Intentionality is most broadly characterized as mind’s directedness upon something. This broad characterization accords with our sense of the mind’s “openness to the world,” as Tim Crane (2008) puts it, or of the mind’s self-transcendence in apprehending an object, as a phenomenologist might put it. Such language captures the ordinary belief that one is directly and without mediation aware of ordinary things and states of affairs, that the subject and the world stand, as it were, in a certain kind of relation that is uniquely different from the relation of being in the world. The subject is subject of the world, and the relation is a dyadic, intentional relation of mind to world. Representationalist accounts, however, claim that mind is only mediately aware of ordinary things and states of affairs. The intentional relation, on this account, is triadic: mind, representation or representative content, and world.

1. Motivating representationalism

The view that mind is only mediately related to the world is motivated first of all by two problems arising in the critique of perceptual experience. The first problem is perceptual illusion. If we define, with A.D. Smith (2002: 23), an illusion as “any perceptual situation in which a physical object is actually perceived, but in which that object perceptually appears other than it really is,” then, to the extent that the subject in the presence of red lighting sees the wall-
as-pink, the perception is illusory. This suggests that the perception does not in fact apprehend the worldly, white wall, but rather some object other than the worldly thing.

The second problem is hallucination, and the conclusion is similar. On the assumption that hallucinations are from the first-person perspective phenomenally indistinguishable from perceptions, and given, by hypothesis, that the object of the hallucination is no worldly thing, the object of the hallucination must be some kind of special object—something other than an ordinary, worldly thing to which the hallucinatory experience apparently directs itself.

Both problems can be generalized beyond perception. The problem of illusion can be generalized as the problem of the conception-dependence of intentional relations (Smith and McIntyre 1984: 13–15). An object is invariably experienced in a particular way or under a description or under a particular conception. Insofar as one can intend an existent object, say, the fact of S’s being p, but under a misconception, that is, as S’s being q, the intentional object that S is q must be distinct from the worldly state of affairs of S’s being p. For example, one might believe that Barack Obama is a Muslim when he is actually a Christian. The difference between the supposed state of affairs that is the object of the belief ‘that O is M’ and the actual state of affairs ‘that O is C’ motivates the claim that our belief is directed to an object that is ontologically distinct from the actual state of affairs. The problem of hallucination can be generalized as the problem of the existence-independence of intentional relations (Smith and McIntyre 1984: 11–13). One can, for example, wish for something that is non-existent or even impossible. The wishing takes an object, but the what we wish for does not exist. The object, then, must once again be a special kind of object that is other than the ordinary, worldly thing for which we wish and which does not exist.
Moreover, both problems—conception-dependence and existence-independence—have analogous problems in the philosophy of logic and language. These problems arise in “intensional contexts,” that is, those contexts wherein the truth-value of a sentence cannot be determined by the extensions of its semantically significant parts. Intensional contexts typically involve modal operators or attributions of mental events or propositional attitudes to a subject. In the context of a discussion of intentionality, our concern is primarily with act-contexts created by the use of expressions referring to mental acts and their objects.

The conception-dependence of intentional relations manifests itself in act-contexts as the failure of the logical principle of the substitutivity of identity (Smith and McIntyre 1984: 26). This principle states that for two expressions which are extensionally, but not logically, equivalent, that is, for two expressions which have the same referent but different meanings, the substitution of one expression for the other yields a proposition having the same truth-value as the original proposition. The principle fails in act-contexts because when one of the expressions refers to an object intended in the act and the subject of the act is unaware of the extensional equivalence of the expressions, the substitution will yield a proposition which will not have the same truth value. So, for example from the fact that Jones believes that William Jefferson Clinton was impeached we cannot infer that Jones believes that the forty-second President of the United States was impeached because Jones might be unaware of the fact that William Jefferson Clinton was the forty-second President of the United States. The reason for the failure of substitutivity of identity is that the propositions in question are not genuinely about the facts believed but are about the believing of the facts and the substitution of one expression for the
other within the statement of what is believed yields a proposition about a distinct act of believing.

