What can phenomenology tell us about the feelings and emotions? Many things, apparently, since there are any number of very different views advanced by phenomenologists as diverse as Brentano, Husserl, Heidegger, Scheler, Sartre, and so forth. This paper shall sketch a phenomenological view indebted most directly to Husserl. My concern, however, is not to expound Husserl’s views but to supplement and complement them so as to enrich our understanding of the complexity of the emotions.

Why turn to phenomenology for this understanding? A helpful clue is provided by the common root of the terms wahrnehmen and wertnehmen, which in their common root offer a valuable starting point for understanding feelings and emotions and the role they play in our experiential lives. Wahrnehmen means to apprehend perceptually, i.e., in a manner that involves a sensorial dimension, and thereby to take and accept something as true. Wertnehmen means to apprehend in a manner involving feelings and thereby to take and accept something as valuable. We “take” S as p and we take S as p as v in pre-predicative experiences prior to the judgments in which we articulate the claim that S is p or Sp is v (cf. Drummond 2003).

This common root reveals that our “takings” must be understood broadly so as to include both cognitive and affective moments. Our ordinary experience from the beginning encompasses cognitive and affective—and, I might add, practical—dimensions, and while we can conceive a
merely cognitive perception, such an experience is an abstraction (see Husserl 1973, 404–405 and also the unpublished ms. A VI 26, 42a). Things and situations affect us; they evoke feelings in us. Things and situations appear to us from the beginning as likable or not, useful or not, pleasurable or not, safe or dangerous, joyous or sad, and so on. Actions and agents from the beginning appear as noble, virtuous, generous, honest, just, compassionate, hospitable, friendly, base, vicious, rancorous, spiteful, mean-spirited, treacherous, and so on. In such experiences, reason and feeling penetrate one another so as to produce evaluations that Philippa Foot (cf. e.g., 1958; 1958–59; 1961) suggests are “matters of fact” that command assent precisely to the extent that reasons can be given for them. These reasons appeal both to features of the situation, action, or agent evaluated and to our shared understandings of evaluative terms.

Given this broad understanding of “takings,” we can appreciate both the descriptive and the anti-naturalistic character of phenomenology (Glendinning 2007; Drummond 2008). Phenomenology is not concerned to provide causal explanations of the neurophysiological underpinnings of the feelings and emotions. To discern the causalities operative in the world, including the causalities operative between objects and subjects as particular entities in the world, presupposes a certain kind of experience of the world on the basis of which we posit causal relations between worldly existents. The causal explanations of psychology and neurophysiology cannot give an account of that world that is always already present to us before we begin to frame our causal explanations. Naturalistic explanations, in other words, can account for the subject that is an entity among other entities in the world, but cannot alone reveal the subject of the world, the subject whose intentional experience first brings a world to disclosure. Intentionality is the proper theme of phenomenology, and intentionality is puzzling
precisely because in intending objects the subject is primarily not in a causal relation with them, but is instead directed to them in their significance for us, i.e., as things or situations that are significant for us in determinate ways. To experience fear, for example, is to take a certain thing or situation as dangerous. This kind of experience cannot be adequately understood if we think of fear as nothing more than a causal sequence of electrical impulses between various parts of the brain ending in the stimulation of the amygdala or if we think of these brain states as somehow that to which our affective experiences are directed (Roberts 2003, 43).

Phenomenology involves a particular kind of non-naturalistic reflection that describes, rather than explains, the intentional correlation between (a) the subjective performances and achievements in which objects are disclosed as having a certain sense and (b) these objects precisely as disclosed. It thereby identifies the intentional structures that make it possible for objects and a world to be experienced—to disclose themselves—as having the sense they do. Phenomenology explores the correlation of subject and object as experienced rather than taking subject and object as externally, i.e., causally, related entities. This does not mean that phenomenological reflection is introspective. It is concerned not to identify the features of the reflecting subject’s experience, but to identify the essential structures of experience and of objects as disclosed by the intentionalities at work in different kinds of experience as lived by any experiencing subject, not just the reflecting subject. The phenomenologist, without presupposing naturalistic explanations that cannot get off the ground apart from the more fundamental experience of the world that naturalistic explanations take for granted, must describe how a world filled with physical, affective, practical, and cultural significance is disclosed by any experiencing subject.
None of this is meant to deny the role of science in coming to an understanding of the emotions, but a full understanding of their place in human life cannot be reductive in the way that naturalistic explanations are. This is because what is central to our emotional experience is that it grasps everyday objects in an affective light; it is directed, in other words, to the affective and axiological significance—to the axiological sense, if you will—that those objects have for us in our emotional grasp of them. The emotions are, as Peter Goldie (2000, 19–20, 71–74) puts it, a “thinking with feeling” that displays an object in a particular manner and involves perception, imagination or memory, or, as Robert Roberts (2003, 2) puts it, “a kind of eye for value and the import of situations,” or, as I am suggesting, an eye for the axiological sense of a thing or situation. But ‘significance’ or ‘sense’ is not an empirical concept, and to explicate our apprehension of things in their significance for us is a task that acknowledges but also transcends our best scientific understandings. It is full-bodied “takings” of things and situations as having both cognitive and affective sense, rather than the neurophysiological processes and merely “perceptual” or purely cognitive takings, that is the subject of my concern in this paper. I shall focus on the pre-predicative takings that anticipate judgments of value and shall sketch what a phenomenological approach can tell us of them.

