David Woodruff Smith’s *Husserl* (2007) sculpt Husserl, along with Aristotle and Kant, on the Mount Rushmore of Western philosophy. He does so because all three were great systematic philosophers whose systems radically changed and improved earlier ones (5). Smith says, “Integrating theories in logic, ontology, phenomenology, epistemology, and social cum ethical theory—in a way that is not yet widely understood—Husserl developed a complex and wide-ranging system of philosophy” (2). The phenomenology for which Husserl is best known is, for Smith, only a part of Husserl’s systematic philosophy, albeit a part that “plays its special role” (1). Its special role derives from the fact that it is the study of intentionality and thereby provides “the proper foundation for knowledge” (12; see also 77). But that alone, according to Smith, is insufficient to make Husserl’s phenomenology fundamental.

Phenomenology, Smith sometimes suggests, is first among equals, foundational in a special way among reciprocally founding parts:

For Husserl…all philosophy is founded on the phenomenological theory of intentionality, but phenomenology, logic, ontology, and epistemology are in certain ways mutually founding. Thus, Husserl’s philosophy developed with a kind of structured holism, even as phenomenology became the avowed centerpiece and the proclaimed foundation for the whole system (12).

As we can detect in the last quoted sentence, however, Smith’s acknowledgment of the priority Husserl gives phenomenology over the other philosophical sciences is grudging: “the *avowed* centerpiece and the *proclaimed* foundation” (my emphases) grudging. As he does in this quotation, Smith continually insists on the reciprocal foundation of the basic philosophical sciences of logic, ontology, phenomenology, and epistemology (see, e.g., 2, 8, 37–38, 41, 45, 69, 72–73, 77, 129, 188), and phenomenology ultimately remains just one part of Husserl’s systematic philosophy. I believe Smith misunderstands the relation of phenomenology to ontology and that this leads, in turn, to a systematic misreading of Husserl’s important phenomenological insights. In what follows I shall suggest (1) that Husserl reinscribes ontology *within* phenomenology and (2) that “ontologizing” the noema distorts Husserl’s theory of intentionality.
Ontology and phenomenology.

Smith provides two arguments for his view of the relation of ontology to phenomenology: (a) the continuity argument that underlies the claim that phenomenology is part of a larger philosophical whole, and (b) the presupposition argument that underlies the claim that ontology founds (in part) phenomenology. I shall challenge both arguments.

a. Against the continuity argument.

According to Smith, the Logical Investigations of 1900-1902 outline the different and interconnected parts of Husserl’s unified systematic philosophy (66; see also Smith 2002; 2003). So, according to Smith, Husserl turns his attention in the first investigation to logic, specifically, the theory of meaning. Husserl then turns in the second and third investigations to ontological issues, detailing first a theory of universals (species) and then a theory of wholes and parts. In the fourth investigation, Husserl returns to logic, employing the theory of wholes and parts to develop a theory of pure logical grammar. The fifth investigation turns to “phenomenology,” i.e., the theory of intentionality, and the sixth takes up epistemology. Combining this view of the unity of the Investigations with the continuity thesis, i.e., the view that Husserl’s career does not involve radical turns but rather develops along a single trajectory that constantly expands the depth of analysis in his philosophical system (33–35), Smith concludes that Husserl’s mature philosophy is a similar systematic achievement of a unity of philosophical subdisciplines. This view implies that phenomenology is more like—to use Husserl’s parlance—a regional science of consciousness, including its real and abstract contents (noemata), than it is itself a comprehensive philosophy (166–67, 188–93; see also 144).

There are, however, different ways to read both the unity of the Investigations and the continuity of Husserl’s thought. With regard to the unity of the Investigations we should note that it begins and ends with the same question: what is the theoretical discipline underlying the normativity of logic? The answer rejected at the beginning is psychology, and the answer proposed at the end is pure logic. Given (1) the argument of the “Prolegomena” that psychology cannot be the theoretical science that underlies logical laws because the (propositional) meanings governed by those laws are ideal and objective, and given (2) the undeniable fact that these meanings can be thought by minds, Husserl is faced with the problem of relating meanings to minds, i.e., with the problem of the relationship between the subjectivity of knowing and the objectivity of the content known. The main body of the Investigations addresses just this problem. At the time of the first edition (1900–1901), descriptive psychology addresses the problem, but by the time
of the the second edition (1913), it is phenomenology that does this work (Husserl [1900/1913] 1975, 12–13; 1970, 47).