The existence-independence of intentional relations manifests itself in act-contexts as the failure of existential generalization. While we can ordinarily infer from the fact that John Doe is a murderer (Mj) to the fact that there exists someone who is a murderer [(∃x)(Mx)], such an inference fails in act-contexts when either of two conditions is satisfied:

1. When a singular term fails to refer to any existent entity (Smith and McIntyre 1984: 28-30), or
2. When a singular term in an act-context refers to a unique, but indefinitely determined existent (Smith and McIntyre 1984: 30–31). To exemplify the first kind of failure we note that from the fact that Jones believes that Pegasus is a winged horse we cannot infer that (∃x)(Jones believes that Pegasus is x), and to exemplify the second kind of failure we note that from the fact that Jones believes that the best political biographer in the land makes a great deal of money we cannot infer that (∃x)(Jones believes that x makes a great deal of money).

We are dealing with a special kind of indeterminateness in the failure of existential generalization, namely, intentions that are existentially indefinite. Quine’s example (1961: 148) for illuminating the difference between de dicto and de re modalities is instructive. In a game in which no ties are permitted it is necessary that someone win, although it is not necessary that any particular player win. Hence, the de dicto modality ‘□ (∃x)(x will win)’ is true, but the de re modality ‘(∃x) □ (x will win)’ is false. In modal contexts, the difference is explained in terms of the placement of the quantifier relative to the modal operator. In act-contexts, by contrast, the difference is the difference between existentially indefinite intentions and definite ones (Smith and McIntyre 1984: 32). Thus, if Jones believes that the best political biographer in the land
makes a great deal of money but does not know who the best political biographer in the land is, we have a de dicto intention for which existential generalization fails. We cannot infer from ‘Jones believes that the best political biographer in the land makes a great deal of money’ that ‘(∃x)(Jones believes x makes a great deal of money).’ However if Jones believes both that the best political biographer in the land makes a great deal of money, and that Doris Kearns Goodwin is the best political biographer in the land, existential generalization is valid. We can infer that Jones believes that ‘(∃x)(Jones believes x [namely, Doris Kearns Goodwin] makes a great deal of money),’ even though Jones is intending ‘Doris Kearns Goodwin’ is indefinite in another respect. It is indefinite because Jones cannot intend all Goodwin’s features and attributes, all there is to know about Goodwin (Smith and McIntyre 1984: 18–21). We might say that Jones’s de re intending ‘Doris Kearns Goodwin’ is attributively indefinite but existentially definite, whereas Jones’s de dicto intending ‘the best political biographer in the land,’ even though it intends a unique individual, is existentially indefinite because it fails properly to identify which unique individual is intended.

2. Representationalism

A number of positions can be developed as a response to these problems. One might argue that the new type of object is a psychological entity, that it is, as it were, mind-contained. On this view, there are at least two possibilities: (1) an indirect realism, of the sort we find in Descartes and Locke, in which the psychological entity represents (or fails to represent) the worldly thing, or (2) a subjective idealism in which the only objects for the mind are the psychological entities themselves and concatenations thereof, for example, Berkeleyan perceptions and their
phenomenalist organization. Alternatively, one might argue, at least regarding perception, in favor of a sense-datum theory, where the sense-datum is not a psychological entity—not mind-contained—and it might or might not be mind-independent (cf. Moore 1953 for a view that considered sense-data to be mind-independent; by contrast see Robinson 1994 for an account of sense-data as mind-dependent). The sense-datum is a new type of object to which a perception is directed.

