Existential Psychology and Intrinsic Motivation: Dect, Maslow, and Frankl

Overview. This chapter surveys developments in psychological theory that support the existential account of projective motivation and applies the distinction between targetable and by-product goods to these debates. It critiques recent theories of intrinsic motivation and self-actualization on this basis and interprets Viktor Frankl’s “logotherapy” as a projective theory. It also applies the goal versus by-product distinction to the problem of self-regarding attitudes such as various types of “self-esteem.” The discussions are not technical and connect familiar themes in psychoanalysis with work of well-known philosophers such as Rawls, Noddings, and Frankfurt.

1. Twentieth-Century Psychological Theories of Motivation

The debate we have traced between cognitive, humanistic, and existential theories of human motivation can also be found in twentieth-century psychology and psychoanalysis, where we now find support for the existential model of striving. I will focus in this chapter on only a few among several areas of important work in contemporary experimental psychology. For the theories behind these experimental approaches often tacitly take over the transmission principle and focus mainly on the etiology of long-recognized states of purposeful motivation—for example, whether altruistic or sympathetic feelings could be evolved responses. As Edward Deci says, the fundamental disagreements between "instinctivists" guiding different empirical methodologies (for example, concerning whether inner experiences are merely epiphenomenal or play a causal role in voluntary action and whether human action is ultimately determined or involves liberty) result from philosophical hypotheses that cannot be directly tested.

To clarify their similarities and differences, it may also be helpful to picture the relation between these theories on a two-dimensional table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motivation Theorist</th>
<th>Nonsocial Causes/Motive</th>
<th>Cognitive Causes/Motive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nonconscious Causes</td>
<td>Extreme behaviorism (Skinner); James-LaPrairie theory of emotion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscious Causes</td>
<td>Drive theory (Hull); Affect arousal theory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The research does not substantiate the assumptions that constitute the metatheory but simply coheres with the framework used to interpret the results. Dect provides a useful summary of the main approaches to motivation in twentieth-century psychology, which include:

I. Mechanistic Theories which hold that behavior is a direct response to stimuli, while thoughts, feelings, and choices are epiphenomenal, playing no causal role in behavior.

   A. Early psychoanalysis (Freud, Adler), which hold behavior to be caused primarily by unconscious drives, conscious desires, and environmental stimuli.

   B. Extreme behaviorism (Watson, Skinner), which reject conscious processes and intentionality altogether.

   C. Behaviorist drive theory (Hull), which focuses on internal associations between stimuli and behavioral responses.

II. Organismic Theories which hold that behavior is primarily caused by conscious internal processes, including cognitive and affective states, and thus generally count as voluntary action.

   A. Affect arousal theories (McGoldrick, Young, Atkinson, Clark, and Loomis), which hold that behavior follows quasi-mechanistically from positive or negative affects or feelings caused by past experiences and aroused again by similar environmental cues.

   B. Cognitive theories (Vroom, Attle, etc.), which hold that actions are caused by choices that are determined in turn by beliefs and desires (or in general, pro-attitudes).

   C. Humanistic psychology (Buhler and Allen, Maslow, Langer), which add free will to a cognitive picture of motivation, with a special emphasis on personal experience.
In this chapter, I will be interested primarily in ideas from theories in the bottom-right cell of the table, since the others proceed from assumptions now largely rejected in philosophical action theory (chap. 2). When they allow conscious states to play a causal role in generating behavior, these theories also tend to be absolutely egocentric. For example, affect-arousal accounts imply that all motivation flows ultimately from the drive to maximize positive feeling and minimize negative feeling, as per the reward-avoidance theory (see chap. 2.2). Similarly, Houb's theory considers the telos of all desire as physiological 'equilibrium,' with drives as disturbances in this equilibrium that have to be reduced by behavior. In this version of behaviorism, 'Drives activate stimulus-response associations, and drive reduction strengthens stimulus-response associations,' as the organism learns what kind of behavioral responses will reduce the unpleasant feeling of the drive by remitting it to homeostasis. On this theory, actions motivated by emotions such as pity would have to be regarded as energized by the agent's desire to quell his own distress. Pure or non-egocentric motives are ruled out a priori.

The dominant influence of such egocentric models is obvious in Douglas Mook's leading textbook on motivation in contemporary experimental psychology, which lists as main topics all the following:

- Under "Biological Motives," hunger, thirst, sex, aggression, homeostatic feedback mechanisms involved in these motives, cultural and cognitive processes related to these, and the neurological and chemical realization of these states in the nervous system;
- Under "Energy, Arousal, and Action," theories of habit and drive, and Freud on around and around;
- Under "Acquired Drives and Rewards," theories of avoidance conditioning, Pavlovian conditioning, imprinting, early infancy, and opponent-process theory;
- Under "Reinforcement Theory," the behaviorism account of operant conditioning; decision theory, its relation to criminology, and problems with maximizing, and so on.

It is only in the last quarter of Mook's textbook that we come to issues closer to the central problems of philosophical psychology, including the cognitive processes involved in human motivation (e.g., reducing cognitive dissonance) or theories of emotions as motivating states; love and altruism as forms of "social motivation" and "attachment"; and finally a brief look at "long-term goals." As this indicates, the origin of the most important motives in human psychology—those most central to the ethos of a person—

has until recently been addressed only in post-Freudian psychoanalysis and humanistic psychology, while more "scientific" approaches focused on cognitive processes that humans bring to share with other animals. As Joel Kupperman points out, there is so little good experimental work on "character" and other key concepts in moral psychology (such as ultimate ends) because it is extremely difficult to conduct experiments in these areas without violating the rights of test subjects or conducting expensive and logistically challenging longitudinal studies of individuals over many years. Even when experiments can be done, they either use animal models or limit test subjects to college students, and the experiments often proceed by way of collective stories, diaries, and so on (which must then be parsed according to subjective criteria). Thus the more speculative contributions of psychoanalysts and humanistic psychology have been able to contribute more to literary and philosophical debates about the context and sources of ultimate human motives.

To illustrate this point, consider one recent example in the post-Freudian psychosomatic traditions. A scholarly textbook for therapists using "ego-strengthening" techniques, including scripts for suggestions under hypnosis, relies on a conception of the "ego" as the "agent or organizer" of the self that is capable of what the authors call "inner strength." They never mention the word "will"—an example of the lingering effects of Freud's effort to dispense with the will. But they start from a notion of "inner strength" which they take to be "part of the vernacular of the common man," referring to "a psychic structure created through ordinary maturational and development." They attribute extraordinary powers to this "structure," which their primary script describes to the patient as feeling like "the very center of your being." In particular, the script suggests that when you are in touch with this part of yourself, you will be able to feel more confident with the knowledge that you have within yourself all the resources you really need to take steps in the direction that you wish to go...to be able to set goals and to be able to achieve them.

