the errors of men, and by filling the minds of their worshippers with impure desires, exciting them to make the representation of their crimes one of the rites of their worship, whilst they themselves found in the spectators of these exhibitions a most pleasing spectacle, – a theology in which, whatever was honorable in the temple, was defiled by its mixture with the obscenity of the theatre, and whatever was base in the theatre was vindicated by the abominations of the temples. To these philosophers also
the interpretations of Varro must give place, in which he explains the sacred rites as having reference to heaven and earth, and to the seeds and operations of perishable things; for, in the first place, those rites have not the signification which he would have men believe is attached to them, and therefore truth does not follow him in his attempt so to interpret them; and even if they had this signification, still those things ought not to be worshipped by the rational soul as its god which are placed below it in the scale of nature, nor ought the soul to prefer to itself as gods things to which the true God has given it the preference. The same must be said of those writings pertaining to the sacred rites, which Numa Pompilius took care to conceal by causing them to be buried along with himself, and which, when they were afterwards turned up by the plough, were burned by order of the senate. And, to treat Numa with all honor, let us mention as belonging to the same rank as these writings that which Alexander of Macedon wrote to his mother as communicated to him by Leo, an Egyptian high priest. In this letter not only Picus and Faunus, and Æneas and Romulus or even Hercules, and Æsculapius and Liber, born of Semele, and the twin sons of Tyndareus, or any other mortals who have been deified, but even the principal gods themselves, to whom Cicero, in his Tusculan questions, alludes without mentioning their names, Jupiter, Juno, Saturn, Vulcan, Vesta, and many others whom Varro attempts to identify with the parts or the elements of the world, are shown to have been men. There is, as we have said, a similarity between this case and that of Numa; for the priest being afraid because he had revealed a mystery, earnestly begged of Alexander to command his mother to burn the letter which conveyed these communications to her. Let these two theologies, then, the fabulous and the civil, give place to the Platonic philosophers, who have recognized the true God as the author of all things, the source of the light of truth, and the bountiful bestower of all blessedness. And not these only, but to these great acknowledgers of so great a God, those philosophers must yield who, having their mind enslaved to their body, supposed the principles of all things to be material; as Thales, who held that the first principle of all things was water; Anaximenes, that it was air; the Stoics, that it was fire; Epicurus, who affirmed that it consisted of atoms, that is to say, of minute corpuscles; and many others whom it is needless to enumerate, but who believed that bodies, simple or compound, animate or inanimate, but nevertheless bodies, were the cause and principle of all things. For some of them – as, for instance, the Epicureans – believed that living things could originate from things without life; others held that all things living or without life spring from a living principle, but that, nevertheless, all things, being material, spring from a material principle. For the Stoics thought that fire, that is, one of the four material elements of which this visible world is composed, was both living and intelligent, the maker of the world and of all things contained in it, – that it was in fact God. These and others like them have only been able to suppose that which their hearts enslaved to sense have vainly suggested to them. And yet they have within themselves something which they could not see: they represented to themselves inwardly things which they had seen without, even when they were not seeing them, but only thinking of them. But this representation in thought is no longer a body, but only the similitude of a body; and that faculty of the mind by which this similitude of a body is seen is neither a body nor the similitude of a body; and the faculty which judges whether the representation is beautiful or ugly is without doubt

3  Dii majorum gentium.
4  Book i. 13.
superior to the object judged of. This principle is the understanding of man, the rational soul; and it is certainly not a body, since that similitude of a body which it beholds and judges of is itself not a body. The soul is neither earth, nor water, nor air, nor fire, of which four bodies, called the four elements, we see that this world is composed. And if the soul is not a body, how should God, its Creator, be a body? Let all those philosophers, then, give place, as we have said, to the Platonists, and those also who have been ashamed to say that God is a body, but yet have thought that our souls are of the same nature as God. They have not been staggered by the great changeableness of the soul, – an attribute which it would be impious to ascribe to the divine nature, – but they say it is the body which changes the soul, for in itself it is unchangeable. As well might they say, “Flesh is wounded by some body, for in itself it is invulnerable.” In a word, that which is unchangeable can be changed by nothing, so that that which can be changed by the body cannot properly be said to be immutable.