II

It is in this context that we should understand the views of those phenomenologists—but not all phenomenologists—who claim (1) that valuing a thing or situation necessarily involves feelings and (2) that this feeling is rooted in a presentation or cognition (see, e.g., Husserl 1984, 402–10, 496–518 [1970, 569–76, 636–51]; cf. also Husserl 1988, 252–54). This view already
stands in sharp contrast to a common view of the emotions that understands them as the unity of belief and desire. The belief-desire account holds that the emotions are a conjunction of beliefs grounding a desire and that only the believing and desiring aspects of an emotion have intentional content (Kenny 1963, Alston 1967, Davidson 1976, Taylor 1976; 1985). On the belief-desire view, feelings are non-essential to the intentionality of the emotions, mere supplements to emotional episodes that do not bear directly upon their intentional content. Such “add-on views,” as Peter Goldie (2000, 4) calls them, fail to capture the important role that feelings play in the emotions and in their intentionality (Goldie 2000, 18–28, 37–47, 72–81). They also fail to capture an important difference between valuation and volition, since it is possible to have a positive feeling or emotion toward something—and thereby positively value it—without desiring it. Moreover, the same emotion can ground different desires—fear, for example, can motivate a desire to flee or a desire to stand one’s ground and fight—and the desire, therefore, cannot form part of the definition of the emotion.

The basic phenomenological view, then, is that value-attributes are the correlates of intentional feelings or episodic emotions that are the affective response of a subject with a particular experiential history—that is, particular beliefs, cares, concerns, emotional states, dispositions, commitments, practical interests, cultural inheritances, and so forth—to the non-axiological properties of an thing or situation. In brief, the valued or disvalued feature of an thing or situation is disclosed precisely as valued or disvalued by an emotive intentionality comprising a presentational moment and an affective moment. The affective moment builds upon and unites itself with the presentational moment directed to the descriptive, non-axiological properties of the thing or situation such that the overall character of the experience is an affective
response to the worth of the thing or situation having those non-axiological properties (Husserl [1952, 8–11] 1989, 10–13; 1988, 252). Within the concrete valuing experience, the descriptive properties of the valued object or situation are the correlates of the presentational or cognitive moments and the value-attributes are the correlates specifically of the moment of feeling or emotion (Husserl 1988, 255–57, 260–62).