This part of the psyche described here as "inner strength" obviously plays the role that I have attributed to the will as the capacity for projective motivation. To the extent that focusing patients' attention on this source of willpower and resolve helps them gain confidence in themselves and overcome obstacles, it is a testament to the existential theory. Yet these authors start from a theoretical framework that obscures any deeper understanding of what this faculty of "inner strength" really is.
...
Concerning the import being made in this set of data, it is clear that the focus here is on the concept of self and its role in determining the self in the context of its early relationships. It is found that the child's self-concept is formed as part of the process of interaction, through participation in social roles and social interactions. As the child grows, the participation with others continues, and ultimately, the self-concept becomes more powerful than primary biological drives—such as hunger, innavigation through the environment, and social participation. For the young child, the self-concept is tightly linked with the environment through the physical and social relationships with others.

Perhaps, the concept of self-concept being linked with the environment is not as clear as it appears. On the one hand, the self-concept is formed as part of the process of interaction, through participation in social roles and social interactions. As the child grows, the participation with others continues, and ultimately, the self-concept becomes more powerful than primary biological drives—such as hunger, innavigation through the environment, and social participation. For the young child, the self-concept is tightly linked with the environment through the physical and social relationships with others.

On the other hand, the self-concept being linked with the environment is not as clear as it appears. On the one hand, the self-concept is formed as part of the process of interaction, through participation in social roles and social interactions. As the child grows, the participation with others continues, and ultimately, the self-concept becomes more powerful than primary biological drives—such as hunger, innavigation through the environment, and social participation. For the young child, the self-concept is tightly linked with the environment through the physical and social relationships with others.

However, these problems with the definitions of self are not as clear as they appear. On the one hand, the self-concept is formed as part of the process of interaction, through participation in social roles and social interactions. As the child grows, the participation with others continues, and ultimately, the self-concept becomes more powerful than primary biological drives—such as hunger, innavigation through the environment, and social participation. For the young child, the self-concept is tightly linked with the environment through the physical and social relationships with others.
proposed that the basic needs for competence, autonomy (or self-determination), and relatedness must be satisfied across the span of life for an individual to experience a genuine sense of integrity and well-being or eudaimonia.113

This explanation results from a dualistic subsumption of earlier drive theories (such as Hull's) that nevertheless leaves room for their most basic and commonly invisible premises; namely (1) that there must be some reward or perceived benefit to the agent involved in causing all motivation; and (2) that the prospect of this benefit explains the energy involved in intrinsically motivated activities, since no activity can plausibly be its own reward.116 It follows from these assumptions that intrinsic motivation exists because of the goods that it tends to produce for its agent, which SDT identifies as psychological development, autonomy, competence and competence-based security, fulfillment, excitement, and so on. In other words, SDT starts from the eudaimonic concept of our formal selves (see chap. 6, sec. 2), and interprets the substance of that ethos as including a tried of inner and externally psychological needs, the drives toward which cause intrinsic motivation to arise (and eventually to be channelized into particular pursuits, projects, and relationships).

The eudaimonic form of SDT is evident in another article, in which Deci and Ryan say that it is part of the natural function of "adaptive design of the human organisms to engage in interesting activities, to exercise capacities, to pursue connectedness in social groups, and to integrate intrapsychic and interpersonal experiences into a relative unity."117 They square performing this natural function, or attaining our natural selves, with psychological health or holistic well-being: the Hulansy definition of the three psychological needs as "organismic necessities" assumes "a fundamental human trajectory toward vitality, integration, and health." This seems to imply that a fundamental drive for eudaimonia motivates the activities that fulfill these needs. This is explicit in Deci's first book, which replaces his initial adaptive definition with the following formula: "Intrinsically motivated behaviors are those behaviors which a person engages in in full competent and self-determined."6 Yet Deci and Ryan now acknowledge that an intrinsically motivated pursuit does not have to be aimed at need satisfaction per se; it may simply be focused on interesting activity or an important goal if they are a contract that allows need satisfaction. However, if need satisfaction is not forthcoming while they are acting, unproductive or dysfunctional consequences typically follow.118

This phrasing is ambiguous: it suggests that satisfaction of one (or more) of the three basic psychological needs is sometimes only a by-product of
some innately motivated activity A; but it adds the caveat that if this contribution to the agent's well-being does not soon follow, then the intrinsic motivation for A will be countermanded and will wane. Thus "A direct corollary of the SDT perspective is that people will tend to pursue goals, domains, and relationships that allow or support their need satisfaction." This turns SDT into a formally egocentric model like Aristotle's acropæon not motivated by acquisitive or consummatory appetites are still driven by the agent's own need for fulfillment. Yet this seems to be refuted by the inherent resilience of intrinsic motives, their tenacity to be sustained even through "dry spells" where the usual fulfillment fails to follow.

3. An Existential Reinterpretation of Intrinsic Motivation

I argue here that intrinsic motivation is better understood in terms of projective striving that is not formally egocentric in structure. Carefully specifying the role of by-product fulfillment will lead us to a fuller articulation of our existential task, as an alternative to the three quasi-drives identified in the Deci-Ryan model. To clarify this alternative, let us return to the example of character-frailty as a type of intrinsic motivation. One leading account of friendship (which SDT includes in the intrinsic good of relatedness) helps illustrate the Deci-Ryan view that agent-related benefits of intrinsic motivation are crucial to their continuance. Nora Bediwar argues that even when benefits to the agent are an "unintended result" of an activity as Bishop-Bolker said, "it may well be that the tacit expectation of self-benefit--based on past experience, or even just on the natural saliency of our biological constitution--is necessary for sustaining the activity." Applying this idea, the argument against Tyndale that the object I contemplate in love to "further evolve the love" rather than quench it, the happiness I derive from the contemplation "must serve to perpetuate the love of the other who is its source." Alternatively, we might explain this idea in terms of what Rorty suggests. Following C. S. Lewis, calls "inherent value," which is "the value that characterizes the object of an innately good experience." In these terms, Bediwar's claim is that we can perceive the inherent value of a person who is loveable for herself only in enjoying or delighting in that perception.

