Virtuous persons, it is commonly said, are those persons who excel precisely as persons or, more exactly, those persons who are disposed, by virtue of their emotional states and attitudes, to actions by whose performance they excel precisely as persons. If we limit our attention to the moral sense of the term “virtue” and its cognates, then virtuous persons are those persons who are disposed to excel at those activities that conduce to human flourishing or involve our relations with others. The disjunction is inclusive, and I believe that in most cases, it can be replaced by a conjunction. I shall not argue the point in this paper, but I believe some of the reasons underlying that belief will become clear as we proceed.

To understand what it is to be a virtuous person, we must first understand what it is to be a person. I do not claim to provide an exhaustive account of the person. The basic idea is that the person is an organism that (i) “minds” the world, (ii) is the synthetic unity of minding experiences, (iii) is the embodied subject of a surrounding world, and (iv) is a substrate of what Husserl calls “habitualities.” The organism with its interpenetrating bodily and “minding” capacities intends a surrounding world of things with physical, affective, and practical dimensions. These intendings disclose things and situations in their significance for us. When these intendings are empty, there is a tendency toward fulfillment in an intuitively grounded experience synthetically unified with the empty intention, an experience that directly, although not immediately, presents the thing or situation just as emptily intended. Husserl calls such an experience “evidence.” This is not the evidence of warrants that provide conclusive or probable propositional evidence for a conclusion. It is instead the
evidence of intuitively grasping the things or situation in a continuous course of harmonious experience that fulfills our non-evidenced sense of the object. Such evidence presents the object as it is, and thereby provides a non-inferential justification of the intended sense of the thing or situation. When the original intention is evidenced, it is confirmed for the experiencing person as true, and this experience of truth is the awareness of what Husserl calls the “congruence” (Deckung) between the sense of an assertion and the sense of the intuitively presented state of affairs. The thing or situation is truthfully disclosed as having the sense ascribed to it in the empty intending. Husserl understands reason as teleologically ordered toward this evidential, truthful disclosure of the world.

Husserl expands the notion of reason beyond theoretical reason to which the notion of ‘truth’ seems most properly to apply. He insists that there are axiological and practical forms of reason and a form of rational evidencing that is proper to each. Axiological and practical reason are, in other words, not rational in exactly the same way that theoretical reason is rational, but they are no less rational in their own proper way insofar as they involve this teleological ordering toward evidence and the truthful disclosure of the good and the right. It follows from this that the evidential experiences toward which reason strives take different forms in cognition and the theoretical sciences, in valuation and the axiological sciences, and in volition and the practical sciences. Nevertheless, the task of reason can be properly summarized as always to ensure in fulfilled experiences the “truthfulness” of our judgments about what is the case, about what is valuable, and about what is right to do. The telos of reason—and by extension of the person who minds the world—is in the broadest sense, then, (i) to apprehend truthfully things and states of affairs, (ii) to have appropriate affective and evaluative attitudes towards those things and states of affairs, and (iii) to act rightly in response to and on the basis of our truthful cognitions and attitudes.
For Husserl, then, a person is rational in the full sense—an “agent of truth,” as Robert Sokolowski puts it—when she in an evidential experience knows for herself what is true, or when she in the light of evidence adopts the right attitudes and emotions regarding things, events, actions, and persons, i.e., when she in the light of evidence recognizes what is truly good, and, finally, when she chooses in the light of evidence what is rightly done. The contrasts are, first, with the experiencing agent who merely accepts passively what others claim to be the true, the good, or the right and, second, with the experiencing agent who judges without evidence, who merely supposes that such and such is the case. In the evidential experience of truth, the person adopts the intended sense of things as her own conviction and assumes responsibility for this conviction. The person in the fullest sense, then, is the self-responsible agent of truth. I take this understanding of the telos of the rational agent to be the eudaimonistic moment in Husserl’s phenomenology, and it is in terms of this telos that we must understand the notion of the virtuous person, the one who is disposed to those activities that conduce to the realization of this telos.