This basic view should be understood against the background of a distinction between two senses of “feeling”: feeling-sensations and intentional feelings (Husserl [1984, 401–10] 1970, 569–75). The former are merely sensory experiences, for example, the visceral feelings such as the tightening of the abdominal muscles associated, say, with anger and fear. On the other hand, an intentional feeling—what we might call with Reinach an “apprehending feeling” (Reinach 1989, 1:298) or with Goldie a “feeling towards” the object (Goldie 2000, 19, 51–62; Goldie 2002, 236–42)—refers to some thing or situation as its object and discloses the object, broadly speaking, as likeable or not. So, for example, liking and disliking are the liking and disliking of something; joy and sadness are joy and sadness in something, and so forth. The objective reference of the feeling is derived, however, from the underlying presentation of a thing or situation. That is, the intentional feeling necessarily contains within itself a moment that presents its object—the thing or situation valued—with certain non-axiological properties². The value-attributes intended are neither separable from nor reducible to the non-axiological properties on which they are founded, but our valuations—precisely insofar as they are grounded on cognitive presentations—track these non-axiological properties. Put another way, the non-axiological properties provide both rational motivation and evidence for the valuation accomplished in the affective response.
The intentional feeling, however, does not exhaust the nature of an emotion. We must distinguish emotions, both in the sense of episodic emotions and dispositional emotions, from the intentional feeling. I might, for example, dislike the taste of a particular food, but this experience remains at the level of the intentional feeling and does not rise to that of an emotional episode. But disliking the taste of a food I normally like, I might fear that the food is tainted and that I have been poisoned. The episode of fear (perhaps paranoia!) is more determinate in identifying the grounds for the dislike and in characterizing the situation in which the episode occurs. This fear, however, does not rise to the level of a dispositional emotion. In an emotion like jealousy, however, we can clearly distinguish the jealous disposition which leads one to interpret certain situations and actions in determinate ways from the particular episodes in which jealousy, as it were, rears its head and which generally involve intense feelings not proper to the disposition itself. Whereas the episode is just that—episodic and transitory—the emotion is complex, dynamic and enduring, involving many different episodes, periods of intensity and of dormancy, different perceptions, beliefs, images, and feelings (Goldie 2000, 12–13, 68–69).

Hence, the basic view—expanded and clarified—identifies (at least) five dimensions in the emotions: (1) the underlying presentation of the non-axiological properties of the thing or situation; (2) the sensuous, non-intentional feelings caused by the thing or situation; (3) the intentional feeling directed toward the value-attributes of the thing or situation; and, in some cases, (4) a “emotional episode” or “situational emotion” (Reinach 1989, 1:298) that both intends the particular affective or evaluative attributes of the object or situation beyond its merely being likeable or dislikable and also discloses something about ourselves and (5) an emotion understood as a long-lasting state that disposes us toward certain affective understandings and
motivates situational emotions, i.e., episodes of that particular emotion. Moreover, insofar as intentional experience in general discloses things in their significance for us, we can say that the presentational significance disclosing the merely descriptive or non-axiological properties of the thing or situation grounds an additional meaning-aspect disclosing the affective or valuable characteristics of the thing or situation (Drummond 2002a, 17–20; 2002b, 175–89; 2004).³

We can illuminate this structure with an example. Suppose I am walking in my neighborhood. I turn a corner and see a Doberman Pinscher coming towards me. I grasp certain non-axiological features of the situation. I hear a dog growling, and I see a very large, powerful looking dog that has pulled back its ears, bared its teeth, and is charging toward me. But that, of course, does not exhaust my “taking” of the situation. The experience, one in which I also fear the dog, is more complex. I

(1) see the charging Doberman with its ears pulled back and its teeth bared, and hear its growling (this is the presentational moment of the experience),

(2) feel my body tense up; in particular, a tightening of muscles in the area of the stomach and neck (these are the bodily feelings),

(3) negatively value the situation in which I have found myself as bad (the intentional or apprehending feeling), and

(4) experience fear (the emotional episode).

The episodic emotion of fear is distinguished from the simple intentional feeling insofar as it intends in a more determinate way the affective aspect of the thing or situation intended; the fear of the Doberman, for example, apprehends the situation not merely as negative, as uncomfortable
and unlikable, but more specifically as dangerous. If, moreover, I am a fearful person, i.e., if I am

(5) a fearful person disposed to fear dogs (the dispositional emotion),

my negative reaction to the dog will be immediate and intensified. If, on the other hand, I am not
a fearful person, I might more easily and quickly recognize, say, that the dog is chasing a squirrel
rather than charging at me, and my fear will quickly pass. And if I am a dog trainer or dog
handler or dog whisperer, I might not experience fear at all.

In fearing the charging Doberman, the valence of the bodily feelings (painful or uncomfortable) and the apprehending feeling (a negative evaluation of the situation) are the same. This reminds us that we must not too sharply separate the apprehending feeling from the bodily feelings. Indeed, we can easily be led into not distinguishing the bodily feelings from the apprehending feeling because in many cases the pleasantness of the bodily feelings will motivate a corresponding positive emotion and evaluation and the unpleasantness of the bodily feelings will motivate a corresponding negative emotion and evaluation.