While it is plausible that delightful and similar agent-related benefits act as reinforcers for fundamental types of intrinsic motivations, it is not as plausible that my friend's delighting me is an essential component of the intrinsic value I see in her--or an integral part of what I love or am devoted to. In general, it seems that characteristictic of intrinsic motivation is difficult to square with final ends that have agent-related benefits built into them, because joy is not always present in the activities explained by intrinsic motivation. In fact, the greater sense of fulfillment or meaning often requires perseverance through dry spells (both initially and later on), during which we still recognize the value of our goals and continue to strive for them. Sometimes the usual joy in having one's friend is missing; sometimes the intrinsically worthy task involves so many negatives that the real sense of satisfaction in its pursuit comes only after a long time of sustained devotion without reinforcing delight.

That many people are not motivated to pursue such "shambles" but valuable activities for long enough to fully appreciate them is no argument for the Aristotelian account. The situation is similar when the agent-transcending goal of intrinsic motivation is an objective standard of excellence rather than the qualities of some figure or the good of some person. As Albert Bandura and Dale Schunk suggest:

By making self-satisfaction conditional on a certain level of performance, individuals create self-incentives to persist in their efforts until their performances match initial standards. Both anticipated satisfactions for matching standards and the dissatisfaction with insufficient ones provide incentives for self-directed actions.

But notice that these "incentives" are generated by appreciating some conception of excellence as one's personal standard; on pain of circularity, the volitional activity of setting and maintaining the standard cannot itself be motivated by the anticipated satisfaction of a job well done. Once again, this hoped-for delight can act as a reinforcer only after the goal of meeting one's standard is perceived. This reinforcer can be necessary for continued pursuit of the goal beyond some point, because the agent can tolerate only so much frustration in the pursuit of the relevant kind of excellence. This is why "A sense of personal efficacy in mastering challenges is apt to generate greater interest in the activity." Thus motivation training has to (a) get the agent to see the intrinsic value in a goal; and (b) tolerate enough lack of success in pursuing it to get to the point where some effectiveness can be experienced.

Hence the existential account of intrinsic motivation does not require that the agent-related by-product goods intrinsic motivationally irrelevant or play no supporting role. On the contrary, such benefits may even help the will sustain its efforts by providing some of the necessary preconditions for volitional striving or outward-looking cares (since a sustainable agent may have trouble keeping volitional focus). By-product satisfactions may also provide personal reasons for valuing the caring process that supports and complements the agent's independent reasons for valuing her own goals. For the striving will, though, these agent-related and process-based reasons for pursuing goals with agent-transcending value are not
We should describe the process of acquiring and using human knowledge as a complex, multi-step process. The process begins with the acquisition of new information. This is followed by the integration of this new information with existing knowledge. The next step is the application of this integrated knowledge to solve problems. Finally, the solutions are evaluated and the process is repeated.

The acquisition of new information is a critical step in the knowledge acquisition process. It involves the gathering of information from various sources, such as books, articles, and conversations. This information is then integrated with existing knowledge to form a more complete understanding of a particular topic.

Integration of information is a complex process that requires critical thinking and problem-solving skills. It involves analyzing the new information, evaluating its relevance, and determining how it fits with existing knowledge. The integration process is often facilitated by the use of tools such as diagrams, flowcharts, and mind maps.

Application of knowledge to solve problems is the next step in the knowledge acquisition process. This involves using the integrated knowledge to identify and solve problems. The solutions are then evaluated to determine their effectiveness.

Evaluation of solutions is a critical step in the knowledge acquisition process. It involves assessing the effectiveness of the solutions and determining whether they meet the desired goals. This process is often facilitated by the use of feedback mechanisms such as surveys, interviews, and focus groups.

The evaluation process is followed by the implementation of solutions. This involves putting the solutions into practice and monitoring their effectiveness. The results are then used to inform future knowledge acquisition efforts.

The knowledge acquisition process is a continuous cycle that involves ongoing learning and improvement. It requires a commitment to continuous learning and a willingness to adapt to new information and changing circumstances.

In conclusion, the knowledge acquisition process is a complex and multi-step process that involves the acquisition of new information, integration with existing knowledge, application to solve problems, evaluation of solutions, and implementation of successful solutions. It requires critical thinking, problem-solving skills, and a commitment to continuous learning and improvement.
since well-being or eudaimonia is a by-product of such pursuits, there is also a gap between performing one's design function well and realizing one's natural telos, and attaining happiness, fulfillment, integration of self, and so on. The agent's holistic goal, in this sense, thus stands at risk of being undermined by the pursuit of higher motivational aims. They may be fulfilled such that, if the by-product benefits that the agent normally derives from pursuing their motivational aims are blocked and fall below some threshold, then some of the necessary preconditions for intrinsic motivation are missing. But, as I said in reply to Badzwar, such a threshold is not the end-point of the motivational telos, which extends it and remains infinitely open to new goal-setting.

These three features together present a working existential concept of our formal telos. The existential approach breaks up the static formal telos (see chap. 6, sec. 3) into three distinct concepts with different extensions: (1) our highest ends, (2) our natural function, and (3) our flourishing. This is a more detailed description of the non-essential formal telos that we found in both Scouras and Kant, although they do not fully agree about its substantive content or requirements (chap. 11). Within this tradition, different material conceptions of our existential telos are distinguished by the extent they specify for our highest ends or, equivalently, the order of agents transcending goods that it is our natural function to will for their own sake. For example, I will present a material conception of our existential telos that is more inclusive than either Scouras's or Kant's conceptions (chap. 14). Any such account of our existential telos remains normative, because it entails as we had some significant ends that it is possible for human persons to project. But it does not make this discrimination simply by asking which among projectible ends it is most fulfilling, integrating, or self-actualizing to will.

4. Maslow's Eudaimonism
To clarify the importance of these distinctions, it will also be useful to consider Abraham Maslow's theory of self-actualization. Maslow's theory is less sophisticated than Deick and Ryan's, which builds in Maslow's idea of an innate motivation to growth and development of creative talents that awakens "higher needs." But given his place in the tradition of humanistic psychology, Maslow's account is much better known among philosophical audiences and more clearly exhibits the problems with eudaimonian meta-theory. Maslow proposes that human needs come in a linear hierarchy, ranging from our most basic biological requirements, through our social dispositions to affiliation, to the most distinctively human goals, in the following order:

- Physiological needs (food, shelter, sex, reproduction)
- Safety (protection from physical danger and stability in one's life-world)
- Love and belongingness (relationships with friends, groups, spouse, attachment in childhood)
- Esteem (recognition from others for our personality and for our productive/useful work)
- Self-actualization ("realizing their capabilities fully, being all they could be")

This theory certainly recognizes a range of possible ends like those suggested in Aristotelian philosophical theories. Maslow still thought of these motives as driven that are innate in human nature, although the higher ones emerge only when the lower ones are largely satisfied. And since even the highest goal of "self-actualization" is understood formally in terms of the agent's flourishing or full development of psychic health, all of our motives remain formally eudaimonic in this model.