Arguments for indirect realism, subjective idealism, and the sense-datum theory share a controversial assumption that Robinson (1994: 32) calls the “phenomenal principle”: “If there sensibly appears to a subject to be something which possesses a particular sensible quality then there is something of which the subject is aware which does possess that sensible quality.” This assumption can be generalized: if one is aware of something’s instantiating $F$, then there is something of which one is aware which does instantiate $F$. Generalizing the principle in this way yields what we might call, with Smith and McIntyre (1984: 41), an object-theory of intentionality. Object-theories of intentionality conceive the intentional relation as an ordinary relation in which all the relata belonging to the relation must exist. Hence, insofar as the objects of illusory perceptions, mistaken conceptions, and experiences intending non-existent objects are not the ordinary, worldly thing, the intentional relation must exist between the mental event or state and a special kind of object, namely, the intentional (but not intended) object. On all these views, the mind is no longer conceived as directly and without mediation aware of ordinary, worldly things and states of affairs.

The generalized phenomenal principle underlying the object-theoretical approach to intentionality is open to challenge. One kind of challenge claims that views dependent upon the
generalized phenomenal principle conflict with our sense of the mind’s openness to the world. Such views, with their intentional objects distinct from worldly objects, imply that mental events and states apprehend the world, if they apprehend it at all, only indirectly and mediately. At best, the world is behind the screen of intentional objects, and we have no direct contact with it. At worst, all experience that purports to apprehend the world directly is, as Mackie (1977: ?) has put it in another context, in error (cf. Martin 2002: 421). If we take seriously our understanding that the mind is open to the world and our experience is in some kind of direct contact with the world, such views do not explain experience so much as explain it away on the basis of exceptional experiences. Unless there is absolutely compelling reason to accept the generalized phenomenal principle, there is no reason to accept this kind of object-theory or error-theory of intentionality.

A second kind of challenge to the generalized phenomenal principle objects that the intentional object need not instantiate the property of which one is aware but that it need only represent it (Anscombe 1965: ?; Searle 1983: ?). Hence, we might recast the phenomenal principle as: if one is aware of something’s instantiating $F$, then there is something of which one is aware which represents $F$. Instead of an intentional object instantiating $F$, we have an intentional content that represents $F$. The intentional content represents the intended thing or state of affairs in the same sense of ‘represents’ that a speech act represents a thing or state of affairs (Searle 1983: 4, 12). The intentional state, on Searle’s view, combines a psychological mode and a representative or intentional content in a manner similar to the speech act’s combining a propositional content and an illocutionary force (Searle 1983: 6). This similarity between speech acts and representative content means that we can understand intentionality in terms of a set of notions such as propositional content (although not all intentional states have a
propositional content—so perhaps it would be better to say meaning or sense), direction of fit, and conditions of satisfaction.

Searle adopts a “non-ontological” approach to intentionality (Searle 1983:16). He is not concerned to bring intentional events and states under an ontological category; he is concerned to bring them, or at least their representative content, under appropriate logical categories. Hence, a belief, for example, “is a propositional content in a certain psychological mode, its mode determines a mind-to-world direction of fit, and its propositional content determines a set of conditions of satisfaction” (Searle 1983: 15). This approach entails that an intentional object has no special ontological status. Indeed, the intentional object, for Searle, is “just an object like any other” (Searle 1983: 16). The intentional object is just the intended, worldly thing—what the mental event or state is directed upon. To use Searle’s example (1983:16–17), “if Bill admires President Carter, then the intentional object of his admiration is President Carter, the actual man and no some shadowy intermediate entity between Bill and the man.” The intentional object of the mental event or state might not exist, but the mental event or state is still characterized by a representative or intentional content in a psychological mode. The mental event or state has an intentional content by virtue of which it is directed to an intentional object which might or might not exist. But this, for Searle, is no more puzzling than linguistic expressions that fail to satisfy their conditions of satisfaction. There is no need to posit “an intermediate Meinongian entity or intentional object” for mental events or states to be about. A mental event or state has an intentional content, but it is not about that content (Searle 1983: 17).