You have no doubt noticed that since Husserl does not speak of the virtues and of virtuous persons, I seem somewhere along the line to have left Husserl behind, and this is indeed the case. Husserl’s earlier ethical reflections divide into two parts: an account of evaluation, what we might think of as his meta-ethics, and a “formal axiology,” a set of rational principles in conformity with which the agent determines the action that is the “best among what is attainable.” This good, Husserl tells us, is the “sole practical good” for the agent in that situation.

Husserl’s view resembles a standard consequentialist view. The latter, first, presupposes a notion of the good, and Husserl’s account of evaluation is relevant to this aspect of consequentialism, although he himself does not specify a particular conception of the good.
Consequentialism, second, applies the normative principle of maximizing the good, however defined, and Husserl’s formal axiological laws are relevant to this aspect of consequentialism. These axiological laws concern the comparison and summation of goods and guide our purely rational maximizing of the good so that we realize “the best among what is attainable.” Hence, when Husserl invokes the teleological notions of ‘happiness’ (Eudämonie) and ‘blessedness’ (Glückseligkeit), he uses these expressions with their consequentialist rather than areteic meaning. What I propose herein is that from Husserl’s early discussions of ethics, we build upon his meta-ethical view but discard his normative account.

Interestingly enough, Husserl himself made a similar move in some of his later ethical writings, shifting away from his rationalist emphases to an ethics based on a notion of ‘absolute loves,’ loves that in their absoluteness can even override rational considerations. This is not, however, the move I wish to make. While there are interesting ideas in Husserl’s later ethical thought, I do not think it provides a clear or consistent normative direction. But I do think, as I have indicated, that his account of reason provides the basis for a eudaimonism and a virtue-ethical normative approach.

Crucial to making good on this claim of a phenomenological eudaimonism is to provide for each sphere of reason a sufficiently thick account of evidence, of the justification of empty intentions so as both to specify the notion of eudaimonia and to underwrite an account of the virtues. In the cognitive or theoretical sphere, the self-responsible agent grasps the true in a presentation that is a perception, a modification of perception such as memory or imagination, or a judgment. Stipulating that “justification” in this context means prima facie, non-inferential, and defeasible justification,

1 $P$ is a justified cognitive presentation when
1.1 $P$ discloses the pre-predicative or predicative sense of a thing or situation $O$ and its properties $x$, $y$, and $z$;

1.2 $P$ is evidenced; and

1.3 this relation of justification is not defeated.

Similarly, in the evaluative and volitional spheres, rational justification includes a reference to a moment of justifying intuition. Let us first consider the axiological sphere. Evaluative experiences, according to a widely shared phenomenological view, apprehend the valuable in a moment of feeling or an episodic emotion that is founded on a “presentation.” This foundational claim is better stated as follows: there are distinguishable layers of sense within the concrete sense of the evaluation such that a “presentational” layer—the layer presenting the merely descriptive features of the object—found additional, affective layers of sense. Value-attributes, then, are the correlates of feelings and episodic emotions that are the affective response of a subject with a particular experiential history—that is, particular beliefs, emotional states, dispositions, practical interests, and so forth—to the presented non-axiological properties of a thing or situation. The value-attributes intended are neither separate from nor reducible to the non-axiological properties on which they are founded, but our valuations—precisely insofar as they are grounded on presentations—track these non-axiological properties. Conversely, the non-axiological properties provide reasons for the valuation accomplished in the affective response. Value-attributes, while disclosed by feelings or episodic emotions, exist independently of those feelings and emotions, at least in the sense that a thing’s being valuable is not reducible to its being felt valuable. Rather, the valuable is that toward which the valuing feeling or episodic emotion is correct or appropriate. The intentional feeling or episodic emotion experienced by the subject is appropriate both when the underlying apprehension of the non-axiological properties is
justified and when it is rationally motivated by the non-axiological properties underlying it.
Moreover, since the underlying presentation can be true and the affective response not
rationally motivated, it must in such cases be the affective dimension of our experience that
discloses this inappropriateness. This occurs because our pre-reflective self-awareness has its
own affective dimension that assesses the feeling or episodic emotion directed to the object.

