HAVING THE RIGHT ATTITUDES

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The virtues, Aristotle tells us, are states “in respect of which we are well or badly disposed in relation to feelings” (NE 1105b26). Virtuous agents, consequently, express their virtue not only in their actions but also in their feelings (NE 1109a22–23). Aristotle’s meaning is clear enough. Not only do we praise those who combat injustice and poverty, we commend those whose sense of indignation alerts them to injustice or whose sense of compassion reveals the pain of another’s misfortune. On the other hand, we blame not only those who slaughter innocents or wield power tyrannically or appropriate wealth unjustly but also those who fail to be indignant about such actions and who fail to feel compassion for displaced or homeless persons or the starving.

Aristotle further tells us that we are well disposed in relation to feelings when we hit the mean: “some vices fall short of what is right in feelings and actions, and others exceed it, while virtue both attains and chooses the mean” (NE 1107a4–5). I am interested in that phrase “what is right in feelings.” What is it to have a right feeling?

Aristotle treats feelings—a term that is to be understood broadly enough to encompass “appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, love, hate, longing, emulation,¹ pity, and in general things accompanied by pleasure and pain” (NE 1105b22–24)—under the general heading of desire (orexis). There are three kinds of desire, two of which are non-rational and desire their object as pleasant (appetitive desire [epithumia] and spirited, sometimes competitive desire [thumos]) and one of which is rational and desires its object conceived as good (rational wish or
deliberate desire \( [boulēsis]\) (cf. \( \textit{NE} \) 1111\(^{b}\)11–19, 1113\(^{b}\)15–24). While \( \textit{orexis} \) in general is inseparable from voluntary action, it is \( boulēsis \) in particular that is inseparable from choice \( \textit{prohairesis} \) (\( \textit{De anima} \) 433\(^{a}\)21–25). In the light of this general conception of desire, Aristotle distinguishes voluntary action, in which the motive principle (desire) is within us and we are aware of what we are doing, from chosen action, which is not merely voluntary but in which there is also at work practical reason in two dimensions (\( \textit{NE} \) 1111\(^{b}\)7–8, 1112\(^{a}\)13–17). Practical reason first recognizes the choiceworthiness of those goods proper not merely to me here and now but to human life in general, and then it deliberates about which actions to choose in the light of and as conducive to those goods (\( \textit{NE} \) 1140\(^{b}\)24–1140\(^{b}\)8).

In \( boulēsis \), then, reason functions to give an account of why it is \textit{good} to have these desires in the light of the ends it recognizes as proper to human flourishing. Reason thus embodies in itself certain desires ordered to ends known by practical reason to be good, and these desires might very well conflict with the non-rational desires, as when an agent’s desire for health pulls her back from her desire for the pleasures of food and drink. The agent \textit{feels} this opposition as something like a contradiction, as being pulled in two different directions, and must decide between the two with the assistance of deliberative reason. The rational desires involve a persuasive force that enables us also to control the non-rational desires.\(^2\)

Aristotle’s treatment of desire is advantageous insofar as it recognizes the unity of the active organism by making desire present in all the parts of the soul. There is a disadvantage, however, in that it ties the discussion of feelings to action and therein blurs some useful distinctions. On the Aristotelian view, emotions, insofar as they are an instance of desire, always include (or should include) in their definition a reference to desire or aversion along with the reference to
pleasant or painful feelings. Aristotle defines anger, for example, as “a desire accompanied by pain, for a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight at the hands of men who have no call to slight oneself or one’s friends” (NE 1378b31–32). In other cases, the connection between the emotion and desire is stated more indirectly. The emotion is not defined primarily by way of a feeling of pleasure or pain, but the account of the emotion includes the reference to desire. For example, Aristotle says envy is “pain at the sight of such good fortune as consists of the good things already mentioned.” While there is no explicit mention of desire here, the references to both good fortune and good things point towards those objects of desire that would produce a desirable situation for me were I to possess them. We see this more clearly as Aristotle continues: “The good things which excite envy…arouse the love of reputation and honor…. The deeds or possessions which arouse the love of reputation and honor and the desire for fame, and the various gifts of fortune, are almost all subject to envy; and particularly if we desire the thing ourselves, or think we are entitled to it, or if possession of it puts us a little above others, or a little below them” (NE 1387b22–1388a4). In still other cases, the reference is not to desire but its opposite. So, fear is defined as “a pain or disturbance, due to imagining some destructive or painful evil in the future” (NE 1382b22–23). The implicit reference here is to one’s aversion to the destructive or painful evil. The definition is cast this way, perhaps, because fear can motivate different desires, for example, the desire to flee or the courageous desire to stand one’s ground and to fight for what is important to oneself.