Perhaps the most significant difference between the first and second editions of the *Investigations* concerns just this difference between descriptive psychology and phenomenology. Whereas in the first edition Husserl had introduced “an important distinction…between the real (reellen) or phenomenological (descriptive-psychological) content of an act and its intentional content,” in the second edition he introduces an “important phenomenological (my emphasis) distinction…between the real (reellen) content of an act and its intentional content” (Husserl [1901/1913] 1984, 411; 1970, 576). The first edition identifies phenomenological content with descriptive-psychological content, and intentional content falls outside the bounds of that with which a descriptive psychology is properly concerned. The second edition, on the other hand, distinguishes real and intentional content within the phenomenological content, and the intentional content now falls within the bounds of what can be phenomenologically considered. Husserl considered the change of sufficient significance that he called attention to it in a footnote in the second edition, a footnote that refers us to the detailed account of the noesis-noema correlation presented in *Ideas I* (see Husserl [1913] 1976, 200–22; 1983, 211–33).

Central to this development is the phenomenological reduction, the new methodological technique that Husserl first details in the five introductory lectures to his 1907 *Dingkolleg* (on the perception of material things in space) that mark the transition from descriptive psychology to transcendental phenomenology. The phenomenological reduction involves the suspension of our participation in the belief that characterizes the natural attitude, i.e., the belief that the world and its objects exist. In suspending our participation in that belief, our reflective attention apprehends the object simply as experienced, but this ‘object as experienced’ is neither a content psychologically immanent to the experiencing subject nor something ontologically distinct from the object experienced in the natural attitude. Part and parcel of the development of the notion of the reduction, in other words, is a working out of revised senses of the terms “immanence” and “transcendence” (see Brough 2008) and of the distinction between the psychological and the transcendental (see Drummond 2008).

The reduction is no reduction to the merely subjective. The reduction is a leading-back of our attention to the experience in which an object is presented along with the object just as presented in that experience. In this phenomenological attitude we attend to the synthetic performances and achievements in which an object is presented as having a certain significance for us and to the various layers of sense that make up that significance. *Contra* Smith, then, consciousness in the transcendental sense is not a region of the world and phenomenology is not a regional science.
Consciousness in the psychological sense—what Husserl usually refers to as psyche or soul—is an ontological region and the subject matter of psychology (including descriptive psychology), but transcendental consciousness as the correlation of experiencing subject and object as experienced transcends the distinction among regions.

The reworked distinction of the second edition of the *Investigations* marks, then, both a methodological and substantive change in Husserl’s understanding of phenomenology, but it does not radically alter the overall unity of the second edition of the *Investigations*. This unity, I have said, lies in the concern to identify the theoretical discipline underlying a normative logic. That discipline is pure logic, and the clarification of the basic concepts of logic requires founding phenomenological investigations. Husserl is explicit about this in the *Investigations* themselves. He calls these phenomenological investigations “a new foundation of pure logic and epistemology” (Husserl [1900/1913] 1975, 7; 1970, 43; cf. Husserl [1901/1913] 1984, 7; 1970, 249–50), and, we can note, he does not speak of logic or epistemology (or ontology) as reciprocally founding the phenomenological investigations. Moreover, looking back upon the *Investigations* from the perspective of *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, Husserl writes: “…the ‘phenomenological’ investigations in the second volume…paved the way to a transcendental phenomenology” (Husserl [1929] 1974, 160–61; 1969, 152). The *Investigations* are, in brief, proto-phenomenological.