Hence, if

2  \( E \) is an intentional feeling or episodic emotion whose base \( P \) is a presentation of an
object or situation \( O \) and its non-axiological properties \( x, y, \) and \( z, \)
then

3  \( E \) is appropriate to \( O \) and its non-axiological properties \( x, y, \) and \( z \) if and only if

3.1  \( P \) is justified, and

3.2  \( P \) is a reason for (i.e., rationally motivates) \( E, \) and

3.3  \( F, \) a (pre-reflectively or reflectively) self-assessing feeling or emotion (such as
approbation or pride) positively appraises \( E, \) and

3.4  no relation of justification mentioned or entailed is defeated.

Condition 3.1 addresses the truth of the underlying cognitive content, ensuring that \( P \) is both
true and evidenced. Conditions 3.2 and 3.3 jointly address the correctness of the affective
response. Condition 3.2 involves our shared understanding of evaluative concepts and their
basis in non-axiological properties, and condition 3.3 brings into play the self-assessing
emotions that appraise the affective dimension of the object-directed feeling or emotional
episode. To have a self-responsible evaluative experience, a self-responsible and appropriate
emotion, is to have this structure of justification.

In the sphere of practical reason, volition denotes the choice of an action as conducive to
some valued good or apparent good and as arising from deliberation. Hence, if
4  \( V \) is a volition that issues in action \( A \) as conducive to end \( G \) and whose base is \( E \)’s evaluation of \( G \) as a good end, we can provisionally characterize justification in the practical sphere as follows:

5  \( V \) is rationally justified and \( A \) is right if and only if

5.1  \( E \) is appropriate;

5.2  \( E \) rationally motivates a desire for \( G \);

5.3  the desire for \( G \) rationally motivates \( V \);

5.4  \( A \) conduces to \( G \) as an internal or external consequence; and

5.5  no relation of justification entailed is defeated.

Embedded in this account of justification of valuations and volitions is both an ambiguity and a bifurcation in the notion of the good, for it points both to the goods that are pursued as the object of our first-order and contingent desires and to the good of self-responsible agency that is the fullness of rational personhood. Our being as rational agents is, we have said, inherently ordered toward the good of self-responsibility in all the spheres of reason, the good of truthfully disclosing what is the case, what is genuinely valuable in the objects of our first-order, contingent desires, and what is right to do. Reason realizes its proper end—its proper good—just insofar as it achieves evidenced judgments in all the spheres of reason.

The phenomenological characterizations of self-responsible personhood in the various spheres of reason point, then, to an areteic notion of the good and to a set of virtues of both intellect and action. As various judgments, evaluations, and choices are made and confirmed over time, they become convictions of the subject that inform subsequent judgments, valuations, and choices. The convictions of the self-responsible agent of truth, especially when continually confirmed, serve in the context of passive synthesis as dispositions to experience things or situations as conforming to past experience. These dispositional beliefs
and convictions—these “habitualities”—are rooted in the person’s perceptions, articulated in judgments, and expressed in words and actions. Since the underlying experiences can be cognitive, affective, or practical, the person is the person who holds a certain set of beliefs, convictions, affective attitudes, and dispositions to act. They are abiding possessions of the person, and they determine a certain way of encountering the world in the continuing and unfolding course of experience, a certain style of experience, and a certain manner of behaving in the world. They dispose us to expect certain features in certain kinds of situations, to pick out what is morally salient in those situations, to have certain kinds of attitudes toward them, and to act in determinate ways. This is just the kind of dispositional state that Aristotle has in mind when he speaks of virtues as states or habits or dispositions to have the right attitudes and to act rightly and from the right reasons.