Maslow's account of the self on a stage-wise quest for its eudaimonia remains too mechanical, conflating how we ought to be moved with how we will in fact be moved. As Maslow argues, it predicts that "the more a person is deficient in a given need, the more important it should be. And the more the needs in each level are satisfied, the more important the needs higher in the hierarchy ought to be." Yet in survey studies, there was little support for either prediction in the data. This is unsurprising, since Maslow forgot that many people street outpour when what Frankfort called wantlessness, or what Kant regarded as "the aesthetic" stage of existence, they are contented with the satisfaction of their existing D1-D2 desires without making any strong evaluations about values that could motivate D3 desires. Yet alone projecting agent-transcending goals necessary to engage in practices or cultivate noble friendships. After winning the lottery, they would happily just sit in their mansion and watch movies on TV all day long.

That said, even if there is an easier distinction to higher intrinsic moti- vates such as exploration, creative work, and achievement, we could recon- struct Maslow's lexical ordering as a thesis about how are rules of physiological satisfaction, physical security, and basic acceptance may func- tion as preconditions to willing higher ends. It is certainly compatible with the existential approach to hold that projective willing has necessary pre- conditions that are not part of the goals it adopts. Physiological deprivation, chaos in civil society, terror, or mental abuse may undermine our capacity to set and strive for worthwhile ends. Ryan and Deci cite 'evasive research showing that 'a secure relational base' needs to be in place for children to
The only way to "restore a man's inner strength" when he reaches such despair is "to succeed in showing him some future goal." To change his attitude by focusing him on life's challenge "to fulfill the tasks which it constantly sets for each individual." 

Frankl generalized these findings into a theory of motivation that led to "logotherapy," a method for helping those with "neoreichian" ideas that do not come from trauma or repression of appetites but rather from lack of sufficiently meaningful purposes to which to devote themselves. This theory recognizes the distinction between the proactive motives of the existential will and what it calls D1-D2 desires.

Logotherapy deviates from Freudian psychoanalysis insofar as it considers man as a being whose main concern consists in fulfilling a meaning and in actualizing values, rather than in mere gratification and satisfaction of drives and instincts, the more reconciliation of conflicting claims of id, ego, and superego, or even adaptation and adjustment to the society and environment.

Frankl also distinguishes the proper functioning of what he called the "meaning" from all other concepts, including D1 desires. He recognizes that in finding intrinsic values in different possible goals and devoting oneself to them on those grounds, "we may arouse inner tension rather than inner equilibrium." To explain this remark, it helps to recall that from Plato's point of view in the Symposium, it would seem that by projecting goals for which we had no prior appetite or attraction, we would be creating need or lack in ourselves, or making ourselves so unfulfilled Frankl describes this as moving from a state of motivational equilibrium to psychic crisis to a new state of tension caused by urging passively about something. "However," Frankl continues, "precisely this tension is an indispensable prerequisite of mental health." We can even recognize this and realize that we enjoy the tension caused by our enthusiasm for the tasks at hand. To paraphrase Senator John McCain, another war camp survivor, we find meaning by devoting ourselves to "causes greater than our self-interest." 

Here Frankl explicitly rejects "those motivational theories which are based on the iso-situation principle"---the psychoanalytic version of Plato's lack of desire, according to which "man is basically concerned with maintaining or restoring an inner equilibrium." This was Freud's principle, but Frankl thinks that it is refused by Alcott, Maslow, and Maslow, and Hobs, who founded that "propagating.eulerAngles() results equilibrium and maintenance moti-

vational tension." So Hobbes and Locke turn out to be right in a sense if we reject their objection to Plato in existential form. There may be no value or sense in stimulating additional D1-D2 desires (which, according to Socrates' famous analogy, would be like making holes in our psychic
Evaluating Psychology and Interpersonal Meaning

458

As Cronenwett and Bunker note, there is certainly a point to requiring people to
be aware of others, but it is also important to consider how this awareness can be
used in a constructive way. In this context, the focus on "other-directedness" as a
means of predicting certain behaviors is not necessarily harmful. However, the
extent to which this awareness is used should be critically evaluated. For
example, if an individual is aware of others but does not use this information to
positively influence their behavior, the awareness may not be as beneficial as
intended.

It is also important to consider the role of social support in the context of
other-directedness. Social support can provide a sense of belonging and
reinforce positive behaviors. However, if the focus on other-directedness leads to
neglecting one's own needs, it may be detrimental.

In conclusion, the concept of other-directedness is complex and requires
consideration of various factors. While it has the potential to be beneficial, it is
important to ensure that it is used in a constructive and empowering way.


---

459

As Cronenwett and Bunker note, there is certainly a point to requiring people to
be aware of others, but it is also important to consider how this awareness can be
used in a constructive way. In this context, the focus on "other-directedness" as a
means of predicting certain behaviors is not necessarily harmful. However, the
extent to which this awareness is used should be critically evaluated. For
example, if an individual is aware of others but does not use this information to
positively influence their behavior, the awareness may not be as beneficial as
intended.

It is also important to consider the role of social support in the context of
other-directedness. Social support can provide a sense of belonging and
reinforce positive behaviors. However, if the focus on other-directedness leads to
neglecting one's own needs, it may be detrimental.

In conclusion, the concept of other-directedness is complex and requires
consideration of various factors. While it has the potential to be beneficial, it is
important to ensure that it is used in a constructive and empowering way.


---

As Cronenwett and Bunker note, there is certainly a point to requiring people to
be aware of others, but it is also important to consider how this awareness can be
used in a constructive way. In this context, the focus on "other-directedness" as a
means of predicting certain behaviors is not necessarily harmful. However, the
extent to which this awareness is used should be critically evaluated. For
example, if an individual is aware of others but does not use this information to
positively influence their behavior, the awareness may not be as beneficial as
intended.

It is also important to consider the role of social support in the context of
other-directedness. Social support can provide a sense of belonging and
reinforce positive behaviors. However, if the focus on other-directedness leads to
neglecting one's own needs, it may be detrimental.

In conclusion, the concept of other-directedness is complex and requires
consideration of various factors. While it has the potential to be beneficial, it is
important to ensure that it is used in a constructive and empowering way.

