A Global Federalist Paper: Consolidation Arguments and Transnational Government

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1. Introduction: Two Scenes of Globalism

Over seventeen years ago, President George H. W. Bush spoke hopefully of a “new world order” that would develop after the fall of the Berlin Wall: “A world where the United Nations, freed from cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders. A world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations.”

Tragically this hope has not been fulfilled. Instead, for many people today, the term “globalism” has come to mean a threat to domestic jobs by cheaper foreign competition, or the expansion of capital markets and the formation of ever-larger multinational corporations with growing power over the lives of people everywhere. For example, John Saul uses “globalism” to stand for the ideology that “global economic forces, if left unretarded by willful man,” will lead to a better life for all, with its corollary that the public good should be treated as a secondary outcome of trade and competition and self-interest. Saul recognizes this as the libertarian ideology found in neo-classical economics and discredited by monopolies and the Great Depression, now restated at the global level: it is simply a new way of presenting the fallacy that markets will spontaneously produce public goods that in fact can only be realized by government coordination. In some cases, this is because market imperfections lead to aggregate outcomes that are suboptimal relative to the satisfaction of subjective or consumer-revealed preferences. In others, the outcome requiring coordination through law is justified as important by way of collective ethical deliberation about values that are not fully registered in brute consumer preferences that are unresponsive to practical reasoning.

It is this free market form of globalization that progressive groups protest at meetings of the World Trade Organization, the G-8 Nations,
problems sapped loyalty to the central government on which common security clearly depended. Likewise, since Congress could not make a common tariff policy, states competed with each other by lowering tariffs for more advantageous trade positions.18

In sum, the weak confederal government found it difficult to get the states to abide by policies that would benefit most or all states collectively, if each would make the necessary sacrifices. The problem was that without the centralized power to assure compliance from all the states, the necessary sacrifices appeared too risky or costly to each state individually; thus adequate coordination among them was impossible. The confederation of southern states during the American civil war had similar problems in acting for their common good. Fortunately, they lacked sufficient unity and centralized power to win the war.

3. Consolidation Arguments, the Coordination Principle, and the Federalist Papers

Such collective action problems, as they are known in game theory, are central to the paradigm form of argument for the establishment of a higher level of government to exercise primary sovereignty or directly to represent the people in handling certain matters. While there may be other ways of arguing for a shift of powers to higher levels of government, this is the best known and historically most influential way of supporting such a conclusion. We can call this paradigm the consolidation argument, since its instances are all directed to justify formation of a federal government at a new level that will unify some of the sovereign powers to decide certain matters and enforce decisions that are presently distributed among independent institutions, each of which currently represents the collective sovereignty of its own members in these and other matters. Such arguments have the following structure, including two principles, the coordination principle and the democratic principle of legitimacy, that will be explained later:

(1) There are various important public goods that cannot be achieved in a stable or reliable way without coordination through law at a new level of government.
(2) The coordination principle
(3) The democratic principle of legitimacy
(4) There is strong prima facie reason to establish government at a new level as a means to the public goods at issue.

(5) There is strong prima facie reason to establish government at a new level and to make it democratically answerable to all the citizens of the pre-existing institutions or authorities out of which its enumerated powers are consolidated.

Here (1) is a factual premise and (2) and (3) are normative premises. (4) follows from (1) and (2), and (5) follows from (3) and (4). The conclusion is that a new federal government ought to exercise primary sovereignty over the matters it has to control to secure or promote the listed public goods; in these matters, it should directly represent the natural authority of a new people formed by a synthesis of the members of the pre-existing institutions. Such a unification is distinct from forming a treaty among the institutions that would derive its authority directly from them and at best indirectly from their members, and whose powers would depend entirely on their continual consent. This was the crucial difference to which James Madison referred in explaining that the new constitution proposed by the 1787 convention in Philadelphia would create "a government established ...by the people at large" as opposed to a confederative continually deriving its governing authority and executive powers from the state legislatures and state officers, as under the Articles.19