The virtuous agent, then, is the one who correctly grasps and assesses situations, who has properly appraised ends and has appropriately ordered her preferences among them, who has deliberated well about which actions conduce to what ends, and who acts rightly in the circumstances. For such an agent, it is important to note, following the example of the phronimos is insufficient. The virtuous agent lives self-responsibly, judging, valuing, and deciding for herself in the light of evidence rather than passively accepting received attitudes and opinions. The self-responsible agent, acting virtuously in the pursuit of genuine first-order and contingent goods for herself and others, also realizes the goods of thinking well, feeling well, and acting well—what we might call the goods of rational agency. The goods for an agent and for others who are the co-agents or patients of her actions are the objects of our valuations and volitions and are realized in actions that bring about appropriately desired worldly states of affairs, whereas the goods of agency are realized in the synthetic
performances and achievements of persons whose cognitive, affective, and volitional experiences both truthfully disclose and fashion the world as morally ordered.

I must emphasize that thinking truly, feeling appropriately, and acting rightly are goods properly realized only in interpersonal contexts when others also realize them. The truthful apprehension of what is the case, evaluations of goods (including moral goods), decisions about how best to realize those goods, and evaluative judgments about our own actions, the actions of others, and social practices and institutions all arise against the background of a common knowledge embodied in our collective determinations of empirical, evaluative, and moral concepts, of choiceworthy goods, and of praiseworthy actions. This common knowledge—our notion, for example, of politeness, kindness, or generosity—is passed from one generation to the next by means of the stories we tell young people, the songs we sing, the practices we adopt, the laws we write, the institutions we establish, even the games we play. Moreover, it continues to be worked out, criticized, reappropriated, and modified within successive generations in our encounters with one another, with those whose opinions or reasoning might differ from our own. In this context, our own opinions and beliefs must be tested against the opinions and beliefs of others. Only in coming to grips with differing opinions and beliefs can we truly be said to come to know ourselves as a person holding certain convictions that have withstood a certain kind of testing. In other words, one does not and cannot reason well by oneself. In order to be self-responsible and to realize the goods of agency, one must think for oneself but not by oneself. For this reason, these goods of agency must be effectively—even if only implicitly—chosen for others as well as for oneself.

Insofar as the goods of agency are realized in an agent’s making sense of the world as she straightforwardly and truthfully seeks to know what is true, what is good for herself and others, and what is right to do, we can think of these goods of agency as second-order goods
that are superveniently and necessarily realized in those pursuits, at least when those pursuits are successfully realized. Securing the goods of agency for ourselves and others does not foreclose the pursuit of different first-order, contingent goods. The universality and necessity of the goods of agency is, in other words, consistent with the pluralism of goods pursuable in free societies. However, insofar as the responsible pursuit of first-order goods requires that one secure the goods of agency as such, the pursuit of some first-order goods is morally wrong on universalist grounds if that pursuit blocks the realization of the goods of agency for other persons. Hence, first-order goods are now apprehended both as necessarily transformed by and as yielding to the second-order goods of agency.

In this light, we can remove the provisional nature of our characterization of self-responsible volition. We now say:

6  $V$ is rationally justified and $A$ is right if and only if

6.1  $E$ is appropriate;

6.2  $E$ rationally motivates a desire for $G$;

6.3  the desire for $G$ rationally motivates $V$;

6.4  $A$ conduces to $G$ as an internal or external consequence;

6.5  $A$ does not frustrate (or frustrates least) the realization of necessarily valued second-order goods of agency; and

6.6  no relation of justification entailed is defeated.

The realization of the end of the action in its performance and ensuring that the action also conduces to necessarily willed goods justify the correctness of the volition and the rightness of the action.