The relation between projective motivation and existential meaningfulness is therefore not usefully explained or analyzed in terms of a drive for meaning. If we could be motivated to take up a demanding task just by the simple longing to be doing something to do or to avoid boredom, or to find "some meaning or other" for our life, then we would be able to satisfy such a desire just by picking any end arbitrarily. But such commonly chosen ends could not be projective motives or to be assumed devotion and vitalization resolves. For they would not be responding to any perceived importance; either there would be no substantial grounds for valuing these ends, or if there were, we would not have these reasons. At a result, we could only play at pursuing them. If our ends lack the requisite gravitas or intrinsic importance for us, we find it possible on a whim to revere our interest in them—which is just to say that we are not able to form a real commitment to them or to fully invest ourselves in them.

3.2 The Allelity of Values to Which the Will Responds

Frankl's existentialism, like any of its, thus presupposes the possibility of real values outside us in the world to which we can respond. As Frankl argues, of "the meaning that one is longing to be fulfilled by" was just an invention of his mind, like Nietzsche's image in the pool, "it would immediately lose its demanding and challenging character, it could no longer call man forth or summon him."

On this basis, Frankl rightly rejects Sartre's notion that we invent values by choosing our projects; Sartre gets the relationship backwards. This is what he means by saying that one cannot just "will to will" without the perception of meaning or significance that could provide an objective reason for forming a seriou project. Without nonarbitrary grounds, then, existential projectivism would be self-undermining and fail to generate personal meaning. This is why "subjectivism and relationship" about values undermine our capacity for existential resolve, or "ends to make us" of the spirit. Moreover, to furnish grounds for projective motivation rather than only D3 desires, these values must have a certain allelity, or otherwise, separation from the agent's goods. This independence of the agent is implied in the concept of self-transcendence, which Frankl explicitly takes from Buber: "The essentially self-transcendent quality of human existence renders man a being reaching out beyond itself." In this respect, Frankl's theory agrees with Nel Noddings's conception of caring, which is crucially influenced by Kittiekaard, Buber, and Marcel. She conceives caring for "living things" as including an effort to attend to "their natures, ways of life, needs, and desires." Without this focus on the other's reality, we could not understand their good well enough to help them. Thus the caring agent focuses on the other rather than on herself "as caretaker" or on how burdened and caring a person she is. In particular, Noddings emphasizes that caring involves "enormation" in the other, or "a displacement of interest from my own reality to the reality of the other." Moreover, she adds that a "genuine caring for the other... for the ethical self... emerges only from a caring for others." Thus, although there is a secondary place for concern about the coherence and value of one's care, at the ground level, "caring is always characterized by move away from self," or a narrower focus. There is a convergence here with Frankl's claim that caring is liberating because of its "selflessness." Caring as a motive state requires this intrinsic interest in something or someone transcending the self. At bottom, all caring involves engagement. The engagement need not be intense nor need it be pervasive in the life of the one-caring, but it must occur. Without it, Noddings says, there is no love in Buber's sense of direct contact with the other-in-us.

Existential will therefore requires an Attun or experience of reality that is not merely an ideal construct in the manifold of one's consciousness. Eiching Buber, Frankl writes: "The world must not be regarded as a mere instrument, or as a means to the end of self-actualization." To projective motivation, I will say movement toward persons, objects, and states whose value I do not seek to possess, experience, or appropriate into myself (even in a reasonably extended sense). It is this allelity of values to which makes existential will essentially non-nativistic in its general form, in direct opposition to formalism. As Frankl puts it, the human person "reaches out for something other than itself."

We cannot create or settle any basic or nonarbitrary values with this kind of allelity or difference from our own being, as Sartre's approach would require, because we are not God. Our inventions and artifacts are doomed to remain extensions of our minds; we rightly see them as expressions of ourselves, and our love of them (even when justified) remains formally nativistic, for they cannot become free beings whom we can meet or to whom we could belong ourselves in fully self-transcending will (this is the dream of which Pascician becoming a "real boy" is in a classic expression). As the existential theory of desire continues, chapter 9 suggests, the ability to create overly itself—to bring forth separate beings that are not mere property or equipment of the maker but free of his or her control—would be a distinguishing mark of the divine. Indeed, Levine (a Jewish author) reminds Christian theologians that the great force of the idea of creation such as was contributed by modernism is that this creation is an end—not because this represents a work more miraculous than the devine, informing of matter, but because the separated and created being is thereby not simply
on the world, but rather in the essentially first-person sense of being experi-
enced as significant by the agent living it. 148

More clearly than Frankfurt, Frankfurt recognizes that while it is good for life to have this kind of existential significance, this is not the only impor-
tant good, since a life that is meaningful to its agent could still be unhappy or evil. 149 Still, the meaningfulness a person finds in her life is a very impor-
tant good that depends, if Frankfurt’s view, on (1) how important the goals of her activities seem to her; and (2) whether she finds the means to her ends or the activities involved in pursuing them intrinsically interesting and well suited to her personality. This shows that the meaning-order of affairs toward a final end is more than the terminal value of the state of affairs sought as the final end, and this surplus may be realized even when the end is not achieved:

when it is important to a person it is important to him only when he is devoted to something that he cares about. Thus a person’s life is meaningful only if he devotes it to some considerable extent, in activity that he is devoted to things that he cares about. It is not essential that the activity he devotes to things he cares about be successful.

The extent to which life is meaningful depends less upon how much it accomplishes than upon how it is lived.150

Thus Frankfurt rejects the traditional view that “the only value that a final end necessarily possesses for us, simply in virtue of the fact that it is a final end, must be identical with the value for us of the state of affairs which we bring about when we attain that end.” For having and pursuing final ends gives personal meaning to our activities, which is an existential value distinct from that attained in the end.151 In those cases, the quest itself is so rewarding that we are almost sure that the end has been attained and the journey toward it is over.

The distinction to which Frankfurt is drawing attention here is the one that I have characterized as the difference between the positive value of E and the derivative values related in pursuing and possibly achieving E (existential meaning, challenge, solidarity with others involved, self-sustenance, etc.). Simply for heuristic purposes, I summarize these relations in the following formula:

\[
\text{Agent} \rightarrow \text{E} \rightarrow \text{M} \downarrow \text{V}
\]

where \(\rightarrow\) indicates intention, \(\rightarrow\) indicates efficient causation, and \(\downarrow\) indicates a grounding relation of rational support.

In this schema, agent A intends E as a final end, and this is grounded by E’s terminal value V, and pursuing E for this reason causes personal meaning (M) and other goods in A’s life. I have argued that A’s motive for intending E must be prospective where V is an agent-transcending value; for M is an effect on A that derives from pursuing E on the basis of V (or having E among his active final ends) rather than part of E. I have also suggested that such existential meaningfulness is not itself a directly target-
able goal; it can be pursued effectively only by looking for objective grounds for caring or seeking our realizable values worth caring about that supply reasons for projecting final ends.