Chapter 6
Concerning the Meaning of the Platonists in that Part of Philosophy Called Physical

These philosophers, then, whom we see not undeservedly exalted above the rest in fame and glory, have seen that no material body is God, and therefore they have transcended all bodies in seeking for God. They have seen that whatever is changeable is not the most high God, and therefore they have transcended every soul and all changeable spirits in seeking the supreme. They have seen also that, in every changeable thing, the form which makes it that which it is, whatever be its mode or nature, can only be through Him who truly is, because He is unchangeable. And therefore, whether we consider the whole body of the world, its figure, qualities, and orderly movement, and also all the bodies which are in it; or whether we consider all life, either that which nourishes and maintains, as the life of trees, or that which, besides this, has also sensation, as the life of beasts; or that which adds to all these intelligence, as the life of man; or that which does not need the support of nutriment, but only maintains, feels, understands, as the life of angels, – all can only be through Him who absolutely is. For to Him it is not one thing to be, and another to live, as though He could be, not living; nor is it to Him one thing to live, and another thing to understand, as though He could live, not understanding; nor is it to Him one thing to understand, another thing to be blessed, as though He could understand and not be blessed. But to Him to live, to understand, to be blessed, are to be. They have understood, from this unchangeableness and this simplicity, that all things must have been made by Him, and that He could Himself have been made by none. For they have considered that whatever is is either body or life, and that life is something better than body, and that the nature of body is sensible, and that of life intelligible. Therefore they have preferred the intelligible nature to the sensible. We mean by sensible things such things as can be perceived by the sight and touch of the body; by intelligible things, such as can be understood by the sight of the mind. For there is no corporeal beauty, whether in the condition of a body, as figure, or in its movement, as in music, of which it is not the mind that judges. But this could never have been, had there not existed in the mind itself a superior form of these things, without bulk, without noise of voice, without space and time. But even in respect of these things, had the mind not been mutable, it would not have been possible for one to judge better than another with regard to sensible forms.
He who is clever, judges better than he who is slow, he who is skilled than he who is unskilled, he who is practised than he who is unpractised, and the same person judges better after he has gained experience than he did before. But that which is capable of more and less is mutable; whence able men, who have thought deeply on these things, have gathered that the first form is not to be found in those things whose form is changeable. Since, therefore, they saw that body and mind might be more or less beautiful in form, and that, if they wanted form, they could have no existence, they saw that there is some existence in which is the first form, unchangeable, and therefore not admitting of degrees of comparison, and in that they most rightly believed was the first principle of things which was not made, and by which all things were made. Therefore that which is known of God He manifested to them when His invisible things were seen by them, being understood by those things which have been made; also His eternal power and Godhead by whom all visible and temporal things have been created.\(^5\) We have said enough upon that part of theology which they call physical, that is, natural.

Chapter 7
How Much the Platonists Are To be Held as Excelling Other Philosophers in Logic, i.e. Rational Philosophy

Then, again, as far as regards the doctrine which treats of that which they call logic, that is, rational philosophy, far be it from us to compare them with those who attributed to the bodily senses the faculty of discriminating truth, and thought, that all we learn is to be measured by their untrustworthy and fallacious rules. Such were the Epicureans, and all of the same school. Such also were the Stoics, who ascribed to the bodily senses that expertness in disputation which they so ardently love, called by them dialectic, asserting that from the senses the mind conceives the notions (ννοιαι) of those things which they explicate by definition. And hence is developed the whole plan and connection of their learning and teaching. I often wonder, with respect to this, how they can say that none are beautiful but the wise; for by what bodily sense have they perceived that beauty, by what eyes of the flesh have they seen wisdom’s comeliness of form? Those, however, whom we justly rank before all others, have distinguished those things which are conceived by the mind from those which are perceived by the senses, neither taking away from the senses anything to which they are competent, nor attributing to them anything beyond their competency. And the light of our understandings, by which all things are learned by us, they have affirmed to be that selfsame God by whom all things were made.