Based on a different reading of the unity of the *Investigations*, then, I can fully endorse the continuity thesis. The overall continuity endures despite the important discontinuity introduced in the move from descriptive psychology to transcendental phenomenology. In that move, Husserl abandons a science that investigates a region of the world (consciousness and its real = phenomenological = descriptive-psychological contents) to a science that investigates the region-transcending correlation of consciousness of the world and the phenomenological (real + intentional) “content” of that correlation. Smith’s view of the unity of the *Investigations* and the continuity of Husserl’s thought leads him to think of phenomenology as a regional science of consciousness and reciprocally founding with logic, epistemology, and ontology, whereas I am claiming that the *Investigations* are a proto-phenomenology and that phenomenology is a comprehensive, clarifying science that grounds logic, epistemology, and—as I shall now argue—ontology.

*b. Against the presupposition argument.*

Smith’s second argument for the view that ontology (in part) founds phenomenology is the presupposition argument. Ontology, Smith claims, is presupposed by phenomenology. On Smith’s reading, Husserl’s concern was first directed
to clarifying certain ontological concepts, such as ‘whole’ and ‘part’, ‘fact’ and ‘essence,’ which then served in the elucidation of phenomenological concepts. We have already seen Smith’s evidence for the priority of ontology in his view of the unity of the *Logical Investigations*. The ontological questions are addressed in the second and third investigations as a background for the phenomenology that is undertaken in the fifth (66–68, 136). Another example is §§1–26 of *Ideas I*, which explain the sense of important logico-ontological concepts in order to prepare the phenomenological considerations introduced in §27 and beyond (136, 140, 173, 238, 295). But it is not merely that these ontological notions were treated first; they are, for Smith, philosophical presuppositions for what Husserl accomplishes in his phenomenology (72–74, 77, 140, 238, 275, 294–300).

Once again, however, there is an alternative reading available. We might compare the logico-ontological considerations at the beginning of *Ideas I* to Aristotle’s *Organon*, a discussion of the terms in which we talk about objects, or in Husserl’s case, the terms in which we explicate consciousness of the world. There is a kind of hermeneutic bootstrapping at work. We begin by identifying the ordinary understanding of the categories as they work in our discourse about things, and we then clarify them philosophically in reflection. In Aristotle’s case, the logical categories of the *Organon* are clarified in the *Metaphysics*, and in Husserl’s case, the logico-ontological categories are clarified in his phenomenology. It is interesting to note, in this regard, that from the beginning Husserl’s distinction between wholes and parts is explicated, at least in part, in presentational (i.e., phenomenological) terms (Husserl [1901/1913] 1984; 1970, 439). Moreover, some of the most ontological sounding of Husserl’s claims in *Ideas I*, e.g., regarding the absolute being of consciousness and the annihilation of the world, are, as Smith admits (see, e.g., 178–80), to be understood phenomenologically.

In this light it is instructive to look at Husserl’s mature treatment in *Formal and Transcendental Logic* of the relations between logic, ontology, and phenomenology. Husserl’s claim is that the *Investigations* had pointed to a distinction between formal logic and formal ontology (the formal theory of objects) (Husserl [1929] 1974, 93; 1969, 89, referring to Husserl [1900/1913] 1975, §§62–68). *Formal and Transcendental Logic* resumes this discussion by distinguishing two different approaches in the tradition that makes up the science of logic, namely, apophantic logic and mathematical logic. Apophantic logic examines the *apophansis*, the assertive judgment in which something is predicated of or in a subject, and develops our understanding of what Husserl calls “meaning-categories” (*Bedeutungskategorien*) (Husserl [1929] 1974, 92; 1969, 88) such as ‘judgment’ or ‘proposition,’ ‘subject,’ ‘predicate,’ and ‘syllogism.’ On the
other hand, mathematical logic—the mathematics of sums and sets and relations—grasps form as that which is applicable to “‘anything whatever’” (Husserl [1929] 1974, 91; 1969, 87, translation modified), and Husserl interprets this as formal ontology, the formal theory of objects, with its correlative set of “object-categories” (Gegenstandskategorien) such as ‘object,’ ‘state of affairs,’ ‘unity,’ ‘plurality,’ ‘number,’ and ‘relation’ (Husserl [1929] 1974, 92; 1969, 88–90). Formal ontology, in other words, is characterized first by its contrast with formal apophantic logic.