The incorporation of the emotions under the general notion of desire loses the sense of a purely evaluative experience apart from its connection to desire and the motivation of action. There are instances, I believe, of valuations that do not motivate a desire and do not motivate
action. I might, for example, value the study of physics without desiring to study it and without undertaking such a study. Moreover, the incorporation of the emotions under the general notion of desire tends to smother the distinctive sense of what is right in feelings in the sense of what is right in action. Indeed, this might explain why Aristotle does not himself provide a clear account of being right in feelings. Husserl’s distinction between axiological reason and practical reason, on the other hand, emphasizes just this separation between valuation and choice, and it allows us to consider more precisely what it is to have a right feeling. Husserl’s question about evidential fulfillment in axiological reason is, in effect, another form of the question regarding right feeling in Aristotle. This paper focuses its attention, then, on feelings and emotions and the evaluations they accomplish—in brief, on axiological reason—and asks in what consists truthfulness in the axiological sphere.

1. *Feelings and emotions.*

A helpful clue to the value of phenomenology in understanding feelings and emotions is provided by the common root of the terms Husserl uses to name pre-predicative perceiving and valuing. *Wahrnehmen* means to apprehend perceptually, i.e., in a manner involving a sensorial dimension, the purely descriptive, non-axiological properties of a thing or situation and thereby to take and accept something as true. *Wertnehmen* means to apprehend evaluatively in a manner involving feelings the axiological attributes of a thing or situation and thereby to take and accept something as valuable. We “take” *S as p* and we take *Sp as v* (i.e., as valuable) in pre-predicative experiences prior to the judgments in which we articulate the claim that *S is p* or that *Sp is v* (cf. Drummond 2003).
This common root suggests that our “takings” are unified and must be understood broadly so as to include both cognitive and affective moments. Our ordinary experience from the beginning encompasses cognitive and affective—and, I might add, practical—dimensions, and while we can conceive a merely cognitive perception, such an experience is an abstraction (see Husserl 1973, 404–405 and also the unpublished ms. A VI 26, 42a). Things and situations affect us; they evoke feelings in us. Things and situations appear to us from the beginning as likable or not, useful or not, pleasurable or not, safe or dangerous, joyous or sad, and so on. Actions and agents from the beginning appear as noble, virtuous, generous, honest, just, compassionate, hospitable, friendly, base, vicious, rancorous, spiteful, mean-spirited, treacherous, and so on. In such experiences, reason and feeling penetrate one another so as to produce evaluations that Philippa Foot (cf. e.g., 1958; 1958–59; 1961) suggests are “matters of fact” that command assent precisely to the extent that reasons can be given for them. These reasons appeal both to features of the situation, action, or agent evaluated and to our shared understandings of evaluative terms.

The notion of “taking something as…” names an aspect of the problem of intentionality, the proper theme of phenomenology. Intentionality is puzzling precisely because in intending objects the subject is primarily not in a causal relation with them, but is instead directed to them in their significance for us, i.e., as things or situations having a more or less determinate significance for us. To experience fear, for example, is to take a certain thing or situation as having features that make the thing or situation dangerous. This kind of experience cannot be adequately understood if we think of fear as nothing more than a causal sequence of electrical impulses between various parts of the brain ending in the stimulation of the amygdala or if we think of these brain states as somehow that to which our affective experiences are directed.
(Roberts 2003, 43). What is central to our emotional experience is that it grasps everyday objects in an affective light; it is directed, in other words, to the affective and axiological significance—to the axiological sense, if you will—that those objects have for us in our emotional grasp of them. The emotions are, as Peter Goldie (2000, 19–20, 71–74) puts it, a “thinking with feeling,” or, as Robert Roberts (2003, 2) puts it, “a kind of eye for value and the import of situations,” or, as I am suggesting, a “taking” of the thing or situation as axiologically significant.