What virtues are appropriate for this notion of *eudaimonia*, tied as it is to these notions of justification and their status as goods of agency? The immediate answer, of course, although
too simple, is (i) theoretical wisdom, (ii) what I shall baptize “axiological wisdom,” and (iii) practical wisdom, i.e., the dispositions to frame and justify truthful judgments in each sphere of reason in the manner previously outlined. The person of theoretical wisdom is disposed to form and to evidence true judgments about the natural and social orders, and he or she excels at so doing. The person of axiological wisdom is disposed to have appropriate affective responses on the basis of which he or she forms and evidences true judgments about what is valuable, and he or she excels at so doing. And the person of practical wisdom is disposed to form and evidence true judgments about what is right to do as well as to fulfill those judgments in action, and he or she excels at so doing. There is, of course, a motivational dimension to these virtues. It is the desire for the fulfillment of the telos embedded in our ordinary experience, and its evaluative component is the love of wisdom or philosophy— not in its technical, disciplinary sense but simply in the sense of positively appraising justified true knowledge such that one comes to desire it. To appeal simply to theoretical, axiological, and practical wisdom is a thin response to the question about the virtues conducive to eudaimonia. In the remainder of the paper, then, I shall try to thicken this account by sketching some other, associated virtues that contribute to these forms of wisdom and thereby conduce to eudaimonia.

I start anew from a slightly different perspective. The life in which eudaimonia is realized is the life of personal autonomy. This is not the autonomy of self-legislation, but the autonomy of self-determination. I determine myself insofar as I am responsible for the convictions—and thereby the dispositions and actions and reactions—that constitute my life. The good of the self-responsible life requires, as we have seen, not only one’s own personal autonomy but that of others as well. It is important to stress, however, that it is not merely the case that a person realizes the good for himself or herself in a communal context in which
others also realize that good *qua* individuals. Insofar as the testing of one’s opinions and convictions necessarily involves an interpersonal dimension, the goods of theoretical, axiological, and practical wisdom are realized in common and concerted efforts, e.g., in conversation or in readings the work of others or in collaboration. Precisely because the good of the autonomous, self-responsible life is realizable only in the joint activities of persons belonging to a community, the value of the pursuit of autonomy is often embodied in political form as constitutionally protected freedoms of thought, speech (including freedoms of the press and expression), and association.

These political freedoms guarantee the moral space in which personal autonomy can be exercised. That moral space is originally cleared, as I have argued elsewhere, by respect. Respect takes the form both of appraisal respect, in which we respect an other for the meritorious exercise of her rational agency, and recognition respect, in which we respect all persons just insofar as they possess those rational capacities apart from which a meritorious exercise is impossible. Respect as a moral feeling, of course, is not yet a virtue, but the disposition to respect the rational capacity and personal autonomy of others is a virtue. The respectful person is the one disposed to have the right feeling—at a minimum, the feeling of recognitional respect—toward others. But respectfulness does not exhaust the virtues required for *eudaimonia* for oneself and others or for the various forms of wisdom. It maintains the moral space in which other virtues associated with and conducive to these forms of wisdom can operate.

Insofar as one’s truthful evidencing of things and situations depends on interpersonally shared understandings, we should expect that some of the requisite virtues will have to do with our interpersonal transactions in the sphere of reason. Chief among these are intellectual charity and intellectual generosity. Charity in its classical, religious sense means the love of
God and of our fellow human beings precisely insofar as they are created by God and potential members of the communion of saints. Charity as an intellectual virtue, then, is the love of others as it operates in our intellectual life. It is directed to others insofar as they are our interlocutors and the authors of texts that we read. By intellectual charity, then, I mean the disposition to exercise goodwill in listening to others and in reading a text so that we can faithfully and truthfully understand the views of others who already command from us recognitional respect. Intellectual charity extends beyond recognitional respect insofar as the intellectually charitable agent treats the other with goodwill, valuing the other precisely as a speaker or author. The intellectually charitable agent attributes as much validity and intelligence to the other as is possible consistent with a careful, and therefore critical, understanding. The intellectually charitable agent seeks to bring it about that the other receives some genuine intellectual goods in the exchange.