Other views, however, take the ontological questions about representative or intentional content seriously. Smith and McIntyre, for example, distinguish the intentional object from the
intended, worldly thing (Smith and McIntyre 1984: 80). The intentional object is an intensional entity—a mode of presentation of the object—but this intensional entity or intentional object is not that to which the mental event or state is directed. The intentional object mediates the intentional relation to the intended, worldly thing (Smith and McIntyre 1984: 81). Hence, Smith and McIntyre claim that their view is a mediator-theory of intentionality. The direction of the mental event or state is realized by virtue of the fact that the mental event or state has an intentional content that refers to a worldly thing. The referent of this intensional entity is the intended object of the mental event or state. The model for this view is Frege’s theory of sense. The intensional entity or intentional object is a mind-dependent but not mind-contained, non-physical object that represents the intended thing and in representing it, refers the mind to it.

Despite the terminological differences, Searle’s view and Smith and McIntyre’s view are similar. In both cases, the intentional content mediates the relation of the experience to the intended object, which might or might not exist and which might or might not exist as conceived in the experience or state. These views differ from those object-theories of intentionality that posit a special ontological kind—the intentional object—as the target of the mental event or state. On those views, the relation to the intended object is neither direct nor unmediated. On the present views, however, the relation to the intended object is direct, although mediated. There is no intermediate entity that takes the place of the intended thing as the object of the mental event or state, nothing that “stands in” for the intended, worldly thing as object of the mental event or state. There is only an intensional content with particular logical properties and by virtue of that content the mental event or state is directed upon a worldly thing or state of affairs.
These views, then, are an advance upon the object-theories of intentionality insofar as they better capture our sense of “openness to the world.” Nevertheless, the mediating role that they attribute to representational or intentional content raises additional issues. Some of these issues are epistemological. How do we know whether our intentional experience is objectless or mistaken. If, for example, hallucinations are phenomenally indistinguishable from perceptions, the question of how can we recognize whether an experience is the perceiving of a worldly existent or the hallucinating of a non-existent object is an important and difficult question. However, the indistinguishability thesis is contestable. It is at least arguable that people experience hallucinations differently from how they experience perceptions. As Merleau-Ponty pointed out (1962: 33–45), the mere fact that we can ask the question about hallucination indicates that we have an experiential way of distinguishing them from perceptions. And to modify Austin’s example, hallucinating that one is presented to the Pope is nothing like really being presented to the Pope (Austin 1962: 48-9). Moreover, I take it that in at least some cases we intend non-existent or even impossible objects knowing they are non-existent as, for example, in wishing for world peace or in wishing I had not had that extra piece of pie at Thanksgiving dinner.

Similarly in the case of mistaken perceptions or misconceptions, intentional experience must contain within itself the motives for correcting our misperceptions and misconceptions, and this allows us to distinguish—even if not in every instance—the veridical and true from the non-veridical and false. Furthermore, in many cases, especially in perception, we experience the object as it actually is even as the appearance is “illusory.” In the case of the red lighting, for example, it is much more likely that I continue to see the wall as white even as it appears pink
than I come to believe that the wall is pink. Our learned patterns of experiencing things in different circumstances and conditions are lead us to compensate—automatically, as it were, for these misleading appearances. It is not enough to say, for example, that the failure to satisfy the conditions for satisfaction reveal the non-veridicality or falsity of the mental event or state. The epistemological question has to do with how we know that the conditions are not satisfied. How do we come to recognize this? The answer to these kinds of questions is phenomenological.

3. A presentational account.

The presentational account, like the representational one, holds that the relation between mental events or mental states is direct but mediated. The two views, however, offer different accounts of the mediation involved in the mind’s intentional directedness to the world. I should note, however, that the representationalist account can distinguish presentation and representation. Searle (1983: 45–46), for example, thinks that perception is presentation and that, nevertheless, presentation is a species of representation. Presentation is representational insofar as it has representational content in a psychological mode, a direction of fit, and conditions of satisfaction. Perceptual presentation differs from representation in general, however, insofar as it involves direct access to the object, immediacy, and an involuntariness that representative events and states do not share.