Frankfurt instead takes this distinction as a reason to question the tradi-
tional relation between “instrumental value” and “terminal value,” and the “fundamental asymmetry” between means and ends in Aristotle’s moral psychology. He summarizes Aristotle’s position as follows:

[First] A means derives its instrumental value from the relationship in which it stands to its end, but its end derives no value from the relationship between itself and the means to it. . . . [Second] A means derives no terminal value from being useful. . . . Of course, what has instrumental value may have terminal value as well. But it cannot have the latter by virtue of the fact that it has the former.152

Frankfurt believes that this Aristotelian approach is too “imperialistic,” since it “diverts attention from the fact that every end is the end of an agent” and plays a complex role in our life.153 Human agents point ends, Frankfurt says, not just for their terminal value but also so that their activities (and thus their life) can be meaningful for them.154 This suggests, in terms of my schema above, that end E can be chosen in part for the sake of M:

Final ends are possible states of affairs, which someone values for their own sake. It must not be supposed that the measure of how a life is lived is given by the value of his final ends. Rather, how a life is lived is a function of what it is like for the person to pursue them. The problem of selecting final ends is not the same, then, as the problem of measuring the inherent or terminal value of possible states of affairs. . . . The goals thus to be most desirable to achieve are not necessarily those that it would be best to seek.

This is not only because there are differences in the probabilities and in the cost of attaining various goals, it is also because there are differences in the kinds of activities, and in the patterns of activity, by which various final ends may be pursued.155

In other words, the required means to a final end have a lot to do with the existential value of pursuing that end. For example, Frankfurt suggests
it is possible that pursuit of some highly noble end might (for a particular individual as his circumstances require very little challenging activity, whereas pursuit of a different end with more modest product-value, might require correspondingly greater wholehearted attention) that "would fill the person's life with meaning and purpose." I agree that she fulfillment an agent gains from pursuing worthwhile ends is partly a function of her means to that end (including relationships involved and necessary preparations), and that considerations about the means can function as excuses for taking up an end if that do not focus on the product-value of E. This is one species of what I will call "purely-grounded goals for pursuing ends." It's existential value, or the meaningfulness of pursuing it, is a part of a function of these important considerations about the processes by which E can be sought. Yet, as the title of his article indicates, Frankfurt instead concludes that final ends have a kind of "instrumental value" for making life meaningful: "our final ends derive a certain instrumental value from the very fact that they are terminally valuable." This is a category mistake like the one that leads to the paradox of reductivism: meaning is contained in an embracing end that we desire (or existential boredom because the object of an embracing aversion), and we choose final ends because of their "instrumental value" as a means toward of leading a meaningful life. Frankfurt repeats this view in his lectures on love: "Despite the act of pandering, we may fairly say that final ends are instrumentally valuable just because they are terminally valuable"; for example, the lover cares about his beloved "for its own sake," but in addition "what he loses necessarily possesses an instrumental value for him, in virtue of the fact that it is a necessary condition of his enjoying the inherently important activity of loving it." Frankfurt clearly senses the tension in this proposed solution, for he asks us to consider a man who tells a woman that his love for her is what gives meaning and value to his life. Living love, he says, is for him the only thing that makes living worthwhile. . . . From his declaration that loving her fulfills a deep need of his life, she will surely not conclude that he is making use of her. Assuming that this man is sincere, Frankfurt is surely correct—but only because the woman will understand that the existential value that loving her contributes to the man's life is primarily a consonant effect of devotion to her rather than the means for her attention to him and his concern for her well-being. For if she thought the latter, she would feel used, like a mere ornament in the man's self-congratulatory (and self-deceiving) project of consummating and maintaining an image of himself as a loving being. Frankfurt seems both to recognize this point yet to obscure it.

The appearance of conflict between pursuing one's own interests and being selflessly devoted to the interests of another is dispelled once we appreciate that what serves the self-interest of the lover is nothing other than his selfishness. It is only if his love is genuine, needless to say, that it can have the importance for him that loving entails... Accordingly, the benefit of loving accrues to a person only to the extent that he cares about his beloved disinterestedly and not for the sake of any benefits that he may derive either from the beloved or from loving him. While correct, this last sentence surely implies that the loving agent is not pursuing his own interest (even if his volitional state does in fact promote it); therefore, the conflict is not resolved. Franklin's phrasing suggests that his analysis gives comfort to eudaimonism, when really it does not. There is also something misleading in Frankfurt's interesting and closely related argument that because "living a meaningful life is important to us for its own sake, useful activity possesses for us not merely instrumental value but terminal value as well." As Frankfurt explains, his point is not just Aristotle's idea that "activities may be esteemed as final ends and not merely as means to ends other than themselves." Of course activities themselves can be desired in ends because of their "intrinsic character." But Aristotle does not recognize that [activities] may possess terminal value precisely because they are instrumentally valuable, that is, because they are experienced as meaningful work that helps produce an end whose realization is valuable for its own sake. Frankfurt's point could be expressed by saying that there is a unique form of terminal value that attaches to the very pursuit of many ends: that is, it is inherently important for us to engage in activity that is devoted to advancing our goals, even aside from the product-value of the goals themselves. This is the intrinsic existential value that useful activities have independently of the value of the ends that define these activities. Existential value in this sense is unlike the terminal value that activities can have for Aristotle when they constitute an intrinsic good. For even those activities that are only means to such goods rather than constituting part of the human good still have Frankfurt's existential value above and beyond the product-value of the ends when achieved. This is an insightful response to Aristotle but it neglects to mention that when an activity acquires such terminal existential value because it is at least partially constituted by disinterested commitments to the final end, the agent cannot choose this activity as a means to such existential value, or initially be moved by erosic desire for such existential value.
In general, Frankfort points the fact that not all terminal values are targetable and what generates non-targetable terminal value should not be described as useful for causing such non-targeted-by-product value. His analysis confuses the extrinsic and intrinsic trade (determinate power to provide an object for meaningful endeavor) with a kind of instrumental value and thereby redefines every goal precisely the extrinsic framework that he has criticized as leading to an inadequate picture of selfhood. The traditional distinction between ends and means may be inadequate, but the problem is not solved by blending them. Considering process-focused grounds for taking up a final end is much as interesting the means involved in the task may be as of pursuit of E is likely to affect one's character—cannot amount to regarding the whole process of pursuing E as final at all what we ordinarily call a means to a separate end. As I argue in chapter 7, even when our final end is itself an activity involving the pursuit of other things, the terminal value of this activity for the sake of which it could be terminally desirable is quite distinct from the derivative benefits of taking the activity as final. Potential of meaning, interesting work, full employment of one’s talents, or fulfilling engagement with a diverse range of goods operate but not as ends in means but, rather, as grounds for willing both the final end and the technique. The introduction of a third term allows us to solve the problems that Frankfort identifies in the traditional Aristotelian doctrine.