This schematic presentation is meant to describe the form of many possible arguments in which particular public goods, matters that must be governed to achieve the goods, and peoples whose authority is being consolidated to govern such matters are listed. Many arguments in The Federalist Papers are instances of this general form. For example, in Federalist No. 2, John Jay argues that not only common security but also individual liberties depend on a strong federal union.20 Jay adds in Federalist No. 3 that individual states are tempered so incostendencies and injustices to one another that a strong federal government can prevent. Similarly, treaties made by three or four regional American confederations would be liable to conflict and give foreign governments a pretext for war.21 By contrast, as he notes in Federalist No. 4, a federal government can harmonize the interests of the parts in a common foreign policy and "apply the resources and power of the whole to the defense of any particular part."22 Distant confederacies would be played off against one another by rival European powers, and each would have an incentive to contribute less than their necessary share to any collective continental defense.23 Already, Alexander Hamilton argues, the weakness of the Congress of Confederation has led to conflict and decline in credit.24 He also foresees that disputes over new territories west of the thirteen original states might lead to war among the states or multiple confederacies formed among them.25 These points support a new federal government.
because of the coordination principle, which comes closest to explicit formulation in Federalist No. 13:

'The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing Con- 
sideration is in the principle of legislation for states or govern-
ments, in their corporate or public capacities, as contradistin-
guished from the individuals of whom they consist... 
[T]he United States have an indefinite discretion to make requisitions
for men and money; but they have no authority to raise either
directly by regulations extending to the individual citizens of America. The 
consequence of this is that [their laws]...are mere recommendations
which the States observe or disregard at their option.' 22

Under the Articles, all enforcement and execution of federal law depended
on the local interests of each state, which could often benefit from for-
riding on others: "The greater deficiencies of some States furnished the
pretext of example and the temptation of interest to the complying, or to
the least deficient State." 23 Hamilton argues, such collective action
problems can only be overcome by consolidating the "characteristic dif-
ference between a league and a government" is direct authority over
individual citizens, or primary sovereignty. 24 This does not mean that all
state powers must be of the "general" level; many can remain at
the state level. But not "so confiner 'in each case [or level] a degree of power
commensurate to the end" or relevant public goods "would be to violate
the most obvious rules of prudence and propriety." 25 It is folly to trust our
national interests to a government too weak to secure them. 26 It is worth
noticing how the ideas of coordination and subsidiarity are stated together
here. For Hamilton, both follow from the hypothetical imperative that
"the means ought to be proportioned to the end" or "every power ought to be
commensurate with its object." 27 As John Marshall also argued in
defending the proposed constitution, it is absurd to make the governing
power less than adequate to its ends just because it might be abused. Since
any power wielded by human persons can be abused, this objection could
only be satisfied by the complete absence of any government. 28

4. Public Goods, Consolidation, and Subsidiarity

Let us consider the main elements of the consolidation argument para-
digm one by one. The first premise is primarily factual, though its first
clause may also involve value-judgments. It claims that there are certain
goods that are essentially public in the sense outlined above, which has

the following four features: first, something is a public good only if it is a
state of affairs that is desired by many or all of the relevant parties, or that
is objectively good for all or most of those parties; second, according to
empirical evidence and game theory, the public good is unlikely to be
consistently produced through competitive interaction of the parties who,
in each decision, select options by a strategic assessment of which best
directly serves their private interests or directly maximizes their desire-
satisfaction; third, the public good can only be achieved by collective
action of all or most relevant parties organized through binding public
law or policy made by the unified authority of a government representing
all the parties; fourth, the coordination secures the public good for all or
most of the relevant parties, where it will be jointly enjoyed by all or most
of the parties when it is achieved.

Public goods in this sense can have several different kinds of value.
Some, like reliable currency and public utilities, are instrumentally
essential to optimizing the satisfaction of common human preferences:
they are among those states of affairs that cannot be spontaneously
produced by market interactions but are instead necessary background
conditions for free markets to operate efficiently and reliably in producing
market goods. Other goods, such as protections from discrimination and
equal opportunity to apply for jobs, are parts of basic justice. Many
others, from parks to art, may be valuable in broadly equal senses
without being requirements of justice. The definition sketched above is
sufficient to specify different types of public good according to the level of
coordination they require. For example, a global public good is a good
that can only be achieved by some coordination through law, policy, or
sovereign power of nations or peoples in most or all regions of the world,
which in turn provides the public good to all of them. More generally, a
consolidation argument for centralizing primary sovereign powers in a
new level of government begins with the claim that there are important
public goods that require coordination through legal institutions able to
secure collective action at this level.