Chapter 8
That the Platonists Hold the First Rank in Moral Philosophy Also

The remaining part of philosophy is morals, or what is called by the Greeks θεῖκη, in which is discussed the question concerning the chief good, – that which will leave us nothing further to seek in order to be blessed, if only we make all our actions refer to it, and seek it not for the sake of something else, but for its own sake. Therefore it is called the end, because we wish other things on account of it, but itself only for its own sake.

\(^5\) Rom. 1: 19, 20.
This beatific good, therefore, according to some, comes to a man from the body, according to others, from the mind, and, according to others, from both together. For they saw that man himself consists of soul and body; and therefore they believed that from either of these two, or from both together, their well-being must proceed, consisting in a certain final good, which could render them blessed, and to which they might refer all their actions, not requiring anything ulterior to which to refer that good itself. This is why those who have added a third kind of good things, which they call extrinsic, – as honor, glory, wealth, and the like, – have not regarded them as part of the final good, that is, to be sought after for their own sake, but as things which are to be sought for the sake of something else, affirming that this kind of good is good to the good, and evil to the evil. Wherefore, whether they have sought the good of man from the mind or from the body, or from both together, it is still only from man they have supposed that it must be sought. But they who have sought it from the body have sought it from the inferior part of man; they who have sought it from the mind, from the superior part; and they who have sought it from both, from the whole man. Whether therefore, they have sought it from any part, or from the whole man, still they have only sought it from man; nor have these differences, being three, given rise only to three dissident sects of philosophers, but to many. For diverse philosophers have held diverse opinions, both concerning the good of the body, and the good of the mind, and the good of both together. Let, therefore, all these give place to those philosophers who have not affirmed that a man is blessed by the enjoyment of the body, or by the enjoyment of the mind, but by the enjoyment of God, – enjoying Him, however, not as the mind does the body or itself, or as one friend enjoys another, but as the eye enjoys light, if, indeed, we may draw any comparison between these things. But what the nature of this comparison is, will, if God help me, be shown in another place, to the best of my ability. At present, it is sufficient to mention that Plato determined the final good to be to live according to virtue, and affirmed that he only can attain to virtue who knows and imitates God, – which knowledge and imitation are the only cause of blessedness. Therefore he did not doubt that to philosophize is to love God, whose nature is incorporeal. Whence it certainly follows that the student of wisdom, that is, the philosopher, will then become blessed when he shall have begun to enjoy God. For though he is not necessarily blessed who enjoys that which he loves (for many are miserable by loving that which ought not to be loved, and still more miserable when they enjoy it), nevertheless no one is blessed who does not enjoy that which he loves. For even they who love things which ought not to be loved do not count themselves blessed by loving merely, but by enjoying them. Who, then, but the most miserable will deny that he is blessed, who enjoys that which he loves, and loves the true and highest good? But the true and highest good, according to Plato, is God, and therefore he would call him a philosopher who loves God; for philosophy is directed to the obtaining of the blessed life, and he who loves God is blessed in the enjoyment of God.

Chapter 9
Concerning that Philosophy which Has Come Nearest to the Christian Faith

Whatever philosophers, therefore, thought concerning the supreme God, that He is both the maker of all created things, the light by which things are known, and the good in
reference to which things are to be done; that we have in Him the first principle of nature, the truth of doctrine, and the happiness of life, – whether these philosophers may be more suitably called Platonists, or whether they may give some other name to their sect; whether, we say, that only the chief men of the Ionic school, such as Plato himself, and they who have well understood him, have thought thus; or whether we also include the Italic school, on account of Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans, and all who may have held like opinions; and, lastly, whether also we include all who have been held wise men and philosophers among all nations who are discovered to have seen and taught this, be they Atlantics, Libyans, Egyptians, Indians, Persians, Chaldeans, Scythians, Gauls, Spaniards, or of other nations, – we prefer these to all other philosophers, and confess that they approach nearest to us.