Formal and Transcendental Logic goes beyond the Investigations, however, in also clarifying the unity of apophantics and the formal theory of objects:5

Ultimately all the forms of objects, all the derivative formations of anything-whatever, do make their appearance in formal apophantics itself; since indeed, as a matter of essential necessity, determinations (properties and relative determinations), states of affairs, combinations, relationships, wholes and parts, sets, cardinal numbers, and all the other modes of objectivity, in concreto and explicated originally, have being for us—as truly existent or possibly existent modes—only as making their appearance in judgments (Husserl [1929] 1974, 83; 1969, 79, translation modified).

This quotation accomplishes two things. It points, first, to the intentional relation between acts and their objects and, second, to the fact that even ontological concepts find their ultimate clarification only in the context of a phenomenological clarification of the experiences in which objects are presented in determinate ways. This is not to say, of course, that these entities and ontological forms owe their being to the judgment; it is only to say that the clarification of ontological concepts presupposes the phenomenology, the intentional analysis, of the experiences in which objects are given. Ontology, for Husserl, whether formal or material (regional), is the science of objects of experience, and ontology is thereby reinscribed within phenomenology.

2. Misreading intentionality.

The movement from viewing meaning-forms and object-forms simply as correlational to viewing them as an identity-in-correlation presupposes, however, an account of the intentionality of the logical, i.e., of how the logical as such arises for us such that it can be grasped in its identity-relation with the ontological. Because Smith is committed to the priority of ontology over phenomenology, however, he is led to ask what I take to be a wrongheaded question about intentionality. He asks what kind of entity the noema is (275). His answer is that it is an entity “utterly different in kind
from both the act and the object” (57); it is an ideal, abstract entity that mediates the relation of an act to its object (cf., e.g., 257, 260–61, 275–80).

The doctrine of the noesis-noema correlation, however, is a phenomenological doctrine, not an ontological one. Just as we must understand the ontologically strong-sounding language of “absolute being” and “annihilation of the world” phenomenologically, so too must we understand the doctrine of the noema phenomenologically, i.e., in the light of the doctrine of the phenomenal reduction as a change in attitude. In changing the attitude in which I consider an object, I am not disclosing a special kind of (previously undisclosed) entity. I am instead considering the same object in a new and special way. In the phenomenal attitude, I suspend the belief in existence that is built into the natural attitude’s straightforward experience of objects as having a particular significance for us, and I consider the object as it appears to me and to us, i.e., in its significance for me and for us.

The idea of an identity-in-correlation presented in a manifold of attitudinally distinct experiences can be traced through three Husserlian discussions. In these discussions, we see how the domain of sense (the subject matter for pure logic) arises in a modification of our encounter with objects. The first discussion is Husserl’s introduction of the notion of the noema in a well known passage from *Ideas I*:

> Perception, for example, has its noema, most basically its perceptual sense, i.e., the perceived as perceived. Similarly, memory has its remembered as such, just as its [remembered], precisely as it is “meant,” “known” in [the remembering]; again, judging has the judged as such, pleasure the pleasing as such, and so forth (Husserl [1913] 1976, 203; 1983, 214, translation modified).

Note that Husserl characterizes the noema as at once (1) the intended object as intended and (2) a sense. I take it, contra Dreyfus (1984), that the only plausible reading of expressions like “the perceived as perceived” refers to the object experienced in the natural attitude and not to some special entity. On Smith’s own account (264), the noema is not an object of perception but a correlate of the perception by virtue of which the perceiving intends its object. This introduces an apparent problem for Smith, since Husserl here explicitly—at least on the “self-evident reading”—identifies the noema as the intended object and the sense.

The second discussion of an identity in attitudinally different experiences reveals more clearly how the sense—in the manner relevant for logic—arises in our experience. The logician is concerned with the logical senses expressed in language, and in §124 of *Ideen I* Husserl speaks of the interweaving of expressive act-strata with other acts. He claims
that anything intentionally presented as significant for us is expressible in language. The noematic sense is, as it were, extracted from the full noema and attached to a linguistic expression. The expression thereby refers to the same object experienced in the underlying presentation and refers to it in the same determinate manner as the underlying experience (cf. 111–15). The intended objectivity just as intended is disclosed by both the underlying act and the expression precisely because the underlying act’s noematic sense has been made into the meaning of the expression. It is in this light that Husserl can claim that there is an identity—albeit at the same time a differentiation—between meaning-forms and object-forms.