It is in this context that we should understand the views of those phenomenologists—but not all phenomenologists—who claim (1) that valuing a thing or situation necessarily involves feelings and (2) that this feeling is rooted in a presentation or cognition (see, e.g., Husserl 1984, 402–10, 496–518 [1970, 569–76, 636–51]; cf. also Husserl 1988, 252–54). This view already stands in sharp contrast to a common view of the emotions that understands them simply as the unity of belief and desire. The belief-desire account holds that the emotions are a conjunction of beliefs grounding a desire and that only the believing and desiring aspects of an emotion have intentional content (Kenny 1963, Alston 1967, Davidson 1976, Taylor 1976; 1985). On the belief-desire view, in other words, feelings are non-essential to the intentionality of the emotions. They are mere supplements—“add-ons,” as Peter Goldie (2000, 4) calls them—to the emotions and do no intentional work. Such views fail to capture the important role that feelings play in the emotions and in their intentionality (Goldie 2000, 18–28, 37–47, 72–81). In particular, they fail to recognize the role feelings and emotions play in focusing our attention on those features of the thing or situation that are evaluatively salient and registering these features with the sort of resonance and importance that only emotional involvement can sustain. They also fail to capture
the important difference between valuation and volition, since it is possible to have a positive feeling or emotion toward something—and thereby positively value it—without desiring it. Moreover, the same emotion can ground different desires—fear, for example, can motivate a desire to flee or a desire to stand one’s ground and fight—and the desire, therefore, cannot, except perhaps disjunctively, form part of the definition of the emotion.

The basic phenomenological view, then, is that value-attributes are the correlates of feelings that are the affective response of a subject with a particular experiential history to the non-axiological properties of an thing or situation. To say that a subject has a particular experiential history is to say that the subject comes to the experience with a set of particular beliefs, cares, concerns, emotional states, dispositions, commitments, practical interests, cultural inheritances, and so forth. The affective moment builds upon and unites itself with the presentational moment directed to the descriptive, non-axiological properties of the thing or situation such that the overall character of the experience is an affective response to the worth of the thing or situation having those non-axiological properties (Husserl [1952, 8–11] 1989, 10–13; 1988, 252). Within the concrete valuing experience, the non-axiological properties of the valued object or situation are the correlates specifically of the presentational or cognitive moments and the value-attributes are the correlates specifically of the moment of feeling or emotion (Husserl 1988, 255–57, 260–62).

This basic view should be understood against the background of a distinction between two senses of “feeling”: feeling-sensations and intentional feelings (Husserl [1984, 401–10] 1970, 569–75). The former are merely sensory experiences, for example, visceral feelings such as the tightening of the abdominal and neck muscles associated, say, with anger and fear. On the other
hand, an intentional feeling—what we might call with Reinach an “apprehending feeling” (Reinach 1989, 1:298) or with Goldie a “feeling towards” the object (Goldie 2000, 19, 51–62; Goldie 2002, 236–42)—refers to some thing or situation as its object and discloses the object, broadly speaking, as likeable or not. Liking and disliking are the liking and disliking of something; joy and sadness are joy and sadness in something, and so forth. The objective reference of the feeling is derived, however, from the underlying presentation of a thing or situation. That is, the intentional feeling necessarily contains within itself a moment that presents its object—the thing or situation valued—with particular and relevant non-axiological properties. The value-attributes intended are neither separable from nor reducible to the non-axiological properties on which they are founded, and our valuations—precisely insofar as they are grounded on cognitive presentations—track these non-axiological properties. Put another way, the non-axiological properties provide both motivation and evidence for the valuation accomplished in the affective response.

The intentional feeling, however, does not exhaust the nature of an emotion. We must distinguish emotions, both in the sense of episodic emotions and dispositional emotions, from the intentional feeling. I might, for example, dislike the taste of a particular food, but this experience remains at the level of the intentional feeling and does not rise to that of an episodic emotion. But disliking the taste of a food I normally like, I might fear that the food is tainted and that it might make me ill. This episode of fear—more precisely, the presentational content of the episode of fear—is more determinate in characterizing the situation in which the episodic emotion arises and, thereby, in identifying the grounds for the fear. The episode of fear, however, does not rise to the level of a dispositional emotion, a state that disposes me toward
having further episodes of that emotion. Regarding jealousy, for example, we can clearly distinguish the jealous disposition which motivates one to interpret certain situations and actions in determinate ways from the particular episodes in which jealousy, as it were, rears its head and which generally involve intense feelings not proper to the disposition itself. Whereas the episode is just that—episodic and transitory—the dispositional emotion is complex, dynamic and enduring, involving many different episodes, periods of intensity and dormancy, and different underlying perceptions, beliefs, and images (Goldie 2000, 12–13, 68–69).