Chapter 10
That the Excellency of the Christian Religion Is Above All the Science of Philosophers

For although a Christian man instructed only in ecclesiastical literature may perhaps be ignorant of the very name of Platonists, and may not even know that there have existed two schools of philosophers speaking the Greek tongue, to wit, the Ionic and Italic, he is nevertheless not so deaf with respect to human affairs, as not to know that philosophers profess the study, and even the possession, of wisdom. He is on his guard, however, with respect to those who philosophize according to the elements of this world, not according to God, by whom the world itself was made; for he is warned by the precept of the apostle, and faithfully hears what has been said, “Beware that no one deceive you through philosophy and vain deceit, according to the elements of the world.”6 Then, that he may not suppose that all philosophers are such as do this, he hears the same apostle say concerning certain of them, “Because that which is known of God is manifest among them, for God has manifested it to them. For His invisible things from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things which are made, also His eternal power and Godhead.”7 And, when speaking to the Athenians, after having spoken a mighty thing concerning God, which few are able to understand, “In Him we live, and move, and have our being,”8 he goes on to say, “As certain also of your own have said.” He knows well, too, to be on his guard against even these philosophers in their errors. For where it has been said by him, “that God has manifested to them by those things which are made His invisible things, that they might be seen by the understanding,” there it has also been said that they did not rightly worship God Himself, because they paid divine honors, which are due to Him alone, to other things also to which they ought not to have paid them, – “because, knowing God, they glorified Him not as God: neither were thankful, but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of corruptible man, and of birds, and fourfooted beasts, and creeping things;”9 – where the apostle would have us understand him as meaning the Romans, and Greeks, and Egyptians, who

6 Col. 2: 8.
7 Rom. 1: 19, 20.
9 Rom. 1: 21–3.
gloried in the name of wisdom; but concerning this we will dispute with them afterwards. With respect, however, to that wherein they agree with us we prefer them to all others namely, concerning the one God, the author of this universe, who is not only above every body, being incorporeal, but also above all souls, being incorruptible – our principle, our light, our good. And though the Christian man, being ignorant of their writings, does not use in disputation words which he has not learned, – not calling that part of philosophy natural (which is the Latin term), or physical (which is the Greek one), which treats of the investigation of nature; or that part rational, or logical, which deals with the question how truth may be discovered; or that part moral, or ethical, which concerns morals, and shows how good is to be sought, and evil to be shunned, – he is not, therefore, ignorant that it is from the one true and supremely good God that we have that nature in which we are made in the image of God, and that doctrine by which we know Him and ourselves, and that grace through which, by cleaving to Him, we are blessed. This, therefore, is the cause why we prefer these to all the others, because, whilst other philosophers have worn out their minds and powers in seeking the causes of things, and endeavoring to discover the right mode of learning and of living, these, by knowing God, have found where resides the cause by which the universe has been constituted, and the light by which truth is to be discovered, and the fountain at which felicity is to be drunk. All philosophers, then, who have had these thoughts concerning God, whether Platonists or others, agree with us. But we have thought it better to plead our cause with the Platonists, because their writings are better known. For the Greeks, whose tongue holds the highest place among the languages of the Gentiles, are loud in their praises of these writings; and the Latins, taken with their excellence, or their renown, have studied them more heartily than other writings, and, by translating them into our tongue, have given them greater celebrity and notoriety.

Chapter 11
How Plato Has Been Able to Approach So Nearly to Christian Knowledge

Certain partakers with us in the grace of Christ, wonder when they hear and read that Plato had conceptions concerning God, in which they recognize considerable agreement with the truth of our religion. Some have concluded from this, that when he went to Egypt he had heard the prophet Jeremiah, or, whilst travelling in the same country, had read the prophetic scriptures, which opinion I myself have expressed in certain of my writings.10 But a careful calculation of dates, contained in chronological history, shows that Plato was born about a hundred years after the time in which Jeremiah prophesied, and, as he lived eighty-one years, there are found to have been about seventy years from his death to that time when Ptolemy, king of Egypt, requested the prophetic scriptures of the Hebrew people to be sent to him from Judea, and committed them to seventy Hebrews, who also knew the Greek tongue, to be translated and kept. Therefore, on that voyage of his, Plato could neither have seen Jeremiah, who was dead so long before, nor have read those same scriptures which had not yet been translated into the Greek language, of which he was a master, unless, indeed, we say that, as he was most earnest in the pursuit of knowledge, he also studied those writings through an interpreter, as he did those of the Egyptians, – not, indeed, writing a translation