Smith and McIntyre, on the other hand, following Husserl, distinguish empty and full intentions and perception is the archetypical full intention or presentation. Perception is distinguished from empty experiences insofar as it includes intrinsic sensory contents that “present” the sensible determinations of the object. These sensory contents are not the objects of
the perception, nor do they belong to the intentional content; they are a real, intrinsic, psycho-physical content that serve, as Husserl puts it (DR), as “presenting contents” (darstellende Inhalte) by virtue of which the perceptual apprehension “presents” the sensible determinations of the object. This introduces into perception a situation wherein both sensory contents and the intentional object play some kind of mediating role in the perceptual experience.

Neither of these views, however, adequately addresses our ontological or epistemological problems. The introduction of mediating contents conflicts with our common-sense view of the mind’s openness to the world as a dyadic, not triadic, relation. The content of experience, as it appears in and to the experience itself, is what the experience is about, what it is directed to, its intended object. Moreover, while we can say that perception can help to correct our illusory or hallucinatory experiences, this claim alone does not help us distinguish illusion or hallucination from perception. Illusions have sensory contents; indeed, that is crucial to something’s being a perceptual illusion. Hallucinations appear to have sensory content; that is why they seem to be indistinguishable from perception. To put the matter another way, these views do not adequately address the problems that motivated representationalism, for illusion and hallucination appear to satisfy some of the conditions that characterize perception. A striking example is Borromini’s perspettivo in the Palazzo Spada in Rome. After entering the palace, you look left through a double set of French doors on either side of a library and you see a courtyard with a long arcaded walkway lined by columns supporting the arcade. The walkway, which appears to be approximately thirty-seven meters or over forty yards in length, leads to a statue that appears to be life-sized. In fact, the arcade is eight meters or less than 9 yards long, and the statue measures 60 centimeters, that is, just under 24 inches high. What makes the illusion work is threefold:
(1) the columns lining and supporting the arcade diminish in size; (2) the floor rises as the ceiling lowers; and (3) all other visual cues are removed by limiting the device of looking through the library to see the arcade without seeing anything else in the courtyard. The illusion is revealed only when one is taken to the other side of the library where one can both explore the arcade, the statue, and their features and see the arcade spatially contextualized by the rest of the courtyard surrounding it. It is this last fact that provides motives for a different way of thinking about the distinction between presentation and representation.

Before developing that point, however, I want to specify some of the key features of this presentational account and to situate it in relation to the representationalist accounts of Searle and Smith and McIntyre. Agreeing with Searle but not Smith and McIntyre, I do not distinguish ontologically the intended thing or state of affairs and the intentional object. The intentional object is just the intended thing or state of affairs, but precisely as it is intended. We can put the matter this way: our ordinary experience focuses its attention on things in their significance for us. This is the intended thing or state of affairs, the object of our experience. When we reflect on our experience, however, say to ask whether the perceptual appearance is veridical or the judgment is true, then our attention subtly shifts its focus. At this point we focus not on the thing or state of affairs in its significance for us but on the significance the thing or state of affairs has for us. Note that on this view, the significance of the thing or state of affairs, its sense—what others are calling the representational content—belongs to the things and our experience draws out that sense or discloses it by virtue of the perceiving and articulating activities we undertake in relation to it. So on this score, I disagree with Searle’s distinction between the intentional object and intentional content. There is no ontological distinction between two objects; there is an
attitudinal difference introduced by our adoption of a reflective stance, a shift that brings about a focus on meaning or sense. This is the intentional object, and it is not ontologically distinct from the intended object, but it is not something different from the intentional content either. There is no introduction of a third relatum in the intentional relation. The intentional relation remains dyadic. This is not to deny that experiences can be directed to non-existent objects—a fact that leads some to deny that intentionality is a relation at all (Zahavi ?)—but, as we shall see later, such experiences do not annul the dyadic character of intentionality built into our ordinary sense of the mind’s openness to the world.