Hence, the basic view—expanded and clarified—identifies (at least) five dimensions in the emotions: (1) the underlying presentation of the non-axiological properties of the thing or situation; (2) the sensuous, non-intentional feelings caused by the thing or situation; (3) the intentional feeling directed toward the value-attributes of the thing or situation; and, in some cases, (4) an episodic emotion that both intends the particular affective or evaluative attributes of the object or situation beyond its merely being likeable or dislikable and, again in some cases (5) an emotion understood as an enduring state that disposes us toward certain affective understandings and motivates episodic emotions. Moreover, insofar as intentional experience in general discloses things in their significance for us, we can say that the presentational significance disclosing the merely descriptive or non-axiological properties of the thing or situation grounds an additional meaning-aspect disclosing the affective or valuable characteristics of that thing or situation (Drummond 2002a, 17–20; 2002b, 175–89; 2004; see also Sokolowski 2008, 22–23).

Suppose, for example, I am walking in my neighborhood. I turn a corner and see coming toward me a large, apparently powerful, salivating Doberman Pinscher with its hairs standing on
end, its ears pulled back, and its teeth bared, all the while growling through its bared teeth. In so seeing the dog, I grasp certain non-axiological features of the situation facing me. I hear the dog growling, and I see it as large, powerful looking, and salivating, as having its hairs standing on end, as having its ears pulled back, as having bared its teeth, and as charging toward me. But that, of course, does not exhaust my “taking” of the situation. I take the situation as dangerous, as posing a threat. I grasp, in other words, an axiological feature of the situation. Hence, the structure of the experience can be analyzed as follows:

(1) a presentational moment: the Doberman is perceptually presented as large, powerful, charging, with its hairs on end, its ears pulled back, its teeth bared, and as growling;
(2) bodily feelings: I feel my body tense up; in particular, I feel a tightening of muscles in the area of the stomach and neck,
(3) the intentional feeling: I feel distress in the situation in which I have found myself, thereby negatively valuing it, and
(4) the episodic emotion: I negatively value the situation more precisely as dangerous and therein experience fear.

If, moreover, I am typically a fearful person, i.e., if I am a person disposed to fear, my fearful reaction to the charging Doberman as dangerous will be immediate and intensified. This is because of the presence of

(5) a dispositional emotion.

In fearing the charging Doberman, the valence of the bodily feelings and the intentional feeling coincide. This reminds us that we must not too sharply separate the apprehending feeling from the bodily feelings. Indeed, we can easily be led into identifying them and thinking of the
episodic emotion simply as the bodily feelings or conceiving the emotion as directed to the bodily feelings themselves. We must nevertheless distinguish them. The bodily feelings are considered in two different relations, once in relation to the body and once in relation to the thing or situation. These feelings, in other words, are at work simultaneously in pre-reflective bodily self-awareness and in object-awareness, and this is why we name them differently—pleasure or pain in the former relation and like or dislike of the thing or situation apprehended in the latter relation.

The bodily feelings, then, are first of all pleasant or painful states of the organism. They also, however, turn our attention back toward the thing or situation that causes them, motivating our apprehension of it as valuable or not on the basis of its non-axiological properties rather than the valence of the bodily feelings themselves. The intentional feeling and its evaluative apprehension of things and situations is, in other words, not simply a function of bodily feelings. Our interests, concerns, cares, and commitments as well as inherited, cultural understandings of emotional and evaluative concepts play a role in determining our affective response to the thing or situation encountered. Hence, it is possible that the bodily feelings and the apprehending feeling or episodic emotion might have different valences. For example, last summer and fall in rehabilitating my surgically replaced knee and this summer and fall in rehabilitating my surgically repaired shoulder, I experienced pain in response to exercises I was assigned to do and to certain manipulations of my leg and shoulder by my physical therapist (or my physical terrorist, as I am sometimes wont to call her). Nevertheless, I positively appraised these manipulations and exercises insofar as they served the end of rehabilitation. My intentional feeling, while involving painful bodily feelings, also, by virtue of my knowing that these physical
discomforts were necessary for and conducive to complete recovery and my commitment to full recovery, positively valued advancing the rehabilitative project through these painful movements and manipulations.

Similarly, we must not too sharply separate the apprehending feeling from the episodic emotion. This is the case because the valence of the intentional feeling and the emotion are the same. As we have seen in the example of the charging Doberman, the intentional feeling intends a thin axiological attribute (unpleasant and distressing) whereas the episodic emotion intends a thick axiological attribute (dangerous). I do not merely dislike the displeasing situation, but I am fearful of the danger. Once again, however, we must nevertheless maintain a distinction between the two. In the case of the physical therapy, for example, I have a positive apprehending feeling of my physical therapy. I appreciate it and approve my undergoing it. This feeling of approbation falls short, however, of taking joy in that therapy, although I might very well experience joy in its success.