These two discussions reveal how sense is contained in both our direct and our linguistically mediated experience of objects, but both these kinds of experience remain directed to the objects themselves. We are absorbed in the things which engage our attention. In speaking of these things, we most often remain fully engaged with them rather than with the words we use or with the logical sense as such (although, of course, we can turn our attention to the words and their sense). We do not yet, in other words, have an account of how the logical sense emerges for our attention precisely as logical, precisely as logical content. It is in the third discussion that we find an account of the emergence of the logical as such. This discussion is found in Formal and Transcendental Logic and concerns the disclosure of the proposition, the judgment in the logical sense.

Acts of judging are directed to a state of affairs, i.e., to those objects about which we judge and their determinations and relations, and we are not aware of any logical objectivity that we might call the judgmental content or the proposition. However, we can reflectively direct our attention to the judged as such, to the judged state of affairs precisely as supposed. We might do so, for example, in those cases where we come to doubt the truth of our own judgments or of those reported to us by a speaker. In either case, we neutralize our acceptance of the judgment and critically reflect upon it. The state of affairs is no longer something we posit for ourselves. Nor, however, do we deny or negate it. We instead simply consider the state of affairs as supposed in our judging or as expressed in someone’s report. The judgment, in other words, takes on for us a double character: what is judged—that is, the categorially formed state of affairs—and the judgment merely as such, i.e., the supposition as supposed, the proposition, or the judgment in the logical sense (Husserl [1929] 1974; 1969, §48). The intended state of affairs and the proposition are properly distinguished, therefore, by means of a difference in the way we focus the meant objectivity. In the straightforward focus on objects, we apprehend the categorial objectivity or state of affairs as such; in the critical focus on the state of affairs
as supposed, we apprehend the judgment or proposition (Husserl [1929] 1974; 1969, §50), more precisely, the intended state of affairs with respect to the sense it has for us.

Although it is only phenomenological or transcendental reflection that allows us to see clearly what occurs in our apprehension of the logical domain, the critical or logical reflection that focuses on the sense or logical content of an experience is different from the phenomenological reflection that views the object as the correlate of an intending. In critically reflecting on the proposition, I do not, as I do in a phenomenological reflection, consider the proposition in relation to the experience in which I intend the state of affairs. Instead, I consider the proposition in relation to the state of affairs straightforwardly experienced, and I seek confirmation or disconfirmation of this state of affairs as supposed by us or as affirmed by my interlocutor. The identity-in-correlation of the logical and the ontological, therefore, is fully realized only at the third level of logic that Husserl calls the logic of truth (Husserl [1929] 1974; 1969, §§13–15).

We can further clarify the point about the identity-in-differentiation of the ontological and the logical by examining the underlying structure of the noema and its relation to pure logical grammar. Husserl distinguishes three moments in the noema: the thetic characteristic, the noematic sense, and the determinable $X$ (Husserl [1913] 1976, 205–206, 297–304; 1983, 216–18, 309–16). The determinable $X$, he says, “makes up the necessary central point of the core and functions as ‘bearer’ for noematic peculiarities specifically belonging to the core, that is to say, the noematically modified properties of the ‘meant as meant’” (Husserl [1913] 1976, 299; 1983, 311). Husserl makes the same distinction between the identical objectivity (the determinable $X$) and its “properties” in different language when he says shortly thereafter:

> it is evident that we must...be able in each consciousness to accomplish a noematic description of this [objective (Gegenständliches)] “exactly as it is meant;” we acquire by explication and conceptual grasping a closed set of formal or material, materially determined or materially “undetermined” (“emptily” meant) “predicates,” and these in their modified meaning determine the content of the object-core of the noema under discussion (Husserl [1913] 1976, 301; 1983, 312–13, translation modified).