In this most general sense, even Hobbes's argument for moving from
a state of nature or anarchy to establish a government with a monopoly
on powers necessary to secure life and property rights can be recognized as
a consolidation argument for government at some level. Since Hobbes
constructs his argument from an imaginary situation in which all sover-
eign rights to rule or decide is retained at the level of each individual, it
appears that he is only arguing for a transfer from individuals to a natural
first level of government. But actually he presupposes families and small
units coordinated by charismatic clan-leaders. In historical context, he is
really trying to justify a strong national government in opposition to the
feats ruled by largely independent and feuding nobles loosely confederated within a weak kingdom, such as England under the Plantagenet kings. The collective action problems with this feudal system were different from the problems that American federalists recognized in their Continental Congress, but both arguments share the same general structure.

Using the above definitions, we can now explain how the first normal premise of consolidation arguments, which is the instrumental principle that guides level-transfers in sovereign power. The coordination principle can be put this way: if there are important public goods that can only be achieved by coordination through law, policy, or collective action with the force of law organized at a certain level of government, then this is a strong prima facie reason to give to governing institutions at that level primary sovereignty and enforcement powers over matters that have to be governed to achieve these public goods. The principle does not imply that this fact about the public goods is a sufficient reason for unifying within government at that level the powers relevant to the public goods that are presently distributed to individuals or to lower levels of government; for the costs of establishing such a new government at that level would also have to be considered in each case; there could also be other moral reasons against such a new government, despite its necessity for achieving the stated public goods. Non-consequentialist moral theories can reject any simple utility measure for comparing the relevant public goods against the costs of government necessary to secure the goods, or they may aim at certain thresholds in public goods rather than maximizing costs over benefits, or regard some public goods as objects of strict obligation that cannot be outweighed by collective utility, at least within certain limits.

Thus the coordination principle is compatible with a variety of strategic and moral considerations against the prima facie reasons it allows for new levels of government, and thus with a variety of ethical perspectives on what else should count beyond the public goods at stake. However, this level-transfer principle does imply that if objections are absent or weak, government at the new level should be established. Thus a consolidation argument is complete only with further steps to show that prima facie reasons against government at a new level are outweighed in comparison that may be holistic rather than just utility-summing.

Federalist proponents of the coordination principle also generally assume that there are few if any other relevant prima facie reasons for government: unification of powers in higher levels of government is not valuable for its own sake, for symbolic glory, or for private gain. Instead, the main reason for establishing any government are the public goods that cannot be realized without it. This is roughly the converse of the coordination principle: if there are no significant public goods that require coordination at a certain level, there are few if any prima facie reasons for establishing government at that level. Let us call this the public rationale principle. It might look like an inherently liberal norm requiring minimal government, but in fact it is compatible with communitarian conceptions that allow for thick ethical values achievable only by strong communal ties or group identities as key public goods. Liberal conceptions emerge only if we combine the public rationale principle with a non-communitarian conception of public goods.

Conjoining the coordination principle with its converse implies the more familiar principle of enumeration: the powers granted to any new level of government, or the matters over which it exercises primary sovereignty, should include all and only those powers that are necessary to achieve public goods that require universally enforceable rules or collective action of the relevant parties at this level. Powers not explicitly enumerated for government at the new level are not consolidated and thus by implication are retained at lower levels of government, or left to individual decision-making. In American history, this idea is expressed in the Tenth Amendment to the 1789 Constitution. Successive application of this enumeration principle to each level, from the autonomy of every individual to the highest order of government, implies that each matter or issue should be left to decision at the lowest level possible consistent with the coordination necessary for vital public goods. This is the principle of subsidiarity. Hence, the principles of coordination and public rationale undulate and explain this familiar idea in natural law: subsidiarity and consolidation are two sides of the same model of sovereignty.

When government at one level leaves direct sovereign authority over significant areas of public life and responsibility for various public goods to lower levels of government, we speak of government at the first level as "federal." This term implies that the lower levels of government do not simply derive their authority from a higher level of government, as an administrative bureau does; they retain primary sovereignty over all matters not consolidated in government at the federal level or left to lower levels. Thus arguments for robust local government based on the principle of subsidiarity and consolidation arguments for new federal levels of government are expressions of the same underlying principles, though this is ignored by extremists on both sides.