10 De Doctrina Christiana, ii. 43. Comp. Retract. ii. 4, 2.
of them (the facilities for doing which were only gained even by Ptolemy in return for munificent acts of kindness, though fear of his kingly authority might have seemed a sufficient motive), but learning as much as he possibly could concerning their contents by means of conversation. What warrants this supposition are the opening verses of Genesis: "In the beginning God made the heaven and earth. And the earth was invisible, and without order; and darkness was over the abyss: and the Spirit of God moved over the waters." For in the Timeæus, when writing on the formation of the world, he says that God first united earth and fire; from which it is evident that he assigns to fire a place in heaven. This opinion bears a certain resemblance to the statement, "In the beginning God made heaven and earth." Plato next speaks of those two intermediary elements, water and air, by which the other two extremes, namely, earth and fire, were mutually united; from which circumstance he is thought to have so understood the words, "The Spirit of God moved over the waters." For, not paying sufficient attention to the designations given by those scriptures to the Spirit of God, he may have thought that the four elements are spoken of in that place, because the air also is called spirit. Then, as to Plato’s saying that the philosopher is a lover of God, nothing shines forth more conspicuously in those sacred writings. But the most striking thing in this connection, and that which most of all inclines me almost to assent to the opinion that Plato was not ignorant of those writings, is the answer which was given to the question elicited from the holy Moses when the words of God were conveyed to him by the angel; for, when he asked what was the name of that God who was commanding him to go and deliver the Hebrew people out of Egypt, this answer was given: "I am who am; and thou shalt say to the children of Israel, He who is sent me unto you;" as though compared with Him that truly is, because He is unchangeable, those things which have been created mutable are not, – a truth which Plato zealously held, and most diligently commended. And I know not whether this sentiment is anywhere to be found in the books of those who were before Plato, unless in that book where it is said, "I am who am; and thou shalt say to the children of Israel, who is sent me unto you."

Chapter 12

That Even the Platonists, though They Say These Things Concerning the One True God, Nevertheless Thought that Sacred Rites Were To Be Performed in Honor of Many Gods

But we need not determine from what source he learned these things, – whether it was from the books of the ancients who preceded him, or, as is more likely, from the words of the apostle: "Because that which is known of God, has been manifested among them, for God hath manifested it to them. For His invisible things from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by those things which have been made, also His eternal power and Godhead." From whatever source he may have derived this knowledge, then, I think I have made it sufficiently plain that I have not chosen the Platonic philosophers undeservedly as the parties with whom to discuss; because the question we have just taken up concerns the

11 Liberating Jewish slaves, and sending gifts to the temple. See Josephus, Ant. xii. 2.
12 Gen. 1: 1, 2.
13 Spiritus.
14 Ex. 3: 14.
15 Rom. 1: 20.
natural theology, – the question, namely, whether sacred rites are to be performed to one God, or to many, for the sake of the happiness which is to be after death. I have specially chosen them because their juster thoughts concerning the one God who made heaven and earth, have made them illustrious among philosophers. This has given them such superiority to all others in the judgment of posterity, that, though Aristotle, the disciple of Plato, a man of eminent abilities, inferior in eloquence to Plato, yet far superior to many in that respect, had founded the Peripatetic sect, – so called because they were in the habit of walking about during their disputations, – and though he had, through the greatness of his fame, gathered very many disciples into his school, even during the life of his master; and though Plato at his death was succeeded in his school, which was called the Academy, by Speusippus, his sister’s son, and Xenocrates, his beloved disciple, who, together with their successors, were called from this name of the school, Academics; nevertheless the most illustrious recent philosophers, who have chosen to follow Plato, have been unwilling to be called Peripatetics, or Academics, but have preferred the name of Platonists. Among these were the renowned Plotinus, Iamblichus, and Porphyry, who were Greeks, and the African Apuleius, who was learned both in the Greek and Latin tongues. All these, however, and the rest who were of the same school, and also Plato himself, thought that sacred rites ought to be performed in honor of many gods.