The involvement of feelings within an emotional experience means that the emotions necessarily involve a first-person perspective and a pre-reflective self-awareness. Fear of the charging Doberman cannot be understood apart from the fact that the situation is dangerous to me. While Goldie recognizes that an intentional feeling is directed toward a thing or situation and “is part of one’s consciousness of the world with which one is emotionally engaged” (Goldie 2000, 64), he claims that our “feeling towards” an object is an “unreflective emotional engagement with the world beyond the body; it is not a consciousness of oneself, either of one’s bodily condition or of oneself as experiencing an emotion” (Goldie 2002, 241). He distinguishes this unreflective object-directed consciousness from what he calls reflective consciousness, my
“being aware that I feel afraid” (Goldie 2000, 64). Goldie’s concern, I take it, is to stress the fact that our emotional encounters are often focused exclusively on the intended things or situation without any thematizing of my own condition. This is true. Nevertheless, in fearing the dog, I feel the tensing of my muscles, and I am pre-reflectively and non-thematically aware of my fearing the dog. I am aware of my fearing the dog without my attention being turned explicitly either to my bodily feelings or to my fear. Goldie is correct that we can be unreflectively engaged with the world without reflective self-awareness, but we cannot be unreflectively engaged with the world without a pre-reflective awareness of that engagement (Drummond 2006). I cannot fear the dog without being pre-reflectively aware of my fearing it.

To say that an emotional experience is first-personal is also to say that it is related to a particular person with determinate instincts, interests, personal history, communal traditions and inheritances, and so forth. What I wish to call attention to here is the intersubjectivity involved in this first-personal relatedness. The manner in which I am raised within my familial, social, and cultural contexts affects my manner of experiencing the world and my manner of thinking. Indeed, my learning to experience correctly certain features of the world is tied to my learning what my culture considers appropriate emotional responses to those same features (Goldie 2000, 30–31). In learning about the world, I learn which situations merit fear and which do not, which situations merit anger and which do not, which situations merit compassion and which do not, and so forth. I thereby become habituated to have certain emotions upon encountering certain objects or situations. When I round that corner and encounter the Doberman in its agitated state, I immediately experience fear and recognize the danger. But I not only do fear the Doberman in its agitated state, I ought to recognize the danger and fear the Doberman. If I do not, I am
impervious to the “true” character of the situation (Goldie 2000, 30–31). Indeed, were you watching this scene develop from an apartment window, you would not—and ought not—feel fear; the situation is not dangerous for you. However, you empathically recognize that the situation is dangerous for me and I ought, consequently, feel fear in my situation.

2. The “truthfulness” or appropriateness of feelings and emotions.

That I ought to fear the salivating, charging Doberman if I am to appreciate the “true” character of the situation I face focuses the question of the truthfulness or appropriateness of the emotions. What justifies our affective responses? How is it that I recognize that the response I experience is inappropriate? What are the grounds in the lived experience itself for distinguishing between appropriate and inappropriate responses? Or, to put the matter differently, what constitutes the “truthfulness” of the emotions? Husserl suggests that there is a special kind of evidence that confirms the “truthfulness” or “rationality” or “appropriateness” of our emotional experiences—an axiological intuition (Husserl [1952, 9–11] 1989, 10–12). Husserl refers here not to some kind of datum that counts for a belief and thus provides a reason for accepting that belief as true but to the fundamental sense of evidence as the intentional experience that takes something as such a datum. This means that evidential experiences are always paired with mere intendings, say, judging (without evidence) that $S$ is $p$. The evidencing experience then directly and intuitively grasps the fact that $S$ is actually $p$ and thereby confirms the judgment, or it directly and intuitively grasps that $S$ is $r$—a disconfirming experience. In the case of emotional experiences, the case is similar. An emotive evidence directly and intuitively grasps that $S$ is actually, say, dangerous or not; such an evidence justifies our sense of object as having that axiological sense,
as having a particular affective property. While Husserl invokes his idea of axiological intuition with respect to judgments of value, I shall concentrate on the intentional feeling or episodic emotion in which pre-predicative valuing is accomplished. In looking for truthfulness in feelings and emotions, I am looking for the analog of veridicality in perception.