5. Democratic Legitimacy, Basic Rights, and Contemporary Applications

The rule of law and coordination through legal institutions are distinct from the democratic idea that legitimate legal orders must derive their
sovereignty from the consent of the governed. This is familiar doctrine. But it is not the whole story. The consent of the governed, to be valid, must be free and informed. Freedom of choice is meaningless if any choice at all is impossible. In practice, this means a measure of popular participation in government, a limit on the power of the government, and some provision for the enforcement of these limits. These are the essential features of popular sovereignty, and they are the means by which popular sovereignty can be enforced.

The concept of popular sovereignty is not only a political ideal, but also a legal principle. The doctrine of popular sovereignty is based on the idea that the government derives its power from the people. This idea is embodied in the Constitution of the United States, which provides that "the powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the government of the United States shall be derived from the people of the United States." The Constitution also provides that "the government of the United States shall be a government of popular sovereignty." This means that the government of the United States is limited by the will of the people, and that any action taken by the government must be consistent with the will of the people.

The idea of popular sovereignty is also reflected in the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution. The Bill of Rights provides that the government must respect the rights of the people, and that these rights cannot be violated by the government. This means that the government must respect the freedom of the people, and that the government must not interfere with the people's ability to express their opinions and to participate in the government.

In this way, popular sovereignty is the foundation of democratic government. It is the foundation on which the government of the United States is built. It is the foundation on which the people of the United States have built their government. And it is the foundation on which the people of the United States have built their society.
orders as given and then ask whether they meet conditions of justice for governing institutions of that kind; we must also ask whether requirements of justice together with other needed goods obligate us to create and maintain higher governing powers. Recent theories of political justice have not linked norms for judging the legitimacy of existing governing powers to principles for distributing authority over distinct levels of government — including levels that might not yet exist. Although the consolidation argument is merely a rigorous reconstruction of familiar federalist ideas, it provides a Missing diachronic link needed to show that contemporary conceptions of justice and other public goods already imply a transfer of significant sovereign authority and powers to stronger transnational institutions.

Specifically, an argument for consolidating some of the powers of existing nation-states into a transnational federation has three main parts.

First, we defend the democratic principle of legitimacy against objections that it is not applicable at the global level. Second, we argue that there are important public goods involving both moral values and the mutual interests of many or all nations that cannot be achieved either by the spontaneous interaction of states pursuing their national interests, by our current international organizations, or by proliferating non-governmental organizations. Third, we show that the steps necessary to establish a federation capable of providing these goods are feasible and worth the costs. Then, given the coordination principle as uncontroversial, it follows that the envisioned federation should be formed. In the subsequent sections, the focus will be on the second of these three steps.


There are a number of goods that are widely recognized as public goods which probably cannot be achieved without global or at least broad transnational cooperation. These include: (1) security from foreign invasion; (2) protection of lives and property from rogue regimes, from terrorist groups inspired by religious ideologies, and from other bullies; (3) recognition and establishment of fundamental human rights, including equal rights to life and bodily privacy; equal basic liberties of conscience, religion, speech, association, movement and employment; and freedom from war crimes, genocide, ethnic cleansing, torture, and other crimes against humanity; (4) the development and stability of the world’s economy and financial systems, including creation of a global currency and a regulatory regime capable of setting world interest rates and preventing global credit crises and other cascading economic failures; (5) the establishment of trade agreements that promote economic expansion and opportunity for developing nations without compromising environmental standards, worker safety, and labor rights; (6) alleviation of dire poverty in third-world nations in ways consistent with moral justice, such as through infrastructure growth, universal education, debt forgiveness, and stability in global commodities markets; coordinated assistance in natural disasters; (7) setting and enforcing immigration laws to regulate the movement of people between states and protect rights of asylum without overburdening particular nations; better systems for placement of new immigrants to avoid high concentrations leading to poverty; (8) the ability of national governments to levy fair and effective individual and corporate income taxes, which is threatened by small nations that specialize in tax havens; (9) setting sustainable usage limits on the world’s environmental resources, such as arable land, topsoil, non-renewable energy sources, minerals, and clean air; sharing the costs of rainforests and their associated biodiversity; stabilizing global temperatures and sea levels to prevent or reduce massive climate change. Each item on this list requires articulation and defense, but they overlap substantially with goods suggested by others. For example, World Bank scholar J. F. Rischard has offered a list of twenty "inherently global" issues that are "indissoluble from a framework of collective global action involving all nations of the world." He recognizes that these goods will not be spontaneously produced by the invisible hand of free markets and lie outside the bureaucratic control of single nation-states. 45 Rischard’s list includes more details on environmental goods, world prevention of global infectious diseases and the need for worldwide biotechnology rules, yet he conspicuously leaves out enforcement of basic human rights. Perhaps this is because he assumes that "we cannot have global government" and does not consider a federation of democracies as a viable alternative. 46