The “predicates,” of course, as Husserl immediately points out, must be “predicates of “something”” (Husserl [1913] 1976, 301; 1983, 13). Hence, we can say that the determinable $X$ as the “bearer” of “properties” is also the “subject” of “predicates.” Husserl, in other words, has used both “ontological” terms (“bearer” and “properties”) and “logical” terms (“subject” and “predicates”) to describe the inner structure of the noematic sense. This comes as no surprise if the
noema is both the intended object itself just as intended and a sense. It is just this identity of the intended object itself (just as intended) and the sense that Smith denies in his ontological approach to Husserl’s account of intentionality.

The text to which Smith and other advocates of a distinction between the intended object and the noema invariably appeal—and Smith appeals to it no fewer than three times (57, 245, 266–67)—is:

The tree simpliciter, the physical thing belonging to Nature, is anything but (nichts weniger als) this perceived tree as perceived which, as perceptual sense, inseparably belongs to the perception. The tree simpliciter can burn up, be resolved into its chemical elements, etc. But the sense—the sense of this perception, something belonging necessarily to its essence—cannot burn up; it has no chemical elements, no forces, no real properties (Husserl [1913] 1976, 205; 1983, 216, translation modified).

I agree with Smith that “nichts weniger als” should be read as an intensified negation. Hence, the tree-noema is anything but the tree simpliciter in nature. This passage, however, is exceptional in the strength of its claim, and I stress again that this ontologically sounding claim must be understood phenomenologically. My claim is that the categorial difference noted in the text does not entail an ontological difference. The categorial differences, i.e., the differences in predicables and the forms of predication, do not entail that the objects referred to by the subject terms of the predications are ontologically different. If I say, “The wall is white,” and “The wall as experienced in this perception appears gray,” I am speaking of one and the same wall even though the predicates are different; the object and the noema are not ontologically distinct, but the single object is considered in different ways. In the first case, I am straightforwardly focused on the object as it is, whereas in the second, I am reflectively focused on the object as it appears and as the correlate of the act in which it appears. It is just this kind of difference that is at work in the text Smith has thrice cited.

While this last example is not perfectly analogous to Husserl’s claim, I think the general point is the same. The object simpliciter and the object (as) reflected upon are the same object, but what we say of them is different. Even though the tree I see [at \(t_1\) in \(p\)] burns up and no longer exists, the tree—the very same tree—as seen at \(t_1\) in \(p\), insofar as this experience is retained in subsequent experiences, remains available to me [at \(t_3\)] for memorial recall and reflection. It remains available to me with the sense that it had for me as given in \(p\) at \(t_1\). Nothing in this claim points to the existence of two entities. What is indicated are two experiences: the first, perceptual experience apprehends at \(t_1\) the tree with a certain significance (say, as burning and existing), while the second, reflective experience at \(t_2\) apprehends the tree—no longer burning and existing—as having had that significance for me at \(t_1\). The tree’s significance for me as
given in a certain experience does not disappear in the manner that it and its natural properties do insofar as the tree as
given with that significance as the correlate of a particular experience remains available to memory and reflection just
to the degree that the experience (with its correlate) is retained in subsequent experiences.

Hence, Smith’s critique of the “east coast” position misses the mark. According to Smith, on the “east coast”
interpretation, the noema of the original perception is X as f and the reflective act’s noema is (X as f) as T, and this turns
an attitudinal modality into a property. Smith’s formulation, however, misconstrues the position. The original
experience’s intended object (= full noema) is (X as f) [as P with its thetic characteristic of belief]. The full noema, we
should recall, comprises both a noematic sense and a thetic character, and the two different instances of “as” point to
these two moments. X is perceived as f with the thetic characteristic of (perceptual) belief. In the phenomenological
or transcendental reflection, however, we have as our object (X as f) [as T with a neutralized belief and precisely as
correlate of the synthetic performances and achievements proper to the perceiving act]. The transcendental reflection
is no more a property of the object than the perceiving. The same noematic sense (= the same intended object just as
intended) is given in acts of different kinds and with different thetic characteristics, but this is just to say that the same
object is given in the same determinate manner in acts of different kinds and with different thetic characteristics, for the
only entity that we are speaking of here is throughout X.