On the presentational view, the response to the problems of perceptual illusion and hallucination motivating representationalism involves two important considerations: (1) the environmental factors in which the perceptual relation occurs; and (2) the enactive and horizonal character of perceptual experience. I introduce the first through a consideration of a critique of Husserl’s notion of presenting contents. Husserl posits the existence of presenting sensory contents on the basis of the possibility that the sensory appearance of perceived thing can change without any real change in either the perception or the thing. He has in mind cases when the perceived thing changes its appearance in changing illumination (as when daylight fades) or in a change in the perceptual medium (as when a fog rolls in) or when there is a real change in the perceptual organ as a result, say, of disease or injury, or when the perceiver’s psychic state changes, say, from a cheerful to a melancholic state. Husserl, seeking to find something in the mental event itself since, by hypothesis, there is no change in the perception or the perceived thing, attributes the changes in appearance to changes in the sensory or presenting contents. There is, however, no phenomenological basis for this claim. What changes in the first two
examples are features of the perceptual medium; the change in the third example is a physical change in the sense organ; and what changes in the fourth example is the psychological (but not sensory) state of the perceiver. What are isolated in these examples, in other words, are not sensory or presenting contents but medial and subjective conditions for perception, the variation of which occasions changes in the appearance of the object. The recognition of these conditions opens a space for a causal account of how environmental factors affect perception. The factors do not cause the appearance or sense of the perceived thing, for sense is not an empirical notion, but they do condition those appearances and our sense of the thing. The system of psycho-physical conditions is, in general, a necessary constituent of the perceptual correlation. The perceptual appearance, illusory or veridical, is the perceived thing precisely as it appears under present psycho-physical conditions.

There are, however, certain conditions, such as seeing in daylight, that establish themselves as “normal” (Ideen II DR). The non-veridicality of an appearance, its illusory or misleading character, is the result of variance from these normal conditions (Id II 61). Such anomalous appearances are overcome by the establishment of a temporally extended, harmonious perceptual experience that “corrects” the anomalous appearance. Such corrections can occur within the same continuous perceptual experience or on the basis of other perceptions by the same sense. If, however, the organ is permanently damaged or some other permanent anomaly exists, the correction can occur on the basis of perceptions by other senses or at the level of intersubjective encounters of the object (Id ii 67-8).

A second central feature of our perceptual experience is its enactive and horizonal character. Consider visual perception. Our visual perception of a three-dimensional material thing in space
apprehends the object from a certain perspective. I see the front of the house, the face of the horse, and so forth. But in seeing the front of the house, I do not see merely the front; I see the house from the front. My perceptual sense, however, includes the sense that the house is three-dimensional, that it has other sides and a back, that the other sides are colored, most likely, the same color as the front, et cetera. These other sides and aspects of the house are not directly given in the way the front is given. They are given as the “inner” horizons of the appearance, a pointing beyond what is directly seen to other parts of the intended thing. There are also other indications in the appearance’s “outer” horizons of other objects in the background and spatial, surroundings of the appearing thing. These horizontal aspects can be brought to direct givenness by moving my sense organs in appropriate ways. For example, I approach the house to see features of its trim in greater detail; I walk around the house in order to see its other sides, and when I complete my “orbit” around the house, I have a fully developed sense of it as having its own bodily enclosedness.

Our perceptions, in other words, are mediated by the causal relations between our environment and our bodies and by our bodily activities in perceiving. Their role is crucial to addressing the problems of perceptual illusion and hallucination, and of conception-dependence and existence-independence. As the body generates a multiplicity of views of the intended thing, which views differ from one another, we nevertheless perceive a single, identical thing. We perceive the thing as a spatio-temporal identity perceptually presented in a manifold of varying appearances. Reference to the identical thing is accomplished via the horizons of our experience, for it is by virtue of these horizontal relations that we have the multiplicity of appearances in and through which the identity of the intended thing is realized.
So now let us consider the problems of illusion and hallucination and the generalized problems of conception-dependence and existence-independence. Consider, for example, the judgment “Barack Obama is a Muslim.” This judgment intends a state of affairs, but one that does not exist. The person about whom I judge, however, does exist, and he is actually a person with religious convictions and allegiances. But the actually existent state of affairs, namely, that Barack Obama is a Christian, is other than the judgment supposes. The judgmental intention still directs itself to the actual world and to an actual existent therein, but it supposes that person to be other than he is. Nevertheless, these false judgments directed to non-existent states of affairs reveal the sense of the existent object to which they are directed. If I claim, for example, that Dan is arrogant and somebody corrects me, saying “No, he’s not arrogant, he’s just shy,” the sense that Dan is not arrogant makes an important contribution to my sense of Dan.