Insofar as emotional experiences involve presentational and affective moments, we must in considering the “evidence” for the “truthfulness,” “rationality” or “appropriateness” of our emotional responses consider not only the presentational dimension but the affective. In confirming our emotional experiences, we evidentially encounter at the presentational level the veridicality of our perceptual grasp of the thing’s non-axiological properties or the truth of the judgments or beliefs underlying the emotion and we evidentially experience at the affective level the appropriateness of our emotional grasp of the thing’s affective properties. Moreover, insofar as the affective apprehension of things and situations involves, as we have seen, pre-reflective self-awareness, intentional feelings and episodic emotions disclose not only the axiological sense and value-attributes of things and situations but also something about ourselves. This feature of our intentional feelings and episodic emotions makes us susceptible to (and, in some cases, prone to) self-deception. Such self-deception might take the form of being mistaken in targeting our affective response, that is, aiming the emotion at, say, the wrong person, or it might take the form of being mistaken about the emotion we are experiencing (cf. Roberts 2003, 317). We can gain a better sense of “truthfulness” in intentional feelings and episodic emotions, then, if we consider the ways in which they can go wrong. I shall illustrate this through a consideration of five examples, the first four of which have just been suggested in the intersections of the distinctions between cognition and affection and between subject and object: we can be cognitively mistaken
about the features of the thing or situation toward which the experience is directed, or we can be affectively mistaken about the value-attributes of what is truthfully cognized, and we can be self-deceived, mistaken in our targeting the object of an object or in identifying the emotion we experience.

The first group of cases, then, is that in which the underlying presentation is false or unjustified. For example, suppose that $A$ is angry at $B$ for misleading him and that $A$ then discovers that $B$ did not, in fact, mislead him. Upon discovering that $B$ did not mislead him, $A$’s anger disappears and, in the moment of reflection that corrects the impression or judgment, $A$ feels embarrassment or shame or remorse for his original anger. I call attention here to both the critical reflection and the self-assessing emotion involved in correcting the original experience of anger. The normative character of certain emotional responses is revealed in these critical reflections upon our emotional experiences, and these critical reflections necessarily invoke, at least implicitly, our intersubjective understandings of what emotions are appropriate for what circumstances. Moreover, as is the case with our experience of things and situations, our self-awareness also includes an affective, evaluative moment.

The second group of cases includes those in which the underlying cognition is true and justified but $A$’s anger is nevertheless unjustified and inappropriate. This inappropriate affective response will be corrected in a way that is similar to the correction of cognitive mistakes, namely, by virtue of the introduction of discordance into the continuing flow of affective experience. The affective response might change over time as, for example, $A$ learns better in what circumstances and under what conditions anger is an appropriate response or when someone points out to $A$ the inappropriateness of $A$’s response and the reasons for thinking it inappropriate. Once again, $A$
becomes involved in a critical reflection that appeals both to the particulars of the circumstances and to our intersubjective understanding of evaluative concepts and their relation to non-axiological properties. Once again, moreover, in the moment of reflection that this time corrects the affective response, \( A \) will feel embarrassment or shame or regret or remorse for his original anger.

The third group comprises those cases where someone is mistaken about the object to which her emotion is directed. This is different from the first case. In the first case, the underlying cognition was mistaken, so to speak, in its predicate. \( A \)’s anger at \( B \) was inappropriate because the underlying belief that \( B \) had misled him was false and the anger toward \( B \) disappeared. The mistake was in predicating something falsely of \( B \); the mistake was in incorrectly taking something to be true of the referent of the emotion. In this case, the mistake is in mistaking the referent—the target—of the emotion. For example, \( A \) is undergoing psychoanalytic therapy and after an especially difficult session, \( A \) feels angry with his therapist when, in fact, he is angry at his father (Roberts 2003, 317).

The fourth group includes those cases where the emotion felt is misidentified. Suppose for the sake of argument that envy can be described in the following way: \( A \) feels distress at \( B \)’s having some good or goods that \( A \) lacks and that \( A \) desires or feels he deserves. Envy, then, is directed at persons by virtue of their having certain goods. In this, it is opposed to covetousness, which is directed to the goods themselves as the object of our desires, and also to jealousy, which is directed at persons insofar as they have the affections of a person whose affection I crave. Moreover, envy is one of those emotions wherein the self is involved not only by virtue of one’s pre-reflective self-awareness but also by virtue of the fact that the self is included in the
intentional content of the emotion. In envy, I am reflectively aware of myself as lacking and perhaps deserving what another has. Finally, this example is further complicated by the fact that envy is one of those emotions that we think it always wrong to feel. It makes no sense to say that one can be envious of the right person, in the right amount, at the right time, in the right way, and for the right reason.