So while I agree with Frankfort that the process of pursuing final ends can add to the agency's life a kind of value distinct from anything the agent believes to be inherent in the end-state pursued, I deny that due for this agent-related value can be what moves the agency to act and strive for such ends. Her own will must motivate the agent if her effort is to generate the highest kinds of existential value for her own life. Another way of saying this is that if they are not to be self-defeating, agent-relativized process-focused considerations can enter into the selection of final ends only as grounds for projecting them, not as attractors that cause an appetite for the pursuit of these ends. When they function as grounds, such process-focused considerations are not already operative as motives; hence they cannot compete with any other motive for pursuing the relevant end for its own sake. Moreover, they can serve as agent-relative grounds for projection only in perspective with more agent-neutral grounds focused on the present-value of the final end. For recognizing that a final end has some terminal value that could justify anyone pursuing it is quite consistent with judging that the pursuit of this end is also supported by considerations concerning what this project would be like in a particular individual's life, given his circumstances, history, other projects, and so on.

Existential Psychology and Intrinsic Motivation

Hence I argue that the sort of consideration to which Frankfort draws attention in this part of his work in fact helps explain why, contra Frank- fort's own position, caring is grounded on objective reasons. Our projected life goals can give meaning to our lives only because they are grounded by an object for meaningful endeavor with a kind of instrumental value and thereby redefines every goal precisely the extrinsic framework that he has criticized as leading to an inadequate picture of selfhood. The traditional distinction between ends and means may be inadequate, but the problem is not solved by blending them. Considering process-focused grounds for taking up a final end is much as interesting the means involved in the task may be as of pursuit of E is likely to affect one's character—cannot amount to regarding the whole process of pursuing E as final at all what we ordinarily call a means to a separate end. As I argue in chapter 7, even when our final end is itself an activity involving the pursuit of other things, the terminal value of this activity for the sake of which it could be terminally desirable is quite distinct from the derivative benefits of taking the activity as final. Potential of meaning, interesting work, full employment of one’s talents, or fulfilling engagement with a diverse range of goods operate but not as ends in means but, rather, as grounds for willing both the final end and the technique. The introduction of a third term allows us to solve the problems that Frankfort identifies in the traditional Aristotelian doctrine.

So while I agree with Frankfort that the process of pursuing final ends can add to the agency's life a kind of value distinct from anything the agent believes to be inherent in the end-state pursued, I deny that due for this agent-related value can be what moves the agency to act and strive for such ends. Her own will must motivate the agent if her effort is to generate the highest kinds of existential value for her own life. Another way of saying this is that if they are not to be self-defeating, agent-relativized process-focused considerations can enter into the selection of final ends only as grounds for projecting them, not as attractors that cause an appetite for the pursuit of these ends. When they function as grounds, such process-focused considerations are not already operative as motives; hence they cannot compete with any other motive for pursuing the relevant end for its own sake. Moreover, they can serve as agent-relative grounds for projection only in perspective with more agent-neutral grounds focused on the present-value of the final end. For recognizing that a final end has some terminal value that could justify anyone pursuing it is quite consistent with judging that the pursuit of this end is also supported by considerations concerning what this project would be like in a particular individual's life, given his circumstances, history, other projects, and so on.
important distinctions. For example, while he treats "self-respect" as a matter of possessing universal dignity shared with all persons, he understands "self-esteem" as involving "a sense of making one special, unique, and (in Hegg's terms) particular" as a valuable end. As this suggests, we need to distinguish between at least four different kinds of positive self-regarding attitudes:

1. The first derives from social recognition of our intimate status as a competent moral agent capable of responsible action, or as a person capable of forming and pursuing a conception of her good, or as a citizen capable of exercising rights, and so on.26

2. The second derives from other people (our caregivers first and foremost) believing in our innate and acquired abilities to do things that should earn us respect and recognition over and above what we deserve merely as competent agents and rights-bearers.27

3. The third, when reality-based, derives from actually doing these things: it then depends on the desert or merit we may or may not acquire by our choices, efforts, and projects. Since these merits arise from accomplishments measured on some absolute scale of excellence (whether discounted relative to individual abilities and circumstance or not), in principle every self-esteem could acquire high merits and the relevant attitude that properly depends on them.

4. The fourth kind of positive self-evaluation properly depends instead on merits defined comparatively according to the differences between individual accomplishments as measured absolutely in S. Metric of this last kind cannot even in principle be achieved equally by all.28

Since praise is fluid in this area, it does not matter much what labels we give to the different kinds of positive self-esteem that arise in these four ways. I will call the first "basic self-esteem," or as a sense of our "intrinsic dignity," and the second "faith in ourselves," or confidence in our own potential. The third, which I call "self-boost," or pride in our accomplishments measured absolutely, comes closest to Aristotle's "imagination" (see chap. 7, sec. 5). The fourth, which I have already called "the desire for supererogatory status" and "pride in distinction" (chap. 10 sect. 2-4) and has an important place in human life but is also dangerous the desire for this kind of pride is what Hobbes calls "glory" and what Nietzsche celebrates as the will to ascendancy over others.

Now, it is clear that a child's "self-esteem" or "positive self-image" refers to other justified self-boost or pride in distinction as defined here, it is irrational to try to produce it directly. For unless they are to rest entirely

on illusions about oneself, these kinds of self-esteem must be mainly by-products of activities undertaken for reasons other than building self-esteem. Hence it is not surprising that one study of 602 college freshmen by Jennifer C. Crocker at the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research has found that students trying to improve their looks or get good grades for the sake of self-esteem were more likely to become frustrated and experience anxiety—thus lowering their confidence in themselves. An obsession with extramural markers of self-worth, Dr. Crocker believes, leads to self-absorption, and this "focus on the self" is also self-destructive to others.29

Frankl's existential approach seems like a plausible solution to this common neurosis: what is needed now will depend on what workable cause, relationship, work, and ability. It is hoped that pride in genuine accomplishments will follow.