The discussion of the false judgment reveals as well a response to the problem of the conception-dependence of intentional relations. The conception of Obama-as-Muslim underlying the false judgment intends Obama as determined in a particular way. The particular intention of Obama as determined in this manner does not truthfully grasp Obama, although (1) it is directed to an actually existent Obama and (2) Obama is truthfully determined in another way. Hence, problems concerning the conception-dependence of intentional relations resolve into problems concerning the possible existence-independence of the various perceptual, explicative, and conceptual intentions composing a particular complex conception-dependent intention. The resolution of both these issues depends on understanding concrete intentional reference to a worldly thing or state of affairs as mediated by the manifold of experiential phases presenting both possible (even false) and actual determinations of the intended object.
Consider a second example, the judgment I make upon (unknowingly) seeing a mirage: there is water ahead on the road. The judging intends a non-existent state of affairs, but now the thing about which I purportedly judge, the water, is also non-existent. In this example, my judgment is presumably grounded directly in a perception of water and the explicative perception of water-as-on-the-road. My recognition that the judgment is incorrect likewise depends upon my recognition that the perception of water is non-veridical or—better—that there is in fact no perception of water at all. More specifically, as I approach what I take—or mistake—to be water, the water disappears from view, but in an ordinary perception we would expect the activity of approaching the object to motivate an enlargement of the appearance of the perceived thing. The disappearance of the water motivates instead the recognition that perception is not genuinely a perception of water at all but is hallucinatory. In this case, however, my attention and my intention are directed in part to the actual world, to the road and its conditions, and although reference fails in certain respects (to the water), it does not in others (to the road).

The cases of existence-independence and conception-dependence, then, involve special cases of horizonal reference. Reference to an actuality is achieved by virtue of the fact that the objectivity as (wrongly) intended in the present experience has horizonal references to both the inner and outer horizons of the object. The objectivity as presented contains horizonal references both to other views or presentations of the same objectivity (the inner horizon) and to other objects in the various fields (spatial, temporal, causal, contextual) in which the experienced thing or state of affairs is situated (the outer horizon). Thus, ‘Obama as Muslim,’ the sense upon which the judgment ‘Obama is a Muslim’ is founded, has as its inner horizon other possible and actual presentations of the actually existent Obama, and thereby reference to an actual existent is
achieved. Similarly, the seen water has within its outer horizon the road upon which the water
appears. The complex perceptual sense ‘water-on-the-road’ underlying the judgment that there is
water on the road is composed of presentations of different things comprised by the intended
state of affairs, things including both the water and the road. The thematic object of the
perception, the seen water, has horizontal references to the separate presentations of the partial
objects implicated in the complex perceptual situation, including reference to the road. Once
again, therefore, reference to an actuality is achieved in the apparently objectless intention, an
actuality, however, which is other than the thematically intended thing and which is apprehended
in a manner other than it actually exists.

In yet other cases, the object which is intended might be posited as a fictional object, for
example, Pegasus, or an ideal object, say the triangle, whose actuality cannot be given in a
perceptual act but must be imaginatively or ideally presented. But the imaginative presentation
presupposes perceptual presentations which the imaginative presentation modifies or from which
the imaginative presentation draws its materials (EU). The imaginative presentation, therefore,
has horizontal references to those perceptual presentations and thereby to the actualities existent
in the world. Furthermore, the type of existence posited in the imaginative act, although different
from the type of existence posited in the perceptual act, draws its significance from the latter.
Thus, although the imaginative presentation of Pegasus is objectless in the sense that there is no
actual physical existent which is Pegasus, it is not objectless in the sense that Pegasus does exist
in the imagined world, and this imagined world both takes at least some of its components from
the real, physical world and has its sense as an imagined world only as a modification of and
departure from the real world. The sense of the imagined world is possible, in other words, only
in contrast to the real world, and the positing of an imagined objectivity precisely as a fictional object is meaningless apart from the implicit reference to the non-fictional (EU).