Intellectual charity minimizes the tendency to misstate or caricaturize another’s position, to focus one’s attention on straw men, and to miss the important issues at stake. Lacking intellectual charity, the agent can truthfully recognize neither the ways in which his or her own convictions are supported or challenged by the other’s views nor the ways in which the other’s positions are supported or challenged by his or her own. Intellectual charity is allied with the virtue of open-mindedness toward another’s ideas. Open-mindedness disposes us to consider carefully the other’s intended meaning, to be willing to consider convictions that conflict with our own, and, when appropriate, to revise one’s opinions. Both intellectual charity and open-mindedness serve to realize intellectual goods and the ends of rational agency.

Generosity in its ordinary sense is an agent’s disposition to give freely to others without expectation of return and for the benefit of the recipients what is valuable to the agent himself
or herself, e.g., material goods, time, or attention. Generosity in the intellectual sphere, then, is the disposition to give freely both of one’s own ideas and of praise, recognition, and encouragement without expectation of return and for the benefit of the recipient. Just insofar as there are intellectual goods and just insofar as these intellectual goods are realized in interpersonal activity, intellectual life calls for generosity. We commonly think, for example, of the scientific enterprise as collaborative; we commonly look to knowledgeable critics for guidance in evaluating works of art, musical performances, films, etc.; and we commonly look to others for moral advice and guidance. And in the give and take of philosophers there is ample room for generosity, e.g., in listening to and reading one another’s work and developing deep, detailed, and charitably critical interpretations and questions. We credit the other with intelligence and look for plausible intentions; we credit the other with having something important to say even when it is said unclearly or imprecisely. We expend a considerable amount of time and energy in such collaborative activities with the result that the other gains from our efforts.

Intellectual generosity is an excellence of special import to us in our role as teachers. It is not merely a matter of telling students what we think regarding the important philosophical issues about which we teach. It is giving to students our attention; it is drawing out from them their own thoughts and critical reactions; it is recognizing their contributions to the collaborative process that is teaching and learning; it is praising them for what is valuable in their ideas; it is guiding them and encouraging them in the ways that will allow them to build further on their thoughts and reactions and that will bring out the best of their capacities. Intellectual generosity is central and crucial to the transfer of intellectual competence from one generation to the next so that the next generation can realize intellectual goods on their own and share them in turn with their successors.
Intellectual generosity, intellectual charity, and open-mindedness dispose us to carefully consider and entertain the views of others. They should not, however, be understood to suggest that we should graciously accept or yield to any view offered for our consideration. Intellectual firmness too is a virtue. Intellectual firmness is the disposition to be tenacious with respect to one’s cognitive, axiological, and practical convictions and not to yield at the first sign of counter-evidence. When challenges are raised against our own convictions and even when they are thrown into doubt, it is appropriate that we look for ways to counter objections to those convictions or to accommodate an anomaly within the set of convictions to which we currently adhere. We do not, of course, want to accept a maze of contradictions, but it is humanly normal for us to live with beliefs that are not fully harmonious, that conflict with one another in such a way that we are not yet able to resolve the discrepancy. The degree of tenacity involved in intellectual firmness varies with the convictions in questions. We hold on to central beliefs more firmly than peripheral ones, and we hold on to convictions that have been consistently and continuously evidenced in prior experience more firmly than those that have not. This virtue of intellectual firmness is especially important in the light of the phenomenological notion of evidence. We hold on to central and more fully evidenced convictions because we have more confidence in them. It is only in the face of a genuine evidence sufficient to override such confidence that we should yield our view, and intellectual firmness holds us fast to this rule. But holding fast to the rule of evidence also accounts for the possibility of distinguishing firmness from rigid dogmatism.

Intellectual courage is another virtue closely associated with the notion of evidence. Intellectual courage is the disposition to follow the evidence wherever it might lead. It aids us in finding our way through the threats, pitfalls, and obstacles that lie before us in the search for evidenced and truthful judgments. Some of these threats, pitfalls, and obstacles
encountered in the search for knowledge are merely apparent, while others are real. In either case, however, the fear must be respected and managed so as not to interfere with the pursuit of intellectual goods. The intellectually courageous person, motivated by the love of evidenced truth, will negotiate these fears skillfully.