To make an initial case for such a federation, we can focus on the first three categories of public goods on the list here, since these are the most fundamental to any decent life in the twenty-first century. While the first and second are instrumental goods for almost everyone, from a prudential perspective, the third is arguably the central component of political justice and it includes rights to the protections mentioned in the first and second categories. Human rights standards differ to some extent according to the moral theory on which they are based, but at least a
minimal set of universal rights is arguably implicit in international law and also in widely accepted just-war principles that are partially reflected in existing international conventions.43

Presumably, political justice also includes goods concerning economic inequalities, but such goods are more controversial, since we cannot as

ses inequities arising from the market without first defining substantive norms of distributive justice. Yet the inequities often pale in comparison to injustices directly imposed by tyrants, dictators, warlords, and corrupt bureaucracies on segments of their own population. As we have seen in Burma, Somalia, Liberia, the Congo, Zimbabwe, and North Korea, tyranny, kleptocracy, and civil war among tribal militias are killing causes of third world poverty.44 For these reasons, the case for a new federation should be made on the basis of categories (1), (2), and (3) before expanding the argument to include the need for global federation to promote elements of global economic justice or environmental goods, though both are vital to our collective future. Yet a brief examination will show why our current institutions are insufficient even to secure goods in the first and second categories.

7. The Security of Borders

Our current world order, which is often called the “Westphalian model,” grossly fails to achieve most of the public goods listed above.45 The “inter-state” system, as Fred Dallmayr dub it, does not secure us from terrorist threats or deter and prevent crimes against humanity because it was only designed to secure borders from territorial aggression by other states.46 Dating from the rise of the modern nation state codified in the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia and reorganized following World War II under the umbrella of the United Nations, our world system is a loose noder linked by international agreements, of which the Declaration of Universal Human Rights is the most prominent. This was not because ideal conceptions of global justice went no further in 1954: the importance of the basic human rights was already recognized in the Nuremberg trials and prior international conventions against war crime, and in principle in the Declaration. The United Nations was so limited in its main goal for reasons of pure realism: during the Cold War, there was ample reason to settle for lesser modus vivendi relationship on the governments of the states, the principle of non-interference.

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In real political terms, the key precepts of the United Nations system since its founding have been the following: First, in order to secure peaceful coexistence, to avoid a devastating third world war, and to promote global trade and commerce, every national government will accept the unlimited right of every other to control its own internal affairs as long as it does not act aggressively against other sovereign states. Second, each de facto state retains all primary sovereignty over the life, liberty, and welfare of its own residents and the disposition of its natural resources, as long as it refrains from attacks on other states or expansionist policies, whether or not its government is democratic, or grants equal basic liberties, or demonstrates genuine concern for the common good of its citizens, or destroys its natural environment. Third, the United Nations and its governing Security Council have no primary sovereignty derived directly from the citizens of member nations; they act solely as proxies for de facto sovereign national governments, not as guardians of the interests of their citizens or judges of claims by individuals or sub-national groups. Fourth, the central purpose and raison d’être of the United Nations and its Security Council is to stabilize peace among nations of many different cultures, to secure their existing borders by detering aggression, and when feasible, to restore their status quo ante borders in response to invasion by regimes breaking the peace. Fifth, any national government, however tyrannical or unjust it may be to its own people, can be accepted as a member of the United Nations, if it pledges to refrain from foreign aggression. Even governments that systematically violate the most basic human rights of their residents can be members of the Security Council, and can have votes if their actual military and political powers are so significant that they must be party to international agreements to prevent wars.