The ideal presentation, too, is possible only insofar as we can construct a progression of actual and imagined cases of, say, a figure, a progression that approaches an ideal of exactness in, for example, the reproduction of angular or length relationships. The ideal presentation, in other words, has its foundation in the experience of the actual and the imaginative variations thereof. It is posited as the ideal, limit case of the ordered progression of such presentations toward the limit. As such, however, it belongs to a different dimension, namely, the ideal, but once again its new ontological dimension depends for its sense upon the contrast with the real. It is ideal only in its union and contrast with that series of actualities and possibilities in the real world rather than in a fundamental separation from the real.

I shall end with a thud—something like a hard landing in the wind at Logan Airport followed by a sudden reversal of engines due to the short runways. The thud in this case is a few, inadequate words about intensional contexts and the failures of substitutivity of identity and existential generalization. When we consider intensional contexts, we must be cognizant of the fact that we attend to the intentional object—the intended thing just as intended—rather than the intended thing simpliciter. This reveals why it is the case that in intensional contexts we cannot substitute non-equivalent expressions referring to the same state of affairs. Because we are not dealing with the straightforwardly intended thing simpliciter but are instead dealing in a reflective attitude with the sense, that is, the straightforwardly intended thing or state of affairs precisely as intended, the non-equivalence of the original and substitute senses render the
principle of the substitutivity of identity inapplicable. We are no longer dealing with identicals; the sense-objects are, by hypothesis, non-equivalent and therefore not identical.

Suppose, for example, Joe thinks that Albert Pujols is the best player in baseball and thinks mistakenly that Pujols is the Yankees’ first baseman, the correct substitution of ‘the Yankees’ first baseman’ for ‘Pujols’ in the ascription to Joe of the belief that Pujols is the best player in baseball would yield the conclusion that Joe thinks the Yankees’ first baseman is the best player in baseball. But this ascription would be false. Conversely, if we were incorrectly to substitute ‘the Yankees’ first baseman’ for ‘Pujols,’ we could conclude that Joe believes that the Yankees’ first baseman is the best player in baseball. Now this ascription of a belief to Joe would be true (as was the original ascription) but what Joe believes would no longer be true, that is, Joe’s supposition is false although it is true that he believes it. These apparent anomalies occur precisely because in the substitution under consideration we are not substituting identicals but thought identicals, that is, identicals as they are conceived or intended to be. Such substitutions, however, occur in the second-order domain of sense rather than that of straightforwardly intended things and states of affairs.

The situation regarding the failure in intensional contexts of the principle of existential generalization is similar. Such failures occur, as we have seen, when a singular term refers to a non-existent thing or state of affairs or to a unique but existentially indefinite object. So, for example, from the fact that Joe believes the Pujols owes his success to the most recent manager of the St. Louis Cardinals we cannot infer that (∃x)(Joe believes that Pujols owes his success to x). Conversely, if Joe believes that Pujols earns more money than the best philosopher in the land but Joe does not know the identity of the best philosopher in the land, we cannot apply the
converse rule of existential instantiation and infer from the fact that $(\exists y)(\text{Joe believes Epy})$ that Joe believes Epa, unless we know that Joe believes some individual to be the best philosopher in the land, i.e., that Joe believes Pa.

I have tried to identify the problems that motivate representational views and have tried to indicate how representational theories of intentionality, in both their object-theoretical and mediator- or content-theoretical forms, fail to address these problems fully while remaining faithful to our basic understanding of the mind’s openness to the world as a dyadic relation. By contrast, I have tried to argue in favor of what I have called the presentational view of intentionality by showing his it is capable of addressing those problems while preserving our sense of the mind’s openness to the world. I suggest that these advantages of the presentational view constitute reasons for accepting it over representationalist views.

REFERENCES