The case I wish to consider is one where $A$ not merely wants, but thinks (wrongly) that she deserves what $B$ has, which is already an evaluative judgment. In such a case, a third party might immediately recognize $A$'s envy, but $A$ is unaware of her being envious. Indeed, $A$ likely feels indignation, another emotion that can involve the self in the intentional content of the emotion; given her belief that she deserves this good that $B$ has, it is an injustice that $B$ has it while she does not. It is only upon reflection that $A$ can realize that her lacking what $B$ has is not injustice at all, but only misfortune. And it is only then that $A$ can recognize herself as being envious of $B$. So, although $A$ is truly envious of $B$, she originally takes this to be indignation. What is crucial to the proper identification is, once again, that moral and evaluative concepts come into play in reflection upon our experience so that, in this case, $A$ is able to distinguish injustice from misfortune and thereby recognize that she is envious.

What, then, can we say about the structure of the experience of axiological fulfillment on the basis of these four cases. Let us quickly review them. In the first case, the subject is cognitively mistaken; the subject takes the target of the emotion to be other than it is and in a critical experience recognizes the falsity of the underlying cognition. In the second case, the cognition is true, but the affective response, originally taken to be appropriate, is, upon reflection, recognized as inappropriate. In the third case, the subject is deceived about the target of the emotion, and
this can be corrected only by a reflection that draws out the underlying cognitions that truly underlie the anger. In the fourth case, the subject is mistaken about the emotion that is felt, and once again, only in a reflection that invokes our shared understanding of the emotions and of moral concepts can this kind of self-deception be overcome. In all these cases, therefore, it is the entrance of a critically reflective reason in which the subject recognizes that something is merely an appearance, or is false, or is an unjustified affective response, or is truly some other emotion at work that is crucial to “getting it right.” In this reflective moment, however, there is also an affective dimension, and the subject affectively responds to the fact of getting it right, say, with approbation or pride and to the fact of getting it wrong, say, with shame or regret.

Hence, if

(1) $E$ is an intentional feeling or episodic emotion whose base $p$ is either a perceptual (or memorial or imaginative) or judgmental presentation of an object or situation $O$ and its non-axiological properties $x$, $y$, and $z$,

and

(2) “justification” in this context means *prima facie*, non-inferential, and defeasible justification,

then,

(3) $E$ is appropriate to $O$ and its non-axiological properties $x$, $y$, and $z$ if and only if

(a) $p$ is a veridical or true presentation of $O$ and of its properties $x$, $y$, and $z$, and

(b) $p$ is justified, and
(c) $p$ is a reason for and cognitively justifies $E$ (and this involves invoking our shared understanding of emotion-concepts and evaluative-concepts and moral concepts in the light of the current non-axiological situation), and

(d) $F$, a reflectively self-assessing feeling or emotion (such as approbation or pride) positively appraises and affectively justifies $E$ (the opposite, that is, of feeling embarrassment or shame or remorse or regret in our examples), and

(e) no relation of justification mentioned is defeated.$^8$

Conditions (3a) and (3b) jointly address these truth of the underlying cognitive content, ensuring that $p$ is both true and justified. To say that $p$ or any cognitive content is justified means that it is directly presented to consciousness in a perception—a seeing of $O$ as $x$—or a categorial modification of perception—a seeing that $O$ is $x$. Conditions (3c) and (3d) jointly address the correctness of the affective response. Condition (3c) involves our understanding of evaluative concepts and their basis in non-axiological properties, and condition (3d) brings into play the self-assessing emotions that justify the affective dimension of the object-directed feeling or episodic emotion. To have a truthful or appropriate emotion is to have just this structure of justification.

I mentioned, however, that I wanted to consider five examples, and the fifth appears as if it might provide a counterexample to (3d). Consider the possibility that where the underlying cognition is true but the affective response is inappropriate, this kind of critical reflection might be both insufficient and beside the point. $M$ might, for example, have an inordinate fear of heights and refuse to go out on an observation deck she knows to have a plexiglass shield surrounding it so that people will not fall or jump. She truly and justifiably grasps the non-
axiological features of the situation and knows it is most unlikely that she will fall, i.e., she knows that fear is unjustified and inappropriate in these circumstances, but she nevertheless fears going out on the deck. She perfectly well understands the concept of danger and accurately sizes up the situation as one that should not motivate fear, but she continues to experience fear. Her fear is, as Peter Goldie puts it, “cognitively impenetrable” (Goldie 2000, 76; cf. Drummond 2004). It is, therefore, neither reflection on the truth of the cognitive dimension of M’s experience nor reflection on evaluative concepts and the circumstances to which those concepts appropriately apply that accounts for the recognition of the inappropriateness of her episodic emotion. M already knows her fear is inappropriate, and it is instead the affective dimension itself that reveals this inappropriateness. In the very moment of experiencing the fear, M is pre-reflectively aware of her inappropriately fearing going out on the observation deck. She intuitively grasps this inappropriateness in a moment of pre-reflective self-awareness that has its own affective and evaluative moments. In fearing to go out on the observation deck, she is, say, embarrassed by her fear. Her embarrassment is a negative appraisal of that fear, and it highlights the fact that one aspect of her knowledge of the situation—that is, that the observation deck is safe—fails to justify her fear even as another aspect of her knowledge—that is, that the observation deck is high—and her fearful disposition motivate it. But in this case her intuitive, affective, pre-reflective self-awareness discloses the underlying episodic emotion as inappropriate (see Drummond 2004).