Similarly, in the case of critical (logical) reflection, we begin with the straightforward judgment ‘X is f,’ and turn
our attention to propositional sense. One way that we do this is in quotation. While I would not agree that the reduction
is “phenomenological quotation” (247), I do believe, with Sokolowski ([1984] 1992, 46ff.), that ordinary quotation is
an incipient phenomenological reduction. Smith makes the judgment ‘X is f,’ and reports it to me in the sentence “X
is f.” I in turn report Smith’s having made that judgment to someone else by saying, “Smith says, ‘X is f.’” Both Smith’s
judgment and my quotation of it focus attention on the state of affairs of X’s being f. But my quotation does not affirm
that state of affairs in the way that Smith’s judgment does. In quoting Smith’s judgment, I neither affirm nor deny but
simply direct one’s attention to the state of affairs as Smith has proposed it and to Smith as the one judging. The state
of affairs as Smith has proposed it is the proposition, a mere proposal about the way things are. In this case, the noematic
shift is from (X’s being f) [as J with its thetic characteristic of belief] to (X’s being f) [as Q with a neutralized belief].
Moreover, in the case of phenomenological reflection on the judgmental experience, the noema of the
phenomenologically reflective act is (X’s being f) [as T with a neutralized belief and precisely as correlate of the
synthetic performances and achievements of the judging]. Once again, however, the only thing that serves as the object of the judgment, the quotation, and the phenomenologically reflective act is the state of affairs that X is f. The “east coast” position does not claim, and has never claimed, that the object and the noema are identical in all respects, that the noema and object are perfectly coincident. The claim is that the noema is not a mediating entity, that is not ontologically distinct from the intended object even as it is categorically distinct. The noema is the intended object just as intended with its various shades and nuances of meaning in experiences that are different in kind, that belong to subjects having different backgrounds, attitudes, interests, and motivations, and that are governed by different sets of psycho-physical conditions.7

In conclusion, the continuity in Husserl’s thought is in the direction of a transcendental phenomenology that is fundamental to all other disciplines insofar as the meanings at work in those disciplines are clarified in phenomenology. Phenomenology reinscribes ontology as the science of the objects of experience, and the ontological categories applicable to objects of experience are clarified phenomenologically. Finally, phenomenological notions, such as the noema, should not themselves be interpreted ontologically.

NOTES

1. Interlinear page references to this work will include only page numbers.
2. I would claim that these three are great philosophers because each plays the role of synthesizer. Aristotle synthesizes pre-Socratic naturalism with the “idealism” of forms found in Plato; Kant synthesizes rationalism and empiricism; and Husserl, it may be said (although Husserl does not say it), synthesizes Aristotle and Kant (cf. Drummond, 1992; 2005). This is why I would add St. Thomas Aquinas to Mount Rushmore; he synthesizes the Platonic and Aristotelian dimensions of the Greek philosophical tradition while refashioning the synthesis, begun by the Patristics, of that tradition with the Judaeo-Christian scriptural and theological traditions.
3. These five lectures are collected as The Idea of Phenomenology ([1907] 1973; 1999); Smith (79) incorrectly identifies them as the “Paris Lectures.”
4. Smith (98) agrees with this point.
5. I have explored in greater detail the relations between logic and ontology in Drummond 2003; 2007.
6. Dreyfus admits (1984, 111), that reading expressions like “the perceived as perceived” as referring to the perceived object just as it is perceived, that is, in its appearing, is a “seemingly self-evident reading.” Nevertheless, he labels it “misleading” (1984, 112) and “counterintuitive” (1984, 113), although without any real argument for that conclusion. I take the reference of such expressions to be the “seemingly” self-evident one! So, I think, does Smith, but that, as I shall discuss, raises a problem for him.
7. Hence, Smith’s “correction” of the “east coast” position for the most part simply states that position. However, the “east coast” position does not think of the object as a pole of identity; rather, it is a self-transforming identity in the manifold of its appearings, including its non-veridical ones.
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