We must nevertheless distinguish them. The bodily feelings are considered in two different relations, once in relation to the body and once in relation to the thing or situation. These feelings, in other words, are at work simultaneously in pre-reflective bodily self-awareness and in object-awareness, and this is why we name them differently—pleasure or pain in the former relation and like or dislike of the thing or situation apprehended in the latter relation. The bodily feelings, then, are first of all pleasant or painful states of the organism. They also, however, turn our attention back toward the thing or situation that causes them, motivating our apprehension of it as valuable or not on the basis of its non-axiological properties. The intentional feeling,
however, i.e., our evaluative apprehension of things and situations, is not simply a function of bodily feelings. Our interests, concerns, cares, and commitments as well as inherited, cultural understandings of emotional and evaluative concepts play a role in determining our affective response to a thing or situation. Hence, it is possible that the bodily feelings and the apprehending feeling or episodic emotion might have different valences. For example, last summer in rehabilitating my surgically replaced knee and this summer in rehabilitating my surgically repaired shoulder, I experienced pain in response to exercises I was assigned to do and to certain movements and manipulations of my leg and shoulder by my physical therapist (or physical terrorist, as I am sometimes wont to call her). Nevertheless, I positively appraised these manipulations and exercises insofar as they served the end of rehabilitation. My intentional feeling, while it involved painful bodily feelings, also involved, in response to knowing that these physical discomforts were necessary for and conducive to complete recovery along with my commitment to full recovery, positive valued advancing the rehabilitative project through these movements and manipulations.

Similarly, we must not too sharply separate the apprehending feeling from the emotional episode. This is the case because the valence of the intentional feeling and the emotion are the same. As we have seen in the example of the charging Doberman, the intentional feeling intends a thin axiological attribute (unpleasant and unlikable) whereas the episodic emotion intends a thick axiological attribute (dangerous). I do not merely dislike the displeasing situation, but I am fearful of the danger. Once again, however, we must nevertheless maintain a distinction between the two. In the case of the physical therapy, for example, I have a positive apprehending feeling of my physical therapy. I appreciate it and approve my undergoing it. This feeling of
approbation falls short, however, of taking joy in that therapy, although I might very well experience joy in its success.

III

The involvement of feelings within an emotional experience means that the emotions necessarily involve a first-person perspective. Fear of the charging Doberman cannot be understood apart from the fact that the situation is dangerous to me. While Goldie recognizes that feeling towards is directed toward things and situations and “is part of one’s consciousness of the world with which one is emotionally engaged” (Goldie 2000, 64), he claims that this is an “unreflective emotional engagement with the world beyond the body; it is not a consciousness of oneself, either of one’s bodily condition or of oneself as experiencing an emotion” (Goldie 2002, 241). He distinguishes this unreflective object-directed consciousness from what he calls reflective consciousness, my “being aware that I feel afraid (Goldie 2000, 64). Goldie’s concern, I take it, is to stress the fact that our emotional encounters are often focused exclusively on the intended things or situation without any thematizing of my own condition. This is true. Nevertheless, in fearing the dog, I feel the tensing of my muscles, and I am pre-reflectively and non-thematically aware of my fearing the dog. I am aware of my fearing the dog without my attention being turned explicitly either to my bodily feelings or to my fear. Goldie is correct that we can be unreflectively engaged with the world without reflective self-awareness, but we cannot be unreflectively engaged with the world without a pre-reflective awareness of that engagement (Drummond 2006). I cannot fear the dog without being pre-reflectively aware of my fearing it.
To say that an emotional experience is first-personal is also to say that it is related to a particular person with determinate instincts, interests, personal history, communal traditions and inheritances, and so forth. What is important here is the intersubjectivity involved in this first-personal relatedness. The manner in which I am raised within my familial, social, and cultural contexts affects my manner of experiencing the world and my manner of thinking. Indeed, my learning to experience correctly certain features of the world is tied to my learning what my culture considers appropriate emotional responses to those same features (Goldie 2000, 30–31). In learning about the world, I learn which situations merit fear and which do not, which situations merit anger and which do not, which situations merit compassion and which do not, and so forth. I thereby become habituated to have certain emotions upon encountering certain objects or situations. These habituated emotional conditions are emotional states, and they shape new encounters we have. Emotional states inform our experiences such that we immediately recognize what is evaluatively salient in the object or situation. When I round that corner and encounter the Doberman in its agitated state, I immediately experience fear and recognize the danger. But I not only do fear the Doberman in its agitated state, I ought to recognize the danger and experience fear. If I do not, I am impervious to the “true” character of the situation (Goldie 2000, 30–31).