The fact, however, that M can be pre-reflectively aware in her embarrassment of the inappropriateness of her fear means only that the reflection that discloses the inappropriateness of the fear is non-occurrent. This is a reflection that has occurred over time, probably since the time
of her original fall. While her knowledge of the facts of the situation cannot penetrate her fear, it
does ground her self-assessing emotion as she experiences the fear. Hence, this kind of case does
not count against 3(d), and it reveals that the truthful emotions always contain as part of their
justification a critically reflective dimension whether occurent or not. This means, in turn, that
the truthfulness of intentional feelings and episodic emotions must always be understood in
relation to our best shared understandings of the different emotions and the conditions under
which experiencing them is appropriate.

In summary, we can identify three points where reason—understood in the broad, Husserlian
sense as the achievement of evidencing experiences—enters our experience of the emotions.
Reason enters, first, in intuitively confirming the presentational content of the emotional
experience; we evidentially experience the veridicality of the presentations or beliefs underlying
the affective response. Reason enters, second, in our evidentially experiencing the fitness of the
emotional condition experienced to the underlying descriptive properties. This experience of
fitness is, as we have seen, related to the context in which we experience the value, to the
education of the emotions handed down to us by the traditions in which we were raised, and to
our weighing the appropriateness of the intersubjectively understood emotion or value concept to
the present context. Reason enters for a third time in our evidentially experiencing our own
emotional condition in a reflectively self-assessing feeling of approbation or disapprobation or
positive or negative episodic emotion.

Notes

1. Irwin (1999) translates this as “jealousy.”

3. This unpublished text is difficult to date. Ullrich Melle of the Husserl-Archief in Leuven guesses, based on the content of the manuscript and the context of the folio in which it is found, that it is from the early 1920s, but perhaps, given a brief note written on the back of the page, as early as 1918. But no certainty as to the date is possible. I thank Professor Melle for his assistance in attempting to date the manuscript.

4. Although more complicated cases wherein the feeling or emotion is rooted in another axiological property are also possible, these in turn will point back to simpler apprehensions of an object’s or situation’s non-axiological properties.

5. For Husserl, a presentation can be a complete experience—a perception or a judgment—that presents the object in a determinate manner, that is, with a particular set of descriptive properties. Husserl calls such experiences “objectifying acts” (Husserl 1984, 500–501 [1970, 639]). But the term “presentation” can also refer more narrowly to the content or “matter” of an experience that accounts for the object being presented in a determinate manner by that experience (Husserl 1984, 474–76, 514 [1970, 620–21, 648]). The significance of this narrower sense of “presentation” is that experiences that are not themselves objectifying acts must be founded not on another act, but on a matter—a presentational or descriptive content—of the sort that belongs to an objectifying act. Put another way, then, the foundational claim states that any act founded on a presentation comprises a matter identical to that of the objectifying intention that presents the merely descriptive features of the object in just that determinate manner present in the founded act as well. Since in Husserl’s later, explicitly transcendental philosophy, the “matter” of a presentation becomes the “sense” belonging to the intentional correlate of the experience (Husserl 1976, 298 [1983, 310]), we can state the claim as it appears in the main text.

6. I have elsewhere suggested, but did not develop, this idea of axiological intuitions as complex experiences involving both cognitive and emotional legitimation and as confirming value-judgments in the moral sphere; cf. Drummond 2002a, 40; an earlier statement of the idea can be found in Drummond 2002b, 184–86. Sokolowski (2008, 24) considers a similar case in his discussion of emotional declaratives.

7. I owe this example and this point to Anne Ozar of Creighton University.

8. This modifies a position taken by Mulligan (1998).

REFERENCES