In sum, this framework was designed to promote only the first global public goods, which is peace in the thin sense of security from war. It was not designed to promote the second global public goods, of the welfare and freedom from want. It was not designed to promote the third global public goods, of the welfare and freedom from want. It was not designed to promote the third global public goods, of the welfare and freedom from want. It was not designed to promote the third global public goods, of the welfare and freedom from want.
The threatening policy would unravel what little coordinating power remains within the United States framework today. Moreover, American interests in major global public goods and matters support from other nations is not enough to fill the vacuum. But a global solution to this transnational problem requires a more comprehensive, coordinated, and durable approach that involves a broader range of actors, including non-governmental organizations, international institutions, and regional organizations. A comprehensive strategy should also address the underlying causes of instability and violence, such as poverty, inequality, and access to resources. A global framework could provide a platform for dialogue and cooperation between countries and regions, while also ensuring that the benefits of peace and security are distributed equitably.
5. Rights of the United Nations to a Federation of Democracies

These reflections suggest that security and human rights are not necessarily irreconcilable global public goods. But, if the United Nations has been effective in ensuring the protection of human rights, is it necessarily a forum where the protection of human rights takes precedence over security interests? The answer to this question is not straightforward. While it is true that the United Nations has a mandate to promote human rights, it is also true that the United Nations has a mandate to maintain international peace and security.

6. Conclusion

The protection of human rights and security are not necessarily incompatible goals. While there are challenges in ensuring that the protection of human rights is a priority in the United Nations, there is also a need to ensure that the maintenance of international peace and security is not at the expense of human rights.

7. References

sovereignty. That consensus is now possible among almost all the powerful nations in the world, and potentially most of the less powerful ones as well. Thus, the prudential reasons that in 1945 forced us to settle for such a non-ideal global framework are fast disappearing.

Any plausible version of the democratic principle of legitimacy suggests the same membership criteria: a federation of nations could not secure borders, halt guerrilla terrorism, or enforce basic rights without significant consolidated powers, and such powers could not in turn be legitimate unless they were widely derived from the ongoing rational support of citizens in all the member nations. But this is possible only through the mediation of democratic member nations: a decent non-democratic regime that avoids civil war could not allow its citizens free debate about issues to be decided by the transnational federation and free voting among multi-party candidates to represent them in the federation, while denying such political liberties with regard to its national government. Thus, the federation would have to limit full membership to democratic nations that respect rights to popular sovereignty along with other basic rights. Non-democratic nations could be considered for associate membership depending on their respect for liberties more basic than democratic rights, giving them a voice in the federation without full voting rights concerning humanitarian interventions or enforced settlements of armed conflict.

Clearly, to alter the current Security Council this radically would be far beyond anything politically feasible in the amendment process of the United Nations Charter. Amendments require a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of the member nations, including all permanent members of the Security Council. There is no foreseeable scenario in which two-thirds of nations, including China, would interpret the current Security Council in favor of a federation limited to democracies with consolidated powers; the very problems that dog the United Nations system will also prevent any sufficient restructuring from within its legal system.

In any case, the changes implied by the consolidation argument are too fundamental to depart from the existing framework to be offered as a mere amendment. Like those met in Philadelphia, a world convention called to make radical revisions to the United Nations today could only meet the world's needs if it proposed much more than amendments, abandoning the Charter for a global federation of democracies that could really enforce fundamental human rights, deter atrocities, and prevent humanitarian catastrophes, while also exercising such powers with democratic legitimacy. Rather than try to move through a legal amendment process, it would be more honest and effective to act in revolutionary fashion and scrap the Security Council to form a federation from an initial set of member states that would include free peoples from all inhabited continents, which would build the federation by setting standards for admitting new states.

A full development of this proposal would have to meet several objections concerning the feasibility of such democratic federation, its likely costs, and the different statuses that could be assigned to states that refused to join it. It would also have to critique in more detail alternative proposals to meet our global needs, including the comfortable illusion so common in Europe that the United Nations framework can still make visible with a little touching up. However, it is clear that the proposed federation differs starkly from both American unilateralism and the United Nations process, which are so often dichotomously posed as if they were the only accessible options. This insufficiency considered alternative demonstrates the relevance of the consolidation argument as a principled way of approaching questions of global governance: when coupled with sufficiently robust conceptions of global public goods and a realistic assessment of evident coordination problems, it points us toward better alternatives that have yet to receive any significant discussion in wider popular fora and political debates.

Notes
3. Ibid., p. 37.
6. For a similar list with further environmental and public health issues, see J. S. Richardson, High Noon: 20 Global Problems and 20 Years to Solve Them (New York: Basic Books, 2002), p. 66.