How is it that I recognize that the emotion I experience does not satisfy the norm for a particular emotion? What are the grounds in the lived experience itself for distinguishing between warranted and unwarranted responses? Or, to put the matter differently, what constitutes the “truthfulness” of the emotions? Husserl thinks that there is a special kind of evidence that confirms the “truthfulness” or “rationality” or “appropriateness” of our emotional
experiences (Husserl [1952, 9] 1989, 10). However, we must distinguish two senses of “evidence.” The first is the ordinary sense of a datum that counts for a belief and thus provides a reason for accepting that belief as true. The second, more fundamental sense is the intentional experience that takes something as such a datum. This means that evidential experiences are always paired with mere intendings, say, judging (without evidence) that S is p. The evidencing experience then directly grasps the fact that S is actually p and thereby confirms the judgment, or it directly grasps that S is r—a disconfirming experience. In the case of emotional experiences, the case is similar. An emotive evidence directly grasps that S is actually, say, dangerous or not; the direct experience confirms or disconfirms the apprehension of the affective property of the object.

Insofar as emotional experiences involve presentational and affective moments, we must in considering the “evidence” for the “truthfulness,” “rationality” or “appropriateness” of our emotional responses consider not only the presentational dimension but the affective. In confirming our emotional experiences, we evidentially encounter at the presentational level the veridicality of our grasp of the thing’s non-axiological properties or the truth of the cognitions underlying the emotion and we evidentially experience at the affective level the appropriateness of our emotional grasp of the thing’s affective properties.

This suggests that the feeling or emotional episode, along with the evaluative experience that it is, can go wrong in two ways. First, the underlying presentation can be false or unjustified. For example, I might discover that the person at whom I am angry for misleading me did not, in fact, mislead me. I might then, in a moment of reflection, feel remorse or shame for my original anger. The normative character of certain emotional responses is revealed in these critical
reflections upon our emotional experiences and our intersubjective working out of what emotions are appropriate for what circumstances.4

There are also instances, however, when the underlying cognition is true and justified and the emotion is nevertheless unjustified and inappropriate. This inappropriate affective response will sometimes be corrected in a way that is similar to the correction of cognitive mistakes. The affective response might change over time as, for example, I learn better what constitutes rude behavior or when someone disagrees with my assessment of a thing or a situation. This introduces discordance into the stream of evaluative experience and motivates a critical reflection that appeals both to the particulars of the circumstances and to our intersubjective understanding of evaluative concepts and their relation to non-axiological properties.

In other cases, however, this kind of critical reflection might be both insufficient and beside the point. Someone might, for example, have an inordinate fear of heights and refuse to go out on an observation deck she knows to be safe. She truly and justifiably grasps the non-axiological features of the situation and knows it is most unlikely that she will fall, but she nevertheless fears to go out on the deck. This fear might, in one respect, be perfectly intelligible. She might have previously fallen from a height and suffered severe injuries. Nevertheless, she herself might in this case recognize that her fear is unjustified and inappropriate. She perfectly well understands the concept of danger and accurately sizes up the situation as safe but continues to experience fear. It is, therefore, neither the cognitive dimension nor reflection on one’s feelings that accounts for the inappropriateness of her episodic emotion. It is the affective dimension itself, and she intuitively grasps this inappropriateness in a moment of pre-reflective self-awareness that has its own affective and evaluative moment. In fearing to go out on the observation deck, she is
pre-reflectively aware of herself as experiencing fear. In having and recognizing this emotional
reaction, she is, say, embarrassed by her fear. Her embarrassment is a negative appraisal of that
fear, and it highlights the fact that one aspect of her knowledge of the situation—that is, that the
observation deck is safe—fails to justify her fear even as another aspect of her knowledge—that
is, that the observation deck is high—motivates it. But in this case her intuitive, affective self-
awareness discloses the underlying emotional episode as inappropriate.