While firmness motivates us to hold on to a cherished conviction, sometimes the evidence points in another direction and we are called upon to abandon our belief, and this can be a fearful undertaking. The same is true when we are called upon to challenge publicly a popular conception or the view of a powerful person. Perseverance in the face of opposing ideas in such contexts can be dangerous and fearful. Intellectual courage, therefore, is associated with yet another intellectual virtue that we might call epistemic conscientiousness, although this latter virtue is broader than intellectual courage and manifests itself even in cases where there is no call for intellectual courage.

While I cannot hope to provide a complete catalog of intellectual virtues that flow from this understanding of phenomenological eudaimonism, I should mention intellectual humility, i.e., the disposition to be unconcerned about—and therefore inattentive to—one’s intellectual status. It is not that one falsely underestimates that status; it is just that it is not a major issue for the humble person. This unconcern with one’s own status leaves room for concern with intellectual goods (both for oneself and others) and attention to their pursuit. It creates space, in particular, for intellectual charity and intellectual generosity. It leads us to rejoice, for example, in the success of our students without concern to measure the degree of our own influence upon them.

Someone might object that this account of phenomenological eudaimonism and of the virtuous person is too heavily weighted toward intellectual virtues. Let me add four caveats by way of response. First, for rational agents eudaimonia must be realized in rational
activities. Anything else would be the *eudaimonia* of a non-rational being. Second, we must recall that the forms of reason are not merely—and perhaps not even primarily—theoretical. A pure theoretical reason is an abstraction from our straightforward experience of and engagement with the world, and indeed, it is an abstraction that cannot fully leave behind the practical since theorizing is a special kind of *praxis*.

Third, and more important to say, then, is that this account of *eudaimonia* and virtue points to an account of virtue in the sphere of action just as much as it does in the sphere of reason. Having the right attitudes—emotions and desires—and performing the right actions belong just as much to the notion of eudaimonism sketched here as knowing theoretical truths. The intellectual virtues identified here operate in all three spheres of reasons. Indeed, since the most encompassing of the three forms of reason is practical, and since practical reason is concerned not merely with knowing what is right but in doing the right in all the spheres of human activity, these intellectual virtues underlie our grasp and exercise of moral virtues as well.

Finally, the attainment of *eudaimonia* and development and exercise of the intellectual virtues about which I have so far spoken requires the satisfaction of certain conditions, and the satisfaction of these conditions points to other goods beyond intellectual goods that must be realized in order for *eudaimonia* to be possible at all. These goods—like the intellectual goods and virtues already mentioned—are valuable both in their own right and as conducive to *eudaimonia*. Chief among these goods are the physical conditions of food, shelter (both clothing and housing), and health as well as the provision of a good education. These goods call forth a doctrine of social and economic rights that can again be embodied in political structures and institutions, e.g., national health care plans and public (and publicly supported private) educational institutions. Once again, however, the political forms do not fully
account for the virtue of distributive justice; they simply create the space in which this virtue is exercised, both in the public sphere—e.g., in debates regarding fiscal policy and the redistribution of wealth or in debates about the allocation of health-care resources among a population for whom there are insufficient resources—and in the private sphere—e.g., in decisions about charitable or philanthropic contributions, volunteer activities, and the like. While the notion of distributive justice in both the public and private spheres is central to the view of moral virtue, the virtue of distributive justice does not exhaust the virtues at work in this sphere. The virtuous person transcends what justice requires in acts expressive of (material) generosity or philanthropy, of even-temperedness, mild-manneredness, self-control, kindness, honesty, friendship, and so forth.

I cannot, of course, recite the full litany of the virtues. I only hope to have shown that in phenomenology there is room for a eudaimonism and a normative account of the virtues that are relevant to debates in contemporary moral philosophy.