Rawls's conception of "self-esteem" (or "self-honor") which combines what I have labeled "self-honor" and confidence in oneself, has the same implications. For he describes its two aspects as follows:

- It includes a person's sense of his own value, his secure conviction that his conception of the good, his plan of life, is worth carrying out. And second, self-esteem implies a confidence in one's ability, so far as it is within one's power, to fulfill one's intentions, etc. It is clear why self-esteem is a primary good. Without it, nothing may seem worthy doing, or if some things have value for us, we lack the will to strive for them.30

Rawls is not concerned to explain how this striving will functions, but he thinks it is undermined both by a lack of worthwhile goals and by pervasive social impediments that make it impossible to pursue worthwhile projects. In this first respect, self-esteem is closely dependent on the goods that are available for the agent to care about. Like Humeans, Rawls also thinks that this requires some level of interpersonal recognition of the value of our life goals and activities. In addition to internal coherence, it requires "finding our person and deeds appreciated and confirmed by others who are likewise esteemed and their association enjoyed."31 Like Frankl's analysis, this suggests that the goods we care about must have a kind of objectivity, although Rawls rejects the strong objectivity of perfectivists doctrines of excellence.32

Rawls's student Alexander, Jr., develops this idea beyond moral self-respect. He argues that in addition to basic respect of oneself as a moral agent, some people develop respectability as moral standards, values, or goals for their lives, whereas others lack "a sense of minimum non-moral standards."33 It is possible for a person in the latter category to satisfy basic defensive moral requirements yet think and act wrongfully within these limits.
Emotional Psychology and Forensic Medicine

Wit as Comedian and Judge

Recesses, a trope in the cinematic genre where shots of a wet rental property are shown, a rain-soaked wall is featured in slow motion. The term "glen" is used to describe a hollow or narrow valley. "Har" is a term used in cricket to denote the number of wickets taken by a bowler. "Remora" is a type of fish that attaches itself to larger marine life. Gordon's remark about the "Great wall" while making fun of the calendar references to "fandango" while discussing the conduct of the case.

Gordon admits that he failed to follow through with the calendar. He discussed the conduct of the case by saying, "I think it's important to remember that the calendar is not a contract. It's just a guide."

On Frank's account, Gordon, the localizer, remains the same throughout the case. Frank, however, is described as a person who is not easy to please. He acknowledges that his opinion is that the calendar is not a contract, but it can be a guide. Frank however, is described as a person who is not easy to please.

Hill recognizes that the calendar is not a contract, and it's not just a guide, but also a tool. He mentions that it's important to remember that the calendar is not a contract. He also recognizes that the calendar is not a contract, but it can be a guide.

Gordon's comment about the "Great wall" while making fun of the calendar references to "fandango" while discussing the conduct of the case.

Franklin's central point is that the calendar is not a contract. It is a guide. Franklin's point is that the calendar is not a contract. It is a guide. Franklin's point is that the calendar is not a contract. It is a guide.

Friedlander's study points out that the calendar is not a contract. It is a guide. Friedlander's study points out that the calendar is not a contract. It is a guide. Friedlander's study points out that the calendar is not a contract. It is a guide.
9. Wilhelm Friedrich Nietzsche

Nietzsche, called the father of postmodernism or art criticism, was a German philosopher and writer who wrote in the late 19th century. His work is characterized by a philosophical approach to art, which he viewed as a means of expressing the highest form of human creativity.

Nietzsche believed that art is a form of self-expression and that it allows individuals to express their innermost thoughts and feelings. He argued that art is a form of communication that transcends language and goes beyond the limitations of logic and reason.

In his book "The Will to Power," Nietzsche explored the concept of the "will to power," which he believed to be the driving force behind all human action. He argued that the will to power is the ultimate expression of human creativity and that it is through art that individuals can best express this will.

Nietzsche's ideas have had a significant impact on philosophy, art, and culture, and his work continues to be studied and debated by scholars and thinkers around the world.
it) yet to select such a goal bearer it guarantees failure. The project becomes a mere means for the agent to prove her worthlessness or lack of merit. Such a state is no mere expression of "infinitesimal dependency." Rather, it is one manifestation of what Lieberson calls "a will to unfreedom or self-abnegation."166

If it really is possible for an agent to be so motivated, then she clearly cannot derive her infirmity in any eocrin sense. Nor could her goal be a separate second-order desire to experience existential desires for approval and success, because as we have seen, second-order desires must be indepen-
dent of the satisfaction or frustration of the first-order desires to which it refers. Sartre’s agent does not even want any second-order satisfaction in being regarded as inferior; ironically, her aim would be stymied if she were happy as a hy-pendant of attaining it.

Sartre imagines an existential ground for such a project that is perhaps intelligible: the agent is desperate enough to see infirmity as a viable way to be assure of some definite meaning in her life, some individual assertion, no matter what the cost in happiness. In addition, we might suggest as grounds for such a project that after years of neglect and abuse by others or the failure to develop ambitions she can currently pursue in good faith, the agent decides an self-hated that the only thing to which she can devote her whole self with all her volitional capacity is the denial of her value as a person and the designation of her agency—and here the act nothing! In this way, she will spurn those who destroyed her hopes or discouraged her, or she will punish herself for past failures.

If Kant is right, then the volitional capacity that the agent engages to will her own worthlessness also inevitably expresses its own inherent value in the very process of motivating her to strive for her perverse goal. This implies a kind of pragmatic contradiction in the existential project of infirm-
ity. For the ground or base for her projection is the importance of some meaning rather than none, or the value of individual expression via existen-
tial projection rather than pure passivity, and this seems to commit the agent to the inherent value of her own will. But the specific content of her goal is to deny this value.167 The will to infirmity is therefore self-
contradictory in the sense that violates the categorical imperative and it can also be regarded as a form of radical evil, or willed cruelty to persons. It is directed inwardly at the self rather than outwardly at others, as in the forms of radical evil I discussed in chapter 10.

Perhaps this kind of self-hated is often connected with a malaise will toward others; perhaps some agents who define themselves in terms of de-
spising others cannot believe themselves capable of more positive contributions or relationships. Since they do not believe themselves capable of

Conclusion

At this point, we have identified the objective status and actuality of values or practical reasons that can serve as grounds for projecting related ends. We have also identified some particular examples of such values or reasons serving as a basis for projective willingness: for example, in the good will to justice or duty and (oppositely) in the various forms of radical evil, willful
carelessness, and the will to infirmity. These are all states of the existential wanting with strong moral properties, ranging from moral virtue to extreme moral corruption. In between, however, there is a large range of projective endeavors that are morally neutral (in the narrow deontic sense), being morally permissible within limits required by justice, but which have broader ethical significance arising from nonmoral values to which they respond.

In chapter 8, I suggested that we find grounds for engaging in practices in aesthetic values, theoretical values of knowledge, and other social goods, while we find grounds for engaging in friendship in the values of individual

personalities and character on the basis of which we commit ourselves to friendships. In the next two chapters, I return to this question of broadly
ethical or non-deontic grounds for projective willing. We will see that the existential theory of willing requires not only a conception of the right but also a conception of the good.