If, therefore,

(1) $E$ is an intentional feeling or episodic emotion whose base $p$ is either a perceptual (or
    memorial or imaginative) or judgmental presentation of an object or situation $O$ and its
    non-axiological properties $x$, $y$, and $z$,

and

(2) “justification” in this context means prima facie, non-inferential, and defeasible
    justification,

then,

(3) $E$ is appropriate to $O$ and its non-axiological properties $x$, $y$, and $z$ if and only if

(a) $p$ is a veridical or true presentation of $O$ and of its properties $x$, $y$, and $z$, and

(b) $p$ is justified, and

(c) $p$ is a reason for $E$, and

(d) $F$, a (pre-reflectively or reflectively) self-assessing feeling or emotion (such as
    approbation or pride) positively appraises and justifies $E$, and

(e) no relation of justification mentioned is defeated.$^5$
Conditions (3a) and (3b) jointly address these truth of the underlying cognitive content, ensuring that $p$ is both true and justified. To say that $p$ or any cognitive content is justified means that it is directly presented to consciousness in a perception—a seeing of $O$ as $x$—or a categorial modification of perception—a seeing that $O$ is $x$. Conditions (3c) and (3d) jointly address the correctness of the affective response. Condition (3c) involves our understanding of evaluative concepts and their basis in non-axiological properties, and condition (3d) brings into play the self-assessing emotions that justify the affective dimension of the object-directed feeling or emotional episode. To have a self-responsible evaluative experience, a self-responsible and appropriate emotion, is to have this structure of justification.

In summary, we can identify three points where reason—understood in the broad, Husserlian sense as the achievement of evidencing experiences—enters our experience of the emotions. Reason enters, first, in confirming the presentational content of the emotional experience; we evidentially experience the veridicality of the presentations or beliefs underlying the affective response. Reason enters, second, in our evidentially experiencing the fitness of the emotional condition experienced to the underlying descriptive properties. This experience of fitness is, as we have seen, related to the context in which we experience the value and to the education of the emotions handed down to us by the traditions in which we were raised. Reason enters for a third time in our evidentially experiencing our own emotional condition in a feeling of approbation or disapprobation.

I have suggested earlier that the emotions disclose not only the axiological sense and value-attributes of things and situations but also something about ourselves. Our emotive apprehension
of things and situations involves a pre-reflective self-awareness in which the subject is aware of its own emotional state and of its appropriateness or justification. Error, as we have discussed, can arise in the object-directedness of the emotion either because the underlying cognitive presentation is false or because the feeling or emotion is inappropriate. However, precisely because we are pre-reflectively self-aware, we are also susceptible to (and, in some cases, prone to) self-deception. This self-deception can again take two forms (Roberts 2003, 317). First, I can be mistaken about the object of the emotion. For example, I might feel angry at my son for wrecking our car, but I am really angry at my wife for letting him use the car. Second, I might be mistaken about the emotion I am feeling. I might, for example, feel compassion for a terminally ill colleague, when I am actually relieved that my job will be less in danger. These kinds of self-deceptive errors, however, are the topic of another paper.

Notes

1. This unpublished text is difficult to date. Ullrich Melle of the Husserl-Archief in Leuven guesses, based on the content of the manuscript and the context of the folio in which it is found, that it is from the early 1920s, but perhaps, given a brief note written on the back of the page, as early as 1918. But no certainty as to the date is possible. I thank Professor Melle for his assistance in attempting to date the manuscript and for permission to quote the manuscript.

2. Although more complicated cases wherein the feeling or emotion is rooted in another axiological property are also possible, these in turn will point back to simpler apprehensions of an object’s or situation’s non-axiological properties.

3. For Husserl, a presentation can be a complete experience—a perception or a judgment—that presents the object in a determinate manner, that is, with a particular set of descriptive properties. Husserl calls such experiences “objectifying acts” (Husserl 1984, 500–501 [1970, 639]). But the term “presentation” can also refer more narrowly to the content or “matter” of an experience that accounts for the object being presented in a determinate manner by that experience (Husserl 1984, 474–76, 514 [1970, 620–21, 648]). The significance of this narrower sense of “presentation” is that experiences that are not themselves objectifying acts must be founded not on another act, but on a matter—a presentational or descriptive content—of the sort that belongs to an objectifying act. Put another way, then, the foundational claim states that any act founded on a presentation comprises a matter identical to that of the objectifying intention that presents the merely descriptive features of the object in just that
determinate manner present in the founded act as well. Since in Husserl’s later, explicitly transcendental philosophy, the “matter” of a presentation becomes the “sense” belonging to the intentional correlate of the experience (Husserl 1976, 298 [1983, 310]), we can state the claim as it appears in the main text.

4. I have elsewhere suggested, but did not develop, this idea of axiological intuitions as complex experiences involving both cognitive and emotional legitimation and as confirming value-judgments in the moral sphere; cf. Drummond 2002a, 40; an earlier statement of the idea can be found in Drummond 2002b, 184–86.

5. This modifies a position taken by Mulligan (1998).

REFERENCES


